On unregulated markets and the freedom of media the transition of the East German press after 1989 by Troger, Mandy D.
ON UNREGULATED MARKETS AND THE FREEDOM OF MEDIA
THE TRANSITION OF THE EAST GERMAN PRESS AFTER 1989
BY
MANDY D. TRÖGER 
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Communications
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2018
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Emeritus John Nerone, Chair
Professor Robert McChesney
Professor Emeritus Dan Schiller
Professor Inger Stole
ABSTRACT 
This thesis fills a gap in research, literature and our understanding of transitioning media in post-
socialist countries. It tells the fascinating and complicated story of a press moving from state 
control to a Western free press model. The focus lies on the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 until after German unification in 
October 1990. It is a story untold in English-language literature, and it is a largely ignored part in
contemporary German media history. Being written for an international readership while 
engaging largely with a unique moment in German and international media history, this thesis 
bridges a gap between national, continental and academic disciplines. Its primary question is in 
how far the democratic potential that existed in the moment of revolutionary change in 
1989/1990 found its institutional and/or political manifestation in the post-socialist East German 
press. Contrary to current research, it answers this question by approaching it from the 
perspective of an expanding Western democratic, and market economic order. It is, thus, not 
concerned with case studies or one press-related sector but looks at structural change on various 
levels; its focus lies on the simultaneous battles fought over a free press. Core concern is the 
intersection between the normative role the press holds in a democratic society and that of a 
newly developing, or rather established expanding Western market economy. 
This thesis analyzes three press-related sectors within a transitioning political setting: 
first, the opening of the GDR to (and sale of) West German print media; second, the reform and 
building of distribution infrastructures, and, third, emerging East-West joint ventures and 
subsequent changing newspaper ownerships. While closely interlinked, reforming distribution 
became the point of conflict over which issues of a “free press” were being debated. This thesis 
shows that nothing that happened in the GDR before, during and after the transition happened in 
isolation nor was it an exclusively East German problem. Instead, East Germany became the 
battle ground for various interests groups, East and West, but with clear and all-overshadowing 
interests of West German political and economic groups. These groups generally expanded and 
continued their long-established interests and disputes onto the newly opened political arena and 
economic market. Aiming for power at different levels, all had an interest in influencing media 
and its policies to their own advantage or, by simply circumventing them, created situations on 
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“No one had expected that after the end of command journalism
in the GDR, the structure of the press market … would copy
[former] SED demarcations – of course, not for political but for
economic reasons.”
Walter Mahle, Pressemarkt Ost, 19921
On May 8, 1990, the theologist and newly elected East German Media Minister Gottfried 
Müller sat down to write in his minister's diary. With a sense of satisfaction he noted, the four major 
West German publishing houses Heinrich Bauer (Hamburg), Axel Springer (Berlin), Gruner+Jahr 
(Hamburg), and Burda (Offenburg) had just experienced a “slap in the face.”2 Representatives of the 
“Big Four,” joined by a representative of the Association of (West) German Magazine Publishers, had 
once again met at the Ministry of Media Policy (Ministerium für Medienpolitik, MfM) to lobby for 
their country-wide press distribution system in a still sovereign German Democratic Republic (GDR). 
Just when the meeting was about to start, however, they were handed the “Resolution on Press 
Distribution” that had been passed a few days earlier and had been made public just hours before. After
having carefully studied the document, the publishers were in outrage. While the Springer 
representative spoke of a “massive infringement of press freedom,” others doubted that the resolution 
was at all democratic, and all jointly threatened to stop investments and to leave the GDR at once (see 
Chapter 5).3 Why? 
The Berlin Wall had fallen six months earlier, on November 9, 1989, and the Socialist Unity 
Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland, SED) had lost its power. The first free elections on 
March 18, 1990, had brought a new (conservative) government and its newly created Media Ministry 
was to ensure a “cultivated transition to media freedom” in the GDR.4 In early March, however, Bauer, 
Springer, Gruner+Jahr, and Burda had independently divided the territory of the GDR among each 
1 “Denn niemand hatte nach dem Ende des Kommandojournalismus der DDR erwartet, daß die Gliederung des 
Pressemarkts … den Grenzziehungen der SED nachgebildet sein würde – natürlich nicht aus politischen Gründen, 
sondern aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen.” Mahle, Walter A. (ed.), Pressemarkt Ost, Nationale und internationale 
Perspektiven, Munich: Ölschläger 1992, p. 13.
2 “die Folgen des Eindringens in die Grauzone DDR.” “Ohrfeige …  Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), 
May 8, 1990, sent to author on January 12, 2017.
3 “massiven Eingriff in die Pressefreiheit.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, 
pp. 3-4, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
4 “kultivierten Übergang in die Medienfreiheit … durch die Hintertür die Medien [zu] beherrschen.” Cited in “Anwalt der 
Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt,” Jens Brüning, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4/27/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
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other. They had started to build their own press distribution infrastructures and began distributing and 
selling largely their own publications. Though Müller generally aimed for a small government in media
matters, he now made clear that this single-handed act of the publishers endangered universal equal 
market opportunities, which made necessary state regulations. During the meeting on May 8, Müller 
made clear that by having built their own, exclusive distribution system, the publishers “had 
consciously pushed into a grey zone, a legal vacuum. It seemed,” he continued, “that after the fall of 
the 'real existing socialism,' [the publishers] wanted to demonstrate 'real existing capitalism'.”5 A 
developing free press in the GDR, Müller added, could further be suffocated by an overflow of Western
print media, and he pointed to “dubious forms of cross-border production by naming a place of 
production in the GDR even though production itself took place in the Federal Republic.”6 All of these 
market methods had far reaching consequences for a transitioning domestic press that was 
disadvantaged on many levels. “The resolution,” Müller concluded, “is not directed against but is to 
secure press freedom” [emphases added].7 
The Big Four were not amused. During the previous months, they had put considerable efforts 
into importing publications into the GDR and by now, had made significant investments into 
distribution infrastructures. Not only had they started operations “from scratch,” but with a 70 percent 
market share in the newspaper and magazine sector of the Federal Republic, they had successfully 
established a similar percentage in the sale of West German print media in the East.8 If the resolution 
was to be applied, months of negotiations and work, it seemed, had been for nothing. Gottfried Müller, 
on the other hand, like most other officials of the new government, had taken over office just weeks 
earlier. The former chief editor of the church paper Heimat und Glaube had little idea of prior 
negotiations and no experience in media policy. 
What he did see, however, were the massive problems faced by his ministry. In his minister's 
diary, he outlined the most pressing issues: “Postal [press] Distribution is failing” (April 23), which 
5 “bewußt in eine Grauzone, in rechtsfreie Räume, vorgestoßen seien … Man habe hier nach dem Scheitern des real 
existierenden Sozialismus wohl den real existierenden Kapitalismus demonstrieren wollen.” Man habe hier Internal 
note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, p. 2, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was 
handed over to the author).  
6 “zweifelhafte Formen einer grenzüberschreitenden Produktion, wobei ein Herstellungsort in der DDR genannt wird, 
obwohl die wirkliche Produktion in der Bundesrepublik erfolgt.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-
Verlagen, May 8, 1990, p. 2, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed over to the author).  
7 “Die Verordnung richtet sich nicht gegen, sondern schützt die Pressefreiheit.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein 
Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, p. 4, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed over to the author).  
8 “Start aus dem Nichts,” Springer Aktuell, No. 1, March 1990, p. 12, Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE; Deutsche 
Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 2, 
BArch DC9/1050.
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made necessary fast and effective actions of the government (April 16/May 23) while the position of 
the MfM was going to be a difficult one (April 11) in that it would need to explain its role to various 
interest groups and would very likely face constant criticism (April 27/May 10).9 Most importantly, 
two days before taking office, Müller noted that after having studied the current situation, it was clear 
that the issues of the press were first and foremost economic ones. This related in particular to the “cut-
throat and destructive competition of West German Grossisten [press distributors].”10 Unfortunate for 
Müller and the MfM: both entered the scene months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a time during 
which various interests groups had already begun exploring new territories and markets. They had 
created a situation on the ground that required and allowed for corrective measures only. Müller added 
in retrospect, “above all, everything had to go very, very, very fast.”11 
This thesis tells the story of this “very, very fast” transition by looking at multiple levels of the 
structural transition process in the press sector. Grounded in historical methods and based on the 
theoretical foundation of a critical political economy of media and communication, this thesis works at 
the intersection of what political scientists call “institution transfer” and what economists might call a 
“natural experiment.” While the former looks at the expansion and subsequent takeover and/or 
rejection of West German institutions and norms in East Germany, the latter might view this thesis as a 
case study of a unique historical moment in time providing empirical evidence of what happens in an 
emerging unregulated market.12 The primary question of this thesis, however, is normative. It asks to 
what extent the democratic potential that existed in the moment of revolutionary change in 1989/1990 
found its institutional manifestation in the post-socialist East German press. It answers this question by 
approaching it from the perspective of an expanding democratic and market economic order. Contrary 
to current research, this thesis, therefore, is not concerned with biographies, specific case studies or the 
developments in individual press-related sectors. Instead, it provides insights into the complexity of 
structural shifts and their underlying dynamics in different sectors, and the simultaneous battles fought 
9 “der PZV versagt.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), sent to author on January 12, 2016.
10 “Verdrängungs- und Vernichtungswettbewerb der Westgrossisten.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), 
sent to author on January 12, 2016.
11 “vor allem musste alles ganz schnell, schnell, schnell gehen.” Personal communication with author, Gottfried Müller, 
Email, January 19, 2017.
12 Note: “A natural experiment occurs when some feature of the real world is randomly changed in a way that allows using
the exogenous variation due to this change in order to study causal effects of an otherwise endogenous explanatory 
variable.” See Sauter, Wolf Nicolas, “Essays on Natural Experiments in Behavioral Finance and Trade, dissertation.” 
PhD Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich, 2009, p. 3. For definition and discussion of institution 
transfer see: Seibel, Wolfgang, “Erfolgreich gescheiteter Insitutionentransfer.” Transformation der politisch-
administrativen Strukturen in Ostdeutschland, edited by Wollmann, Hellmut et al. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 473-
494, 1997, p. 476. Bogumi, Jorg, and Werner Jann, “Transformation der Verwaltung.” Verwaltung und 
Verwaltungswissenschaft in Deutschland, 2nd ed., Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 261-262, 2009.
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over a free press. It, thereby, fills a gap in research, literature, and our understanding of the transition of
media and the development of media markets in transitioning countries. Since the GDR only set the 
precedent for a broader Eastern expansion of a Western political-economic order, this study provides 
detailed insights into the workings of such expansion. Placed in the international context of market 
liberalization pushed by Reagan/Thatcher neoliberalism, it documents the consequences of cross-
border media marketization and production for democratic media reform in post-socialist countries.
It does so by focusing on the time period, as the East German paper Junge Welt put it, between 
the “old muzzle” of political censorship falling off and new market structures setting in.13 Gazing into 
this short but fast-changing time period reveals condensed struggles over all matters of a free, 
democratic media and press: arguments over the role and rights of the state and industries, debates over
the role and rights of journalists and citizens, and the definition of a “free press” itself. These stories are 
untold in English-language literature, and they are largely ignored in contemporary German-language 
media history. 
Journalist Joachim Nolte, who spent these months of transition at the documenting division of 
the MfM, compiled a chronological overview of the changing press landscape between Fall 1989 and 
Fall 1990.14 He described three transitional stages: First, the time of departure (Aufbruch) and 
awakening defined by an atmosphere of optimism and liberation from state patronage closely 
interlinked with damage control of an old system in despair. Second, the phase of political and 
structural reshaping. Here, new publishers and publications were being founded, and democratic 
structures in journalism were being debated. Third, the market penetration of West German companies 
that brought along the transformation of the press to a market economic system. Along came the fight 
for existence of East German publishers, and the beginning of a restructuring process of the media 
according to federal principles.15 
The first phase roughly started with the precipitating events around the fortieth anniversary of 
the GDR, the second began in November/December 1989, and the beginning of the third, Nolte defines
by a specific date: April 1, 1990, the day press subsidies for East German publications ceased to exist. 
Not only did newspapers drastically increase their prices, but they also introduced advertising as a 
13 “alte Maulkorb.” Pressefreiheit adé, Frank Schumann, Junge Welt, May12, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07754. 
14 Personal communication, Joachim Nolte, Email, February 26, 2018. Nolte, Joachim, “Oktober 1989 bis Oktober 1990. 
Ausgewählt und kommentiert von Joachim Nolte,” in Claus, Werner (ed.), Medien-Wende, Wende-Medien? 
Dokumentation des Wandels im DDR-Journalismus, Oktober '89-Oktober '90, Berlin: Vistas, pp. 17-116, 1991.
15 Nolte, Joachim, “Oktober 1989 bis Oktober 1990. Ausgewählt und kommentiert von Joachim Nolte,” in Claus, Werner 
(ed.), Medien-Wende, Wende-Medien? Dokumentation des Wandels im DDR-Journalismus, Oktober '89-Oktober '90, 
Berlin: Vistas, pp. 17-116, 1991, p. 19.
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revenue stream while still working within old structures of centralized resource allocation.16 At the 
same time, as the West German business paper Handelsblatt put it, they needed to compete with a 
“flood of West German publications [that] after the opening of the border” likewise aimed to capture 
market positions at East German newsstands.17 While none of these phases were clearly separable, and 
were defined by breaks and turmoils, it is legitimate to claim that the press was never to be as free as in
its immediate transitioning period (stage two), breaking free from a former party monopoly over 
information and still free of future market demands. 
This thesis gives insights into the initial concepts, negotiations and lobbying strategies that 
allowed West German firms to not simply adapt better to shifting playing fields but to, in fact, become 
major agents that largely defined these shifts. In particular early market pressures exercised by major 
but also smaller West German publishing houses influenced media policies and reform initiatives in the
GDR early on. And while East German institutions, in particular those consisting of reform- and civic 
groups that had initiated the democratic movement in the GDR, pushed for their visions of reform from
within, they had little to counteract these early political influences and market interests. Both were 
fostered by an “increasingly faster pace to unify both German states,” which was largely based on the 
“stimulating effects” of the Deutschmark pushed by the federal government (see Chapter 3).18 
However, just as there was not one cohesive interest of East German publishers and/or 
institutions, there was also not one political or economic West German agenda. Rather, various interest 
groups in East and West Germany (ministries, publishers, associations, and parties etc.) had their own 
interests at stake and struggled for power on various levels. More successful and overshadowing, 
however, were those pushing from the West to the East. East German media policies largely reacted to 
situations on the ground partly by adopting West German legislative measures. These regulative 
attempts were generally ineffective and German unification itself became a regulatory act that put back 
in check the actions of West German publishers to comply with federal practices. But since 
ineffectiveness does not equal irrelevance, a closer look at the dynamics of domestic reforms and their 
early succumbing to Western influences are just as revealing as the analysis of the latter. This is 
because discussions on issues of labor as on the definition of “free media” bring to the fore alternative 
16 Nolte, Joachim, “Oktober 1989 bis Oktober 1990. Ausgewählt und kommentiert von Joachim Nolte,” in Claus, Werner 
(ed.), Medien-Wende, Wende-Medien? Dokumentation des Wandels im DDR-Journalismus, Oktober '89-Oktober '90, 
Berlin: Vistas, pp. 17-116, 1991, p. 20.
17 “nach der Öffnung der Grenze eine Flut von Titel.” Die Post und private Grosso-Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am 
Lesermarkt bieten, Handelsblatt, p.8, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07777.
18 “immer schneller werdende Tempo der Vereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten.” Protocol, “Protokoll über die 
Beratung der Arbeitsgruppe 'Grundsatzfragen' der Gesetzgebungskommission 'Mediengesetz' im Ministerium für 
Medienpolitik am 26. Juli 1990,” p. 3, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
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visions of what might have been but subsequently gave way to expanding vested Western interests.
It is important to recognized, however, that also West German interest groups, even those with 
similar agendas in one aspect, did not necessarily follow a consistent line of cooperation. For instance, 
while the “Big Four” temporarily and selectively joined efforts for matters of distribution (see Chapter 
5), they simultaneously started a fierce dumping price competition on the newly opened Eastern market
(see Chapter 4) and fought rigorously over the re-distribution of ownership shares of East German 
publishers (see Chapter 6). It was, as the East German TV guide FF dabei wrote in a letter to its 
readers, a “rampant fight between media corporations, in which neither East nor West German law 
applies.”19 In particular the issue of distribution, however, was, as the Berliner Zeitung put it, the “key 
issue for the future structuring of the market in the GDR.”20 Therein lay the root for questions of import
and sales, and, subsequently, ownership changes. 
The head of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren, BMI), Erich 
Schaible, held a different view. During a meeting on the issue of distribution in the GDR on February 
14, 1990, he made clear that contrary to current East German rhetoric, one needed to distinguish 
between “the direct, uncontrolled import of print media into the GDR and their respective logistics.”21 
Both were separate issues and needed to be approached as such. Schaible spoke out of the federal 
context, within which their institutionalization had been set for decades. His statement with reference to
the GDR, however, not only showed an insufficient understanding of the workings of a planned press 
economy, within which matters of media production, import and distribution were economically 
interdependent, but also a (willful?) disregard for the West German market interests at work in it. And 
here, distribution was the key.
Already by February 14, 1990, the growing “legal vacuum” of a media landscape in transition 
was being filled increasingly by the joined market interests of major West German publishing houses; 
they, as the West German union magazine Publizistik und Kunst pointed out, “take advantage of the 
circumstance that currently there exists no particularly efficient distribution system [in the GDR].”22 
19 “zügelloser Kampf der Medienkonzerne, bei dem weder Ost- noch Westgesetze gelten.” Mit dem Fuß in der Tür, Alfred 
Wagner, FF dabei, 5/22/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08036.
20 Full quote: “Kernfrage für die künftige Gestaltung der Verhältnisse aus dem Medienmarkt ist das Vertriebssystem.” 
Neue Vertriebsverordnung wirkt auch keine Wunder, K. Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
File 35a-b, DSC07780. 
21 “der unmittelbaren, unkontrollierten Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen in die DDR und der danach dort zu erbringenden 
Logistik.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema 
Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
22 “Zunutze machen sich die BRD-Verlage den Umstand, daß in der DDR bisher kein sonderlich leistungsfähiges 
Vertriebssystem existiert.” Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, 
p.52, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07921. 
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These insufficient infrastructures initially endangered the import and sale of West German publications
in the GDR, and West German major publishers aimed at closing potential market obstacles. Further, 
with an estimated total annual revenue of about 1 billion DM in distribution, looming profits were 
high.23 Other effects, however, were immediate: the success of about one million sold copies of 
Springer's Bild in the GDR by June 1990, for instance, would not have been possible without the 
respective distribution infrastructures. It required the latter to allow for sales, and along with the 
distribution concepts of the major publishers came initiatives for sales, marketing and joint ventures. 
They were based on common federal practices, interests and market logic. Schaible's statement, 
therefore, only exemplified a more general self-righteous approach of the BMI towards press matters in
the GDR, potentially because of its own close relations to the major publishing houses (see Chapters 4, 
5 and 6). 
Closer to the historic reality of a transitioning press in the GDR was a declaration drafted by the
newly created, reformist Media Control Council (Medienkontrollrat, MKR) on March 28, 1990. 
Underlining that the media situation “in our country has changed drastically” and that current 
legislation offered “barely a basis for solutions,” the MKR urged the East German government to step 
in and close legislative loopholes.24 This referred, first, to the massive sale of West German print media
in the GDR und the “extremely uneven competitive chances between West German major publishers 
and the domestic press.”25 Second, it pointed to issues of press distribution, and, third, it urged for 
“[e]economic and legal regulations over ownership changes of newspapers and magazines to safeguard 
the independence of the press and to prevent a too great concentration of capital and market 
dominance.”26 The MKR, thereby, drew a close relation between all three press-related sectors, and 
underlined that they were mutually dependent if the goal was to establish a free, independent press in 
the GDR. Following these political developments and market shifts, Joachim Nolte, in his chronology 
23 Stern und Geo für Suhl und Gera. Vier westdeutsche Verlage wollen ein Vertriebssystem in der DDR aufbauen, Andreas
Kühner, Horizont, January 26, 1990, attachment V to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, 
Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
24 Full quote: “unseres Landes [hat sich] drastisch verändert. Dabei sind eine Reihe von Problemen entstanden, auf die 
unsere Gesellschaft nicht vorbereitet war … kaum eine Grundlage, die entstandenen Probleme zu losen.” Draft, Entwurf 
- Erklärung des Medienkontrollrates an die Regierung, Berlin, March 28, 1990, p. 1, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 
– Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30; also in Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-
Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
25 “extrem ungleichen Wettbewerbschancen zwischen westdeutschen Grossanbietern und der einheimischen Presse.” Draft,
Entwurf - Erklärung des Medienkontrollrates an die Regierung, Berlin, March 28, 1990, p. 2, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
26 “Wirtschaftliche und rechtliche Kontrolle der Eigentumsveränderungen bei Zeitungen und Zeitschriften zur Wahrung 
der Eigenständigkeit der Presse und Verhinderung zu großer Kapitalkonzentration and Marktbeherrschung.” Draft, 
Entwurf - Erklärung des Medienkontrollrates an die Regierung, Berlin, March 28, 1990, pp. 2-3, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
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of the transformation of the press, documented their outcome; he claimed that it was for future 
historians to make out the closer and more complex developments behind subsequent events and 
policies.27 This thesis takes up this challenge.
It does so by looking at all three interrelated sectors of an emerging press market within a 
transitioning political setting. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the literature, theoretical frame, methods, 
and sources. Chapter 3 provides the historical context of German-German relations during the 
transition period in general and introduces the main policy institutions and actors of a transitioning 
media in particular. Chapter 4 documents the fast increase of West German print media in the GDR. It 
analyzes different market strategies employed by West German publishers to secure a future 
readership, and it shows the different interests and strategies of East German publishers and institutions
to deal with the changing market situation. Chapter 5 is the central chapter of this thesis. It tells the 
complicated story behind what the trade journal kressreport called the “secret diplomacy of the four 
major publishers …. with the Postal Ministry of the GDR over the building of a functioning press 
distribution system in the GDR – a pact of a state monopoly with big business.”28 This chapter gives 
insights into the various and competing interests of East and West German interest groups involved in 
it and holds that a focus on the “Big Four” alone is a too narrow frame to sufficiently understand 
developments on the ground. Chapter 6 then moves to early cooperation and joint venture agreements 
between East and West German publishers, and the eventual “wave of mergers … so massive, yet 
unparalleled in international media history.”29 Eventually administered by the East German trust agency
Treuhandgesellschaft, the subsequent “massive buy-out” of East German publishers was the third 
cornerstone of a complex accession process preceded by an appropriation through market interests on 
various levels.30 
 The spectrum of problems documented and analyzed in this thesis, namely the transition of the 
press, represents only a fraction of larger transitional shifts, similar pressures and interests that affected 
27 Full quote: “Die Chronik ... muss es zunächst dem Leser, bzw. einer späteren wissenschaftlichen Aufarbeitung 
überlassen, sich daraus ein Gesamtbild zu formen.” Nolte, Joachim, “Oktober 1989 bis Oktober 1990. Ausgewählt und 
kommentiert von Joachim Nolte,” in Claus, Werner (ed.), Medien-Wende, Wende-Medien? Dokumentation des Wandels 
im DDR-Journalismus, Oktober '89-Oktober '90, Berlin: Vistas, 1991, pp. 17-116, p. 20.
28 “die Geheimdiplomatie der vier Großverlage … mit dem DDR-Postministerium zum Zwecke des Aufbaus einer 
funktionierenden Pressevertriebssystems in der DDR – ein Pakt des Staatsmonopols mit dem Großkapital.” Alles ohne 
Gewähr, kress report, no.3, February 1, 1990, p. 2, attachment III to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an 
Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34 (see Chapter 6).
29 “Die Konzentrationswelle rollt in so gewaltiger Form, wie dies in der internationalen Mediengeschichte bisher einmalig 
ist.” Wolfgang Mayer, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, p.53, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07921. 
30 Full quote: “Bundesdeutsche Verlage überrennen die DDR nicht nur durch den Vertrieb ihrer Zeitungen und 
Zeitschriften – sie kaufen sich in der DDR auch ganz massiv ein.” Wolfgang Mayer, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, p. 53, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07921. 
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all socioeconomic sectors during the early transition period, and the more general westward expansion 
of a democratic and market economic order across Eastern Europe. Though different by sector and in 
respective outcome, in particular the insurance sector, the aviation, the energy, and the automotive 
industry, early on, showed, for instance, an “alarming density of coalitions” similar to those of the press
presented in the following chapters.31 By reassessing post-socialist history through the lens of a 
changing media and press system in East Germany, this project, therefore, aims to trace the broader 
social, economic and political realities of this unique historical moment and its lasting ramifications for
post-Wall Germany. Laying open the close connection between political and economic interests in the 
exploration of new Eastern markets, it shows that nothing that happened in the GDR before, during and
after the transition happened in isolation nor was it an exclusively East German problem. Instead, East 
Germany became the battle ground for various interests groups, East and West, but with clear and all-
overshadowing interests of West German political and economic groups. These groups generally 
expanded and continued their long-established interests and disputes onto the newly opened political 
arena and economic market. Aiming for power at different levels, all had an interest in influencing 
media and its policies or in simply circumventing them, they created situations on the ground barely 
changeable once put into place. 
31 “bedenkliche Kooperationsverdichtungen.” “Die Fusionskontrolle soll in der DDR nur in einer abgemilderten Form 
gelten,” Das Handelsblatt,  June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08071. See Czada, Roland, and Gerhard 
Lehmbruch (eds.), Transformationspfade in Ostdeutschland: Beiträge Zur Sektoralen Vereinigungspolitik, Frankfurt am 
Main [u.a.]: Campus-Verlag, 1998. Kreiss, Sylvia, Ausgleichsforderungen im Rahmen der deutschen 
Wiedervereinigung, Hamburg, 2003. Nägele, Frank, Strukturpolitik wider Willen? Die regionalpolitischen Dimensionen 
der Treuhandpolitik, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament. B 43-44, 1994. 
Seibel, Wolfgang, Verwaltete Illusionen – Die Privatisierung der DDR – Wirtschaft durch die Treuhandanstalt und ihre
Nachfolger 1990-2000, Frankfurt a. M, 2005. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY, METHODS, SOURCES, AND PROBLEMS
Theory in International Perspective
This thesis fills a gap in research, literature and our understanding of the transition of media in 
transitioning countries. While concerned with contemporary, post-socialist German media and press 
history, it is positioned in the US American tradition of what Dan Schiller calls “radical” and others 
call “critical” political economy of communication (PEoC) and its corresponding paradigms, 
theoretical and methodological premisses, and normative assertions about communication and media in
(expanding) Western market economies and democracies.32 Vincent Mosco defines the “central 
qualities” of PEoC as an overall concern with social change and history, social totality, moral 
philosophy and praxis.33 More specifically, research in the PEoC tradition provides studies “of the 
social relations, particularly power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and 
consumption of resources, including communication resources.”34 While research based on this 
definition of PEoC can be found also in German-language literature, the difference between both lies in
their methodological outlook. Situated in the applied social sciences, PEoC in German-language 
communication research (CR) greatly differs from the kind of qualitative historical research presented 
in this thesis.35 More importantly, however, with the almost complete absence of the political economy 
paradigm in German CR, with it being underrepresented in literature and produced mainly outside of 
Germany, PEoC is a forgotten academic tradition in research and teaching in Germany.36 This thesis 
aims to make a contribution in reviving this tradition. By presenting a historically informed study on a 
32 Schiller, Dan, The Legacy of Robert A. Brady. Antifascist origins of the political economy of communications, in: 
Journal of Media Economics, 12/2, pp. 89-101, 1999. See Mosco, Vincent, The Political Economy of Communication, 2
ed., Los Angeles: Sages Publications, 2009. Mosco, Vincent, and Janet Wasko (eds.), The Political Economy of 
Information, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.
33 Mosco, Vincent, The Political Economy of Communication, 2 ed., Los Angeles: Sages Publications, 2009, p. 26. 
34 Mosco ,Vincent, The Political Economy of Communication, 2 ed., Los Angeles: Sages Publications, 2009, p. 2. 
35 See for instance the work of Manfred Knoche: Knoche, Manfred, Medienkonzentration als Macht- und 
Legitimationsproblem für Politik und Wissenschaft. Kritisch-empirische Konzentrationstheorie versus apologetisch-
normative Wettbewerbstheorie, in Ahrweiler, Petra, and Barbara Thomaß (eds.), Internationale partizipatorische 
Kommunikationspolitik. Struktur und Visionen. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Hans J. Kleinsteuber, 
Münster/Berlin et al.: Lit, pp. 117-140, 2005. Knoche, Manfred, Kommunikationswissenschaftliche Medienokonomie 
als Kritik der politischen Ökonomie der Medien, in Siegert, G. (ed.), Medienökonomie in der 
Kommunikationswissenschaft. Bedeutung, Grundfragen und Entwicklungsperspektiven. Manfred Knoche zum 60. 
Geburtstag, Munster: Lit, pp.101 – 109, 2002. Knoche, Manfred, Kapitalisierung der Medienindustrie aus 
politokonomischer Perspektive; in: Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft, 49/2, pp. 177 – 194, 2001. Available 
online: http://www.medienoekonomie.at/pdf/pubdown/kapitalmedindustrie_01.pdf [09-10-2012]
36 On the history of PEoC in Germany, see Scheu, Andreas, Ardornos Erben, Koln: Harlem Verlag, 2012. Meyen, 
Michael, “Die konservative Wende der Kommunikationswissenschaft,” conference presentation at the Founding 
Conference of the Network of Critical Communication Research Germany, University of Munich, Munich, Nov 30 – 
Dec. 1, 2018.
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topic concerned with contemporary German media history, it further offers a methodological 
alternative to more readily available PEoC approaches in German-language literature.
 The major aim of this thesis, however, is to lay open to a non-German speaking audience a 
deeply fascinating part of German and international media history, and an unique example of and 
detailed look into the political economy of a post-socialist media transition. The German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) offers a rare-to-find case study for such transition in that it provides a condensed 
microcosm of Cold War alliances in close relation to German-German dynamics. Existent throughout 
forty years of division, German-German economic and political relations allowed for immediate cross-
border activities during the early reform period. The East German context, therefore, offers a rich 
repertoire of competing interests in domestic reform activities and early external market interest and 
political influences, all in close alliance with broader political German-German agendas. Further, East 
Germany was to become the entrance door for Western media corporations to other Eastern European 
media markets. 
The transition period is still a highly politicized and culturally loaded topic in Germany; its 
analysis through the lens of a critical political economy approach might lead to attempts to 
delegitimatize its findings due to its theoretical outlook, its qualitative methods or the subjectivity of 
the author. All potential charges are serious and need to be addressed: 
The assumption of this thesis is that while PEoC might be an absent field in Germany, it still 
holds a legitimate and important place within the broader spectrum of different academic traditions. To 
disregard the findings of this thesis based on reservations regarding its theoretical outlook, therefore, 
not simply limits our understanding of history but of social reality. This thesis, in analyzing the 
competing interests of various political economic groups, grounds its findings in meticulous archival 
work and an almost exclusive reliance on (semi-)primary sources. It, thereby, offers a unique look into 
the complexity of historical reality, integrates the German case into international media markets, and 
applies PoEC to issues specifically relevant to German media history and its current media system.  
This thesis further holds that writing of history is never objective or neutral but a reflection of 
past convictions and present conditions. The latter change how we approach history, how we narrate 
stories and the kinds of questions we ask. That is the beauty of it, history never gets old. In writing this 
history, however, my own intersubjectivity becomes part of the story. Having grown up in East Berlin 
during the transition period, I have experienced the consequences of the stories unfolding in this thesis. 
The questions asked and the perspective taken, are, thus, influenced by personal experience. Further, it 
11
can be expected that being from East Germany and being identified as an East German allowed for 
different dynamics in the communication with (mainly East German) interview partners (see below). It 
does not follow, however, that the events outlined in this thesis are skewed or less accurate than others. 
The often cited and well-known media researcher Gunter Holzweißig, for instance, an expert on media 
in the GDR, was also the director of the All-German Institute – Federal Office for All-German Tasks 
(Gesamtdeutsches Institut – Bundesanstalt für gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben). As the name suggests, the 
office found its task and purpose in the legal statute of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that the
GDR was an illegitimate state, and that Germany was, indeed, one nation that was, for the time being, 
represented by the FRG. It is not surprising that Holzweißig's research, based on these premises and 
convictions, was and is deeply influenced by it (see below). 
Holzweißig is one example among many. The question whether or not the GDR, indeed, was an
illegitimate state influences how German-German history is being written, and the answer to this 
question affects all others. While most historical accounts in German language research work on the 
premise (upheld by the Federal Republic) that the GDR was not a legitimate, sovereign state, and that 
everything that happened during the transition period and thereafter was an inevitable process, this 
thesis takes international law and domestic reform initiatives as its starting point. The recognition of the
GDR by the United Nations in 1973 officially gave it domestic autonomy, though the GDR was never 
truly independent from the Federal Republic on material, political or social terms. This thesis 
acknowledges, however, that throughout forty years, the GDR developed a different social order as part
of a broader Cold War international political economic order. It views the reform movement in the 
GDR as an attempt to bring down a dictatorial government as part of a wider international movement 
that had started with Michal Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika.37 Contrary to often dominant 
conceptions, however, the end goal of this reform movement in the GDR had not been German 
unification. Rather, writing history in the service of such narrative gives legitimacy to, for instance, 
questionable state regulations in this process of unification (see Chapter 3).38 
This thesis does not present the story but a story of the transitioning of the press in the GDR. It 
does not claim exclusivity, and acknowledges the fact that history writing requires a selection of facts 
and a subsequent construction of events that serves a specific purpose; it is done with an intention and 
is framed according to certain predispositions. As stated earlier, the leading question of this thesis is in 
37 Bahrmann, Hannes, and Christoph Links, Chronik der Wende, Berlin: Ch. Links, 1994-c1995.
38 Note: This argument was made by Wolfgang Ullmann in: “Niederlage der deutschen Demokratie,” Wolfgang Ullmann, 
DVZ, May 25, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 26. 
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how far the democratic potential that existed in the moment of revolutionary change in 1989/1990 
found its institutional and/or political manifestation in the post-socialist East German press. Having laid
out the assumptions upon which this thesis is written and acknowledging its limitations does not 
undermine its overall contribution to literature in general and our understanding of  “media transitions” 
specifically. Instead, in offering an analysis of structural political economic shifts in the transition 
process, this thesis fills a gap English and German-language literature and theory.
Scope, Sources, and Methods
The scope of this thesis is the transition of the press in the GDR from November 1989 until 
after mid-1991. This includes the production, circulation, sale and ownership of print media and its 
respective publishers. The focus lies not on a specific publisher or one press-related sector but on the 
structural preconditions and shifts within which publications were being produced and distributed. 
General attention is given to the Zeitungspresse or (newspaper) press.39
The findings are entirely based on primary and semi-primary sources. I rely on secondary work 
to supplement on when primary sources left gaps in the overall narrative or when needed for 
contextualizing specific findings within a broader context. Archival work was done in eleven public 
and non-public (publishers, association etc.) archives.40 Valuable material was added by the holdings of
seven private archives, and seventeen non-biographical interviews.41 
Archives and Interviews 
In various ways, archives are places of institutionalized “politics of memory.”42 In Germany, 
and with specific relevance to this thesis, the policy of national archives is such that all files classified 
under “GDR” are generally open to the public (even if they contain material from after 1990). The 
National Archive in Berlin (BArch) holds the majority of “GDR” records. Files of the same time period
labeled “FRG” are closed for at least thirty years to protect individual rights and potentially sensitive 
information of economic and political interest groups. The consequences of this imbalance for 
historical research are serious and well-known among archivists and historians, not the least because 
39 For a discussion on definitions and categories of press matters see Erdmann, Georg, and Bruno Fritsch, Zeitungsvielfalt 
im Vergleich. Das Angebot der Tageszeitungen in Europa, Cologne: Hase & Koehler Verlag, 1990, pp. 13-14, Corporate
Archives of Axel Springer SE.
40 Guidelines for archival work can be found in Gunn, Simon, and Lucy Faire (eds.), Research methods for history, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.
41 For a complete list of all archives and interview partners, please see Sources and Bibliography.
42 Brown, Richard Harvey, and Beth Davis-Brown, The making of memory: the politics of archives, libraries and museums
in the construction of national consciousness, in History of the Human Sciences, 11/2, pp. 17-32, 1998.
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they relate to a broader political agenda to the writing and construction of German history. They partly 
explain the often one-sided and GDR-centric approaches in current German-German history writing. 
The GDR, before but especially in 1989/90, however, cannot be thought of without the political, 
economic and social relations, pressures and affiliations to the Federal Republic. Not having had access
to these files, made necessary different strategies: 
First, the filing of “requests to shorten the term of file protection” (Antrag auf 
Schutzfristenverkürzung) to be granted access to classified federal documents in the National Archives 
in Koblenz and Berlin - Koblenz holds the files of the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
(Bundesministerium des Inneren, BMI) that was responsible for media related issues; Berlin holds, for 
instance, those of the trust agency Treuhandgesellschaft (see Chapter 6).43 The issue of classified 
access made more important the archives of political foundations affiliated with individual parties 
(Stiftungsarchive). These archives, in general dispute with the national archive over new acquisitions, 
at times, hold files of politicians who worked on a federal level. For instance, the Archive of Liberalism
of the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation for Freedom, affiliated with the liberal Free Democratic Party 
(Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP), holds the record of several members of the FDP's federal media 
commission, and the Green Memory Archive (Grünes Gedächtnis) of the Boll Foundation and the 
Green Party in Berlin holds the estate of Gerhard Bächer, former media representative of the Green 
Party (East) at the Media Control Council (Medienkontrollrat, MKR).44 The Archive of Democratic 
Socialism (Demokratischer Sozialismus, ADS) of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and the leftist party
DIE LINKE in Berlin holds the estate of interim prime minister and later member of the German 
Bundestag, Hans Modrow.45 These archives have individually negotiated classified periods, and are 
generally easier to access. 
The third way around the issue of access lay in the “GDR” files themselves. Since classification
matters, not content, detailed communication between various East and West German interest groups 
can, if traced throughly, be found in these files. In particular Chapter 5, telling the complicated story of 
early market interests in the building of a monopoly-like press distribution in East Germany, is based 
43 Note: These requests are generally complicated and can take up years. I was granted access to files of the BMI at the 
National Archive in Koblenz; two requests for the trust agency Treuhandgesellschaft in Berlin are still being processed 
with the prospect of access in the summer of 2018.
44 More information on the archive holdings in Becker-Schaum, Christoph, Der Archivbestand Gerhard Bächer und die 
Grüne Partei in der DDR, Grünes Gedächtnis, pp. 71-76, 2009.  
http://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/uploads/2014/06/jb_2009_-_cbs_archivbestand_gerhard_baecher.pdf [May 25, 
2016].
45 More information on the archive holdings see ADS, Bestände/Findbücher, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.  
https://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/historisches-zentrum/archiv/bestaende-findbuecher/ [January 10, 2018].
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on files found in the holdings of the East German Ministry of Postal and Telecommunication 
(Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, MPF). Labeled “GDR,” they are open for research, even 
though, as will become clear, some federal interest groups might have good reasons for wanting to keep
this communication off record. 
Other important archives were the ID-Archive at the International Institute for Social History 
(IISH/ID-Archive MKR) in Amsterdam that holds an extensive collection (forty-two boxes) of the 
MKR, and the extensive library on media (policy) books in the corporate archive library of Axel 
Springer Publishers.46 
In particular the private (personal) archives took a central role in the original research. During 
the transition period, with fast institutional changes, it was common for those working at ministries, 
newspapers, publishers or in civic groups to take files home once the job was done and no archive was 
in charge of storing documents. In particular the private archives of Wolfgang Spickermann (newly 
elected editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland), Ralf Bachmann, and Hans-Jürgen Niehof of the MPF 
were invaluable for this thesis.47 
Hans-Jürgen Niehof's and Gottfried Müller's background knowledge further greatly contributed 
to this thesis. The communication with both, as well as all other seventeen interview partners were non-
biographical. Questions related to the specific subject matter at hand, such as the specific dealings of a 
ministry, a newspaper or media policy institution during the transition.48 The driving goal was to fill 
gaps that could not have been filled based on archival material alone. This is important because during 
the fast-paced transition period, much of the communication happened verbally and/or was not 
documented systematically but noted by hand on pieces of paper. This was partly due to the grass-
roots-like character of reform institutions such as the Round Table or the MKR and the often non-
professional background of their members, as well as to institutional shifts more generally. Thus, 
archival holdings generally contain numerous pieces of hand written notes and papers that require 
context to make sense of, and this context can often only be provided by those who worked on the spot.
46 Note on IISH/ID-Archive MKR: The collection was transferred to the IISH/ID-Archive MKR in 1997, and contains 
minutes of the meetings of the Media Control Council in 1990, correspondence and documents regarding the reshaping 
of the media landscape (radio, television, newspapers and publishing houses) in the German Democratic Republic in 
1990, and an extensive collection of press clippings 1989-1990. 
47 See also Bachman, Ralf, Ich bin der Herr. Und wer bist Du? Ein deutsches Journalistenleben, Edition Reiher, Berlin: 
Dietz Verlag, 1995.
48 Note: interview were, thus, from “timeline” or biographical interviews. See Adriansen, Hanne Kirstine, Timeline 
interviews. A tool for conducting life history research, in Qualitative Studies, 3/1, 2012, pp. 40-55. 
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Semi-Primary Sources 
It has been established by several scholars that there is no objectivity in the news. In Western 
based models of journalism as well in a centralized socialist settings, journalism always operates within
specific social systems defined by context-related values, interests and material conditions.49 This 
becomes particularly apparent when dealing with a press transitioning from one political economic 
system to another and the simultaneous clashing of both.
The press, next to broadcasting, was the most important source of information during the 
transition period that was defined by fast-paced change and little transparency. Newspaper demand in 
the GDR rose exponentially, and while several battles on all levels of society were being fought 
simultaneously, especially those relating to media developments found their way into the daily press. 
This was not the least because, as the East German paper Neue Zeit admitted, the press itself was “most
interested in it.”50 Here, newspapers served as informants, agents, and platforms of debate. The 
discussion whether or not the former propaganda paper Neues Deutschland had any legitimacy in 
continuing circulation, for instance, was first and foremost debated in different newspapers, via open 
letters and editorials.51 
More importantly, newspapers served as the main and often sole source of information for 
policy makers. Several surveys of the newly established Ministry of Media Policy (Ministerium für 
Medienpolitik, MfM) on the fast changing situation of publishers and newspapers in the GDR, for 
instance, were based solely on press material. The archival holdings of the advisory MKR or of the 
MfM are, therefore, filled with an abundance of press clippings on press-related issues.52 Consistent 
references to newspaper articles in letters of various interest groups bear proof that they too relied on 
the press as a major source of information. All learned from the press about the struggles of East 
German papers, planned or executed mergers, and the media policy goals of East and West German 
political and economic groups. 
49 Bennett, Lance, News. The Politics of Illusion, 3rd ed. Washington D.C.: Longman, 1996. Nerone, John, The Historical 
Roots of the Normative Model of Journalism, in Journalism, 14/4, 2012, pp. 446-458. Nerone, John (ed.), Last Rights: 
Revisiting Four Theories of the Press. Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
50 “am meisten daran interessiert.” Friedrich Eismann, “Einheitlich definieren,“  Neue Zeit, July 6, 1990, BArch DC9/1033 
(1/2), folder 2. 
51 See for instance:  Hans Christoph Buch, “Ein Feigenblatt verdeckt die Bloße nicht. Warum an die Vergangenheit des 
'Neuen Deutschland' in Erinnerung behalten sollte,” FAZ, August 31, 1990;  Karl-Heinz Jakobs,“Weder Feigenblatt 
noch Bloße.  Die Vergangenheit des 'Neuen Deutschland' ist vergangen,” FAZ, September 14, 1990. Also in “Die 
Sonntagsgeschichte – Briefwechsel Nr. 2,” Neues Deutschland, September 19, 1990, p. 8., archive Vistas Publishers.
52 Here in particular the holdings of the IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Boxes 34-36 (Media Control Council); Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR, Box 27-30 (Gerhard Bächer, member of the Media Control Council); BArch 
DC9.
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Newspapers, however, did not merely document, but – with newspaper publishers themselves 
having had vested interests in these developments – they too became key actors in policy campaigns, 
for instance the publisher Jahreszeiten with regard to distribution practices, or Tagesspiegel with regard
to consolidation issues (see Chapter 5). While these two West German publishers mainly focused on 
the dealings of the West German major publishing houses in the GDR, also East German publishers 
became relevant actors and used their publications to make their own concerns heard. Thereby, they 
were not necessarily in agreement; former SED party papers claimed their independence but still held 
various privileges, while newly established newspapers pointed to the continuation of former monopoly
structures. All of them, however, faced a growing competition and made their struggles public by 
addressing their readers for feedback or help. This was true also for other interest groups, such as 
media unions and publishers' associations. They too made use of their own publications to push for 
their ideas of press and policy change in the GDR. Press coverage was, thus, defined by the respective 
situations, interests and affiliations of specific publications. They all revealed different perspectives in 
a puzzle that contains many pieces. 
It is not the scope of this thesis to analyze in detail the kind of coverage generated by different 
publications. Though such a project would be highly interesting, this dissertation draws from print 
media as semi-primary sources in the acknowledgment that all were conditioned by structural shifts and
were simultaneously agents of change. Given this background, newspaper accounts offer valuable 
insights into the battles fought and the interest at stake. 
In short, since newspapers not simply documented change but were actively involved in it, their 
coverage must be seen as significant historical sources of information. They spoke out of the very 
context of interest they aimed to push. And though the general tendency in research literature is to 
focus on ideological content in East German papers, this thesis shows that also West German papers 
had clear political and economic agendas based also on assumptions that were not self-evident in a 
country in transition. All perspectives are equally valid during the transition period in the GDR.
Language
Language is political and carries deeply rooted systematic beliefs, inequalities and/or  
assumptions about the workings of a specific social order.53 In the German-German context, this refers 
to how both German states were made sense of and to the language that developed in the service of 
53 For a discussion of issues of language see: Part Four - Deciphering Meanings, in Gunn, Simon, and Lucy Faire (eds.), 
Research methods for history, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.
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those beliefs.54 While these language issues pose a general challenge, translation issues add to it. For 
instance, the words “in- und ausländisch” are generally translated into “national and international.” 
Since, according to federal law, the GDR was part of the German nation, its territory was “national.” 
The term, thus, undercuts geographies and jurisdictions of states and cannot be applied easily to one or 
the other. Put differently, while to the GDR the Federal Republic was “foreign” territory, the language 
used in the federal context (and its respective concepts applied) made the GDR part of the “national” 
context. The term “bundesdeutsch,” therefore, commonly referred to the Federal Republic in East 
German language, but it simply translates into “German,” which again purports the idea that West 
Germany stood for all of Germany. Whenever the word “bundesdeutsch” has been used, I have 
translated it as “West German.” 
This is one example to make clear the political connotations of language in this specific 
historical context. Culturally loaded words such as Wende (turn-around, transition or transformation 
period), Ossi (East German) or Wessi (West German) hold their own challenges. The terms commonly 
used to describe the Wende-period, that is the rapid socio-economic and political changes in the GDR, 
are “transformation” or ”transition.” While “transition” suggests that reform happened from within and 
out of itself, as a linear process of progress, the term “transformation” aims to break with this linearity 
by showing how various interests groups were at work.55 Seen in historical context, however, the term 
“integration” is a more useful way to think of it. This is because “integration” points to political-
economic agendas and material realities that led this “transition” phase according to well-established 
norms of an expanding Western political economy.56 These norms (and pressures) set new boundaries 
within which people and institutions could exercise agency. For matters of consistency, and to 
underline that a transformation process took place according to a well established but expanding 
Western political economy, the term “transition” is being used throughout this thesis. 
54 Hellmann, Manfred W., Zur Sprache vor und nach der „Wende“: Ost-West-Kulturen in der
Kommunikation in Casper-Hehne, Hehne, and Irmy Schweiger (eds.), Deutschland und die "Wende" in Literatur, 
Sprache und Medien. Interkulturelle und kulturkontrastive Perspektiven. Dokumentation eines Expertenseminars für 
Internationale Alumni der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen vom 8.-13. Juli 2007, Gottingen: Universitätsverlag 
Gottingen, pp. 97-116, 2008.
55 Siebert, Horst (ed.), The Transformation of Socialist economies. Symposium, 1991, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1992; Otte, 
Hans-Heinrich, Experiences from the privatisation of the East German economy, Allendale, Mich.: Seidman School of 
Business, Grand Valley State University, 1994. Spangenberg, Sabine, The institutionalised transformation of the East 
German economy, Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 1998. Jovanović, Mica (ed.), System transformation in comparative 
perspective. Affinity and diversity in institutional, structural and cultural patterns, Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007. Pickel, 
Andreas, and Helmut Wiesenthal, The grand experiment. Debating shock therapy, transition theory, and the East 
German experience, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.
56 Pickel, Andreas, and Helmut Wiesenthal, The grand experiment. Debating shock therapy, transition theory, and the 
East German experience, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.
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In translating German terms and sources, the overall aim of the author has been to translate 
meaning rather than words, a challenge doomed to fail.57 A similar problem appears with regard to 
institutions, terms or concepts that lack compatible terms or counterparts in a non-socialist context (i.e. 
“Valuta,” “Planvorgaben,” or “Organ”).58 Non-German readers might, therefore, find some translations 
dense or unfamiliar sounding. To allow for the contextualization of text passages, background 
information of political, economic and social terms, actors or institutions was included whenever 
possible and to the best knowledge of the author. And while all quotes have been translated into 
English, the original quotes in German can be found in the text or the respective footnote. 
The dynamics of language certainly also played into the interviews led with (mainly East 
German) interview partners and should, therefore, not be omitted. Being identified as an East German 
and speaking East Berlin dialect certainly created communication dynamics that were partly based on a
shared East German identity. While such interpersonal dynamics are part of every interview (they are 
are simply different in their assumed objectivity), the author is aware of the underlying issues 
connected to this intersubjectivity with regard to the content of the interviews. All interview transcripts 
have been sent to the interviewees; only approved interviews have been used for this thesis.
Literature Review
One difference between research in Germany and the Anglo-American context is the socio-
political context within which it is being conducted. Current research on the GDR and its post-socialist 
history in the Anglo-American context offers a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches 
increasingly in resistance to still dominant Cold War narratives.59 In Germany, this history remains a 
highly politicized topic, not the least because of lasting socio-economic disparities between different 
Länder (states), which affects also the outlook of research.60 Historian and political scientist Martin 
57 For a discussion of issues of language see Part Four, Deciphering Meanings, in Gunn, Simon, and Lucy Faire (eds.), 
Research methods for history, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.
58 Note: to name a few other examples: Planteil, Postzeitungsliste, Sperrzeichen etc.
59 See for instance: Betts, Paul, The Twilight of the Idols. East German Memory and Material Culture, in The Journal of 
Modern History, 72:3, 2000, 731-765. Betts, Paul, Within walls. Private life in the German Democratic Republic, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Berdahl, Daphne, and Matti Bunzl, On the social life of postsocialism. Memory, 
consumption, Germany, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010; Berdahl, Daphne, The Spirit of Capitalism and 
the Boundaries of Citizenship in Post-Wall Germany; in: Comparative Studies in Society and History, 47:2, Apr., 2005, 
pp. 235-251. Gumbert, Heather, Envisioning socialism. Television and the Cold War in the German Democratic 
Republic, University of Michigan Press, 2014. Veenis, Milena, Cola in the German Democratic Republic. East German 
Fantasies on Western Consumption, in Enterprise and Society, 12, 2011, 489-524. Veenis, Milena, Consumption in East 
Germany. The Seduction and Betrayal of Things; in: Journal of Material Culture, Mar 1999, 4/1, 1999, pp. 79-112. 
Willis, Jim, Daily life behind the Iron Curtain, Santa Barbara, Calif.: Greenwood, 2013.
60 Pollack, Detlef et al. (eds.), Political culture in post-communist Europe. Attitudes in new democracies, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2003. Berth, Hendrik (ed.), Einheitslust und Einheitsfrust. Junge Ostdeutsche auf dem Weg vom DDR- zum 
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Sabrow identifies three ideal types of how memory of the GDR is being constructed in Germany: 
progress, arrangement and dictatorship.61 The memory type dominant in past and current 
communication or journalism research is that of dictatorship, which only stands symptomatic for the 
construction of GDR memory in general.62 According to Sabrow, this type focuses on the oppressive 
state structures and its courageous overcoming in the peaceful protests of 1989. He criticizes that GDR 
dictatorship history, as an institutionalized and publicly funded operation, generally is set into 
opposition to a self-serving narrative of West German democratic freedom.63 It stands in the long West 
German tradition of framing the East German experience through the lens of offenders, victims, and 
resistance, in which the “GDR is the contrasting foil for the Western model that emphasizes the rule of 
law, freedom, and democracy.”64 The dictatorship frame finds its expression in media representations, 
political discourse, and academic research, all of which are dominated by preconceived Western 
notions of socialist life.65 Several content analyses of the former and current coverage of the GDR and 
East Germans in the (West) German media, for instance, show how, for decades, life in the GDR has 
overwhelmingly been represented as deeply political, characterized by oppression, decay and material 
shortage.66 And though this frame is increasingly being challenged, for instance, in research on issues 
of representation, research conducted in the social sciences and/or communication research 
predominantly follows it.67
Bundesbürger. Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Längsschnittstudie von 1987-2006, Giessen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2007.
61 Note: The second ideal type, arrangement, combines power and the everyday world from the East German perspective. 
The general frame of self-assertion under rough conditions serves to increase East Germans’ pride in ‘survival,’ which 
makes this ideal type, according to Sabrow, very vivid in East Germans today. Thirdly, with progress the idea remains 
that socialism is a legitimate alternative to capitalist societies, and is especially cultivated among former GDR elites. See
Sabrow, Martin, Die DDR erinnern, in Martin Sabrow (ed.), Erinnerungsorte der DDR, München: Beck, pp. 9-27, 2009,
pp. 18-19.
62 Meyen, Michael, Mass media and collective memory. The communist GDR in today’s communicative and cultural 
memory, Conference Paper, IAMCR 2012 Conference, Durban, 2012.
63 Sabrow, Martin, Die DDR erinnern, in Martin Sabrow (ed.), Erinnerungsorte der DDR, München: Beck, pp. 9-27, 2009,
p. 18.
64 Sabrow, Martin, Die DDR erinnern, in Martin Sabrow (ed.), Erinnerungsorte der DDR, München: Beck, pp. 9-27, 2009,
p. 18. Sabrow, Martin, Wohin treibt die DDR-Erinnerung? Dokumentation einer Debatte, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung, 2007.
65 See for instance: Weidefeld, Werner, and Karl Rudolf Korte, Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit 1949-1989-1999, 
Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1999. Ahbe, Thomas, Rainer Gries, and Wolfgang Schmale, Die Ostdeutschen in den Medien. 
Das Bild von den Anderen nach 1990, Leipzig: Leipziger Uni-Verlag, 2009. Zahlmann, Stefan (ed.), Wie im Westen, nur
anders. Medien in der DDR, Berlin: Panama, 2010. 
66 Ahbe, Thomas, Rainer Gries, and Wolfgang Schmale, Die Ostdeutschen in den Medien. Das Bild von den Anderen nach
1990, Leipzig: Leipziger Uni-Verlag, 2009. 
67 See for instance: Reck, Roland, Wasserträger des Regimes. Rolle und Selbstverständnis von DDR-Journalisten vor und 
nach der Wende 1989/1990, Münster, 1995. Dittmar, Claudia, and Susanne Vollberg (eds.), Die Überwindung der 
Langeweile? Zur Programmentwicklung des DDR-Fernsehens 1968 bis 1974, Leipzig, 2002. Meyen, Michael, Denver 
Clan und Neues Deutschland, Mediennutzung in der DDR, Berlin, 2003. Meyen, Michael, Aufsätze und Berichte – 
Kollektive Ausreise? Zur Reichweite ost- und westdeutscher Fernsehprogramme in der DDR, in Publizistik, 47/2, 2001, 
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This institutionalized creation of collective memory is a continuation of the Cold War history 
and of forty years of division throughout which the FRG never recognized the GDR as a legitimate 
state but instead claimed to represent the whole of Germany by constitutionally guaranteeing “one 
German citizenship.” Also in consequence to that, the GDR remains, what Zahlmann calls, a “footnote 
to history” or, what Meyen calls, the “Opaque Germany” (Dunkeldeutschland); and it relates to 
complaints of Stuhler that the last and only freely elected East German government seems “to have 
fallen out of history.”68 Examples are manifold. 
Konrad Dussel's book on the German daily press in the 19th and 20th century, for instance, 
though dedicating an entire chapter to the GDR (1945-1989), offers only a brief narrative of post-War 
press policies that seemed to not have changed until 1989, while also claiming that “[m]ore than fifty 
years of press history in the Federal Republic cannot be outlined in detailed fashion in one chapter.”69 
The underlying irrelevance and simplicity of East German press history framed according to a distinct 
political outlook, however, neither captures more interesting questions of internal reform processes, nor
makes use of this unique historical case study of a socialist press.70 Similar concepts and narratives are 
also being applied to the biographies of those who have lived in the East German “anomaly.”71 
Little to no space is given to alternative perspectives. Any critique or broadening of the 
dictatorship frame can easily be delegitimized as Ostlagie (East German nostalgia), that is a 
mystification for a socialist past based on communal solidarity, progressive welfare programs, socialist 
security and full employment.72 Some point to this form of muting dissent as one way of securing the 
pp. 200-220; Meyen, Michael, and Ute Nawratil, The Viewers. Television and everyday life in East Germany, 
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 24/3, 2004, pp. 355-365.
68 Stuhler, Ed., Die letzten Monate der DDR. Die Regierung de Maizière und ihr Weg zur deutschen Einheit, Berlin: Links,
2010; Zahlmann, Stefan (ed.) (2010), Wie im Westen, nur anders. Medien in der DDR, Berlin: Panama. Meyen, Michael,
Wir haben freier gelebt. Die DDR im kollektiven Gedächtnis der Deutschen. Transcript: Bielefeld, 2013. Examples for 
this paradigm: See Stober, Rudolf, Deutsche Pressegeschichte, Einführung, Systematik, Glossar, Konstanz: UVK 
Medien, 2000. Schulz, Günther (ed.), Geschäft mit Wort und Meinung, Medienunternehmer seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, 
Munich: Harald Boldt Verlag im R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999. Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert, Münster: Lit Verlag, pp. 187-205, 2004.
69 “Mehr als fünfzig Jahre Pressegeschichte in der Bundesrepublik sind in einem Kapitel nicht detailliert darstellbar.” See 
Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Münster: Lit Verlag, pp. 187-205, 2004, p. 225.
70 For counter examples, see for instance: Meyen Michael, and Anke Fiedler, Wer jung ist, liest die Junge Welt. Die 
Geschichte der auflagenstärksten DDR-Zeitung, Berlin: Ch. Links, 2013.
71 Kuczynski, Rita (ed.), Ostdeutschland war nie etwas Natürliches. Deutschlandkenner aus Mittel- und Osteuropa, 
Frankreich, Grossbritannien und den USA über das vereinte Deutschland, Berlin: Parthas, 2005. Zelizer, Barbie, 
Reading the Past against the Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies, in Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 12, 
1995, pp. 214-239. 
72 Ziegengeist, Juliane, DDR-(N)Ostalgie in deutschen Nachwende-Spielfilmen von 1990 bis 2006: Zwischen Kritik und 
Kult, in Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte, 13, pp. 119-153, 2011. Bach, Jonathan, The Taste Remains. 
Consumption, (N)ostalgia, and the Production of East Germany, in Public Culture, Oct. 2002, 14/3, pp. 545-556. Cook, 
Roger F., Good Bye, Lenin! Free-Market Nostalgia for Socialist Consumerism, in Seminar. A Journal of Germanic 
Studies, 43/2, 2007, pp. 206-219.
21
material interests for, and increasing the social capital of West German interest groups.73 Ironically, 
therefore, similar to old times, personal narratives of East Germans deviating from the dictatorship 
narrative are often told and shared only in private.74
The work of earlier mentioned Gunter Holzweißig's on media in the GDR and the transition 
period, therefore, stands exemplary only for a broader dictatorship paradigm dominant in research on 
the GDR. Holzweißig's general focus on the strong ideological content of East German news media and
the information monopoly of the SED leads him to frame it as a monolithic bloc that stood in 
opposition to free Western media.75 His conclusion on the media transition is likewise rather uniform in
its pro-Western perspective: the acceptance of West German structures in the East led to stability and 
pluralistic parliamentary democracy, which had been withheld from the East German population during
the six decades of National Socialist and SED rule.76 While such perspective stands in its own right, it 
does not follow that it is more true than others. Instead, it refrains from asking more critical and 
meaningful questions with regard to the complexity of social reality and must be read as being deeply 
engrained in a federal political agenda. This type of research, therefore, exemplifies how value 
statements, basic beliefs and particular occupations made for a different kind of subjectivity.  
Other examples can be found in those few studies that have analyzed aspects of a transitioning 
print media landscape in the GDR. Thematically closest is a ground work study on the changing press 
structures in the former GDR, which was commissioned by the BMI in fall of 1990, and was 
announced by the Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble in November 1991. This study, under the
lead of Beate Schneider, gives a comprehensive overview of the “structural changes, problems of 
adaptation, and opportunities of development of the press in the new Länder.”77 It came out in early 
1992 and became a regularly cited study on the transition of the East German press.78 It was added by 
73 Beckmann, Chistopher, Die Auseinandersetzung um den Vergleich von ‘Drittem Reich’ und DDR vor dem Hintergrund 
der Diskussion um Moglichkeiten und Grenzen vergleichender Geschichtsforschung, in Deutsche Studien, 38, 2002, pp. 
9-26.
74 Cooke, Paul, Representing East Germany Since Unification. From Colonization to Nostalgia, New York, 2005.  
Berdahl, Daphne, and Matti Bunzl, On the social life of postsocialism. Memory, consumption, Germany, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010.
75 Holzweißig, Gunter, Wandel der DDR-Medien durch die Wende, in Casper-Hehne, Hehne, and Irmy Schweiger (eds.), 
Deutschland und die "Wende" in Literatur, Sprache und Medien. Interkulturelle und kulturkontrastive Perspektiven. 
Dokumentation eines Expertenseminars für Internationale Alumni der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen vom 8.-13. 
Juli 2007, Gottingen: Universitätsverlag Gottingen, pp. 141-160, 2008.
76 Holzweißig, Gunter, Die Schärfste Waffe Der Partei, Bohlau Koln, 2002. Holzweißig, Gunter, Massenmedien in der 
DDR, Berlin, 1983. 
77 Schneider, Beate et al., Strukturen, Anpassungsprobleme und Entwicklungschancen der Presse in den neuen 
Bundesländer, Forschungsbericht für den Bundesminister des Inneren, 2 Bände, Hannover und Leipzig, 1991/92.
78 See for instance manuscript, “Rede von Bundesminister Wolfgang Schäuble vor dem Kongress der deutschen 
Lokalpresse in Bonn-Bad Godesberg,” Der Bundesminister des Inneren, Bonn, November 12, 1991, p. 3, BArch 
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several follow-up publications, and still is the only major study that specifically examines the changing 
conditions of the press sectors in the former GDR, in particular those of ownership.79 It found that the 
high concentration of the newspaper market by 1992 was the result of the allocation practices of the 
Treuhandgesellschaft (THA) in privatizing former SED regional papers (Bezirkszeitungen).80 The 
overall outcome of Schneider's study: press concentration was inevitable due to the superior market 
positions of the major West German major publishing houses. Though insightful in documenting shifts 
in ownership and the persistence of regional monopolies of former SED regional papers, so far, neither 
the fact that the study was commissioned by the BMI (with its own close relations to publishers' 
associations), nor its questionable conclusion of an “inevitable” market concentration have been 
fundamentally questioned in research literature.81
Dussel gives a slightly more differentiated conclusion by questioning the “necessity” of 
developments, stating that “[t]here should be no doubt ... that within this policy framework, leeway 
existed that was unnecessarily given away. Specific economic interests could, thereby, assert 
B/106/156193. See also  Letter and attachments, Lage der Lokalpresse im Betrittsgebiet, Merk, Bundesminister des 
Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, Dezember 20, 1991, BArch B/106/156193. Also 
Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher 
nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten 
Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, 
Bonn, May 21, 1992, BArch B/106/156193. Also Mahle, Walter A. (ed.), Pressemarkt Ost, Nationale und internationale 
Perspektiven, Munich: Ölschläger 1992, Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
79 See for instance Schneider, Beate, Pressemarkt Ost II. Nur die  Konzentration macht Fortschritte, Pressemarkt Ost, 
Nationale und internationale Perspektiven, Walter A., Mahle (ed.), Munich: Ölschläger, pp. 35-46, 1992. Schneider, 
Beate, Die ostdeutsche Tagespresse- eine (traurige) Bilanz, in Media Perspektiven, 7/92, 1992, pp. 428-441. Schneider, 
Beate, Nach der Medienwende in der DDR; in PM, 411, 2004, pp. 17-22. Available online: 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_4029-544-1-30.pdf?040415182927 [May 5, 2014]; Schneider, Beate, Die Wende auf dem
Medienmarkt; in HPM, 9, 2002, pp. 217-225. Available online: 
http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/HPM/HPM_09_02/HPM_09_02_14.pdf [May 5, 2014]
80 For the Treuhandanstalt see: Boick, Marcus, Die Treuhandanstalt, Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Thüringen, 
2015. Cassell, Mark, How Governments Privatize: the Politics of Divestment in the United States and Germany, 
Georgetown University Press, 2002. Breuel, Birgit, Treuhandanstalt: Bilanz und Perspektiven, in: Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, B 43-44, 1994. Breuel, Birgit und Michal C. Burda (eds.), 
Ohne historisches Vorbild. Die Treuhandanstalt 1990-1994. Berlin, 2004. Fischer, Wolfram, Herbert Hax, and Hans 
Karl Schneider (eds.), Treuhandanstalt. Das Unmögliche wagen, Forschungsberichte, Berlin, 1993. Grosser, Dieter, Das
Wagnis der Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion, Stuttgart, 1998. Jürgs, Michael, Die Treuhändler, München und 
Leipzig, 1997. Kemmler, Marc, Die Entstehung der Treuhandanstalt. Von der Wahrung zur Privatisierung des DDR-
Volkseigentums, Frankfurt a. M./New York, 1994. Treuhandanstalt 1994, Dokumentation 1990-1994, 15 Band, Berlin, 
1994.
81 Likewise insightful in documenting the development of the press in East Germany, the publications of the Federal 
Association of German Newspaper Publishers (Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (BDZV) or the German 
press Council (Deutscher Presserat), for instance: Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e.V., Zeitungen '89, 
Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e.V. (BDVZ), Bad Honnef: HVZ-Druck, 1989. Bundesverband Deutscher 
Zeitungsverleger e.V., Zeitungen '90, Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e.V. (BDVZ),  Bad Honnef: HVZ-
Druck, 1990. Deutscher Presserat, Jahrbuch 1990, Trägerverein des Deutschen Presserats e.V., 1990. Deutscher 
Presserat, Jahrbuch 1991, Trägerverein des Deutschen Presserats e.V., 1991. Ostergaard, Bernt Stubbe (ed.), The Media 
in Western Europe, The Euromedia Handbook, Euromedia Research Group, London: Sage Publications, 1991.
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themselves in almost unimpeded ways.”82 Though pointing to market pressures and political interests, 
Dussel provides no research for his claims and leaves it to the reader to explain what those “specific 
economic interests” were. Instead, his overview narrative focuses on the papers of the SED and on 
political obstacles in the fight for a free press. In the end (so the suggestion), it was the ending of press 
subsidies on April 1, 1990 (and the consequent increase in newspaper prices and their decrease in 
subscription rates) that made for the core economic issue in the struggle of East German newspapers. 
Why, however, the “broad range of new regional and local publications [established by East German 
reform groups]” could not reach “economic stability” and soon folded, he does not explain.83 
 Insightful in this respect, the statistical work of Walter J. Schütz gives an overview of this 
process. Schütz documents the German-German press landscape in 1989, the explosion of print media 
in 1990, the decrease in numbers throughout the next five years and the slow increase of press 
concentration on the East German market throughout the 1990s.84 Also insightful, Haller, Lugwig and 
Weßler's study for the BMI on the transition and increasing concentration on the East German 
magazine market until 1994.85 These studies are being supplemented by case studies on magazine or 
book publishers, for example, Jasmin Wiedemann's research on the transition of East German women's 
magazines or Carsten Wurm's history of the book publisher Aufbau Verlag.86 Most relevant in this 
body of work, due to its broader approach, is the 2008 dissertation of publisher Christoph Links on the 
“transition of the East German [book] publishing landscape in the process of German unification,” 
82 Full quote: “Man mag darüber streiten, ob sich diese Entwicklung nicht mit Notwendigkeit so vollziehen musste, wie sie
sich vollzog. Keinen Zweifel sollte es jedoch daran geben, dass innerhalb dieses politischen Rahmens Spielräume 
vorhanden waren, die ohne Not verschenkt wurden. Spezielle okonomische Positionen konnten ich damit im 
Pressebereich fast ungehindert durchsetzen.” See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 
Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 245.
83 “Fülle von neuen Regional- und Lokalblättern [die vor allem im Umfeld von ostdeutschen Bürgerbewegungen 
entstanden sind] … okonomische Stabilität.” See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 
Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 245.
84 Schütz, Walter, Die Zeitungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der DDR 1945-2005, Welke W and J. Wilke 
(eds.), 400 Jahre Zeitung. Die Entwicklung der Tagespresse im internationalen Kontext, edition lumière, Bremen, pp. 
467−482, 2008. Schütz, Walter, Zeitungen in Deutschland. Zeitungsatlas 2004. Maßstab 1:350.000, Berlin: Vistas 
Verlag, 2006. Schütz, Walter, Zeitungen in Deutschland. Verlage und ihr publizistisches Angebot 1949-2004, Berlin: 
Vistas Verlag, 2005.
85 Haller, Michael, Johannes Ludwig, and Harmut Weßler, Entwicklungschancen und strukturelle Probleme der 
Zeitschriftenpresse in den neuen Bundesländern, Forschungsbericht für den Bundesminister des Inneren, Band I: Der 
Zeitschriftenmarkt Ost, Institut für Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft der Universität Leipzig, 1994.
86 Wurm, Carsten, Gestern. Heute. Aufbau. 70 Jahre Aufbau Verlag, 1945-2015, Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2015. Wurm, 
Carsten, Jeden Tag ein Buch. 50 Jahre Aufbau Verlag, Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1995. Wiedemann, Jasmin, Mitgefangen, 
mitverkauft. Zur Situation ostdeutscher Frauenzeitschriften nach der Wende, Band 181, Internationale 
Hochschulschriften, Waxmann Verlag, 1995. Also, Barck, Simone, Martina Langermann, and Siegried Lokatis (eds.), 
Zwischen Mosaik und Einheit. Zeitschriften in der DDR, Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1999. Kapitza, Arne, Transformation
der ostdeutschen Presse: „Berliner Zeitung“, „Junge Welt“ und „Sonntag/Freitag“ im Prozeß der deutschen 
Vereinigung, Band 26, Studien zur Kommunikationswissenschaftm, Springer-Verlag, 2013.
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published in the book on The Fate of GDR Publishers. The Privatization and its Consequences.87 Links
founded the first new book publisher in the GDR immediately after printing permissions had been 
abolished on December 1, 1989. In his study, he shows how of initially seventy-eight book publishers 
in the GDR, only about a dozen survived the transition, holding a little more than 2 percent of overall 
annual book production. These studies on print media are supplemented by research on the 
development of public broadcasting, most notably Andreas Rummel's thesis on “the role of party 
politics in building the Central German Broadcaster” (Mitteldeutschen Rundfunk).88 Jorg Becker 
published several reports on the developing information landscape in East German in the early 1990s 
more generally and documented growing deficiencies in information infrastructures.89 All of these 
studies document in their own ways the strong influences of federal interests and agendas, or as 
claimed by Dussel with regard to media in the GDR: “Seen in result, [their] end … could be 
summarized in one sentence: they were taken over by their West German competitors.”90 This process, 
however, was anything but “self-evident.”
How embattled the memory of it is, becomes clear in the book How East German Media Found
their Freedom, that (in spite of its title) gives critical insights into the different perspectives, the 
successes and failures of the transition process.91 Documenting the “takeover” mentioned by Dussel, 
and thematically closest to this thesis, are Pürer and Raabe's 1994 study on the press in Germany, 
Bernd Klammer's study on the economic and political interests in the building of the Press Distribution
87 Links, Christoph, Das Schicksal der DDR-Verlage. Die Privatisierung und ihre Konsequenzen,  2. ed., Berlin: Ch.Links,
2010.
88 Note: Lothar Mahling, media representative of the FDP and an expert sent from Bonn to aid liberal party in the GDR 
during the transition, refers to Rummel's thesis as a very profound representation of how political interests shaped the 
broadcast landscape in the East, Lothar Mahling, interview with author, June 28, 2016. See Rummel, Andreas, Die Rolle
der Parteipolitik beim Aufbau des Mitteldeutschen Rundfunks, Diplomarbeit (Master thesis), University of Munich, 
1993. See also Hepperle, Susanne, Durchsetzung des westdeutschen Ordnungsmodells: Rundfunk und Fernsehen, in 
Czada, Roland, and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.), Transformationspfade in Ostdeutschland: Beiträge Zur Sektoralen 
Vereinigungspolitik, Frankfurt am Main [u.a.]: Campus-Verlag, pp. 191-240, 1998. Bohrmann, Hans, The 
Amalgamation of East German and West German Media: 1989-1995, and Graf, Andreas, The Dismantling of the East 
German Media System: Content and Consequences, in Daly, Peter M., Hans Walter Frischkopf, and Trudis Goldsmith-
Reber (eds.), Germany Reunified: A Five- and Fifty-Year Retrospective, New York: P. Lang, 1997.
89 Becker, Jorg, Neue Bundesländer - Ein Prozeß der De-Informatisierung. Oder: Die ostdeutsche Informations-
Infrastruktur im Untergang, in Manecke, Hans-Jürgen, Jorg Becker, Willi Bredemeier, und Hans Joachim Samulowitz, 
1. Jahresbericht zur Lage der Informationswirtschaft in den neuen Bundesländern, Hamburg: Hamburger 
Weltwirtschaftsarchiv, 1994. Becker, Jorg, Die kontinuierliche De-Informatisierung der neuen Bundesländer, in 
Manecke, Hans-Jürgen, Bernd Markscheffel, Willi Bredemeier, and Jorg Becker, 2. Jahresbericht zur Lage der 
Informationswirtschaft in den neuen Bundesländern 1995/96, Hamburg: Hamburger Weltwirtschaftsarchiv, 1996.
90 Full quote: “Vom Ergebnis her betrachtet, liesse sich das Ende der DDR-Medien in einem Satz zusammenfassen: Sie 
wurden von ihren westdeutschen Konkurrenten übernommen.” See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 
20. Jahrhundert, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 243.
91 Haller, Michael, and Lutz Mükker (eds.), Wie die Medien zur Freiheit kamen. Zum Wandel der ostdeutschen 
Medienlandschaft seit dem Untergang der DDR, Koln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2010.
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in East Germany, and Schupbach Guzman's dissertation on “East German Journalists and the Wende.”92
Pürer and Raabe's book Media in Germany - the Press gives a comprehensive history of the 
press in Germany from 1945 until 1994.93 Different from other studies, both authors put a particular 
emphasis on German-German relations by sketching a detailed picture of the press developments, 
legislation and concentration processes in the Federal Republic until 1989, while also offering an 
insightful narrative of parallel press structures in the GDR. Eventually, they document press 
developments in the GDR and emerging press market structures during the transition and after German 
unification. The book succeeds in giving a comprehensive but detailed overview, touching upon critical
points and problems of the press in the Federal Republic and subsequently in a unified Germany. The 
study, however, is only as good as its limited sources. Similarly, Klammer's study gives valuable 
insights into the competing interests in reforming East German press distribution according to West 
German models and interests. Limited also by the sources available in the mid-1990s, however, and by 
its exclusive focus on distribution issues, the study leaves out the more complex interdependencies to 
other sectors that made for the overall transitional shift of the press. 
Schupbach Guzman documents how various journalists, news organizations and media policy 
institutions experienced the period of transition from domestic reform attempts to the political 
economic takeover of federal interests. Schupbach Guzman's put these shifts into close relation to 
changes in the news coverage. She shows how, based on an unprecedented professional freedom in the 
early upheaval period of 1989/90, reform attempts from within changed practiced journalism in the 
East German press:  
During this period, many news organizations tried to demonstrate their break from the 
old regime and their commitment to the new democratic process through penetrating 
investigations into abuses and violations of the past. These reports reflected a general 
trend during this period of uncovering the full extent of corruption and injustice.94 
According to Joachim Nolte, journalists argued the best way to make up for the past was to engage in 
true-to-life reporting that reflected the reality and interests of their viewers.95 Gunter Holzweißig, on 
92 Klammer, Bernd, Pressevertrieb in Ostdeutschland. Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Interessen beim Aufbau eines 
Pressegroßhandelssystems nach der Oktoberwende 1989, Dortmunder Beiträge zur Zeitungsforschung, Band 56, 
München: Saur, 1998. Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille, “East German Journalists and the Wende: A history on the 
collapse and transformation of socialist journalism in Germany,” PhD Dissertation, University of California, Los 
Angeles, 2015.
93 Pürer, Heinz, and Johannes Raabe, Medien in Deutschland, Presse, Band 1, Munich: olschläger, 1994, Springer 
Corporate Archive.
94 Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille, “East German Journalists and the Wende: A history on the collapse and 
transformation of socialist journalism in Germany,” PhD Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2015, pp. 
193-194.
95 Nolte, Joachim, Oktober 1989 bis Oktober 1990. Ausgewählt und kommentiert von Joachim Nolte, in Claus, Werner 
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the other hand, criticizes that these attempts have been either incomplete or insincere and investigative 
efforts of previous abuses usually degenerated into superficial sensationalism.96 Nolte is equally 
hesitant to readily accept the journalists' sincere efforts. He points out that while some journalists 
aimed to prove themselves through hard work and honesty, others tried to explain their own failures by 
pushing the blame on others, searching for and finding a constant supply of new scapegoats.97
Schupbach Guzman, in accordance with Michael Meyen, argues that the criticism of the 
legitimacy and sincerity of the professional and moral transformation of journalists must be seen as part
of a broader scholarship that pervades the historiography of the collapse of the Communism in Eastern 
Europe.98 It penetrates the ways journalism and its transition in East Germany is made sense of and 
upholds accounts of Western models of a “free press” as the ultimate measure of press freedom. This 
thesis shows how these patterns of legitimizing Western interests and pressures in the GDR were at 
play also during the transition period. 
(ed.), Medien-Wende, Wende-Medien? Dokumentation des Wandels im DDR-Journalismus, Oktober '89-Oktober '90, 
Berlin: Vistas, pp. 17-116, 1991, p. 66.
96 Holzweißig, Gunter, Die Schärfste Waffe Der Partei, Bohlau Koln, 2002, pp. 169–170.
97 Nolte, Joachim, “Oktober 1989 bis Oktober 1990. Ausgewählt und kommentiert von Joachim Nolte,” in Claus, Werner 
(ed.), Medien-Wende, Wende-Medien? Dokumentation des Wandels im DDR-Journalismus, Oktober '89-Oktober '90, 
Berlin: Vistas, pp. 17-116, 1991, p. 19.
98 Meyen, Michael, Mass media and collective memory. The communist GDR in today’s communicative and cultural 
memory, Conference Paper, IAMCR 2012 Conference, Durban, 2012. See for example: Haller, Michael, Klaus Puder, 
and Jochen Schlevoigt (eds.), Presse Ost, Presse West: Journalismus im vereinten Deutschland, Berlin: Vistas, 1995. 
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CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL CONTEXT
“Social market economy has turned out to be nothing more than
ordinary capitalism.”
Hans Modrow, New Year's greeting, 199299
On October 3, 1990, after forty years of division, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
joined the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) according to Article 23 of the federal Basic Law. This 
ended a forty-year federal postulate according to which reestablishing of German unity was the only 
possible end goal. The FRG had never officially recognized the GDR as a legitimate state and had 
claimed Alleinvertretungsanspruch, meaning that it was the sole representative of the German nation. 
With the Beitritt (accession) of the GDR to the FRG, federal law became all-German law, and four 
decades of struggle seemed resolved in a “super glue-unity.”100   
Much of the time between the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and October 3, 
1990, has fallen out of history: the ground breaking work, central importance and eventual decease of 
various opposition or civil movements (Bürgerbewegungen), the interim government under Hans 
Modrow, and the last and freely elected government under Lothar de Maizière. All of them did their 
share in reforming and administering a broken state that had to negotiate the interests of many.101 
The November revolution and the subsequent transition of the GDR (as of the entire Eastern 
bloc) was a complex process on a local, national, bi-lateral and international level. Narratives and 
interpretations of the driving goals, aims and motivations of different interest groups differ. The frame 
of this chapter is defined by the early involvement, goals and pressures of the federal government in the
East German transition. Thus, while this chapter introduces the main political actors, institutions and 
treaties of the transition process, it also outlines the early unification agenda of the federal government. 
This is followed by a parallel sub-chapter documenting the transition of media in the GDR. The focus 
lies on institutions of the GDR and their initiatives to bring about a democratic press. While this sub-
chapter also touches upon the (well researched) reform attempts within (press and broadcast) media 
during the transition period, its focus lies on the (understudied) structural challenges and political 
99 “Soziale Marktwirtschaft hat sich als ganz gewohnlicher Kapitalismus entpuppt.” Hans Modrow, Grußwort zum Neuen 
Jahr an die Leserinen und Leser des 'Offenen Blattes', November 27, 1992. ADS/Modrow-016 (1990-1994, Band I). 
100“Schnellkleber-Einheit.” Information box, Infokasten 17./18.2.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, 
Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 104, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
101Note: The focus of this thesis, thus, lies on the time between November 9, 1989, and October 3, 1990.
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attempts to face them. The goal in contrasting the overall federal agenda coming from Bonn and 
domestic initiatives in East Berlin is to show how the latter had little chance in the face of increasing 
unification dynamics. While there are various explanations as to why Bonn pushed for unification early
on, this thesis is concerned only with the consequences of this federal policy and its subsequent push 
for the GDR to adopt the West German socio-economic system. The warning of the magazine Spiegel 
“that the defects of our system are repeated over there [the GDR]” serves as a guiding light.102 The 
question of this chapter is how much this was the case. 
The GDR in Transition
“[A]n important psychological mistake … it was reported in the
press that we don't shed a tear for these people [GDR citizens
leaving the country].”
Egon Krenz to Mikhail Gorbachev,
November 1, 1989, Moscow103
The peaceful revolution in the GDR did not start in November 1989. Since the 1970s, several 
opposition groups in the GDR had formed around ecological issues, the international peace movement, 
free elections, arts and church matters.104 In the late 1980s, several of them started to form into civic 
movements or officially founded new parties (i.e. the Social Democrat Party, SPD). By 1987 and 1988,
these groups initiated meetings and demonstrations and publicized independent, alternative information
increasingly critical of the regime, for instance, of the electoral fraud at local elections on May 7, 
1989.105 On October 4, 1989, oppositional civic groups such as the New Forum (Neues Forum), 
102“daß die Fehler unseres Systems drüben noch einmal gemacht werden.” Cited in “Gegen Wildwuchs,”  Michael Müller, 
Neues Deutschland, May 10, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07795. 
103“wichtiger psychologischer Fehler … in der Presse wurde geschrieben, daß wir diesen Leuten keine Träne nachweinen.”
Protocol, Niederschrift des Gesprächs des Genossen Egon Krenz, Generalsekretär des ZK der SED und Vorsitzender des
Staatsrates der DDR, mit Genossen Michail Gorbatschow, Generalsekretär des ZK der KpdSU und Vorsitzender des 
Obersten Sowjets der UdSSR, am 1.11.1989 in Moskau, November 1, 1989, p. 4, BArch N/2541/65.
104Extensive collections on oppositional activities in the GDR can be found in the Archive of the Federal Foundation for 
the Examination and Reappraisal of the Communist Dictatorship in East Germany (Berlin), here, particularly those 
relating the oppositions in the church context (i.e. Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, Thomas Welz), as part of the 
international peace movement (i.e. Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, Katrin Eigenfeld). The Grüne Archiv holds extensive 
collections regarding political activism with regard to ecologcal issues in the GDR (i.e. Arche). See also Report, 
“Politische Zielvorstellungen wichtiger Oppositionsgruppen in der DDR,” Gesamtdeutsches Institut Bundesanstalt für 
Gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, Analysen und Berichte Nr. 13/1989, Bonn, November 10, 1989, Zusammenfassung, 
Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, Katrin Eigenfeld, 32/II.
105Die Mücke. Eine Dokumentation … Herausgegeben von Mitarbeitern der Arbeitsgruppe Menschenrechte und des 
Arbeitskreises Gerechtigkeit Leipzig, March 1989, pp.1-34, in Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, Katrin Eigenfeld, 13/II. See
also Report, “Politische Zielvorstellungen wichtiger Oppositionsgruppen in der DDR,” Gesamtdeutsches Institut 
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Democratic Awakening (Demokratischer Aufbruch), Democracy Now (Demokratie Jetzt) and others 
circulated a declaration that outspokenly argued for a political and economic reform of the state. 
Responding to growing numbers of refugees escaping to the FRG via Hungary and to demonstrations 
in cities such as Leipzig and Dresden to legalize these groups, state officials, the state police and 
institutions in the Federal Republic monitored them closely. Just one day after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the All-German Institute – Federal Office for All-German Tasks (Gesamtdeutsches Institut – 
Bundesanstalt für gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben) issued a seventy-five page internal report on the six 
major oppositional groups in the GDR.106 It made clear that while pushing for reform, all “adhere to the
special status of the GDR, in other words, to a vision of a democratic socialism with guaranteed civil 
liberties to be built on German soil.”107 Central demands were the freedom of speech, media freedom 
and the freedom to travel.
In spite of increasing pressures, the General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland, SED) Erich Honecker virtually ignored the problems in the 
country. Celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the GDR on October 7, 1989, attended by Michael 
Gorbachev and most of the Warsaw Pact leaders, Honecker faced an open conflict with closed ears. 
Gorbachev famously proclaimed to the Central Committee (Zentralkommitte, ZK) of the SED: “'life 
punishes those who come too late” – later admitting, he had actually talked about himself.108 
Gorbachev, who had always had a good personal relationship with Honecker, later stated that Honecker
“had not faced reality and seen what had gone on for real,” but he “had apparently thought of himself 
as the number one in socialism, if not the world,” which represented “a great personal tragedy.”109 
Bundesanstalt für Gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, Analysen und Berichte Nr. 13/1989, Bonn, November 10, 1989, 
Zusammenfassung, Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, Katrin Eigenfeld, 32/II.
106Report, “Politische Zielvorstellungen wichtiger Oppositionsgruppen in der DDR,” Gesamtdeutsches Institut 
Bundesanstalt für Gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, Analysen und Berichte Nr. 13/1989, Bonn, November 10, 1989, 
Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, Katrin Eigenfeld, 32/II.
107“Alle Reformgruppen halten an der Sonderexistenz der DDR, d.h. an einer Vision von einem zu errichtenden 
demokratischen Sozialismus auf deutschen Boden mit garantierten Freiheitsrechten fest.” See for instance Report, 
“Politische Zielvorstellungen wichtiger Oppositionsgruppen in der DDR,” Gesamtdeutsches Institut Bundesanstalt für 
Gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, Analysen und Berichte Nr. 13/1989, Bonn, November 10, 1989, Zusammenfassung, 
Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, Katrin Eigenfeld, 32/II.
108“Wer zu spät kommt, den bestraft das Leben.” Protocol, Niederschrift des Gesprächs des Genossen Egon Krenz, 
Generalsekretär des ZK der SED und Vorsitzender des Staatsrates der DDR, mit Genossen Michail Gorbatschow, 
Generalsekretär des ZK der KpdSU und Vorsitzender des Obersten Sowjets der UdSSR, am 1.11.1989 in Moskau, 
November 1, 1989, p. 2, BArch N/2541/65.
109“habe nicht mehr real gesehen was wirklich vorgehe … habe sich offensichtlich für die Nummer 1 im Sozialismus, 
wenn nicht sogar der Welt gehalten … “ein großes personliches Drama.” Protocol, Niederschrift des Gesprächs des 
Genossen Egon Krenz, Generalsekretär des ZK der SED und Vorsitzender des Staatsrates der DDR, mit Genossen 
Michail Gorbatschow, Generalsekretär des ZK der KpdSU und Vorsitzender des Obersten Sowjets der UdSSR, am 
1.11.1989 in Moskau, November 1, 1989, p. 8, BArch N/2541/65.
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The anniversary parade was followed by the first of many mass demonstrations in East Berlin 
and rising political pressures. The Politburo ousted Honecker on October 18, and replaced him with 
Egon Krenz, the regime's number-two man for most of the second half of the 1980s. Krenz made 
promises to open up the regime from above. When meeting Gorbachev in Moscow on November 1, he 
underlined that the current political crisis had been in the making for some time. Honecker's rigorous 
resistance to any reform attempts, however, had led to the complete absence of discussions based on an
“unvarnished picture of the real economic situation in the GDR.”110 Approaches taken on the ninth SED
party congress had not been based “on a real assessment of the situation” but the “on subjective 
perceptions.”111 Wrong conclusions had been drawn from international and national developments that 
had let to economic and political hardship, and changes that had been made in the Soviet Union had 
been missed in the GDR.
Demonstrations continued and so did the stream of people fleeing to the FRG via Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. The highpoint of protest came on November 4, with 250.000 people protesting in the 
streets of East Berlin. On November 9, 1989, in an effort to calm the protests and the mass exodus, the 
government crafted new travel regulations that allowed East Germans to go to West Germany (either 
permanently or for a visit). When it was announced that the new regulations were due to take effect 
immediately and without delay, large crowds gathered at the checkpoints near the Berlin Wall. 
Unprepared, outnumbered, and unwilling to use force to keep them back, the guards finally let them 
through. That same night, Krenz wrote a telex to Gorbachev. He reasoned that the large amounts of 
people at the border had made the “short-handed decision” necessary; “[a] denial to access to West 
Berlin would have also had serious political consequences whose dimensions would have been 
incalculable,”112 According to Krenz, about 60.000 citizens of the GDR had gone to West Berlin, about 
45.000 had returned that same night, and he urged for immediate negotiations with the Western powers 
to avoid violent confrontations.113 In the following days, increasing numbers of East Germans took 
110“ungeschminktes Bild der realen Situation der Volkswirtschaft der DDR.” Protocol, Niederschrift des Gesprächs des 
Genossen Egon Krenz, Generalsekretär des ZK der SED und Vorsitzender des Staatsrates der DDR, mit Genossen 
Michail Gorbatschow, Generalsekretär des ZK der KpdSU und Vorsitzender des Obersten Sowjets der UdSSR, am 
1.11.1989 in Moskau, November 1, 1989, p. 9, BArch N/2541/65.
111Full quote: “auf einer realen Einschätzung der Lage … bei der Losung okonomischer Fragen ging man von subjektiven 
Auffassungen [aus].” Protocol, Niederschrift des Gesprächs des Genossen Egon Krenz, Generalsekretär des ZK der SED
und Vorsitzender des Staatsrates der DDR, mit Genossen Michail Gorbatschow, Generalsekretär des ZK der KpdSU und
Vorsitzender des Obersten Sowjets der UdSSR, am 1.11.1989 in Moskau, November 1, 1989, p. 4, BArch N/2541/65.
112“kurzfristige Entscheidung … Eine Nichtzulassung der Ausreisen nach Berlin (West) hätte auch zu schwerwiegenden 
politischen Folgen geführt, deren Ausmaße nicht überschaubar gewesen wären.” Telex, Egon Krenz, Generalsekretär 
des ZK der SED, to Michail S. Gorbatschow, Generalsekretär des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU, Berlin, November 10, 
1989, BArch N/2541/65.
113Telex, Egon Krenz, Generalsekretär des ZK der SED, to Michail S. Gorbatschow, Generalsekretär des Zentralkomitees 
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advantage and visited West Germany or West Berlin, where they were met by 100 DM “greeting 
money” (Begrüßungsgeld). 
Modrow Government – 'A School of Democracy'
“Not campaigning takes priority but the exercising of our national
responsibility.”
Hans Modrow in preparation for a meeting Helmut Kohl,
February 4, 1990114 
In his conversation with Krenz on November 1, Gorbachev had underlined that a dialog with 
the population was crucial for any leading party whose job was to analyze and give political guidance. 
Not to fear ones own people but to realize that the people and the party of the GDR were going through
fundamental changes that needed to be addressed.115 On December 1, the People's Chamber removed 
those provisions in the GDR constitution that had given the SED a monopoly of power. Krenz, the 
politburo, and the Central Committee resigned two days later, and Hans Modrow, who had been an 
early critic of Honecker within the SED leadership and who had been appointed prime minister only 
two weeks earlier, now became the de facto leader of a country that was in a state of utter collapse. 
Modrow, who was to become “a candid administrator of the transition process in the GDR,” put his 
immediate attention to maintaining security and a stable domestic situation.116
On December 7, the grass-roots democratic Round Table (RT) had its constitutive meeting, on 
the initiative of “those new political powers and the churches who have brought about the peaceful 
revolution.”117 The RT, based on similar initiatives in Poland, was a response to the drastic current 
der KPdSU, Berlin, November 10, 1989, BArch N/2541/65.
114“Es darf nicht um Wahlkampf gehen, sondern um die Wahrnehmung unserer nationalen Verantwortung.” Notes, 
Empfehlungen für das Vieraugengespräch mit Bundeskanzler Kohl, n.d., p. 2, BArch N/2541/72.
115Protocol, Niederschrift des Gesprächs des Genossen Egon Krenz, Generalsekretär des ZK der SED und Vorsitzender des
Staatsrates der DDR, mit Genossen Michail Gorbatschow, Generalsekretär des ZK der KpdSU und Vorsitzender des 
Obersten Sowjets der UdSSR, am 1.11.1989 in Moskau, November 1, 1989, p. 2, BArch N/2541/65.
116“ein redlicher Verwalter dieses Übergangsprozesses in der DDR.” Interview, “Man behandelt die DDR-Regierung, als 
wäre sie nicht mehr existent.' Antje Vollmer, Fraktionssprecherin der Grünen, über den Modrow-Besuch in Bonn,” 
Manfred Kriener (taz vom 15.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der 
Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 95, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. Also report, Bericht der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur inneren 
Sicherheit für die Beratung mit dem Runden Tisch am 15.1.1990, January 15, 1990, p. 2, BArch DA3/7.
117“jener neuen politischen Kräfte und der Kirchen, die die friedliche Revolution auf den Weg gebracht haben.” Report, 
Ergebnisse der 16. Sitzung des Rundentischgespräches am 12. März 1990, Abschlusserklärung des Zentralen Runden 
Tisches, March 12, 1990, p. 7, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; File 7.  Report, Information über
den Runden Tisch 7.12.89, December 7, 1989, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; File 7. Note: 
The following is largely based on the RT protocols and report of the meetings between December 7 (first meeting) and 
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political changes and, as founding member Gerhard Bächer put it, the need to give political space to 
oppositional groups.118 It soon turned into a grass-roots level “school of democracy.”119 The RT aimed 
for democratic reforms within the GDR, and a renewal of the given socialist political and economic 
structures. As such, its initiatives aimed first at reform, not unification, and eventually at a contractual 
cooperation and agreement (Vertragsgemeinschaft) between the FRG and the GDR based on the Basic 
Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) of 1972. Another possibility was a confederation (Konfoderation) between 
both German states.120 By December 18, eleven (of eventually seventeen) RT committees had been 
created: the media committee was one of them. It aimed to guarantee media access and resources to 
oppositional groups organized in the RT. 
Modrow, however, paid little attention to the RT, and for weeks did not meet in person. Instead,
on December 19, he met with the federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (of the Christian Democratic Union, 
CDU) in the East German town of Dresden. Expectations were high. Just two weeks earlier, Kohl had 
published a ten-point program for Germany that also envisioned a “contractual arrangement” based on 
a confederal system. And while the RT demanded clear results at the meeting, Modrow himself brought
to the table a long list of immediate concerns: the unstable situation in the GDR fostered by the 
economic situation and the lack of state resources led to unpopular measures (i.e. the decrease of 
subsidies) and more people leaving the country. For the first free elections, set for May 6, 1990, 
Modrow emphasized, “free elections also do not tolerate interferences from the FRG, as can already be 
seen very clearly.”121 Also on top of the list, the currency gap (Währungsgefälle) between the GDR and 
FRG. With growing bi-lateral exchange processes, the gap worked already against the GDR. It was to 
bring new problems with the beginning of the visa-free entry of West German citizens starting on 
January 1, 1990. This would lead to “a sellout of certain goods and services as well as increase return 
flows of speculative money into the GDR … including the consequences of undeclared labor.”122 
March 12, 1990 (sixteenth meeting), which can be found in Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; File
7, partly also in BArch DA3/7.
118Personal communication, Gerhard Bächer, interview, June 27, 2016. 
119Report, Ergebnisse der 16. Sitzung des Rundentischgespräches am 12. März 1990, Schlußansprache der Moderatoren, 
March 12, 1990, p. 11, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; File 7. 
120Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. Sitzung, 15.1.1990, Vorlage Nr. 8, Demokratie Jetzt – an den Runden Tische zur 
Bildung einer Arbeitsgruppe 'Internationale Politik'. January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
121“Freie Wahlen vertragen aber auch keine Einmischung aus der BRD, wie sie bereits jetzt sehr deutlich sind,” Internal 
note, “Für das Gespräch mit Kohl unter vier Augen (in Dresden!),” Hans Modrow [n.d.], p. 1, ADS/Modrow-005 
(November 1989 – Dezember 1989). See also statement, Stellungnahme des Runden Tisches zum Besuch von BRD-
Kanzler Kohl, [n.d.], ADS/Modrow-005 (November 1989 – Dezember 1989). 
122“einen Ausverkauf an bestimmten Waren und Leistungen sowie einen verstärkten Rückfluß spekulativen Geldes in die 
DDR ... einschließlich Folgen der Schwarzarbeit.” Internal note, “Für das Gespräch mit Kohl unter vier Augen (in 
Dresden!),” Hans Modrow [n.d.], p. 2, ADS/Modrow-005 (November 1989 – Dezember 1989). 
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Modrow concluded, both states needed to take joint responsibility and find solutions for a peaceful 
Europe, for instance, by a “contractual agreement” (Vertragsgemeinschaft) and a burden sharing 
(Lastenausgleich) for reparations paid by the GDR after World War II. The FRG was to support the 
GDR with an annual 15 billion DM for 1990, and 1991.123 The GDR, in turn, would commit to 
spending these means exclusively in the FRG, using them for the modernization of its economy and 
infrastructure. Based on this burden sharing, the economic cooperation between the GDR and the FRG 
needed to be given a broad and diverse basis to guarantee optimal results on both sides.124 Modrow 
underlined: 
As we see it, the impression must not come up that the FRG is awaiting an increase of 
instability in the GDR instead of giving effective, thus, fast support … There must not 
be disappointment in this meeting for this would increase the danger of social unrest 
resulting from political and social insecurity. It is crucial that all political forces, also the
newly established, are encouraged by this meeting to continue the process of 
democratization and to prepare for the free elections on May 6.125
The meeting between Modrow and Kohl and its resulting agreements became pivotal points for all 
following German-German initiatives. German-German expert committees were established a wide 
range of socio-economic and political issues. They were to meet and develop collaborative steps and 
policies on issues such as the economic and monetary union, or media and the press. 
The general situation worsened, however, and in late January, Modrow stressed to the People's 
Chamber that “the situation was alarming” on all levels of society.126 The major aim to maintain peace, 
order and non-violence respectively changed the government's relationship to the RT. On January 15, 
Modrow attended the seventh meeting of the RT, and the press reported that he now aimed “at 
123Note: Modrow estimates for such economic burden sharing were based on the reparations paid by the GDR after WWII, 
which accumulated to 727 billion DM, while the FRG had received considerable economic aid after the war. They also 
included the economic losses experienced by the GDR due to its citizens leaving the country (in 1989 alone, it had been 
about 300.000 workers whose educational and training costs amounted to 17 billion M) and its economic losses due to 
currency gap. Internal note, “Für das Gespräch mit Kohl unter vier Augen (in Dresden!),” Hans Modrow [n.d.], p. 3, 
ADS/Modrow-005 (November 1989 – Dezember 1989). 
124Internal note, “Für das Gespräch mit Kohl unter vier Augen (in Dresden!),” Hans Modrow [n.d.], p. 4, ADS/Modrow-
005 (November 1989 – Dezember 1989). 
125“Es darf unseres Erachtens nicht der Eindruck entstehen, daß von seiten der BRD auf eine Zunahme der Instabilität der 
DDR gewartet wird, statt wirksame, also rasche Unterstützung zu geben. ... Es darf keine Enttäuschung über dieses 
Treffen geben, weil darin die Gefahr einer Zunahme sozialer Unruhen als Folge politischer und sozialer Unsicherheit 
läge. Wichtig ist, daß alle politischen Kräfte, auch die neu etablierten, durch dieses Treffen die Ermutigung erhalten, den
Prozeß der Demokratisierung fortzusetzen und sich auf freie Wahlen am 6. Mai vorzubereiten.” Internal note, “Für das 
Gespräch mit Kohl unter vier Augen (in Dresden!),” Hans Modrow [n.d.], p. 5, ADS/Modrow-005 (November 1989 – 
Dezember 1989). 
126“'Die Lage ist besorgniserregend.' Dokumentation: Auszüge aus der Erklärung des Ministerpräsidenten Modrow vor der 
Volkskammer,” Hans Modrow (taz vom 30.1.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 
1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 63, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 
– Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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including into government responsibility the opposition organized around the Round Table.”127 This 
step had not been easy for Modrow. He underlined that not the pursuit of short-term partisan interests 
stood at the fore, but that all political parties and RT groups had to work together to support its efforts 
in doing its work.128 Modrow would attend three RT meetings in total, and eventually, eight ministers 
coming from RT oppositional groups became the legitimizing basis of the Modrow government. To the
latter, “the often practical cooperation with citizens but especially the ... various established security 
partnerships with new groups of society and parties as well as civic groups” were “essential for 
securing public order and safety, and, above all, non-violence.”129 One consequence of this cooperation 
with the RT: the rescheduling of new elections from early May to March 18, and the agreement that all 
new major laws were to be passed to the RT first.
Simultaneously and due to an increasingly unstable situation, Modrow, in late January, adopted 
the four-stage plan for “establishing a united German state.”130 While he received approval from 
Gorbachev, the plan was opposed by almost all NATO states at the Conference of Security Policy 
(Wehrkundetagung) on February 3 and 4, in Munich. Security expert of the Social Democratic Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) Egon Bahr rigorously rejected the “entirely 
unrealistic” idea of a united Germany's membership in the NATO - there will not be such a thing.131 
Domestically, however, the federal agenda was clear and had been since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, if not before. At the executive board meeting of the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische 
Partei, FDP) in November 1989, for instance, it was underlined that “the demand for self-determination
of Germans in the GDR was completely justified but this needed to be added by the sentence that the 
127“die am Runden Tisch versammelte Opposition in die Regierungsverantwortung einzubinden.” “Bilanz einer 
Gratwanderung. Ist die Regierung von Hans Modrow gescheitert oder nicht?” Walter Süß (taz vom 17.3.1990), taz - 
DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur 
Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 159-160, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
128Protocol, Ergebnisse des Rundtischgespräches am 15.1.1990, January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
129Full quote: “das in vielen Fällen praktizierte Zusammenwirken mit den Bürgern und insbesondere die in den letzten 
Monaten zustandegekommenen vielfältigen Sicherheitspartnerschaften mit neuen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen und 
Parteien sowie Bürgerkomitees. … Sie erwiesen sich als unerläßlich für die Gewährleistung der offentlichen Ordnung 
und Sicherheit und vor allem auch für die Gewaltlosigkeit.” Report, Bericht der Regierung der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik zur inneren Sicherheit für die Beratung mit dem Runden Tisch am 15.1.1990, January 15, 
1990, p. 2, BArch DA3/7.
130“Bildung eines einheitlichen deutschen Staates.” Information box, Infokasten 1.2.90, and document “Schritte zur 
deutschen Einheit,” taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des 
Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 71, pp. 72-73, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
131“vollig irreal.” Information box, Infokasten 3./4.2.90, and document “Schritte zur deutschen Einheit,” taz - DDR 
Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung 
der Wahlurnen, p. 72, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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FDR aimed for the reunion of both German states.”132 This line of reasoning had been followed at the 
Deutschlanddebatte, the discussion on Germany, in the German Bundestag in mid-January: Federal 
Minister for Special Affairs and the head of the Office of the German Chancellery Rudolf Seiters asked
for a contractual community (Vertragsgemeinschaft) with the GDR to formalize German unity. FDP 
head Otto Graf Lambsdorff demanded a “clear 'Yes' of the GDR to the market economy.”133 The corner
stone of any reform attempts in the GDR needed to be an economic one. As journalist Walter Süß put 
it, “[i]t touches almost all aspects of the society of the GDR.”134 
This was nothing new to reformers in the GDR. Already in October 1989, the newspaper Der 
Morgen, when discussing needed reforms of journalism, made clear that “many of the problems we 
need to tackle in our country root in hardcore economics.”135 Oppositional civic groups envisioned a 
mix of “radical democratic and socialist ideas” in “a hybrid system” that included market elements in a 
less bureaucratic and “democratically controlled framework planning of the state.”136 The new 
Economic Minister Christa Luft, Süß criticized, viewed this project as completely apolitical in that new
models were being discussed among academic elites while the population only learned of the 
consequences. “A public debate on possible alternatives and their respective costs, over priorities that 
society at large could have agreed upon, did not take place.”137 To the RT, the main obstacle to 
fundamental economic reforms were grounded in the fact that decisions and processes were still shaped
132“Die Forderung nach Selbstbestimmung der Deutschen in der DDR sei vollkommen richtig, davor gehore aber der Satz, 
daß die F.D.P. die Wiedervereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten anstrebe.” Protocol, Protokoll der Sitzung des 
Präsidium am Montag, den 13.11. 1989, Bonn, November 13, 1989, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Präsidium/15467.
133“deutliches Ja der DDR zur Marktwirtschaft.” Information box, Infokasten 18.1.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die 
Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 38,
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
134Full quote: “Sie berührt fast alle Bereiche der DDR-Gesellschaft – gewachsene Sicherheiten und Bequemlichkeiten, 
Zukunftshoffnungen und -ängste.” “Bilanz einer Gratwanderung. Ist die Regierung von Hans Modrow gescheitert oder 
nicht?” Walter Süß (taz vom 17.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von 
der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 159-160, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
135“viele der anzupackenden Probleme in unserem Lande [haben] mit knallharter Ökonomie zu tun.” Pamphlet, Frank 
Mangelsdorf, Leitlinien des Redaktionskollegiums, October 23, 1989, p. 1, Archiv des Liberalismus, LDPD / L7-418. 
136Full quote: “radikaldemokratische und sozialistische Überlegungen, die zumeist auf der Schaffung eines Mischsystems, 
also auf dem Einbau marktwirtschaftlicher Elemente in eine entbürokratisierte, demokratischer Kontrolle unterworfene 
Rahmenplannung durch die [sic] Staat gerichtet sind.” Report, “Politische Zielvorstellungen wichtiger 
Oppositionsgruppen in der DDR,” Gesamtdeutsches Institut Bundesanstalt für Gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, Analysen und
Berichte Nr. 13/1989, Bonn, November 10, 1989, Zusammenfassung, Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, Katrin Eiegenfeld, 
32/II.
137“Eine offentliche Debatte über die denkbaren Alternativen und ihren jeweiligen Preis, über Prioritäten, auf die die 
Gesellschaft sich hätte verständigen konne, fand nicht statt.” “Bilanz einer Gratwanderung. Ist die Regierung von Hans 
Modrow gescheitert oder nicht?” Walter Süß (taz vom 17.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, 
Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 159-160, Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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by former SED elites who “still exercise their power by means of old structures.”138 And while the East 
German population and internal reforms were one thing, West German political and economic interests 
were another. 
When Kohl and Modrow (joined by Round Table members) met again in Bonn on February 4, 
Kohl made clear the situation in the GDR had deteriorated to an extent that he had contacted the Soviet 
Union as well as the US.139 At the follow-up meeting on February 13/14, Kohl expected an accelerated 
unification process not the least because of a continuous exodus of East German citizens.140 Between 
January 1 and February 17, about 89.000 people had left the country.141 The delegation of the GDR, 
however, pointed out that the goal could not be a hasty annexation but that the citizens of the GDR 
needed to keep their sovereignty.142 Further, Modrow argued, in spite of consistent public promises of 
support on part of the Federal Republic, Kohl had distanced himself from them and had disappointed 
high expectations of the population. In preparing for the meeting with Kohl, he made clear that these 
“delaying tactics,” willingly or not, fueled sentiments for a hasty unification by creating a situation on 
the ground that Europe then had to accept; the message of a quick monetary union was spread 
throughout the media and had attracted great publicity but also created insecurities in the GDR.143 The 
RT, in its own position paper, underlined that while it was “obvious that certain interests in the FRG 
are currently heading for a deliberate intensification of the problems in the GDR,” the federal 
government failed to counteract these interests and an increasing destabilization in the country.144 It 
warned again of hasty plans of a monetary union and argued the GDR needed, first and foremost, to 
find its own solutions for economic reforms to ensure the social well-being of its population. Modrow 
138“immer noch unter alten Strukturen ihre Macht ausüben.” Report, Ergebnisse der 16. Sitzung des 
Rundentischgespräches am 12. März 1990, March 12, 1990,  Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; 
File 7. 
139Protocol, Gespräch Hans Modrow – Helmut Kohl am 4. Februar 1990 in Davos,  Berlin, February 5, 1990, BArch 
N/2541/72.
140Meeting documents, “Sitzungsmaterial, personlich, für den 15.2.1990 / zum Tagesordnungspunkt 1b, Bericht über den 
Besuch des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, Hans Modrow, am 13. und 14. Februar in Bonn,” n.d. [February 
12, 1990], pp. 1-2, ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 1990). 
141Information box, Infokasten 17./18.2.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von 
der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 104, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
142Meeting documents, “Sitzungsmaterial, personlich, für den 15.2.1990 / zum Tagesordnungspunkt 1b, Bericht über den 
Besuch des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, Hans Modrow, am 13. und 14. Februar in Bonn,” n.d. [February 
12, 1990], pp. 1-2, ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 1990). 
143“Hinhaltetaktik.” Notes, Empfehlungen für das Vieraugengespräch mit Bundeskanzler Kohl, n.d., pp. 1-2, BArch 
N/2541/72.
144“offensichtlich, daß manche Kräfte in der BRD gegenwärtig Kurs auf eine bewußte Verschärfung der Probleme in der 
DDR nehmen.” Position paper, “Positionen des Runden Tisches für die Verhandlungen zwischen Ministerpräsident 
Modrow und Bundeskanzler Kohl am 13./14.Februar 1990,” n.d. [February 12, 1990], p. 1, ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 
1990). 
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and the RT stood in agreement. Handing over the RT position paper to Kohl, Modrow underlined, “[i]n
them [these positions], the concordant will of the government and the Round Table found their 
expression.”145 
Kohl, on his part, insisted that current developments had outpaced ideas of a contractual 
agreement, which had prompted him to suggest a monetary and economic union. “The DM 
[Deutschmark] was to be used as the strongest 'asset' in calming the situation. This demanded for 
resolute economic reforms to introduce a social market economy in the GDR”146 This position was 
preceded by a declaration of the Bonn Cabinet on February 7, 1990. It had made the takeover of the 
West German economic and legal system the precondition for a monetary union with the GDR. 
Economic Minister Helmut Haussmann (FDP) demanded a “full commitment” to “thoroughbred 
private property,” and the federal government constituted a cabinet committee on “German unity” 
(Deutsche Einheit) chaired by Kohl.147 The meeting on February 13/14 was followed by a private 
discussion between Modrow and Kohl on February 15. Kohl declared that “without a fast decision on 
the currency question, there was not going to be calming [of the situation]. After, a fast economic boom
was going to set in.”148 Kohl, thus, wanted the expert meetings for a monetary and economic union to 
start working the following week.
Facing these crystallizing demands and unification scenarios in Bonn, Wolfgang Ullmann, RT 
representative of the civic group Democracy Now, on February 12, demanded the creation of a trust 
agency (Treuhandgesellschaft). It was to safeguard the rights of the East German population in the 
transition of people's or public property (Volkseigentum) (see Chapter 6).149 The RT was further 
145“In ihnen komme der übereinstimmende Wille von Regierung und Rundem Tisch zum Ausdruck.” Meeting documents, 
“Sitzungsmaterial, personlich, für den 15.2.1990 / zum Tagesordnungspunkt 1b, Bericht über den Besuch des 
Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, Hans Modrow, am 13. und 14. Februar in Bonn,” n.d. [February 12, 1990], p. 
5, ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 1990). 
146“Die DM solle als stärkstes 'Aktivum' zur Beruhigung der Lage eingesetzt werden. Das erfordere in der DDR 
konsequente Wirtschaftsreformen zur Einführung der sozialen Marktwirtschaft.” Meeting documents, “Sitzungsmaterial,
personlich, für den 15.2.1990 / zum Tagesordnungspunkt 1b, Bericht über den Besuch des Vorsitzenden des 
Ministerrates der DDR, Hans Modrow, am 13. und 14. Februar in Bonn,” n.d. [February 12, 1990], pp. 3-4, 
ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 1990). 
147“uneingeschränktes Bekenntnis … reinrassigem Privateigentum.” Cited in: Information box, Infokasten 7.2.90, taz - 
DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur 
Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 72, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
148“ohne eine schnelle Währungsentscheidung werde es zu keiner Beruhigung kommen. Dann werde es einen schnellen 
Wirtschaftsboom geben.” Report, Zusammenfassung des Vieraugengespräches zwischen Ministerpräsident H. Modrow 
und Bundeskanzler H. Kohl, attachment 2 to meeting documents, “Sitzungsmaterial, personlich, für den 15.2.1990 / zum
Tagesordnungspunkt 1b, Bericht über den Besuch des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, Hans Modrow, am 13. 
und 14. Februar in Bonn,” n.d. [February 12, 1990], pp. 12-13, ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 1990). 
149Information box, Infokasten 12.2.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der 
Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 72, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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working on a new constitution, and its referendum was to be held in mid-June.150 These reform attempts
were planned just days before the first free elections in the GDR (see below), and weeks after it had 
been claimed that “the ship [heading towards unity] has sailed.”151 
And while Modrow complained about Bonn's empty promises and urged for action, the federal 
government pushed for a monetary and economic union, and the introduction of a social market 
economy in the GDR with the Deutschmark as a stabilizing factor. It underlined that any 
democratization process in the GDR went hand in hand with the unification of both German states.152 
And while SPD financial expert Matthäus-Maier expected a “second economic miracle,” Haussmann 
criticized Modrow for his complaints about his visit in Bonn, claiming that “returning with the 
Deutschmark in your pocket is one of the greatest gifts.”153 Only a few West German politicians took a 
different approach: Antje Vollmer of the Green Party pointed to the crumbling resistance in the GDR 
due to pressures of the Federal Republic.154 “The government [Modrow and the RT delegation] are 
being treated as if they are not existing anymore,” she proclaimed.155 Others spoke of a “demonstrative 
disregard for the Modrow government in Bonn” having found its high point at the visit in mid-
February.156 Similarly, the two-plus-four talks in Ottawa in mid-February, during which the two 
German foreign ministers and the four victorious powers of WWII dealt with the “outer aspects of 
150Note: This draft constitution was finished by June 1990. Article 15 dealt with the freedom of media.
151“Der Zug ist abgefahren – aber wohin? Dokumentation: Günter Grass über Rudolf Augstein, den 'Spiegel' und die 
deutsche Frage,” Günter Grass (taz vom 23.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 
1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 114-115, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / 
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
152Report, Zusammenfassung der Sitzung im Kreis der Delegierten, attachment to meeting documents, “Sitzungsmaterial, 
personlich, für den 15.2.1990 / zum Tagesordnungspunkt 1b, Bericht über den Besuch des Vorsitzenden des 
Ministerrates der DDR, Hans Modrow, am 13. und 14. Februar in Bonn,” n.d. [February 12, 1990], pp. 18-20, p. 23, 
ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 1990). 
153“zweites Wirtschaftswunder … mit der Deutschen Mark im Gepäck zurückzukehren, ist eines der großten Geschenke.” 
Cited in: Information box, Infokasten 17./18.2.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 
1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 104, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / 
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
154Report, Zusammenfassung der Sitzung im Kreis der Delegierten, attachment to meeting documents, “Sitzungsmaterial, 
personlich, für den 15.2.1990 / zum Tagesordnungspunkt 1b, Bericht über den Besuch des Vorsitzenden des 
Ministerrates der DDR, Hans Modrow, am 13. und 14. Februar in Bonn,” n.d. [February 12, 1990], p. 23, 
ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 1990). 
155Interview, “Man behandelt die DDR-Regierung, als wäre sie nicht mehr existent.' Antje Vollmer, Fraktionssprecherin 
der Grünen, über den Modrow-Besuch in Bonn,” Manfred Kriener (taz vom 15.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die 
Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 
95, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
156“demonstrative Mißachtung der Regierung Modrow durch Bonn.” “Bilanz einer Gratwanderung. Ist die Regierung von 
Hans Modrow gescheitert oder nicht?” Walter Süß (taz vom 17.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der 
Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 159-160, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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creating German unity,” in fact, became more a “One plus Four” talk.157 
Modrow eventually became one of the most outspoken critics of the unification process, the role
of the federal government in it and its repeated reliance on a proclaimed “inherited burden of the SED 
regime,” which served its own interests.158 In 1994, having been asked about his biggest 
accomplishments and failures, Modrow responded that the former lay in having been able to play his 
part in keeping the revolution peaceful, without civil war and bloodshed. His goal of “one Germany – 
one nation” (Deutschland einig Vaterland), however, had not been fulfilled. Any such union would 
have required a gradual socially and economically agreeable integration of both states, which due to the
West German political agenda, had not happened.159 
Elections and Campaigning in the GDR
“Fights are being fought here that are actually those of the
Federal Republic.”
Interview on the election campaign, Lothar de Maizière, March 7,
1990160
Already in January 1990, Modrow had urged “a number of politicians and media in the Federal 
Republic of Germany to not make the GDR the stomping ground of interference.”161 At the meeting 
157Note: This referred to an “open fire meeting” between foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher [FRG] and US foreign 
minister James Baker two weeks earlier, Genscher's unilateral talks on German unity with Soviet foreign minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze, repeated consultations of the FRG with the victorious powers, and the information on the Ottawa-
talks given to East Berlin just the day before the conference (on February 13). Quote: “äußeren Aspekte der Herstellung 
der deutschen Einheit,” “Die Bundesdeutschen auf der Siegerstraße,”Andreas Zumach (taz vom 15.2.90), taz - DDR 
Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung 
der Wahlurnen, pp. 93-94, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
158“Erblast des SED-Regimes.” See Interview, “Hans Modrow im ND-Interview: Deutschland, einig Vaterland? Nur, wenn
die Selbstachtung der ehemaligen DDR-Bürger gestärkt wird,” Neues Deutschland, Feb. 1, 1991, p. 6., ADS/Modrow-
016 (1990-1994, Band I). Also talk, Hans Modrow, Verfassungserfahrungen der Ostdeutschen und 
Verfassungsgestaltung im vereinten Deutschland, Vortrag Tübingen (19.10.92), Bonn, October 5, 1992, ADS/Modrow-
016 (1990-1994, Band I). See also Interview, “Hans Modrow, Über die Bewertung des von der DDR 1990 in die 
deutsche Einheit eingebrachten Volks- und Staatseigentums,“  Neues Deutschland, Bonn, October 4, 1992, 
ADS/Modrow-016 (1990-1994, Band I).
159Response Hans Modrow [n.d.] to telex, Rafael Pilsczek, Die Woche, August 2, 1994, ADS/Modrow-016 (1990-1994, 
Band II). 
160“Da wird jetzt etwas bei uns ausgetragen, was eigentlich eine bundesrepublikanische Auseinandersetzung ist.” 
Interview, “'Einen Beitritt ohne Bedingungen macht die CDU nicht mit' – Interview mit Lothar de Maizière, 
Vorsitzender der CDU, zu den sozialen Folgen der Wiedervereinigung, den Differenzen der Allianz für Deutschland und
zu Debatte um die polnische Westgrenze,” Interview Brigitte Fehrle (taz vom 7.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die 
Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 
146-147, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
161Full quote: “Ich fordere eine Reihe von Politkern und Medien in der Bundesrepublik  Deutschland noch einmal auf, die 
DDR nicht zum Tummelplatz der Einmischung zu machen.” Protocol, Ergebnisse des Rundtischgespräches am 
40
with Kohl in mid-February, several RT members underlined that the first free elections in the GDR 
needed to happen without massive campaign support coming from the Federal Republic. The RT, thus, 
decided against an active involvement of West German politicians in it.162 Kohl on his part declared, 
however, that “one could not expect that parties from the FRG stay out of the election campaign in the 
GDR. There were common traditions,” while repeating that “with the DM, the greatest asset could be 
used. It is about a social market economy.”163 
The Federal Ministry of Intra-German Relations (Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche 
Beziehungen) allocated around 7.5 million Mark to the election via political foundations. The GDR-
CDU received 4.5 million, the SPD and FDP each 1.5 million, the GDR Green Party nothing.164 This 
massive funding was the consequence of all established West German parties supporting their “East 
German junior partners.”165 Along with financial support came serious interventions of West German 
party politics for reasons of power rather out of considerations for the actual economic and social 
conditions in the GDR.166 The GDR Green Party called it a “degeneration of political customs that is 
being carried into the GDR by means of swanky campaigning of West German parties” and by election
strategists who “export an understanding of democracy based on domestic hostilities.”167 Several 
15.1.1990, January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
162Report, Zusammenfassung der Sitzung im Kreis der Delegierten, attachment to meeting documents, “Sitzungsmaterial, 
personlich, für den 15.2.1990 / zum Tagesordnungspunkt 1b, Bericht über den Besuch des Vorsitzenden des 
Ministerrates der DDR, Hans Modrow, am 13. und 14. Februar in Bonn,” n.d. [February 12, 1990], pp. 16-18, 
ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 1990). 
163“man konne nicht erwarten, daß sich die BRD-Parteien aus dem Wahlkampf in der DDR heraushalten. Es gebe 
gemeinsame Traditionen … Mit der DM konne das stärkste Aktivum eingesetzt werden. Es gehe um eine soziale 
Marktwirtschaft.” Report, Zusammenfassung der Sitzung im Kreis der Delegierten, attachment to meeting documents, 
“Sitzungsmaterial, personlich, für den 15.2.1990 / zum Tagesordnungspunkt 1b, Bericht über den Besuch des 
Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, Hans Modrow, am 13. und 14. Februar in Bonn,” n.d. [February 12, 1990], p. 
18, ADS/Modrow-006 (Februar 1990). 
164Information boxes, Infokasten 15.3.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der 
Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 148, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
165“DDR-Juniorpartner.” “Bilanz einer Gratwanderung. Ist die Regierung von Hans Modrow gescheitert oder nicht?” 
Walter Süß (taz vom 17.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der 
Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 159-160, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne
Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. Note: The FDP executive board, for instance, in late January had decided to support a 
liberal party with 500.000 DM; the core question was which one (either the LDPD, BFD or the newly established FDP). 
See Protocol, Protokoll der Sitzung des Präsidium am Montag, den 29. Januar 1990, Bonn, January 29, 1990, Archiv des
Liberalismus, FDP Präsidium/15469. 
166See for expample: Rolf Berndt und Hans-Jürgen Beerfeltz, “Der liberale Wahlkampf in der DDR, 16. März 1990,” 
attachment to “Wahlen zur Volkskammer der DDR am 18. März 1990, Ergebnis und Analyse,” March 19, 1990, Archiv 
des Liberalismus, FDP Präsidium/15470. 
167“Verwilderung der politischen Sitten, die der großklotzige Wahlkampfstil der Westparteien in die DDR trägt … [Die 
Bonner Wahlstrategen von CDU, CSU, SPD und FDP] exportieren ein Demokratieverständnis, das sich an 
innerstaatlichen Feindbildern orientiert.” Press release, Presseerklärung, Grüne Partei (DDR), Berlin, March 02, 1990, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 38. 
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Eastern and Western critics pointed at the destabilizing effects of disaster messages spread for 
campaign reasons disallowing rational debate over alternatives other than unification. Antje Vollmer 
even feared that elections might not happen anymore “because the media machine fed by Bonn has 
already completely demoralized the population of the GDR.”168 Journalist Matthias Geis agreed, 
claiming that the federal chancellery was “currently in nothing less interested … than in establishing a 
legitimate government in East Berlin that was capable of acting, thus, negotiating.”169 Instead, Bonn 
propagated the monetary union by spreading disaster messages, panic and fear, which Otto Graf 
Lambsdorff, chairman of the FDP, called an “arson attack.”170 According to Antje Vollmer, the 
immediate “surrender of the GDR” without an interim government but with an immediate monetary 
union would have been the “smoothest solution for takeover … [a]nd also the coming East German 
government will not be allowed any scope of action.”171 With public opinion in the Federal Republic 
shifting, Bonn was eager to create hard facts. 
It did not follow, however, that all of the East German population considered unification to be 
inevitable. On February 22, thousands of people followed a call of the civic group New Forum to 
demonstrate against a “capitalist unification,” while two days later, more than 10.000 people 
demonstrated in East Berlin against social cutbacks and the “appropriation” of the GDR.172 The civic 
groups themselves, however, had little to no chance. Their growing “experiences of impotence” were 
rooted in the general federal practice that civic movements cannot replace parliamentary structures 
168“weil die von den Bonn gefütterte bundesdeutsche Medienmaschine die Bevolkerung der DDR schon vollig 
demoralisiert hat.” Interview, “Man behandelt die DDR-Regierung, als wäre sie nicht mehr existent.' Antje Vollmer, 
Fraktionssprecherin der Grünen, über den Modrow-Besuch in Bonn,” Manfred Kriener (taz vom 15.2.90), taz - DDR 
Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung 
der Wahlurnen, p. 95, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
169“An nichts ... derzeit weniger interessiert als an der Etablierung einer legitimierten und handlungs-, sprich 
verhandlungsfähigen Regierung in Ost-Berlin.” “Übernahmestrategien, Die Destabilisierungskampagne aus dem 
Kanzleramt” Matthias Geis (taz vom 12.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, 
Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 82, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
170“Brandstiftung.” Cited in “Übernahmestrategien, Die Destabilisierungskampagne aus dem Kanzleramt” Matthias Geis 
(taz vom 12.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des 
Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 82, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 
31-38, File 33. 
171“Kapitulation der DDR … glatteste Übernahmelosung … man behandelt die DDR-Regierung und den Runden Tisch 
auch jetzt bereits so, als wären sie schon nicht mehr existente Großen. Und auch der kommenden DDR-Regierung wird 
keinerlei Spielraum mehr gelassen.” Interview, “Man behandelt die DDR-Regierung, als wäre sie nicht mehr existent.' 
Antje Vollmer, Fraktionssprecherin der Grünen, über den Modrow-Besuch in Bonn,” Manfred Kriener (taz vom 
15.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger 
Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 95, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
172“kapitalistische Wiedervereinigung … Vereinnahmung.” Information boxes, Infokasten 22.2.90 and 24./25.4.90, taz - 
DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur 
Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 115 and p. 120, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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and/or participate in policy making processes without the respective legal or political status.173 In 
copying West German party structures, civic groups were being pushed to the sidelines. Friedrich 
Schorlemmer, pastor and founding member of the civic group Democratic Awakening, already in early 
February lamented that “the revolution now discharges its fathers.”174 The people of the GDR did not 
want new experiments, a critical left or the potential of socialism but clear solutions, and a unification 
and market economy offered them. With the devastating state of the country now being in the open, a 
critique of capitalism was impossible. And while the idea was being pushed that now it was on the 
citizens of the GDR to freely decide whom they wanted in the government, Schorlemmer argued that 
they “only [have] West German criteria” to base their judgments on; they “knew” West German parties
because of years of consuming West German television.175 This made the elections more a choice of 
Western symbols than of real political Eastern alternatives, which also obscured discussions of 
domestic issues.
The conservative electoral Alliance for Germany (Allianz für Deutschland), created by the 
federal CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU), 
in joint effort with the German Social Union (Deutsche Soziale Union, DSU), DA and CDU (GDR), 
won the March election. This, in effect, meant a victory for Helmut Kohl. DSU vice-chair Hubertus 
Nowack made clear, the sole purpose of having founded the Alliance had been “to create a 'platform' 
for the chancellor's appearances in the East.”176 Kohl had, thus, taken a central position in election 
173“Ohnmachtserfahrungen.” Seelig, Marion, “Erst auflosen, dann verschmelzen. Die GRÜNE PARTEI der DDR am 
Anfang oder Ende bei der Fusion?” newspaper clipping, [n.d.], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; 
Box 31-38, File 38. See expert report, Wetzl, Ulrich und Lutz Beyermann, “Gutachten zur rechtlichen und damit 
zusammenhängend politischen Fragen der Verschmelzung der GRÜNEN PARTEI (DDR) und den GRÜNEN (BRD) im
Prozeß der deutschen Einheit,” Berlin, June 12, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-
38, File 38.
174 “Die Revolution entläßt jetzt ihre Väter.” Note: the quote is based on the Wolfgang Leonhard's autobiographical novel 
Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder (1955) (trans. Child of the Revolution) on his experiences in Soviet Russia from 
1935 until 1949.  Interview, “Die Revolution entläßt ihre Väter, Ein Gespräch mit Friedrich Schorlemmer, Pfarrer an der
Schloßkirsche zu Wittenberg und Mitbegründer vom Demokratischen Aufbruch, seit kurzem Mitglied der SPD,” 
Michael Rediske and Annette Rogalla (taz vom 9.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis 
März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 101-102, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
175Full quote: “Er [der Bürger] hat aber nur die Kriterien vom Westen.” Interview, “Die Revolution entläßt ihre Väter, Ein 
Gespräch mit Friedrich Schorlemmer, Pfarrer an der Schloßkirsche zu Wittenberg und Mitbegründer vom 
Demokratischen Aufbruch, seit kurzem Mitglied der SPD,” Michael Rediske and Annette Rogalla (taz vom 9.2.90), taz 
- DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur 
Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 101-102, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
176“um dem Bundeskanzler eine 'Plattform' für seine Auftritte im Osten zu verschaffen.” “Die brüchige Allianz der 
Konservativen,” Brigitte Fehrle (taz vom 13.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 
1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 144-145, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / 
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. Note:  Its Campaign Paper of the Alliance (Wahlzeitung der Allianz) 
had been printed by Springer. Notes, Gerhard Bächer, March 7, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
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promises largely made by the Federal Republic. 
Critics of this “short-handedly cobbled-together conservative election alliance in the GDR,” on 
the other hand, claimed it was a “mere facade.”177 With reason: the DSU belonged to the extreme right, 
the weak DA soon joined the CDU (GDR) that itself stood in the overbearing shadow of its West 
German partner. The loser in the East German election had, in fact, been the West German SPD. The 
SED-successor party PDS achieved a respectable outcome, while “the fathers and mothers of the 
revolution, aligned in Alliance 90, sank into a percentage oblivion.”178 The subsequent victory of the 
CDU and Kohl's reelection in December 1990, would likely not have happened without his campaign 
efforts in the GDR and the respective votes from East Germany.179 
De Maizière Government - State Treaty and Unification
“[A]s much market as possible and as much state as needed.”
Government policy statement of Lothar de Maizière,
April 20, 1990180
Its election victory came as a “complete surprise” to the CDU (GDR), and according to Udo 
Bartsch, soon to be Minister of Culture, the immediate reaction was: “What is going to happen now, 
what are we going to do now? Now we need to govern.”181 At its final meeting on March 12, 1990, the 
RT urged for stabilizing the GDR and the sovereign rights of its citizens. It needed fast and consistent 
reforms to enter a contractually settled unification of both states. More importantly, with unification, 
the experiences of groups and individuals in “thorough democratic initiatives” needed to be legally 
177“kurzfristig zusammengeschusterte konservative Wahlbündnis in der DDR … bloße Fassade.” “Die brüchige Allianz 
der Konservativen,” Brigitte Fehrle (taz vom 13.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis 
März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 144-145, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
178“Die Väter und Mütter der Revolution, zusammengeschlossen im 'Bündnis '90', versinken in prozentualer 
Bedeutungslosigkeit.” ”Information boxes, Infokasten 18.3.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar 
bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 151, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
179Note: The victory of the CDU turned out to be lucky timing. In April 1990, the accountability report of the individual 
parties revealed that the CDU was the party with the greatest financial difficulties; its banking debt had increased from 
11.1 million DM (1984) to 77.2 million DM in 1988. The SPD had decreased its bank debt from 80.9 million (1984) to 
24.4 million DM (1988). “...den großten Geldsorgen. Berichte über die Finanzen der Parteien / Mitgliederschwund,” 
FAZ, April 24,1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 38. 
180“soviel Markt wie moglich und soviel Staat wie notig.” Cited from Regierungserklärung des Ministerpräsidenten der 
DDR, Neues Deutschland, p. 5, April 20, 1990. BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 3. 
181“komplette Überraschung … Was wird denn jetzt, was machen wir jetzt? Wir müssen jetzt regieren.” Personal 
communication, Udo Bartsch, interview, July 7, 2017.
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fixed; grass-roots democratic work needed to be institutionalized to involve civic groups, parties and 
minorities that otherwise find no representation in the parliament.182 New Prime Minister Lothar de 
Maizière (CDU), a civil rights lawyer in the GDR, took a different approach.183 He claimed “those who 
love round tables may do so, [they] do not adhere to my understanding of democracy.”184 Not a man of 
big words and critical of the Western omnipresence during the election campaign, he claimed that the 
Beitritt according to Article 23 was a necessity of time; drafting a new Basic Law or constitution would
take too long, accession was, therefore, the only option. De Maizière made clear, however, that “the 
CDU will not allow for a [fast] unconditional Beitritt. We could not do that to our people,” only to 
eventually become “the side-actor of the transition-CDU.”185 
The tenth People's Chamber had its constitutive meeting on April 5, 1990; its ministries started 
working about two weeks later. The blueprint takeover of federal institutional structures differed only 
in the creation of two additional ministries: The Ministry of Media Policy (Ministerium für 
Medienpolitik, MfM), and the Ministry of Agriculture, indicating “the high priority given to this sector 
[media] in the GDR.”186 Soon to be Media Minister Gottfried Müller (CDU) outlined in retrospect, the 
different political interests that had worked against the newly elected government, namely old and new 
leaders of the former SED party, the SPD, the civic grass root groups (basisdemokratsiche Gruppen), 
the opposition at the Round Table and the major publishing houses with their media power.187 More 
importantly, however, the newly elected government had been largely the result of, and, thus, stood in 
the shadow of, its Western allies.
182“konsequenter Demokratiegestaltung.” Report, Ergebnisse der 16. Sitzung des Rundentischgespräches am 12. März 
1990, Abschlußerklärung des Zentralen Runden Tisches, March 12, 1990, p. 9, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; File 7. 
183“Der Statist der Wende-CDU,” Brigitte Fehrle (taz vom 20.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, 
Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 158, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
184“Wer runde Tische liebt, mag es tun; [dies] entspricht aber nicht meinem Demokratieverständnis.” Cited in Gottfried 
Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), April 25, 1990, sent to author on January 12, 2017.
185Einen [schnellen] bedingungslosen Beitritt wird es mit der CDU nicht geben. Das konnen wir unseren Menschen nicht 
antun.” Interview, “'Einen Beitritt ohne Bedingungen macht die CDU nicht mit' – Interview mit Lothar de Maizière, 
Vorsitzender der CDU, zu den sozialen Folgen der Wiedervereinigung, den Differenzen der Allianz für Deutschland und
zu Debatte um die polnische Westgrenze,” Interview Brigitte Fehrle (taz vom 7.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die 
Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 
146-147, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. See also “Der Statist der Wende-
CDU,” Brigitte Fehrle (taz vom 20.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, 
Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 158, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
186“welch hohen Stellenwert die DDR gerade auch diesem Bereich [Medien] beimißt.” Letter, Gerd Kapp, Presse-Grosso, 
to Gottfried Müller, Ministerium für Medien und Presse, Koln, April 29, 1990, Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
187Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), Email, January 30, 2017.
45
The Office of Competition Protection, Anti-Trust Legislation, and Lobbying
Underlying (and a central part of) these political initiatives were economic reforms and early 
cross-border economic activities. With the election on March 18, and the new conservative 
government, joint venture negotiations between East and West German enterprises “ramped up to a 
downright coalition fever.”188 This made necessary a framework legislation. 
On May 18, the first state treaty between both German states was signed. It stipulated a 
monetary, economic and social union. It was to commence on July 1, 1990, and regulated the economic
unity of both states, while the political and state-level unity was to be elaborated in a second state 
treaty. According to this first treaty, also federal anti-trust law was to be adopted in the GDR, which 
made necessary a respective institutional body.189 While the need for this institution had been realized 
and worked on since December 1989, agreed upon by the Modrow government and, again, by the 
Council of Ministers on March 22, it took until late May for the Office of Competition Protection (Amt
für Wettbewerbsschutz) to be officially constituted. It started working on June 7.190 The eventual 
antitrust law, passed in June and valid also as of July 1, was, thus, part of a broader structural reform 
package passed by the People's Chamber as a first step to the monetary, economic and social union of 
both German states. 
The Office of Competition Protection was founded in close cooperation with the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW), the Federal Cartel Office and the Federal Economic Ministry, 
and it stood under the leadership of Dr. Gunter Halm. With sixty-five planned staff members (25 
percent from the Cartel Office), the office generally followed the institutional blueprint and legislative 
framework of the Federal Cartel Office and was, from the outset, destined to eventually merge with it. 
The office's overall goal was to introduce a social market economy and to provide a legislative frame 
188“steigerten sich die Beteiligungsverhandlungen zu einem regelrechten Koalitionsfieber.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 
“Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 11, BArch 
DC9/1050.
189DDR-Kartellbehorde nimmt Medien an die Kandare, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, 
DSC08072. 
190Note: A first meeting with the Federal Cartel Office on March 13, soon followed further administrative and legislative 
steps to bring about the official formation of the office. It took until May for the office to work at full capacity. Internal 
communication, Freier Wettbewerb – Grundsatz der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Bildung des Amtes für 
Wettbewerbsschutz beschlossen – Gesetze und erste Entscheidungen gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen sind 
vorbereitet, n.d., BArch DE10/67. See also, policy document, Information über die im Ergebnis vom 22. März 1990 
durchgeführeten Maßnahmen zur Bildung des Amtes für Wettbewerbsschutz, Berlin, May 21, 1990, BArch DE10/67. 
“Die Fusionskontrolle soll in der DDR nur in einer abgemilderten Form gelten,” Das Handelsblatt, June 7, 1990, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08071. Also “Medien in BRD und DDR: Alles unter Kontrolle?,” Ute Thon, die 
tageszeitung, June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08071. Also “DDR-Kartellbehorde nimmt Medien an die 
Kandare,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08072. Also “Ostberliner 
Kartellwächter folgen westlichem Beispiel,” Die Welt, June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08073. 
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for the fast-paced developments in the economic sector.191 
While the idea for the office had emerged under Modrow, federal influences soon took the lead.
The Federal Cartel Office and the Federal Ministry of Economics had agreed early on that the transition
from a state monopoly in production, distribution and trade to a competitive market needed early anti-
trust laws to safeguard competitive structures in support of medium-sized enterprises. This structure 
was deemed impossible “when state monopolies, merging with market domineering West German 
companies turn into private monopolies.”192 Equal opportunities for newly developing small and 
medium-sized companies, according to the office, needed to be protected “against the power of large 
enterprises from the Federal Republic but also against large domestic conglomerates [Kombinate] that 
often, almost blindly join forces with the first partner from FRG coming along and, thereby, want to 
further increase their market power.”193 The office's overall purpose, therefore, was to check that 
formerly state-owned conglomerates (Kombinate) that had dictated the market so far, did not turn into 
new private monopolies by means of mergers and planned investments of West German companies. It 
furthermore was in charge of price policy.194 
By June, planned joint ventures in the insurance sector (Allianz and GDR insurances), the 
aviation industry (Lufthansa and Interflug), in the energy and the automotive industry, and in the press 
distribution and publishing sector showed an “alarming density of coalitions” and were particularly 
pressing.195 In building the Office of Competition Protection, the federal ministries hoped to close the 
191Note: Documentation on the formation of the Office (i.e. resolutions, concepts, structure of the Office) can be found in 
BArch DE10/67. For the close cooperation between the different institutions see: Letter and attachment, Grabley, 
Wirtschaftskommitee, to Halm, Minister für Leichtindustrie und Leiter der Arbeitsgruppe Wettbewerbsfragen, Berlin, 
March 23, 1990, BArch DE10/67. 
192“wenn sich Staatsmonopole durch Zusammenschluß mit marktbeherrschenden bundesdeutschen Unternehmen in private
Monopole wandeln.” Communication, Information über die im Ergebnis des Ministerratsbeschlusses vom 22. März 
1990 durchgeführten Maßnahmen zur Bildung des Amtes für Wettbewerbsschutz, Berlin, May 21, 1990, p. 1, BArch 
DE10/67. 
193“gegen die Macht der großen Unternehmen aus der BRD, aber auch gegenüber den eigenen großen Kombinaten, die 
sich oftmals geradezu blindlings mit dem ersten besten Partner aus der BDR zusammentun und damit ihre Marktmacht 
weiter vergroßern wollen.” Internal communication, Freier Wettbewerb – Grundsatz der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. 
Bildung des Amtes für Wettbewerbsschutz beschlossen – Gesetze und erste Entscheidungen gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen sind vorbereitet, n.d., p. 1, BArch DE10/67. 
194“Die Fusionskontrolle soll in der DDR nur in einer abgemilderten Form gelten,” Das Handelsblatt, June 7, 1990, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08071. Also “Gegen Monopole – für freien Wettbewerb,” Dieter Resch, Berliner 
Zeitung, June 8, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08069. See also Internal communication, Freier Wettbewerb – 
Grundsatz der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Bildung des Amtes für Wettbewerbsschutz beschlossen – Gesetze und erste 
Entscheidungen gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen sind vorbereitet, n.d., BArch DE10/67. 
195“bedenkliche Kooperationsverdichtungen.” “Die Fusionskontrolle soll in der DDR nur in einer abgemilderten Form 
gelten,” Das Handelsblatt,  June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08071. See also Medienminister: “Etwa 100
Fusionen im DDR-Pressewesen geplant,” Der Tagesspiegel,  June 8, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08070. 
“Also DDR-Kartellbehorde nimmt Medien an die Kandare,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR,
35d, DSC08072. See also Internal communication, Information über einen ersten Meinungsaustausch mit dem 
Bundeskartellamt, n.d. [around March 13, 1990], BArch DE10/67. 
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gap between two-state political and administrative jurisdictions facing an all-German market. Already 
in its formation process, however, lay the office's fundamental weakness.
A German-German working group on competition, part of the expert commission on the 
economic and monetary union, had been put in charge. It had met in Berlin in late March 1990 (see 
also Chapter 5). Representatives of the group came from the Federal Ministry of Economics (FRG), the
Federal Cartel Office (FRG), the Ministry for Finances and Prices (GDR), and the Office of 
Competition Protection (GDR), as well as the Economic Committee and the Economic Council of 
Ministers. The group met on March 27, and again on April 24, 1990. Much of the first meeting focused
on the adaptation of federal law in the GDR, future Treuhand activities and on upcoming privatization 
legislation on free prices and on competition.196 The latter two were to be implemented as soon as 
possible as the “necessary conditions for a fast development of competition as the basis for a market 
economic order.”197 Upmost priority was given also to competitive problems in current German-
German joint-venture activities, including issues of press distribution.198 The East German side and its 
head Dr. Halm made clear that the general problem lay in the current legal gap, which resulted in 
merger tendencies that might eventually have negative repercussions on the Federal Republic. The 
overall goal of the group was, therefore, to “put in place immediately a whole range of anti-trust 
legislation.”199 For the process of privatization, the group proposed “to use the possibilities inherent in 
state ownership to prevent the development of anti-competitive structures” in joint venture negations.200
And while these political aims had been established, the drafting and redrafting of the anti-trust 
legislation happened in close cooperation with the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband 
der Deutschen Industrie, BDI).201 
A day before the second meeting of the working group in Bonn on April 24, the East German 
196Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der 1. Beratung der deutsch-deutschen Arbeitsgruppe Wettbewerb am 27.3.1990, 
Ministerium der Finanzen und Preise, Abt. Grundsätze des Preis- und Wettbewerbsrechts, Berlin April 4, 1990, p. 2, 
BArch DE10/67. 
197“notwendige Voraussetzung für eine schnelle Entfaltung des Wettbewerbs als Grundlage der marktwirtschaftlichen 
Ordnung.” Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der 1. Beratung der deutsch-deutschen Arbeitsgruppe Wettbewerb am 27.3.1990,
Ministerium der Finanzen und Preise, Abt. Grundsätze des Preis- und Wettbewerbsrechts, Berlin April 4, 1990, p. 2, 
BArch DE10/67.
198Internal document, Deutsch-Deutsches Gespräch über Wettbewerbsfragen in Berlin am 27.3.1990, Bonn, March 21, 
1990, BArch DE10/67. 
199“sofort Wettbewerbsschutz in ganzer Bandbreite durchzusetzen.” Internal document, Hinweise für die Beratung zu 
Fragen des Wettbewerbsschutzes am 27.3.1990, n.d. [late March 1990], p. 2, BArch DE10/67. 
200“die Moglichkeit auszunutzen, die der Saat als Eigentümer hat, um beim Verkauf bzw. beabsichtigten 
Unterehmenszusammschlüssen das Entstehen wettbewerbsbeeinträchtigender Strukturen zu verhindern.” Protocol, 
Ergebnisprotokoll der 1. Beratung der deutsch-deutschen Arbeitsgruppe Wettbewerb am 27.3.1990, Ministerium der 
Finanzen und Preise, Abt. Grundsätze des Preis- und Wettbewerbsrechts, Berlin April 4, 1990, p. 3, BArch DE10/67. 
201Internal Note, Informationen zum Gespräch beim BDI, Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz, April 25, 1990, BArch DE10/86.
48
delegation talked once more to the BDI in Cologne to discuss the current state of legislation. Both 
parties agreed “to forego mandatory prohibitions of joint ventures leading to market domineering 
positions,” allowing for easier foreign investments in East German industries “for a transitional 
period.”202 Investments were not to be made “overly difficult” as they were deemed necessary for the 
much needed transfer of Western capital and expertise, any law implemented, therefore, “must not 
contradict this greater economic policy goal.”203 The BDI had handed the delegation its own proposals 
“for the precise legal wording and, therewith, the fixing of this intended regulatory behavior of the 
Cartel Office of the GDR.”204 It suggested increasing the de minimis limit (Bagatellgrenze) and to 
connect merger control to a more general control of the Act against Restraints on Competition. 
According to the office, the BDI “was given the prospect” that its suggestions, still subject to the 
German-German working group on competition, were to be included in legislation.205
 With a draft supported by the BDI, the East German delegation joined the working group the 
next day. It was underlined by the FRG that the proposed legislation needed to be submitted to the 
People's Chamber by May, and “that all activities must be directed to a very fast legislation and thereby
[create] a working base for competitive decisions.”206 Until legislation was in place, both sides agreed 
that their work of analyzing and influencing joint-venture processes would need to focus on specific 
cases, in particular in press distribution, banks and insurance companies, the electricity, gas and oil 
industries, and the transport sector.207 Also the problem of privatization based on fair competition 
needed to be examined further and in close cooperation with the Treuhand. Its director was to be 
invited for the next meeting, on May 22, 1990.
The subsequent anti-trust law was modeled according to the West German blueprint Act against
Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB), and included a “non-
202Full quote: “daß in der DDR in einer Übergangszeit auf die zwingende Untersagung von 
Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen im Fall des Entstehens marktbeherrschender Situationen verzichtet wird.” Internal 
Note, Informationen zum Gespräch beim BDI, Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz, April 25, 1990, BArch DE10/86.
203“unverhältnismäßig erschwert … darf zu dieser großen wirtschaftspolitischen Linie nicht im Widerspruch stehen.” 
Internal Note, Informationen zum Gespräch beim BDI, Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz, April 25, 1990, BArch DE10/86.
204“zur exakten rechtlichen Formulierung und damit Fixierung dieses beabsichtigten Eingreifverhaltens der DDR-
Kartellbehorde.” Internal Note, Informationen zum Gespräch beim BDI, Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz, April 25, 1990, 
BArch DE10/86.
205“in Aussicht gestellt.” Internal Note, Informationen zum Gespräch beim BDI, Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz, April 25, 
1990, BArch DE10/86.
206“daß alle Aktivitäten auf eine sehr schnelle Gesetzgebung und damit Arbeitsgrundlage für wettbewerbliche 
Entscheidungen … gerichtet sein müssen.” Communication, Information über die 2. Beratung der deutsch-deutschen 
Wettbewerbskommission am 24.4.1990 im Bundesministerium für Wirtshaft, Bonn/BRD, Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz, 
April 25, 1990, BArch DE10/86.
207Communication, Information über die 2. Beratung der deutsch-deutschen Wettbewerbskommission am 24.4.1990 im 
Bundesministerium für Wirtshaft, Bonn/BRD, Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz, April 25, 1990, BArch DE10/86.
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discrimination rule for companies with high market shares …a  prohibition of concerted practices … 
[and a] ban on restrictive practices.”208 Different from federal law, however, and as promised to the 
BDI, the East German Act against Restraints of Competition included an Amendment Act that allowed 
for the optional not mandatory prohibition of mergers (Kannbestimm-ung). It, thus, gave greater 
leeway to mergers and joint-ventures in favor of macroeconomic rather then solely competitive 
considerations.209 According to the BDI, not even this provisional option of a preventive merger control
(prohibition until authorization) for mergers bigger than 500 million Mark, should have been included. 
The East German delegation, while arguing with broader economic goals and a needed flexibility of the
office, underlined that due to transitional circumstances it was “to orient itself on a very liberal policy 
of merger control.”210 This meant, it would intervene only if larger amounts, “for instance two billion 
Mark,” were at stake, and not much time would be spent on individual cases, allowing for “ad-hoc 
approvals of mergers.”211 Its general approach was to open the GDR market by means of low thresholds
for market entries making easier foreign investments. With legislation having been worked out in close 
cooperation with the Federal Cartel Office, its president Wolfgang Kartte, often encountered questions 
about a potential “sellout” of the GDR. Kartte's general response was that “[we should] be happy when 
foreign companies invest in our markets ” because it means a “welcomed strengthening of investment 
capacities for our markets.”212 Without an official jurisdiction of the Federal Cartel Office over GDR 
territory, “foreign companies” were West German investors, while the market was “ours.” This made 
the Office of Competition Protection weak in legislative measures. The Act against Restraints of 
208“Diskriminierungsverbot für marktstarke Unternehmen …Verbot aufeinander abgestimmter Verhaltensweisen … 
Kartellverbot.” Communication, Arbeitsweise des Amtes für Wettbewerbsschutz, Berlin, May 21, 1990, pp.1-2, BArch 
DE10/67. Note: It covered three major areas: first, the “prohibition of cartel agreements” (Verbot von 
Kartellabsprachen), second, the keeping an oversight over market-dominating enterprises and connected to it, thirdly, it 
held the authority over merger controls. See “Medien in BRD und DDR: Alles unter Kontrolle?,” Ute Thon, die 
tageszeitung, June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08071. See also “Die Fusionskontrolle soll in der DDR 
nur in einer abgemilderten Form gelten,” Das Handelsblatt, June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08071. Also
“Medienminister: Etwa 100 Fusionen im DDR-Pressewesen geplant,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 8, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, 35d, DSC08070.   
209Note: The law differed from its West German counterpart particularly in the merger control proceedings. “In case of 
mergers with a certain magnitude” (“bei Fusionen bestimmter Großenordnung”) the “Cartel Office's duty to interdict” 
(Untersagungspflicht der Kartellbehorde) was replaced with a “right to interdict with a margin of discretion” 
(Untersagungsrecht mit Ermessensspielraum). Cited in “Medienminister: Etwa 100 Fusionen im DDR-Pressewesen 
geplant,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 8, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08070. 
210“sich aber an einer sehr großzügigen Fusionskontrolle orientiert.” Internal Note, Informationen zum Gespräch beim 
BDI, Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz, April 25, 1990, BArch DE10/86.
211“z.B. ab zwei Milliarden Mark … kurzfristige Freigaben der Fusion.” Internal Note, Informationen zum Gespräch beim 
BDI, Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz, April 25, 1990, BArch DE10/86. 
212“froh sein, wenn sich ausländische Unternehmen auf unseren Märkten engagieren … willkommene Stärkung der 
Investitionskraft auf unseren Märkten.” Cited in Medienminister: Etwa 100 Fusionen im DDR-Pressewesen geplant, 
Der Tagesspiegel, 6/8/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08070. 
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Competition was eventually introduced at a joint press conference of the office and the MfM in early 
June (see Chapter 6).213 
The Failures of the Second State Treaty
In addition to economic transfers, the second state treaty was to establish the political union of 
both German states. Preparing for it, a committee of the government of the GDR drafted a resolution in 
June 1990 according to which “the German Democratic Republic accedes to the Federal Republic of 
Germany according to Article 23 of the Basic Law and its jurisdiction.”214 The treaty was to regulate 
the harmonization of the law, public assets, issues of labor and social welfare etc.215 In retrospect, Udo 
Bartsch, then state secretary of the Ministry of Culture, saw it as his greatest accomplishment to have 
included “culture” as a cornerstone in this treaty.216 
Wolfgang Ullmann and Konrad Weiß, representatives of the newly created election alliance 
between the Green party and civic movements, Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Grüne), at the 
final session of the committee brought in a minority report. While supporting German unity, both 
regretted “the undemocratic process by which the state treaty is being rushed though the coalition 
parties.”217 Contrary to former assurances, several changes and additions that had been elaborated in the
respective expert committees (i.e. on ownership questions, social security issues of citizens, and 
women's rights) had not found any place in the treaty. Not only had governments taken on legislative 
roles by means of the treaty, but parliaments “are being degraded to side actors” while the GDR gave 
up essential parts of its sovereignty.218 The minority vote underlined that “[t]he treaty leads to a sellout 
of productive assets as well as land and property in the GDR.”219 Ullmann, one of the most outspoken 
213Medien in BRD und DDR: Alles unter Kontrolle?, Ute Thon, die tageszeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, 
DSC08071. 
214“tritt die Deutsche Demokratische Republik gemäß Artikel 23 des Grundgesetzes der Bundesrepublik Deutschland dem 
Geltungsbereich des Grundgesetzes bei.” Draft, Entwurf Erklärung der Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik vom 17. Juni 1990, Berlin, June 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, 
File 38. 
215 “The Unification Treaty between the FRG and the GDR (Berlin, 31 August 1990).” Accessed January 12, 2018.   
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/2c391661-db4e-42e5-84f7-bd86108c0b9c/publishable_en.pdf
216Personal communication, Udo Bartsch, interview, July 7, 2017.
217Full quote: “bedauern sie das undemokratische Verfahren, mit dem der Staatsvertrag durch die Koalitionsparteien 
durchgepeitscht wird.” Presseerklärung Fraktion Bündnis 90/Grüne, Minderheitenvotum des Bündnisses 90/Grüne im 
Ausschuß Deutsche Einheit, June 13, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 38.
See also minority vote, Minderheitsvotum der Abgeordneten der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Grüne im Ausschuß Deutsche 
Einheit, pp. 1-6 [June 13, 1990], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 38. 
218“werden zu Statisten degradiert.” Minority vote, Minderheitsvotum der Abgeordneten der Fraktion Bündnis 90/ Grüne 
im Ausschuß Deutsche Einheit, pp. 1-6 [June 13, 1990], point 3, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 31-38, File 38. 
219Full quote: “Die Bürgerinnen und Bürger der DDR und ihr Parlament werden einem Rechtssystem ausgesetzt, auf das 
sie keinerlei Einfluß hatten und haben .... Der Vertrag führt zu einem Ausverkauf des Produktivvermogens sowie Grund 
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critics, continued to protest fiercely by laying out the detailed consequences of a treaty that
fundamentally changes the legal situation of citizens of the GDR … by dictating a 
completely new trustee of their property rights, the bank and government of the FRG … 
This blatant lack of rights … they experience in the ways in which their saving accounts 
are being discussed and being disposed of, and in how people's property is being treated,
which – regardless the flagrant economic degeneration to which its administration by the
SED dictatorship may have led – is not an abandoned commodity just waiting to be 
taken over by whomever happens to have access to it.220  
What it needed was, thus, a constituent assembly and a national referendum, and more power to the 
People's Chamber on resolutions of the government. Despite this protest, on August 31, 1990, the 
Unification Treaty establishing a single federal democratic state was signed, and on September 20, 
1990, the People's Chamber and the German Bundestag each voted on and adopted the treaty. With it, 
the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic was set for October 3, 1990.
Analysis - Different Sides of History
“Only political means to back-up the currency and economy can
help the GDR against an uncontrolled 
growth of market forces.”
Prof. Dr. Elmar Altvater et al., die tageszeitung,
February 14, 1990221
What some called a “sold-off revolution” and others refer to as one of the greatest transitions in 
modern history is an issue of debate and will remain such for history.222 Round Table member 
Wolfgang Ullmann pointed out early on that when thinking of the Fall Revolution (Herbstrevolution) 
und Boden in der DDR.” Minority vote, Minderheitsvotum der Abgeordneten der Fraktion Bündnis 90/ Grüne im 
Ausschuß Deutsche Einheit, pp. 1-6 [June 13, 1990], point 4 and point 6, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 38.
220Full quote: “Er verändert die Rechtssituation der DDR-Bürger … von Grund auf, indem er ihnen einen ganz neuen 
Sachwalter ihrer Eigentums- und Vermogensrechte vorschreibt, Bank und Regierung der BRD... Die krasse 
Rechtlosigkeit … bekommen sie zu spüren an der Art, wie über ihr Sparguthaben diskutiert und verfügt wird und wie 
man mit dem Volkseigentum umgeht, das – zu welche krassen okonomischen Entartungen dessen Verwaltung durch 
SED-Diktatur auch geführt haben mag – doch kein herrenlosen Gut ist, das darauf wartet, von dem originär angeeignet 
zu werden, dem der Zugriff gerade moglich ist.” “Niederlage der deutschen Demokratie,” Wolfgang Ullmann, DVZ, 
May 25, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 26. 
221“Gegen einen Wildwuchs von Marktkräften konnen nur Maßnahmen der politischen Absicherung von Währung und 
Wirtschaft der DDR helfen.” “Revolutionäre Geduld. Dokumentation: Warnung vor okonomischen Folgen des hastigen 
Anschlusses der DDR an die BRD,” Prof. Dr. Elmar Altvater et al., (taz vom 14.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die 
Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 
87-88, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
222Max Fischer, “Die verramschte Revolution,” Der Anzeiger, April 6, 1990, private archive Vistas Publishers.
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of 1989, contrary to often dominant conceptions, its end goal had not been German unification 
according to Art. 23 of the Basic Law. Rather, writing history in the service of this narrative gave 
legitimacy to, for instance, a questionable state treaty regulating its very process.223 In its the forty years
of existence, the FRG had never accepted the GDR as a sovereign state. Instead it had maintained 
several institutions and legal regulations that stood in the service of maintaining an “all-German” 
approach, such as a quasi “all German” citizenship, a Basic Law claiming Alleinvertretungsanspruch of
the Federal Republic, a “representation” rather than an “embassy” in East Berlin, a Federal Ministry of 
Intra-German Relations (Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen) or the All-German 
Institute – Federal Office for All-German Tasks (Gesamtdeutsches Institut – Bundesanstalt für 
gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben).224 Given these institutions and regulations, the Fall Revolution of 1989 was
inevitably to lead to German unity. 
While opinions on the matter differ, certain facts remain: First, in 1990, unification dynamics 
grew fast and strong. They came along with a lack of readily available alternative political economic 
models in the GDR. They were also a result of early and strong influence of the federal government. 
The latter viewed the GDR an illegitimate state, aimed for unification, and, thus, did little to support 
democratic alternatives. Instead, it actively promoted its own interests that closely connected demands 
for the introduction of a market economy to those of introducing democracy. Second, the GDR served 
as a new territory for federal politics early on, or as Walter Süß put in early February, “prominent West
German politicians” started “to occupy hard won public space in the GDR” by capturing a 
demonstrating people in a “popularity-seeking-style” – they emphasized on a broken East German 
economy and promised a quick fix by means of adapting the federal system.225 The federal government 
pushed the DM as an incentive and cure for economic and political remedies, while the generally 
devastating state of the East German economy, which had been ignored for years, put additional 
pressures on the interim governments. This early penetration of federal interests disallowed for an 
emancipation from Western concepts for a functioning democracy and its economic underpinnings. 
223“Niederlage der deutschen Demokratie,” Wolfgang Ullmann, DVZ, May 25, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 26. 
224See for instance Report, “Politische Zielvorstellungen wichtiger Oppositionsgruppen in der DDR,” Gesamtdeutsches 
Institut Bundesanstalt für Gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, Analysen und Berichte Nr. 13/1989, Bonn, November 10, 1989, 
Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, Katrin Eiegenfeld, 32/II.
225“bundesdeutscher Politprominenz … das in der DDR erkämpfte offentliche Terrain zu okkupieren … 
Popularitätshascherei.” “Bilanz einer Gratwanderung. Ist die Regierung von Hans Modrow gescheitert oder nicht?” 
Walter Süß (taz vom 17.3.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der 
Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 159-160, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne
Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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This weakened domestic reform movements. The Round Table alone had sixteen meetings between 
December 7 and March 12, at which it elaborated recommendations for legislative proposals “under 
consistently more complicated and faster growing developments.”226 Likewise, the working schedule of
the Council of Minister from January to April alone contained 141 points; an incredible amount that 
would generally require years.227 Intense time pressure and massive internal and external shifts in all 
institutions took their toll, however. Everything had to go fast, only weeks for drafting and passing 
bills, legislation could not be discussed in detail, there was only one try. Soon to be Media Minister 
Gottfried Müller noted in retrospect: “I only later realized how big the time pressure really was when I 
became acquainted with the leisurely speed of parliamentarianism in the West. How long does it take, 
for instance, to draft and ratify a bill: usually years, while we had only a few weeks at hand. It lies in 
the nature of a parliamentary democracy to generally require a lot of time.”228 Time, however, was a 
scarce good.
Part of the push for unification was the fast monetary, economic and social union that opened 
the GDR to the international market. And though West German politicians showed themselves 
“dreadfully optimistic,” expecting a “second economic miracle,” promises of economic prosperity 
turned into their opposite.229 Along with the monetary and economic union came a breakdown of the 
domestic industrial and agricultural production of up to 70 percent, accompanied, as Modrow pointed 
out, by an increase in production and distribution of the private sector for a newly opened market in the
Federal Republic.230 By the mid-1990s, in spite of increasing capital transfers from West Germany, 52 
percent of East Germans had experienced aspects of unemployment, dislocation and a bankrupt 
economy.231 Until this day, in spite of massive capital transfers, the socio-economic gap between both 
226“unter ständig komplizierteren und schneller ablaufenden Entwicklungsprozessen.” Report, Ergebnisse der 16. Sitzung 
des Rundentischgespräches am 12. März 1990, Abschlußerklärung des Zentralen Runden Tisches, March 12, 1990, p. 8, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; File 7. 
227Work schedule, Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Beschluß des Ministerrates vom 4. Januar 1990, 
Arbeitsplan des Ministerrates, January 4, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
228“Wie groß der Zeitdruck war wurde mir später ganz bewusst, als ich den gemächlichen Gang des Parlamentarismus im 
Westen kennenlernte. Wie lange dauert z.B. die Erarbeitung und Verabschiedung eines Gesetzes: oft Jahre, während uns
nur wenige Wochen zur Verfügung standen. Parlamentarische Demokratie benotigt ihrem Wesen nach normalerweise 
viel Zeit.”Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), sent to author in 
January 30, 2017.
229“geben sich entsetzlich optimistisch … zweites Wirtschaftswunder” Cited in: Information box, Infokasten 17./18.2.90, 
taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur 
Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 104, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
230Sulc, Zdislav, Privatization in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, Perspectives, 5, 1995, pp. 71-79; Hans Modrow, 
“Die Treuhand – Idee und Wirklichkeit,” iPW, 7/8-91, pp. 39-42, p. 40, ADS/Modrow-016 (1990-1994, Band I). 
231Conradt, David P., Political Culture in Unified Germany: The First Ten Years, German Politics & Society, 20/2 (63), 
Special Issue: How Culture Matters. Culture and Change in the Federal Republic of Germany, 2002, pp. 43-74, p. 54.
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German sides remains unbridged.232
These lasting inequalities have generally been attributed to the poor economic state of the GDR.
The transfer of capital funds have been interpreted “as a useful measure of West Germany's 
commitment to unification and a market economy.”233 The brief outline above, however, points to the 
political nature of these persistent inequalities that were not per se inevitable. In fact, none of the 
economic developments in East Germany came as a surprise but were well-known consequences of 
political economic decision-making processes whose primary concern had not been the economic or 
political well-being of the GDR. The consistent urge of East German civic groups for caution has been 
outlined above. Also, several West German economic advisors had given their explicit “warnings of the
economic consequences of a hasty annexation of the GDR to the FRG.”234 They aimed to avoid an 
“uncontrolled large-scale experiment” of unification based on the propagated necessities that omitted 
all too certain consequences.235 Already on January 23, 1990,the economic expert council of the “Five 
Wise Men” (Fünf Weisen), advising the federal government on macroeconomic issues, had clearly 
spoken out against a monetary union and so had the German Council of Economic Experts 
(Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung). In a letter to Kohl on
February 9, 1990, the council made clear that the fast introduction of the DM would not bring long-
term benefits to the GDR but the opposite.236 This position was shared by political scientist Kurt 
Hübner who had publicly laid out the consequences of a propagated fast monetary union: it meant an 
opening of the GDR to world market competition, “the dissolution of the state monopoly over foreign 
trade und the liberalization of foreign trade and capital movements,” which were to “hit the economy of
the GDR like a shock and to reveal existing structural deficits in an economically devastating way.”237 
232“German reunification 25 years on: how different are east and west really,” Kate Connolly, theguardian.com, October 2,
2015. Accessed January 17, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/02/german-reunification-25-years-on-
how-different-are-east-and-west-really
233Hall, John, and Udo Ludwig, “East Germany's transitional economy,” Challenge, 37/5, Sep/Oct. 1994, pp. 26-32.
234“Warnung vor okonomischen Folgen des hastigen Anschlusses der DDR an die BRD.” “Revolutionäre Geduld. 
Dokumentation: Warnung vor okonomischen Folgen des hastigen Anschlusses der DDR an die BRD,” Prof. Dr. Elmar 
Altvater et al., (taz vom 14.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der 
Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 87-88, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
235“unkontrollierten Großexperiment.” “Revolutionäre Geduld. Dokumentation: Warnung vor okonomischen Folgen des 
hastigen Anschlusses der DDR an die BRD,” Prof. Dr. Elmar Altvater et al., (taz vom 14.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2,
Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, 
pp. 87-88, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
236Information box, Infokasten 23.1.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der 
Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 38, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. In Hans Modrow, “Die Treuhand – Idee und Wirklichkeit,” iPW, 7/8-91, pp. 39-42, p. 39, 
ADS/Modrow-016 (1990-1994, Band I). 
237“die Auflosung des staatlichen Außenhandelsmonopols und die Liberalisierung von Außenhandel und Kapitalverkehr …
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Considering the massive obsolescence of production facilities and the vast deficits in the level of labor 
productivity compared to leading capitalist countries, Hübner predicted that economic and socio-
political developments in the GDR would be defined and limited by its dependency on the FRG.238 
Likewise, Prof. Dr. Elmar Altvater and other academics in an early open letter urged for caution. 
According to them, 
the fast economic annexation of the GDR would be an adventure not with an uncertain 
but with a very certain outcome: the collapse of great parts of the economy, which 
would not be internationally competitive without the protection of their own currency 
with a low exchange rate. Apparently it is being deliberately reckoned that the massive 
costs of a fast annexation can be blamed on the old system [emphases added].239 
Campaign promises of immediate prosperity by means of the DM would only result in a bi-national 
disaster and would open political spaces likely to be filled by the extreme right. A hasty unification 
would necessarily “result in a magnitude of costs hard to cope.”240 The Federal Republic would have to 
pay a high price for introducing a market economy to the GDR, Hübner underlined, because the 
restructuring of its economy could only be brought about with massive public investments.241 Instead of
a free market, it needed fiscal equalization schemes or development funds because market economy 
reforms in the GDR were possible only by means of a stable domestic currency and “specific economic
wird die DDR-Wirtschaft wie einen Schock treffen und die bestehenden Strukturdefizite auf okonomisch katastrophale 
Weise aufdecken.” “Wenn die D-Mark den Osten überrollt. Ein Szenario,” Kurt Hübner (taz vom 07.2.90), taz - DDR 
Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung 
der Wahlurnen, pp. 83-85, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
238Full quote: “daß die DDR sich in eine Situation der abhängigen Entwicklung begeben wird, die die Spielräume für 
nationale wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Zielvorgaben begrenzt.” “Wenn die D-Mark den Osten überrollt. Ein 
Szenario,” Kurt Hübner (taz vom 07.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von 
der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 83-85, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
239“Der rasche wirtschaftliche Anschluß der DDR wäre ein Abenteuer nicht mit ungewissem, sondern sehr gewissem 
Ausgang: mit dem Zusammenbruch großer Teile der DDR-Wirtschaft, die ohne den Schutz eigener Währung mit 
niedrigem Wechselkurs nicht international konkurrenzfähig wären. Es wird offenbar bewußt kalkuliert, daß die 
gewaltigen sozialen Kosten eines raschen Anschlusses dem alten System angelastet werden konnen.” “Revolutionäre 
Geduld. Dokumentation: Warnung vor okonomischen Folgen des hastigen Anschlusses der DDR an die BRD,” Prof. Dr.
Elmar Altvater et al., (taz vom 14.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von 
der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 87-88, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
240“zoge Kosten in einer Großenordnung nach sich, die kaum zu bewältigen sind.” “Revolutionäre Geduld. 
Dokumentation: Warnung vor okonomischen Folgen des hastigen Anschlusses der DDR an die BRD,” Prof. Dr. Elmar 
Altvater et al., (taz vom 14.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der 
Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 87-88, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
241Full quote: “Für die Einführung der kapitalistischen Marktwirtschaft wird ... die Bundesrepublik einen hohen Preis zu 
zahlen haben. … die Umstrukturierung der DDR-Wirtschaft nur mit hohen offentlichen Leistungen der Bundesrepublik 
zu bewerktstelligen.” “Wenn die D-Mark den Osten überrollt. Ein Szenario,” Kurt Hübner (taz vom 07.2.90), taz - DDR 
Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung 
der Wahlurnen, pp. 83-85, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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protective measures.”242 As long as the differences, repeatedly underlined by the FRG to legitimate its 
own action, existed between both states, it needed a controlled transition instead of a “financing of 
misery.”243 
Such warnings, however, did not fit the federal agenda. While Hübner's analysis received 
considerable attention, there was also “lots of ignorance; especially to political parties, such scenario 
analysis was perceived as a betrayal of German unity.”244 Instead, Kohl and his Minister of Finances 
Waigel remained with their position based on the opinions of “the majority of expert economists.”245 
The goal was “to create a unified economic area with a proximate level of production in a process of 
gradual market economy reforms …. This way is well justifiable economically but needs time and 
requires patience of the people in the GDR. ”246 To Modrow, it was, “above all, political ambitions” 
that motivated such reasoning and the over-night-opening of the GDR to the free market.247 To him, the
“goal of the federal government had been the unconditional annexation of the GDR to the political 
economic system of the FRG,” which left unquestioned federal regulative power.248 This overarching 
goal left little time for long-term thinking. Without political and/or economic concepts and ignoring the
international recession, the federal government trusted in the power of the market and hoped for the 
benevolent support of the private sector in dealing with the East German economy.249 It left its own 
population and the population of the GDR in the dark as to the full scope of long-term consequences.
242“gezielten okonomischen Schutzmaßnahmen.” “Revolutionäre Geduld. Dokumentation: Warnung vor okonomischen 
Folgen des hastigen Anschlusses der DDR an die BRD,” Prof. Dr. Elmar Altvater et al., (taz vom 14.2.90), taz - DDR 
Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung 
der Wahlurnen, pp. 87-88, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
243“Finanzierung des Elends.” “Revolutionäre Geduld. Dokumentation: Warnung vor okonomischen Folgen des hastigen 
Anschlusses der DDR an die BRD,” Prof. Dr. Elmar Altvater et al., (taz vom 14.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die 
Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 
87-88, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
244“viel Ignoranz, denn vor allem von politischen Parteien wurde eine solche Szenarienanalyse ja als Verrat an der 
deutschen Einheit wahrgenommen.” Personal communication, Kurt Hübner, Email, January 23, 2018.
245“die meisten sachverständigen Ökonomen.” Cited in Hans Modrow, “Die Treuhand – Idee und Wirklichkeit,” iPW, 7/8-
91, pp. 39-42, p. 40, ADS/Modrow-016 (1990-1994, Band I). 
246“durch einen Prozeß stufenweiser marktwirtschaftlicher Reformen einen einheitlichen Wirtschaftsraum mit 
angenäherten Produktionsniveau zu schaffen … Dieser Weg ist volkswirtschaftlich gut begründbar, braucht aber Zeit 
und verlangt Geduld von den Menschen in der DDR.” Cited in Hans Modrow, “Die Treuhand – Idee und Wirklichkeit,” 
iPW, 7/8-91, pp. 39-42, p. 40, ADS/Modrow-016 (1990-1994, Band I). 
247“vordergründigem politischen Ehrgeiz.” Hans Modrow, “Die Treuhand – Idee und Wirklichkeit,” iPW, 7/8-91, pp. 39-
42, p. 40, ADS/Modrow-016 (1990-1994, Band I). 
248Full quote: “Ziel der Bundesregierung war ein macht- und ordnungspolitisch bedingungsloser Anschluß der DDR an die
wirtschaftspolitischen Verhältnisse der BRD.” Report, Bericht der Gruppe PDS/Linke Liste im Deutschen Bundestag 
zur Tätigkeit und abschliessenden Wertung des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses “Treuhandanstalt” nach Artikel 44 des 
Grundgesetzes, August 30, 1994, p. 6, BArch N/2541/152.
249Report, Bericht der Gruppe PDS/Linke Liste im Deutschen Bundestag zur Tätigkeit und abschliessenden Wertung des 2.




“The hunger for words, language, expression, data, newspapers,
media, history, might be even the most prominent [feature] in this
unfinished revolution of the GDR.”
Ute Scheub, die tageszeitung, February 24, 1990250
“A completely free market will in no time lead to the destruction
of an independent domestic [East German] press.”
Media Control Council, March 28, 1990251
In early 1990, journalist Ute Scheub stated that the Eastern European revolutions in 1989/1990 
were first and foremost “information revolutions.”252 In the GDR, it was the response to what the SED-
successor party PDS called “the devastating consequences of monopolizing public opinion via media 
due to the SED's monopoly claim over the entire political culture in our country.”253 Media and press 
matters had always played a central role in German-German relations and in sparking reform processes 
in the GDR. Freedom of opinion, free media and freedom of the press had been core demands during 
the revolutionary protests, and in a political and a material sense, the press was never to be as free as in 
the immediate transitioning period. The press aimed to brake free from former party rule but was also 
still free of future market demands. About ten months later, Gerhard Bächer, member of the advisory 
Media Control Council (Medienkontrollrat, MKR) for the Green Party, urged his party members for 
political action in media legislation. “Please do not underestimate the significance of this field 
[media],” he claimed, “it does make a great difference whether or not media policy – and with it, the 
250“Der Hunger nach Worten, Sprache, Ausdruck, Daten, Zeitungen, Medien, Geschichte, er ist vielleicht sogar das 
eindrücklichste in dieser unvollendeten DDR-Revolution.” “Melancholie. Stimmungsbericht zur Plage der Nation,” Ute 
Scheub (taz vom 24.1.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung 
des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 20, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; 
Box 31-38, File 33. 
251“Ein vollig freier Markt führt in kürzester Frist zur Vernichtung einer eigenständige einheimischen [DDR] Presse.” 
Draft, Entwurf - Erklärung des Medienkontrollrates an die Regierung, Berlin, March 28, 1990, p. 2, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
252“informationelle Revolutionen.” “Melancholie. Stimmungsbericht zur Plage der Nation,” Ute Scheub (taz vom 
24.1.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des 
Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 20, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 
31-38, File 33. 
253“die verheerenden Folgen der Monopolisierung offentlicher Meinung über die Medien durch den Monopolanspruch der 
SED auf die gesamte politische Kultur in unserem Lande.” Concept draft, Entwurf “Medienpolitische Grundlinien der 
PDS mit Blick auf die Einheit Deutschlands,” Vorlage für das Präsidium, Kommission Medienpolitik, Berlin, June 14, 
1990, p. 2, ADS/PDS-PV-349 (Januar – November 1990, Band II). 
58
opinion building process – is dominated by private interests or the interests of individual parties.”254 
Two days after German unification, Bächer's urge related to media legislation to be introduced to the 
new East German Länder (states). But it spoke of almost eight months of working between political 
and economic pressures in a council that had committed itself to helping the democratic transition of 
the press and to guaranteeing “freedom of information and plurality of opinion on the territory of the 
GDR.”255 As late as summer 1990, however, months after the ship for a sovereign GDR had sailed, 
Bächer realized that the MKR's work had been, in fact, “all for nothing.”256 With the unification, the 
West German system became the all-German system, which meant a takeover by federal media 
structures and legislation. The jurisdiction over culture and media was to fall to the newly established 
Länder. Respectively, different West German political and economic interests dominated the current 
political debate on media in the East.257 
This sub-chapter relates the transition of the GDR – the time between November 1989 and 
Bächer's urge for action – to media and press-related issues. Its focus lies on East German institutions 
and their work in aiming for a democratic transition of the press. It, first, provides insights into the 
ways the centralized media and press were organized in the GDR (i.e. legislation, distribution, and 
ownership), and then documents the role and struggles of the press during the transition period. Several
(governmental) bodies dealing with media reform in the GDR were established, indicated the central 
role of media-related issues: the Media Control Council (MKR), the Ministry of Media Policy (MfM) 
and Press and Media Commission (Ausschuß für Presse und Medien) of the People's Chamber. By 
introducing these institutions, and their individual and joint efforts in bringing about press freedom, this
sub-chapter puts them into the broader historical context. It sketches reform processes before 
November 1989, the agreement on the free press exchange between Helmut Kohl and Hans Modrow in 
December 1989, the Act on Freedom of Information of the People's Chamber on February 5, 1990, and 
the meeting between Kohl and then Media Minister Gottfried Müller in May 1990. The overall aim is 
to give a legislative and political framework analysis for the economic processes laid out in the 
254“Unterschätzt bitte die Bedeutung dieses Bereichs nicht, es ist doch ein großer Unterschied, ob die Medienpolitik – und 
damit der Prozeß der offentlichen Meinungsbildung – von Privatinteressen bzw. den Interessen einzelner Parteien 
dominiert wird, oder nicht.” Policy recommendations, Grundsatzempfehlungen für die Mediengesetzgebung in den 
Ländern Berlin, Brandenburg [etc.],” Volkskammerausschuss, [n.d.], attached to letter, Gerhard Bächer, to, 
Landesverbände Grüne Partei, Oktober 5, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, 
File 30.   
255“Informationsfreiheit und Meinungspluralismus auf dem Gebiet der DDR.” Press release, Presseerklärung, 
Medienkontrollrat der DDR, March 21, 1990, p. 1, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, 
File 30. 
256“für die Katz.” Personal communication, Gerhard Bächer, interview, June 27, 2016. 
257Personal communication, Gerhard Bächer, interview, June 27, 2016. 
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following chapters.
The Press in the GDR 
“Article 27 in the constitution of the GDR establishes that the
freedom of the press, radio broadcasting and television are
guaranteed.”
Classified document, Willi Stoph,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, November 1, 1989258
“Likely nowhere was the discrepancy between ideal and reality in
the past so blatant as it was in our media landscape”
Government policy statement of Lothar de Maizière,
April 20, 1990259
Officially, citizens of the GDR had the right to express their opinions freely and publicly 
according to the principles of the constitution. No service or working relationship could limit this 
freedom and no disadvantages should result from exercising it.260 Freedom of opinion and freedom of 
the press found their limits in the constitution only. The latter, in manifesting the leading role of the 
SED (Art. 1) and the principles of “democratic centralism” (Demokratischer Zentralismus), 
subsequently also defined the scope of media content and the role of media institutions and journalists. 
Both had to follow directives of higher-ranking institutions. Paragraph 106 in the Criminal Code of the 
GDR further defined “anti-state agitation” and penalized “the production, import, dissemination or 
installment … of writings … discriminating the existing social order.”261 The raison d'être of the press 
258“Die Verfassung der DDR bestimmt in Artikel 27, daß die Freiheit der Presse, des Rundfunks und des Fernsehens 
garantiert sind.” Classified proposal, Vertrauliche Verschlußsache, Titel der Vorlage: Maßnahmen zur Ausgestaltung der
verfassungsmäßigen Grundlagen der Tätigkeit und Erneuerung der Massenmedien, Einreicher der Vorlage: Vorsitzender
des Ministerrates, Berlin, November 1, 1989, p. 3, BArch DC9/1051.
259“Wohl nirgends war in der Vergangenheit der Widerspruch zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit so kraß wie in unserer 
Medienlandschaft.” Cited from Regierungserklärung des Ministerpräsidenten der DDR, Neues Deutschland, p. 6, April 
20, 1990, BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 3. 
260“Eine Pressezensur findet nicht statt … Die Freiheit der Presse, des Rundfunks und des Fernsehens ist 
gewährleistet.”Die Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [vom 7. Oktober 1949 und vom 9. April 1968 
geändert durch Gesetz vom 7. Oktober 1974 (GBl. I S. 425)]. Retrieved from: http://www.documentarchiv.de/ddr [Dec. 
18, 2016]
261“staatsfeindliche Hetze … Schriften … zur Diskriminierung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse … herzustellen, 
einzuführen, zu verbreiten oder anzubringen.” Cited in Axel Springer Verlag AG, DDR am Wendepunkt. Wirtschaft, 
Medien und Gesellschaft vor neuen Herausforderung-en, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Marketing Anzeigen, November 
1989, p. 69, Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
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in the GDR was based on an unequivocal relationship between state, people and media. The 
assumption was that “because there is no contradiction between state power [that is] leading public 
processes in the interest of the people and the activities of the press, but complete consensus, there is 
absolutely no form of state control over the press or even censorship.”262 In reality, however, an 
elaborate evaluation system of the SED Central Committee as well as in the Press Office ensured the 
alignment of all publications with the state/party. The consistent threat of disciplinary measures put in 
place a rigid system of self-censorship. Nonetheless, the press played a major role in the media 
landscape of the GDR. Partly due to prices that had barely changed since the 1970s (in spite of 
increasing paper and printing costs), partly due to newspaper subscriptions of entire factories, with 583 
copies per thousand inhabitants, the GDR ranked highest in international comparisons in newspaper 
circulation.263 
Erich Honecker, in giving his own approach to media and society, pointed to media's political 
task. At the tenth party convention in April 1981, he famously declared that the “press, broadcasting 
and television of the GDR have … proven reliable instruments of our socialist order, powerful weapons
in confronting imperialism. They made an important contribution in the political orientation of workers
and in satisfying their intellectual-cultural needs.”264 By November 1989, however, Willi Stoph, 
chairman of the Council fo Ministers, in an classified internal document admitted this not to be the 
case; current legislation on media did not meet current needs.265 Political control over the press was 
manifest in several ways: It lay in the monopoly of the German Post over newspaper and magazine 
distribution, in mandatory licensing for all publications, and in the state control (or better the control of 
the Central Committee and the SED Party) over paper allocation (thus, circulation rates). Circulation 
numbers and the volume of newspapers were centrally planned since 1983, and SED papers were 
generally given privileges. Further, the GDR's only press agency, the General German News Service 
262“Da zwischen der Staatsmacht, die die gesellschaftlichen Prozesse im Interesse des ganzen Volkes leitet, und dem 
Wirken der Presse kein Widerspruch besteht, sondern volle Übereinstimmung, gibt es in der DDR auch keinerlei Form 
der Kontrolle des Staates über die Presse oder gar eine Zensur.” Panorama DDR, Presse, Funk und Fernsehen in der 
DDR, 1-IX-5/1.10, 1982, p. 3.
263In Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp.
1-17, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050.
264Full quote: “Presse, Rundfunk und Fersehen der DDR haben sich ... als zuverlässige Instrumente unserer sozialistisschen
Ordnung, als schlagkräftige Waffen in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Imperialismus erwiesen. Sie leisteten einen 
wichtigen Beitrag zur politischen Orientierung der Werktätigen und zur Befriedigung ihrer geistige-kulturellen 
Bedürfnisse.” Cited in Panorama DDR, Presse, Funk und Fernsehen in der DDR, 1-IX-5/1.10, 1982, p. 1.
265Full quote: “Die geltenden Rechtsvorschriften zur Tätigkeit der Medien erfassen nur Teilbereiche und entsprechen nicht 
mehr den Anforderungen der veränderten Medienpolitik.” Classified proposal, Vertrauliche Verschlußsache, Titel der 
Vorlage: Maßnahmen zur Ausgestaltung der verfassungsmäßigen Grundlagen der Tätigkeit und Erneuerung der 
Massenmedien, Einreicher der Vorlage: Vorsitzender des Ministerrates, Berlin, November 1, 1989, p. 3, BArch 
DC9/1051.
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(Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichten Dienst, ADN), was the exclusive news source for all mass media. 
All of these means of control were to become the target of early reform efforts.
Postal Distribution and Licensing
The Postzeitungsvertrieb (PZV) or Postal Newspaper Distribution (Postal Distribution), was 
one of the core pillars of the postal services in the GDR. Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Postal
and Telecommunication (Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, MPF), the German Post by law 
held the exclusive rights and responsibilities for distributing periodically published and licensed print 
media in the GDR since 1955.266 Publications licensed for postal distribution were listed on the 
Postzeitungsliste, a list that contained domestic press products as well as those of other socialist 
countries. It also included small circulation numbers of Western publications, predominantly trade 
journals. For any publication to be distributed, its listing was mandatory. A removal from the 
Postzeitungsliste effectively meant a ban of a publication. Quotas in the allocation of printing paper 
differed by publisher and further regulated circulation numbers. A publication whose circulation rate 
was exhausted was marked with a blocking bar (Sperrzeichen), meaning the paper had reached its 
limits. The biggest magazine in the GDR, the TV guide FF dabei, for instance, with a circulation of 1.5
million copies only met 21.8 percent of the general demand but its increase in circulation was 
blocked.267 In distributing publications, the PZV bought the newspapers and magazines in advance and 
sold them respectively, without any Remissionsrecht (the right to return unsold copies). It was a system
based on high demand and short supply. Most publications were subscription based, partly because it 
266Note: Only days after Germany's surrender in World War II, there had been first attempts to enforce an information 
policy by means of regularly appearing press products in the Soviet zone of occupation. This process was initiated and 
supervised by a series of orders from the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. While initially private companies, 
Grossisten, organized newspaper distribution, on December 9, 1948, the order no. 199 of the the Soviet Military 
Administration in Germany delegated this task in exclusive competence to the Post Office. Basic structures for this 
distribution task were set up within the Post Office several months before the founding of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) in October 1949. The Newspaper Distribution Office (Zeitungsvertriebsamt) was created and took over 
the tasks of a Grosso-enterprise (wholesale), and several departments of the Postal Newspaper Distribution Service 
(Postzeitungsvertrieb) were created in Regional Directorates of the Post (Oberpostdirektionen), later Regional 
Directorates (Bezirksdirektionen), and their respective offices. See “Die Geschichte des Postzeitungsvertriebs in der 
DDR Zusammenfassung” (The History of Postal Newspaper Distribution in the GDR Summary) by Jürgen Niehof 
[n.d.], sent to the author in August 2017. See also: Final report, “Abschlußbericht der Arbeitsgruppe 'Abwicklung 
Postvertrieb VGO,'” März 1991 bis Juni 1992, June 1992, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. On the history of ZVA 
and the PZV see: ZAV Festschrift. 40 Jahre Zeitungsvertriebsamt. Deutsche Post, Berliner Verlag, August 1, 1988, 
private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. Also Werner Bühling, “Der Postzeitungsvertrieb in der SBZ und der ehemaligen 
DDR,” in Post- und Telekommunikationsgeschichte, DGPT , Heft 1, 1997, pp. 107-117, private archive Hans-Jürgen 
Niehof. See also Axel Springer Verlag AG, DDR am Wendepunkt. Wirtschaft, Medien und Gesellschaft vor neuen 
Herausforderung-en, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Marketing Anzeigen, November 1989, pp. 69-72, Corporate Archives 
of Axel Springer SE.
267 Haller, Der Zeitschriftenmarkt Ost, Band 1, p. 16.
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increased the chances to get them.268 
This meant that subscriptions made up for 60 to 80 percent of the total sales of publications and 
were essentially passed on from generation to generation.269 Many readers subscribed to several 
newspapers at once, partly because of cheap prices and generally not because of “political diversity of 
opinion,” as one reader put it early 1990.270 Instead, it was the 
interesting weekend supplement, classified ads, listing special offers (the well-know car 
market in the Neue Zeit, for instance, or the collectors' meeting place in Der Morgen) or 
also the desire for local information. The 'rest' was part of the deal, which did not put 
anyone into poverty considering subscription prices.271 
With the Post in charge of retail and subscription services, an insufficient supply of both, however, had 
for years “caused irritations among many citizens.”272 
For retail sales, the PZV had a network of 1.697 general retail locations (of which 1.282 were 
newspaper stands or “kiosks”), 9.777 other retails location and about 4.500 postal offices. In 1989, 
Postal Distribution distributed 783 East German publications, 6.257 publications from other socialist 
countries, and 193 publications from non-socialist countries.273 In 1989/1990, about 25.000 employees 
(mainly women) worked for Postal Distribution. Responsible for handling and delivering an overall 
161.000 tons of publications in 1989 (the majority by subscription), the last MPF minister Hans-Jürgen 
Niehof underlined that these numbers “allowed for an appreciation of the performance of the 
predominant female delivery staff.”274
268Protocol, Postal Minister Wolf, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 7, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
269Personal communication, Hans-Jürgen Niehof, interview, March 20, 2017. “Die Geschichte des Postzeitungsvertriebs in
der DDR Zusammenfassung,” Jürgen Niehof [n.d.], sent to the author in August 2017. See also: Final report, 
“Abschlußbericht der Arbeitsgruppe 'Abwicklung Postvertrieb VGO,'” März 1991 bis Juni 1992, June 1992, private 
archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. Also “Bilanz zum 20. Jahrestag der deutschen Einheit. Ausgangslage und Ergebnisse im 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit.” Hans-Jürgen Niehof [n.d], private archive 
Hans-Jürgen Niehof. See also Axel Springer Verlag AG, DDR am Wendepunkt. Wirtschaft, Medien und Gesellschaft 
vor neuen Herausforderung-en, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Marketing Anzeigen, November 1989, pp. 69-72, Corporate 
Archives of Axel Springer SE.
270“politische Meinungsvielfalt,” Letter, Reader to Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, January 
17, 1990, BArch DC9/1069.
271“interessante Wochenendbeilage, ein Annoncenteil, der spezielle Angebote offerierte (der berühmte Automarkt in der 
'Neuen Zeit' etwa oder der Treffpunkt der Sammler im 'Morgen') oder auch das Bedürfnis nach lokaler Information. Den
'Rest' nahm man eben in Kauf, was ja beim Abonnementspreis auch keinen verarmen ließ.” Letter, Reader to Presse und 
Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, January 17, 1990, BArch DC9/1069.
272Full quote: “das unzureichende Angebot – sowohl im Abonnement als auch im Einzelverkauf an die Kiosken – seit 
Jahren zur Verärgerung vieler Bürger führt.” Letter (draft), Entwurf, Brief, Meyer an Modrow, November 29, 1989, 
BArch DC9/1052.
273“Bilanz zum 20. Jahrestag der deutschen Einheit. Ausgangslage und Ergebnisse im Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR
auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit.” Hans-Jürgen Niehof [n.d], p. 1, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
274“kann man die Leistungen der zumeist weiblichen Zustellkräfte ermessen.” Protocol, Postal Minister Wolf, Protokoll 
Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 7, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Also “Bilanz zum 20. Jahrestag der deutschen Einheit. 
Ausgangslage und Ergebnisse im Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit.” Hans-
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By the 1980s, however, the infrastructure of the PZV had become so outdated and ineffective 
that the Post faced a constant stream of complains on late deliveries, closed newsstand on Saturdays, 
the unavailability of publications as well as rejections of subscription requests.275 An MPF report from 
February 1988 bore witness to the conditions of the PZV: comparing it to distribution standards in the 
“capitalist economic territory” (kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsgebiet) and pointing to differences within 
the “socialist economic territory” (sozialistischen Wirtschaftsgebiet), the report emphasized the urgent 
need for modern data-processing and high-performance technology and logistics to meet current and 
future demand.276 Due to the generally bad economic situation in the late 1980s, however, little to no 
investment happened. The head of the PZV, Dietrich Germer, who for years had pointed to the 
worsened situation in distribution, declared that the high number of recorded complaints regarding 
rejected subscription requests “is an expression of a growing dissatisfaction of the population with the 
continuously worsening supply situation here. The content of these complaints shows that the 
population has no more sympathy for it.”277 In the first two quarters of 1989, the PZV had recorded 
increasing complaints regarding the unavailability of Neue Zeit und the very popular Soviet monthly 
Sputnik.278 The latter had been removed from domestic circulation by Erich Honecker in the winter of 
1988, which had “unleashed a massive outcry in the East German public” and became a core spark in 
the protests for press freedom.279 By October 1989, demands for other publications had increased 
Jürgen Niehof [n.d], p. 2, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
275Note: In the late 1960s, there had been attempts to improve Postal Distribution and to introduce market research 
methods to include the needs and wants of GDR readers. According to the plans, a market research office was to provide
research based premisses for the planning of supply and management decisions. The file BArch DM3/21121 (2/3) 
contains concepts and drafts of a planned office for market research for the time period 1968 to 1976. See Niederschrift 
über die Beratung zur Bildung einer zentralen Gruppe Marktforschung für den Postzeitungsvertrieb am 28.06.68 beim 
MPF, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, July 5, 1968, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). Also Organisationsprojekt 
'Zentrale Gruppe Marktforschung für den Pressevertrieb der DDR', pp. 1-8, Anlage I, Richtlinien über die Stellung, 
Aufgaben und Arbeitweisend er zentralen Gruppe Marktforschung für den Pressevertrieb der DDR, n.d., BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
276Report, Institut für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Stellvertreter des Leiters für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Die Aufgaben 
des IPF auf dem Gebiet des Postzeitungsvertriebs, Berlin, February 1988, BArch DM302/4969.
277“ist ein Audruck der wachsenden Unzufriedenheit der Bevolkerung mit der sich ständig verschlechternden 
Versorgungssituation auf dem Gebiet. Aus dem Inhalt der Eingaben ist erkennbar, daß die Bevolkerung für diese 
Entwicklung keinerlei Verständnis mehr aufbringt.” Internal document, Eingabeanalyse II. Quartal 1987, PZV/ Germer, 
July 8, 1987, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
278Internal document (draft), Hausmitteilung von PZV and PS, Eingabeanalyse III. Quartal 1989, PZV/ Germer, October 2,
1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
279Note: Schupbach Guzman described how this scandal not only threatened the legitimacy of the ruling socialist party in 
the late 1980s prompted by pressure exerted by West German media, but laid open the conflict between Erich 
Honecker’s and Mikhail Gorbachev’s visions for the future, censorship, and growing dissatisfaction with the East 
German media. See Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille. 2015. “East German Journalists and the Wende: A history on 
the collapse and transformation of socialist journalism in Germany.” PhD Dissertation. University of California, Los 
Angeles, 3.
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“rapidly.”280 Twenty-two newspapers had been blocked, which had temporarily opened up paper 
supplies but contributed to a generally worsened situation.281 While several “proposals of the 
population on how to improve press distribution in the GDR” had reached the PZV, they could not be 
put into place due to a general lack of resources (i.e. saving of printing paper, redistribution of printing 
paper etc.).282
Papers, Parties and Ownership
Newspaper publishing in the GDR was highly concentrated. The production of the daily and 
weekly press was organized in a few conglomerates that were owned either by individual parties or by 
the Free German Trade Union Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB). Called 
Association of Organized Plants (Vereinigung organisierter Betriebe, VOB), these company-like 
organized economic units generally focused on print and publishing (with the exception of the FDGB). 
The most important, VOB Zentrag, belonged to the SED. It was joined by VOB Aufwärts of the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands, LDPD), VOB 
Union (CDU), VOB Nation of the National-Democratic Party of Germany (National-Demokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, NDPD) and the joint enterprise of the FDGB and the Democratic Farmers Party 
Germany (Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschland, DBD). 
A total of 90 percent of the printing capacities and paper allocation went to VOB Zentrag, and 
thirteen out of fifteen printing plants in the GDR were controlled by it. Respectively, the SED held 
around 70 percent (or 6.5 million copies) of a total newspaper production that in 1987 amounted to 9.7 
million copies daily. SED papers included fourteen regional papers (Bezirkszeitungen), each with a 
circulation of between 200.000 and 700.000 copies, with their local editions for over 200 community 
districts (Kreise), the party's major national Neues Deutschland (around 1.2 million copies) and the 
different papers of the publisher Berliner Verlag. The SED, thus, owned sixteen out of thirty-nine daily 
newspaper in the GDR.283 The official task of all SED owned papers was to take the role of a 
280“sprunghaft.” Internal document, Hausmitteilung von PZV and PS, Eingabeanalyse IV. Quartal 1989, PZV/ Germer, 
January 2, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
281Full quote: “Versorgungssituation hat sich keinesfalls verbessert, sondern durch die Aufnahme von Sperrzeichen bei 22 
Tageszeitungen verschlechtert.” Internal document, Hausmitteilung von PZV and PS, Eingabeanalyse III. Quartal 1987, 
PZV/ Germer, October 12, 1987, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
282“Vorschläge der Bevolkerung zur Verbesserung des Vertriebes von Presseerzeugnissen der DDR,” Internal document, 
Hausmitteilung von PZV and PS, Eingabeanalyse IV. Quartal 1989, PZV/ Germer, January 2, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 
(2/3). 
283Axel Springer Verlag AG, DDR am Wendepunkt. Wirtschaft, Medien und Gesellschaft vor neuen Herausforderung-en, 
Axel Springer Verlag AG, Marketing Anzeigen, November 1989, pp. 70-74, Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE. 
Also Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, 
pp. 1-17, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050.
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“propagandist, agitator and organizer of the Party.”284 
Other dailies, under ownership of the bloc parties CDU, LDPD, NDPD and the DBD, together 
had an overall circulation of 800.000 copies.285 The CDU, next to its main national paper Neue Zeit 
(circulation: 90.000) had five regional publications. The situation was similar for the NDPD and the 
LDPD: each held one main national paper, Berliner Allgemeine (NDPD) and Der Morgen (LDPD), and
four or five regional papers with a combined circulation of around 200.000 copies daily. The DBD 
published the Bauernecho with a circulation of around 90.000 copies.286 
This made Neues Deutschland the largest paper in the GDR, next to Die Junge Welt. The latter 
was the paper of the Central Committee of the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend, FDJ), the 
official youth movement of the GDR, and had a daily circulation of around 1.4 million copies. As 
pointed out in a report of the West German publishing house Axel Springer in November 1989, Die 
Junge Welt was “written with relative ease” and was “cleverly presented,” which had allowed it to 
“reach a considerable increase in circulation in the 1980s.”287 Other papers were the union paper Die 
Tribüne (FDGD), the sport paper Das Deutsche Sportecho and the Sorbian-language paper Nova-Doba.
Important weekly and monthly publications were the magazine and TV-guide Wochenpost 
(circulation: around 1.2 million), the aforementioned FF-Dabei, and the women's magazine Für Dich 
(circulation: 1 million) both published by Berliner Verlag. This was added by the satire weekly 
Eulenspiegel (circulation: 450.000), as well as the small monthly political publications Weltbühne and 
Horizont.288 By the end of 1989, there were a total of 575 magazines with a total circulation of 
31.450.823 copies. Only about 10 percent or fifty-nine publications, however, were popular magazines 
for the general public or Publikumszeitschriften.289 
284“Propagandist, Agitator und Organisator der Partei.” Cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der 
DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050.
285Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050.
286Axel Springer Verlag AG, DDR am Wendepunkt. Wirtschaft, Medien und Gesellschaft vor neuen Herausforderung-en, 
Axel Springer Verlag AG, Marketing Anzeigen, November 1989, pp. 70-74, Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE. 
Also Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, 
pp. 1-17, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050.
287Full quote: “die relativ locker geschrieben und pfiffig aufgemacht ist, konnte in den 80er Jahren eine bemerkenswerte 
Auflagensteigerung erzielen.” Axel Springer Verlag AG, DDR am Wendepunkt. Wirtschaft, Medien und Gesellschaft 
vor neuen Herausforderung-en, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Marketing Anzeigen, November 1989, p. 74, Corporate 
Archives of Axel Springer SE.
288Note: With an overall circulation of 2 million copies, also papers published within and for individual factories, plants 
and companies (Betriebszeitungen) took an important role but are being left out here. Axel Springer Verlag AG, DDR 
am Wendepunkt. Wirtschaft, Medien und Gesellschaft vor neuen Herausforderung-en, Axel Springer Verlag AG, 
Marketing Anzeigen, November 1989, p. 75, Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
289Note: Though low in number (compared to the FRG with 1.480 Publikumszeitschriften), they were published in 
relatively higher numbers with an average circulation of 40.3500 per publication (compared to 66.500 sold copies per 
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Subsidies played a major role in the financing of newspapers. According to Jürgen Grubitzsch, 
media researcher in Leipzig, the average need for subsidies of a typical newspaper with a circulation of 
500.000 copies was more than one third of its production costs.290 In 1989, the SED spent for its own 
regional papers alone about 332 million Mark on subsidies.291 This was partly because until the late 
1970s, product advertising played a minor to no role and, thus, remained a relatively insignificant 
source of revenue. Centrally controlled, advertising eventually covered on average 21 percent of the 
production costs (compared to West Germany, with an average of 65 percent).292 
The CSCE and Early Considerations on Press Imports 
After the follow-up meeting of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
in Vienna on January 19, 1989, there were increasing debates among institutions in the GDR on the 
“consequences arising from the final document of the … meeting for the import and distribution of 
periodic and non-periodic printed matter and other sources of information.”293 The secretary of the 
Central Committee was asked to implement broad reforms for internal responsibilities, since 
established structures lacked behind political realities.294 On a similar note, Dietrich Germer criticized 
in May 1989, that responsibilities regarding the import admissions for foreign publications were still 
based on media policies from December 1965. This, he argued, did “not give credit to changed political
conditions. Domestic political developments in many socialist countries have led to changes in media 
policy and demand for the revision … of approval procedures [of print media].”295 In September 1989, 
it was proposed “to examine how far more newspapers and magazines can be imported in limited 
numbers from CSCE member states.”296 Results were to be presented to the secretary in early 1990. 
edition in the FRG). See Haller, Lugwig and Weßler, Vol. 1, 1994, pp. 13-14.
290In Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp.
1-17, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050.
291Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050.
292Note: Domestic advertising was controlled by the SED-owned monopoly enterprise Dewag, the German Association for
Advertising (Deutsche Werbe- und Anzeigengesellschaft), foreign advertising by Interwerbung (see Chapter 4). 
Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050.
293Proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem abschließenden Dokument des 
Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen und nicht periodischen 
Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), BArch DC9/1052.
294Proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem abschließenden Dokument des 
Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen und nicht periodischen 
Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), BArch DC9/1052.
295“wird den veränderten politischen Bedingungen nicht mehr gerecht. Die innenpolitische Entwicklung in vielen 
sozialistischen Ländern, die auch zu Veränderungen in deren Medienpolitik geführt hat, zwingt dazu, das 
Zulassungsverfahren … neu zu regeln.” Internal note, Aktenvermerk, Germer, Berlin, Mai 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
296“zu prüfen, inwieweit aus KSZE-Teilnehmerstaaten weitere Zeitungen und Zeitschriften in einer begrenzten 
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In November 1989, the amount of imported newspapers and magazines from West Germany, 
West Berlin or other western countries was, as one official noted, “extremely limited. Only a total of 
190 publications with a circulation of 175.600 copies is approved for public distribution in the GDR (of
which 144.000 copies account for the church paper Frohe Botschaft alone).”297 Most publications from 
non-socialist countries could only be subscribed to if other subscribers canceled their subscription. At 
the same time, “the retail sale turnover for publicly sold publications from non-socialist countries was 
2.3 billion Mark in 1988.”298 For receiving any such such publication, however, it required a special 
permit (Sondergenehmigung), of which according to the custom authorities, by December 1989, there 
existed 576.299 Whereas newspapers and other press matters from non-socialist countries received such 
permits from the Press Office, all other print media had to be approved by the Ministry of Culture 
(Ministerium für Kultur, MfK). The import and export was then handled by AHB Buchexport, an 
Außenhandelsbetrieb, that is an enterprise specialized on international trade. AHB Buchexport was 
exclusively responsible for the import/export of literature and press matters. Distribution happened via 
Auflagenhohe importiert werden konnen.” Proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die 
sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von 
periodischen und nicht periodischen Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 
1989), BArch DC9/1052.
297“äußerst gering. Insgesamt sind nur 190 Presseerzeugnisse zum offentlichen Vertrieb in der DDR mit einer Auflage von 
175.600 Exemplaren zugelassen (davon entfallen allein auf die Kirchenzeitung 'Frohe Botschaft' 144.000 Exemplare).” 
Letter (draft), Entwurf, Brief, Meyer an Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. Note: Other publications 
were dailies of Western European Communist parties (ten with a total circulation of 6.000 copies), other publications of 
communist parties (21 publications with a total circulation of 7.700 copies), 142 trade and science journals from the 
FRG and West Berlin with a total circulation of 16.700 copies (the sales revenue of the West German publications 
remained in the GDR), 9 such publications from Finland with a total of 200 copies, and 7 other publication with 1.000 
copies in circulation. This made a total of 175.600 copies, of which only 25 were available in retail sale and subscription
service, all other were subscription only. Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr 
von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich 
aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen
und nicht periodischen Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 3, 
BArch DC9/1052. The break-down of publications: dailies of Western European communist parties (i.e. Morning Star 
(GB) circulation: 950 ; Unsere Zeit (FRG): 2010; L'humanite (F): 1000; Wahrheit (Berlin West):1300 (other dailies from
Belgium, Italy, Finland, Greece, Austria); other publications of communist parties in non-socialist countries (Marxism 
Today (GB): 50; Seven days (GB): 20; L'humanite-Dimanche (F): 1010; Unsere Zeit – Wochenendausgabe (BRD): 
4000, Daily World (USA): 100, Political Affairs (USA): 45 (others from Spain, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, Lebanon); 
trade and research journals from the FRG (mainly Chemistry and Medicine), in attachment, Tabelle, Zum offentlichen 
Vertrieb in der DDR zugelassene Presseerzeugnisse aus dem NSW, 7 Seiten, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation 
bei der Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, November 3, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
298Full quote: “Die meisten Presseerzeugnisse konnen nur abonniert werden, wenn andere Abonnenten vom Bezug 
zurücktreten. Der Einzelhandelsumsatz an Presseerzeugnissen aus dem NSW, die offentlich vertrieben werden, betrug 
1988 2,3 Mill. M.” Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr von 
Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus 
dem Abschließenden Dokument des Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen 
und nicht periodischen Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 3, 
BArch DC9/1052.
299Internal note, Vermerk über eine Beratung des Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR am 05.12.1989, 
M. Wolter, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 6, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
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the Postal Distribution.300 The general import/export rights on the West German side lay with the 
Company Petermann in West Berlin. It held the exclusive rights to deal with AHB Buchexport.301 The 
latter also handled the import/export of printed media to and from other socialist countries. By 
September 1989, about 6.400 publications were permitted distribution in the GDR (a total of 36.000 
copies of dailies, and 930.000 copies of other publications), much smaller quantities than what the 
GDR exported to other socialist countries (90.000 copies of dailies and about 1.5 million copies of 
other publications). In 1988 alone, the revenue of press exports into other socialist countries was 21.3 
billion Mark.302 The situation differed in press exports to non-socialist countries, which, with 62.000 
copies daily, was smaller than respective imports of 218.000 copies.303 
Next to public distribution, there was a separate special distribution network (Sondervertrieb) 
that supplied a selected group of about 15.000 recipients with about 10.000 different publications and a 
total of about 44.000 copies from non-socialist states. As was stated in an internal document, “there are 
no legal but only internal guidelines” in the selection of subscribers.304 In short, it was a system based 
on internal privileges. Still, the overall retail revenue of this separate distribution amounted to 35 
billion Mark in 1988. This was not the least because it allowed for obtaining publications “that, 
according to applicable legislation, are otherwise not permitted import into the GDR.”305 To be a 
300Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to 
proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des 
Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen und nicht periodischen 
Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), BArch DC9/1052.
301Stern und Geo für Suhl und Gera. Vier westdeutsche Verlage wollen ein Vertriebssystem in der DDR aufbauen, Andreas
Kühner, Horizont, January 26, 1990, attachment V to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, 
Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
302Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to 
proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des 
Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen und nicht periodischen 
Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
303Letter (draft), Entwurf, Brief, Meyer an Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052; see also Attachement, 
Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to proposal, 
Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des Wiener 
KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen und nicht periodischen Druckerzeugnissen und 
anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 4, BArch DC9/1052.
304“Für den Sondervertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus dem NSW an bestimmte ausgewählte Bezieher bestehen keine 
gesetzlichen, sondern nur interne Regelungen.” Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der 
Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, 
die sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von 
periodischen und nicht periodischen Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 
1989), p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
305“Sondervertrieb konnen auch Presseerzeugnisse bezogen werden, die nach den dafür geltenden Rechtsvorschriften sonst
nicht zur Einfuhr in die DDR zugelassen sind.” Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der 
Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, 
die sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von 
periodischen und nicht periodischen Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 
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member of special distribution required a permit given out by the Ministry of Culture. By March 1989, 
a circle of about 3.000 institutions or individuals were in possession of such permits.306 They allowed 
for the “free subscription to any press products,” of which, according to the Press Office, in particular 
newspapers were making heavy use.307 The small publisher Volk und Welt, for instance, received about
sixty such publications via special permits (e.g. Osteuropa (FRG) and Le monde (F)) and the office 
underlined that, “[i]n practice, all editorial offices and publishers in the GDR are [already] participating
in the exchange of information material.”308 Individuals receiving such publications, as the head of the 
Department on Newspaper Imports pointed out, were generally political and economic elites who 
received “newspapers from non-socialist countries for their private use by means of official hard 
currency allotments.”309 There were no exact numbers on the volume of imports based on special 
permits but according to custom authority, in September 1989, it was several million publications 
annually (i.e. church press, trade journals, sports magazines etc.).310  
Next to press imports from non-socialist countries (either by public and special distribution), 
publications could officially also be imported by tourist travel (Einfuhr im Reiseverkehr) and/or be sent
as a gift by mail (Geschenk in Postsendung). The latter was possible “for all citizens and certain 
1989), p. 4, BArch DC9/1052.
306Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to 
proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des 
Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen und nicht periodischen 
Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 5, BArch DC9/1052. In March 
1989, the total amount of such special permits was 2.834 (church institutions/persons: 464, art institutes/persons: 889, 
research institutes: 449, individuals: 1.132); a total of 9.770 copies were regularly being imported this way (not 
including publications obtained by ADN, Panorama, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, Deutsche Bücherei Leipzig and Liga für
Volkerfreundschaft); a total of 753 recipients (of which 36 were individuals) received press reviews regularly with an 
annual distribution of about 1.532.000 press clippings taken from 22 daily and weekly papers from the FRG, Austria and
Switzerland, see overview, Zuarbeit für die Arbeitsgruppe A (Gedruckte Information), Presseamt beim Vorsitzenden des
Ministerrates der DDR, Kontakte aus Austausch zwischen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, Austausch von 
Zeitungsabonnements, Berlin, March 1, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
307“kostenlosen Bezug von Presseerzeugnissen aller Art.” Overview, Zuarbeit für die Arbeitsgruppe A (Gedruckte 
Information), Presseamt beim Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, Kontakte aus Austausch zwischen Zeitungen 
und Zeitschriften, Austausch von Zeitungsabonnements, Berlin, March 1, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
308“Praktisch führen alle Redaktionen und Verlage der DDR einen Austausch gedruckter Informationsmaterialen durch.” 
Overview, Zuarbeit für die Arbeitsgruppe A (Gedruckte Information), Presseamt beim Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates 
der DDR, Kontakte aus Austausch zwischen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, Austausch von Zeitungsabonnements, Berlin, 
March 1, 1989, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052.
309Full quote referring the December 1989 practices: “ungerechtfertigt privat NSW-Zeitungen aus dienstlichen Valuta-
Kontingenten beziehen.” Internal note, Vermerk über eine Beratung des Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung 
der DDR am 05.12.1989, M. Wolter, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 6, 1989, 
p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
310Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to 
proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des 
Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen und nicht periodischen 
Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 5, BArch DC9/1052. 
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selected recipients with permits to receive all/certain publications,” but it was also based on an 
extensive list of various custom regulations.311 Press imports were regarded as legal unless publications 
were directed against peace, if they were revanchist, fascist, or pornographic in content, or, third, 
“contradict in other way the interests of the GDR or its citizens.”312 This broad definition allowed for a 
rigorous policy of restricting the import of almost all West German publications for public use. 
Justifying this policy, officials in the GDR reasoned that by prohibiting West German publications, “no
real information deficits arise for citizens ... especially since they have the unrestricted opportunity to 
receive almost all broadcast media from the FRG and Berlin (West) in their own language, which 
indeed is not possible in any other European country.”313
There were also direct attempts for closer cooperation between the GDR and the FRG. The 
option of gift subscriptions (Geschenkabonnement) served the government as a example for direct 
interstate press exchange. Preparing for the CSCE information forum in London, the customs authority 
stated that
based on the respective contractual agreements between West German publishers and 
the AHB Kunst und Antiquitäten GmbH, on the one hand, and AHB [Buchexport] and 
the Ministry of Postal and Telecommunication, on the other, these publishers are 
sending certain specified publications to citizens in the GDR, which are being paid for 
by subscribers in the FRG.314 
311“für alle Bürger und bestimmte ausgewählte Empfänger mit Genehmigung zum Empfang aller/bestimmter 
Presseerzeugnisse … ” Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr von 
Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus 
dem Abschließenden Dokument des Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen 
und nicht periodischen Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 1, 
BArch DC9/1052.
312“widersprechen in anderer Weise den Interessen der DDR oder ihrer Bürger.” Attachement, Anlage, Information zur 
gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des
ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die 
Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen und nicht periodischen Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen 
ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 5, BArch DC9/1052.
313Full quote: “Ein echtes Informationsdefizit entsteht durch das Fehler dieser Presseerzeugnisse für DDR-Bürger nicht, 
zumal für sie die uneingeschränkte Moglichkeit besteht, nahezu alle elektronischen Medien der BRD und von Berlin 
(West) in eigener Sprache zu empfangen, was wohl in keinem anderen europäischen Land moglich ist.” Internal 
Document, Zuarbeit für die Arbeitsgruppe A (Gedruckte Information), Presseamt beim Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates 
der DDR, Kontakte aus Austausch zwischen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, Austausch von Zeitungsabonnements, 
Ergänzung zum Material vom 1.3.1989, Geschenksendungen politischer Periodika, Berlin, 8. März 1989, p. 1, BArch 
DC9/1052.
314“Auf der Grundlage entsprechender vertraglicher Vereinbarungen zwischen BRD-Verlagen und dem AHB Kunst und 
Antiquitäten GmbH einerseits sowie dem AHB und dem Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen andererseits 
werden von diesen Verlagen bestimmte festgelegte Presseerzeugnisse, die von Abonnementen [sic] in der BRD bezahlt 
werden, an Bürger der DDR versandt.” Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr 
von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich 
aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen
und nicht periodischen Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 6, 
BArch DC9/1052.
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These contractual agreements had been negotiated exclusively with the West German major publishing 
house Burda and its partner AHB Kunst und Antiquitäten GmbH in September 1989. 
Burda had for some time delivered six of its magazines (e.g. Burda Moden, Neue Mode, Maxi, and 
Selbst ist der Mann) into the GDR with a total distribution of about 9.870 copies per month. As of July 
1, 1989, this range of publications was extended by nine publications (e.g. Verena) with no exact 
circulation numbers.315 This was now extended to gift subscription agreements.
One issue with press imports from non-socialist countries was how to determine the 
administered retail prices (Endverbraucherpreis, EVP). Based on the “Guideline for Determining the 
EVP for Imported Press Products from May 4, 1981” (Richtlinie für die Bildung der EVP für 
importierte Presseerzeugnisse vom 4. Mai 1981) that had been developed by the MPF in negotiation 
with the Office for Prices (Amt für Preise), the prices for print media in public and non-public 
distribution were based on the West German retail price. This meant, prices in DM were equivalent to 
the EVPs in East German currency (Mark). This practice disregarded the great value gap between both 
currencies, and did not cover “the expenses to the national economy” inflicted by these imports.316 
Since most Western publications were for non-public distribution, this meant that a selective group of 
officials received a selection of otherwise unavailable print media at almost no cost. 
The Press and the Transition Period
“One day we will probably realize with embitterment that in the
stretch of land between [the northern island of] Rugia and the
[southern mountain range] Fichtelgebirge, press freedom lasted
from November '89 until May '90.”317
Junge Welt, May 12, 1990
One of the “central goals of the citizens' movements at the beginning of the upheaval in the 
GDR has been diversity and authenticity [of information],” the magazine Publizisitk & Kunst claimed 
315Attachement, Anlage, Information zur gegenwärtigen Situation bei der Einfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen, attachment to 
proposal, Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem Abschließenden Dokument des 
Wiener KSZE-Folgetrefffens für die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb von periodischen und nicht periodischen 
Druckerzeugnissen und anderen Informationsquellen ergeben, n.d. (September, 1989), p. 6, BArch DC9/1052.
316Full quote: “wird der volkswirtschaftliche Aufwand nicht gedeckt.” Letter, Standpunk zur Preisbildung für 
Presseerzeugnisse aus der BRD und WB, Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise to Presse und Informationsdienst, Berlin, 
December 8, 1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
317“Vermutlich werden wir eines Tages verbittert feststellen: Die Pressefreiheit in dem Landstrich zwischen Rügen und 
Fichtelgebirge währte vom November '89 bis Mai '90.” Pressefreiheit adé, Frank Schumann, Junge Welt, 5/12/90,  
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07754. 
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in 1990.318 But just as the events in November 1989 were preceded by longterm protests, they were 
likewise accompanied by internal debates among East German institutions, officials, opposition groups 
and newspapers on needed administrative shifts, legal reforms and the reallocation of resources. Early 
on, the idea of a comprehensive media law was a driving goal among media reformers. These debates 
had been going on for years and had increased in November 1988, with the removal of the Soviet 
publication Sputnik from the Postzeitungsliste.
On October 31, 1989, Eberhard Heinrich, chairman of the Association of Journalists of the 
GDR (Verband der Journalisten der DDR, VJD), and the first secretary of the Association of Film and 
Television Professionals (Verband der Film- und Fernsehschaffenden, VFF) founded a joint working 
group “to ensure the immediate start and the exact implementation of the work necessary for 
elaborating a media law of the GDR.”319 “Everyone is being invited to cooperate,” in particular 
ministries, universities, journalists and others.320 The aim was a proposal “that, developed 
democratically and discussed broadly,” would find a consensus and the chance for being passed by the 
People's Chamber in a timely manner.321 For this, they commissioned Dr. Anselm Glücksmann, the 
only legal scholar in the GDR dealing with press and media law.322
On November 5, 1989, Glücksmann, welcoming the current push for reform, called for 
prudence and detailed work, and pointed to two major issues in the attempt to draft a media law. “So 
far, in no other socialist country exists a law that could serve us as a role model,” which made the 
initial deadline for the end of the year “unrealistic, if we don't want to approach it in a superficial and, 
thereby, irresponsible manner.”323 Glücksmann suggested a commission consisting of journalists, 
318“Vielfalt und Authentizität [von Information] als Kampfziel der Bürgerkomitees mit am Anfang des DDR-Umbruchs 
gestanden hatte.” “Medien in der DDR: Vom totalitären Zwang zum manipulativen Kommerz” Ulrich Briefs, Publizisitk
& Kunst, Zeitschrift der IG - Medien, No. 7/90, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File
21. 
319“Um den sofortigen Beginn und die exakte Durchführung der für die Ausarbeitung eines Mediengesetzes der DDR 
notwendigen Arbeiten zu sichern.” Agreement, Vereinbarung zwischen dem Verband der Journalisten (VJD) und dem 
Verband der Film- und Fernsehschaffenden (VFF), n.d. [October 1989], p. 1, BArch DC9/1051.
320“Alle, die es angeht, werden zur Mitarbeit aufgefordert.” Agreement, Vereinbarung zwischen dem Verband der 
Journalisten (VJD) und dem Verband der Film- und Fernsehschaffenden (VFF), n.d. [October 1989], p. 1, BArch 
DC9/1051.
321Full quote: “Die Verbände streben einen Entwurf an, der demokratische erarbeitet und breit diskutiert wird, der dadurch 
Konsensfähigkeit erlangt und die Chance hat, in der Volkskammer der DDR zügig behandelt zu werden und die 
Zustimmung einer großen Mehrheit zu finden.” Agreement, Vereinbarung zwischen dem Verband der Journalisten 
(VJD) und dem Verband der Film- und Fernsehschaffenden (VFF), n.d. [October 1989], p. 2, BArch DC9/1051.
322Based on full quote: “einziger [DDR] Rechtswissenschaftler, der sich in der DDR mit Presse- und Medienrecht 
beschäftigt hat.” Letter, Dr. Anselm Glücksmann to Manfred Flegel, Betr: Schaffung eines Medien- und Pressegesetzes, 
November 5, 1989, BArch DC9/1051.
323Full quote: “In keinem sozialistischen Land gibt es bisher ein Gesetz, das uns als Vorbild dienen kann....so hielt ich eine 
solche Terminstellung [bis Ende des Jahres] … für irreal, wenn wir nicht oberflächlich und damit verantwortungslos 
herangehen wollten.” Letter, Dr. Anselm Glücksmann to Manfred Flegel, Betr: Schaffung eines Medien- und 
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members of all parties and several public organizations and lawyers. It was to be “carried by the trust 
of the people” and to start working immediately on a comprehensive law, based on information 
gathered from around Europe (FRG, Spain, and Moscow).324 
Also on the highest government level, reform pressures did not go unnoticed. On November 1, 
Stoph submitted an internal, confidential document on the “measures for organizing the constitutional 
basis for operating and renewing mass media.”325 The proposal, similar to that above, suggested a 
commission consisting of representatives of various political and social groups, publishers, and 
researchers to be created by November 15, 1989. According to Stoph, it needed changed media policies
and it was, thus, “necessary, to elaborate media legislation in compliance with the propositions offered 
by the broad public and by associations,” with a first deadline by March 1990.326 Suggestions for 
concrete changes: the creation of the position of a government spokesperson and the implementation of
press conferences.
These internal processes came too late and happened too slowly. The push of opposition groups 
for free media, freedom of opinion and information, and the rejection of the SED's information 
monopoly increased forcefully. For years, these groups had published samizdat publications, such as 
Arche Nova, Umweltblätter, Die Kirche, or Die Mücke and now took a central role in the dissemination
of information. These papers often consisted of just loose sheets and were written on typewriters or 
copied by hand.327 Several studies also show (and question) how West German broadcast media served 
as a crucial source of information and contributed to the developments in the GDR.328
Also GDR media responded to the general push for reform of hundreds of thousands of people 
Pressegesetzes, November 5, 1989, BArch DC9/1051.
324“daß diese vom Vertrauen des Volkes getragen wird.” Letter, Dr. Anselm Glücksmann to Manfred Flegel, Betr: 
Schaffung eines Medien- und Pressegesetzes, November 5, 1989, BArch DC9/1051.
325Proposal, Vertrauliche Verschlußsache, Titel der Vorlage: Maßnahmen zur Ausgestaltung der verfassungsmäßigen 
Grundlagen der Tätigkeit und Erneuerung der Massenmedien, Einreicher der Vorlage: Vorsitzender des Ministerrates, 
Berlin, November 1, 1989, BArch DC9/1051.
326“erforderlich, in Übereinstimmung mit den in der breiten Diskussion der Bevolkerung und den Verbandsorganisationen 
hierzu unterbreiteten Vorschläge ein Mediengesetz auszuarbeiten.” Proposal, Vertrauliche Verschlußsache, Titel der 
Vorlage: Maßnahmen zur Ausgestaltung der verfassungsmäßigen Grundlagen der Tätigkeit und Erneuerung der 
Massenmedien, Einreicher der Vorlage: Vorsitzender des Ministerrates, Berlin, November 1, 1989, p. 3, BArch 
DC9/1051.
327Note: Arche, a GDR publication concerned with ecological problems or Die Kirche, a church publication, critically 
addressing humanitarian issues and the relationsship between church and the state, freedom of expression and media and
the lack of both. A comprehensive collection of oppositional publications can be found in Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, 
Katrin Eigenfeld, 13/I-III; an extensive collection and information regarding arche can be found in  Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis.
328Czaplicki, Andreas, “Die Rolle der Westmedien in der Revolution in der DDR,” PhD Dissertation, Johannes Gutenberg-
Universität zu Mainz, Mainz, 2000. Bosch, Frank, Medien als Katalysatoren der Wende? Die DDR, Polen und der 
Westen 1989, Spiegel der Forschung, 26/2, December 2009, pp. 30-39. Available online: http://geb.uni-
giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2009/7341/pdf/SdF_2009_2_30_39.pdf [June 16, 2015].
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demonstrating in the streets. While some newspapers, such as Neues Deutschland, initially changed 
little in their reporting,even when the number of citizens leaving the country skyrocketed, other papers, 
such as the LDPD paper Der Morgen, published increasingly daring texts. In October 1989, its editorial
staff circulated new guide principles for its journalistic work. The latter needed to be “characterized by 
openness and a sense of reality, that does not shy away from expressing inconvenient truths, that is 
debatable in conflict, that is being carried by the respect of differing opinions, by the dignity of the 
reader,” and by the pluralism of information.329 This kind of push for reform, for a discussion of media 
policy principles, for transparency, and a public engagement of newspapers, though different in detail 
and temporal sequence, eventually happened within all editorial offices, even those of the Neues 
Deutschland where a new editor-in-chief, Wolfgang Spickermann, was elected by the editorial staff on 
November 14, 1989.330 At times, these discussions were followed by extensive and detailed reform 
concepts.331 
The growing rejection of (self-)censorship, thus, preceded the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was
in many cases followed by an almost immediate inclusion of topics unthinkable before. This, at times, 
created confusion, not relating to news coverage alone. About a week after the fall of the Wall, for 
instance, the TV guide FF-dabei announced it was going to include the programming of the Federal 
Republic. The mistaken assumption that the circulation rate of FF-dabei was also to increase caused a 
tremendous backlash of requests at the PZV that, in turn, complained to the paper.332 Many citizens 
expressed their anger about limited subscriptions for popular publications and made practical 
suggestions on how to improve the general press supply.333 
The push for change also worked the other way around and at times in curious ways. The day of
the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the East German lawyer Christian Fischer received a 
telex from the owner of a West German moving company regarding the immediate distribution of 
newspapers such as Der Morgen and Neues Deutschland in the FRG. “Have publisher at hand 
329Full quote: “Die eingeleitet Wende hat bei uns einen Prozeß tiefen schopferischen Nachdenkens ausgelost …  [über 
journalistische Arbeit] die von Offenheit und Realitätssinn geprägt ist, das Aussprechen unbequemer Wahrheiten nicht 
scheut, streitbar ist in der Auseinandersetzung, die getragen ist von Respekt vor der Meinung des anderen, von der 
Würde und Mündigkeit des Lesers.” Pamphlet, Frank Mangelsdorf, Leitlinien des Redaktionskollegiums, October 23, 
1989, p. 1, Archiv des Liberalismus, LDPD / L7-418. 
330Personal communication, Wolfgang Spickermann, interview, July 8, 2016. 
331See for instance the eight page draft of Norddeutsche Zeitung, Entwurf, Grobkonzeption zur Weiterentwicklung des 
Profils der NdZ, [gr], Schwerin, November 27, 1989, Archiv des Liberalismus, NDZ / 31898. 
332Letter, 'Programmzeitschrift FF-dabei', Mitarbeiter der Abt. Postzeitungsvertrieb des Post- und Fernmeldeamtes 
Zwickau, to F. Eitler, Stellvertretender Chefradaktuer, Berliner Verlag, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1069.
333See BArch DC9/1069.
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interested in the immediate sale of all papers without compensation transaction,” the telex read.334 
Fischer, following the request, specified the details of the deal to the chair of the bloc party LDPD. The
West German publisher was to receive the exclusive marketing rights of these publications and their 
“production [the provision of paper and print capacities] and sale in the Federal Republic.”335 Fischer 
had already contacted Modrow while his client had asked for support from FDP parliamentary party 
leader Wolfgang Mischnick and Kurt Biedenkopf. While these plans eventually fell through, they bear 
proof for very early attempts at cross-border sales and production activities in the newspaper sector. 
They fell through only because West German newspaper publishers themselves had similar and more 
elaborate plans (see Chapter 4).
Early Media Legislation, Policies and Agreements 
When Helmut Kohl and Hans Modrow met on December 19, movement had come into the 
media landscape of the GDR. Though the press was still in the firm hands of the SED, the West 
German union journal journalist dedicated its lead story to the changing media in the GDR and pointed
to increasing trans-border press movements.336 Already in November, officials of the GDR had noted 
that regulations for press import/export from non-socialist countries (referring to the Federal Republic) 
needed to be harmonized and be part of the meeting between Kohl and Modrow. The situation was so 
pressing, however, that they had doubts “that we can defer this political decision until December 19, 
1989.”337 At the meeting, Kohl and Modrow agreed on the press exchange between both states, and in a
joint press release underlined
the great importance of free and comprehensive information via newspapers, magazines, 
books, broadcasting and television. They agreed to make possible the mutual distribution 
and subscription of newspapers and magazines, and to facilitate the broader reach of 
broadcasting and television services. Resulting financial and technical issues shall be 
discussed by a group of experts.338 
334Full quote: “zwecks sofortigem vertrieb der zeitungen saechsisches tageblatt, morgen, union und nd in brd. Habe verlag 
an der hand, welcher sofort am verkauf aller zeitungen interessiert ist ohne kompensationsgeschaeft.” Telex, Telefax, 
Frank Weickert to Christian Fischer, Rechtsanwalt, November 9, 1989, Archiv des Liberalismus, LDPD / L7-29. 
335“Herstellung und den Vertrieb in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” Letter, Brief, Christian Fischer, Rechtsanwalt, to 
Manfred Gerlach, Vorsitzender der LDPD, Dresden, November 15, 1989, Archiv des Liberalismus, LDPD / L7-29. 
Note: In return, newspapers would receive 0.30 DM net profit per copy (with a daily circulation of 50.000 to 100.000 
copies).
336Öffnung, journalist, pp. 8-13, December 1989, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
337“daß wir diese politische Entscheidung noch bis zum 19. Dezember 1989 hinausschieben konnen.” Letter (draft), 
Entwurf, Brief, Meyer an Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052.
338“die große Bedeutung einer freien und umfassenden Information durch Zeitungen, Zeitschriften, Bücher, Rundfunk und 
Fernsehen. Sie kamen überein, wechselseitig den Vertrieb und Bezug von Zeitungen und Zeitschriften zu ermoglichen 
und die Verbreitung von Rundfunk- und Fernsehnprogrammen zu fordern. Die dabei auftretenden technischen und 
kommerziellen Fragen sollen in einer Gruppe von Experten behandelt werden.” Cited in “Gemeinsame Mitteilung der 
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This passage was to become the legitimating basis for all follow-up agreements on press matters, for 
meetings and expert talks on February 8, 1990.339
Two days after the meeting between Kohl and Modrow, on December 21, 1989, the East 
German Council of Ministers ratified the “Resolution on Start-up Newspapers and Magazines” 
(Beschluß zur Neugründung von Zeitungen und Zeitschriften). The resolution stood in general support 
of the newly founded Round Table (RT) by guaranteeing all political groups represented in it access to 
the media (Section 6), the allocation of paper, printing capacities and licenses (Section 7) and of 
communication and press distribution capacities by the MPF (Section 8). Based on the broadest 
possible definition of information and a likewise broad approach to the needed infrastructures in their 
service (i.e. import of needed technology, local support for political groups), the resolution guaranteed 
the freedom of information. It ensured the access to and distribution of media and information to the 
new political parties and opposition groups for “their societal work.”340 A council's working group in 
cooperation with the RT was established to check on the implementation of the resolution. 
Shortly after, on January 9, 1990, the newly created legislative committee on media law 
(Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz) of the People's Chamber submitted a policy proposal that 
was to guarantee the freedom of opinion, information and media until more comprehensive media 
legislation was in place. It was based on a proposal that had been submitted by the SPD (East) on 
January 3, and that had claimed it “needed immediate measures” to implement constitutional rights, 
duties and obligations that arose from international treaties.341 Thus, the January 9 proposal declared 
that in compliance with international law – the Convention on Civic and Political Rights (1966), the 
Final Act of the CSCE (1975), and the UNESCO Mass Media Declaration (1978) – the GDR promoted 
Regierungschefs,” Neues Deutschland, December 20, 1989, p. 6, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
339Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (after February 5, 
1990), BArch DC9/1052.
340“ihrer gesellschaftlichen Arbeit.” Resolution, Ministerrat, Beschluss zur Unterstützung des Runden Tisches, December 
21, 1989, p. 9, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 38. Note: Christoph Links 
pointed out in relation to book publishers that these provisions (such as on paper supply) were guarranted to RT 
members only, while the rights independent projects remained unclear. Interview, “Neue Buchverlage – kein Papier. 
Christoph Links hat in Ost-Berlin den unabhängigen Sachbuchverlag 'Linksdruck' gegründet,” Interview Michael Reiske
(taz vom 9.1.1990) (S.125), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung 
des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 124-125, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
341“sofortige Maßnahmen erforderlich.” Cited in Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. Sitzung, 15.1.1990, 
Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz, Entwurf vom 9.1.1990, Beschluß der Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung 
der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7. See also Information box, 
Infokasten 18.1.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des 
Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 38, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 
31-38, File 33. 
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“a free exchange of information and a broad international cooperation in the information and 
communication sector.”342 In fifteen points, it laid out in detail how free media, and the freedom of 
opinion and information were to be guaranteed. Applying a broad definition of these freedoms, it stated
that
[e]very citizen has the right to freedom of expression. This right includes the freedom to 
obtain information and ideas of all sorts, regardless of boundaries, in oral, written or 
printed form, in art or through any other chosen means, to receive and distribute them.343
Mass media were to represent publicly and in unimpeded ways the existing pluralism of opinion by 
allowing all state institutions, political parties and other organizations and groups appropriate access. 
Media were free as long as they were not misused for “warmongering, instigation of violence, 
manifestation of religious hatred, racism and xenophobia as well as militaristic, fascist, revanchist and 
other anti-humanistic propaganda.”344 While any censorship was prohibited, no citizen was to 
experience any negative repercussions for making use of his/her guaranteed constitutional rights of 
expressing his/her opinion freely and openly. It further held personally responsible those working in 
media whose work appeared in public: “Media employees have the right to refuse to work on material, 
if the topic and task contradict their personal convictions.”345 The emphasis on inner press freedom, 
giving priority to individual agency over institutional authority, fundamentally differed from the 
established West German Tendenzschutz (see Chapter 4).
The proposal further declared that any natural and legal person in the GDR had the right to 
publish printed media. Licensing was abolished, only registration was required. The Council of 
Ministers was in charge to establish a public fund for paper and printing capacities to allow for equal 
342“einen freien Informationsaustausch und eine breite internationale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich von Information und 
Kommunikation.” Cited in Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. Sitzung, 15.1.1990, Gesetzgebungskommission 
Mediengesetz, Entwurf vom 9.1.1990, Beschluß der Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, 
Informations- und Medienfreiheit, January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
343“Jeder Bürger hat das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung. Dieses Recht schließt die Freiheit ein, sich um Informationen 
und Ideen aller Art, ungeachtet der Grenzen mündlich, schriftlich oder gedruckt, in Form von Kunstwerken oder durch 
jedes andere Mittel seiner Wahl zu bemühen, diese empfangen und mitzuteilen.” Cited in Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7.
Sitzung, 15.1.1990, Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz, Entwurf vom 9.1.1990, Beschluß der Volkskammer über 
die Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
344“für Kriegshetze, Aufruf zur Gewalt, die Bekundung von Glaubens-, Rassen- und Volkerhaß sowie militaristische, 
faschistische, revanchistische und andere antihumanistische Propaganda.” Cited in Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. 
Sitzung, 15.1.1990, Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz, Entwurf vom 9.1.1990, Beschluß der Volkskammer über 
die Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
345“Die Mitarbeiter der Medien haben das Recht, die Ausarbeitung eines Materials zu verweigern, wenn Themenstellung 
und Auftrag ihren personlichen Überzeugungen widersprechen.” Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. Sitzung, 15.1.1990, 
Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz, Entwurf vom 9.1.1990, Beschluß der Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung 
der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
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opportunities.346 The People's Chamber further commissioned the Council of Ministers in cooperation 
with the Round Table to allow for the means of publishing an independent national daily.347 Soon after, 
the initiative for such a paper was taken up by the Berlin Initiative of Journalists (Berliner Journalisten-
Initiative) to create the Berliner Tageblatt.348
The proposal included other significant points: First, it stipulated that Postal Distribution (PZV) 
was obliged to distribute all domestic publications with circulations higher than 500 copies.349 This 
meant, it had to buy all publications with circulations higher than 500 copies; a policy later misused by 
new publications such as Das Blatt.350 Self-distribution, however, was permitted. Second, it suggested 
the creation of a Media Control Council (MKR) that was to ensure and overlook the implementation of 
the resolution. The MKR was also to give its approval on “any foreign investment in media,” which 
was to safeguard the “independence of media” in the GDR.351 Third, the Council of Ministers was 
commissioned to draft legislation on advertising to be presented to the new People's Chamber. The 
draft of the law was to be discussed publicly, as was the draft of the media law to be developed by the 
Commission on Media Law headed by the minister of justice in cooperation with representatives of all 
346Full quote: “für diesen Zweck im Interesse der Chancengleichheit einen offentlich kontrollierten gesellschaftlichen 
Fonds für Druck- und Papier zu schaffen.” Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. Sitzung, 15.1.1990, 
Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz, Entwurf vom 9.1.1990, Beschluß der Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung 
der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7. Note: On January 9, 1990, the 
printing paper working group (Arbeitsgruppe zur Bereitstellung von Druckpapier für die am Runden Tisch 
teilnehmenden Parteien und Gruppierungen), chaired by representatives of the economic commission (formerly State 
Planning Commission), was commissioned to guarantee a fair access and distribution of printing paper. This was to 
happen according to needs and wants of publishers and the general economic resources the GDR. Needed additional 
paper was gained, for instance, by a reduction of 2.000 tons of paper distributed to the SED/PDS press. Several dailies 
designated entire pages to new parties and political groups. See Internal note, Zum Entwurf eines Beschlusses der 
Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, Berlin, January 26, 1990, p. 3,
BArch DC9/1051. 
347Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. Sitzung, 15.1.1990, Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz, Entwurf vom 9.1.1990, 
Beschluß der Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, January 15, 
1990, BArch DA3/7.
348See concept, Berliner Tageblatt, Ein Projekt der Berliner Journalisten-Initiative, Berliner Journalisten-Initiative, n.d., 
attached to protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 21.3.1990, Berlin March, 23, 1990,  
Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, 
File 1.
349Full quote: “ab 500 Exemplare den Vertrieb von inländischen Presseerzeugnissen aus vertraglicher Grundlage zu 
übernehmen.” Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. Sitzung, 15.1.1990, Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz, Entwurf 
vom 9.1.1990, Beschluß der Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, 
January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
350Note: With a circulation of 300.000 copies, its publishers Helfried Schreiter sold them to the Post but did not pay 
printers, and eventually disappeared. Personal communication, Wolfgang Spickermann, interview, July 8, 2016. 
351Full quote: “jede Eigentumsbeteiligung an Medien der DDR durch Ausländer … Eigenständigkeit der Medien.” Round 
Table, Runder Tisch, 7. Sitzung, 15.1.1990, Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz, Entwurf vom 9.1.1990, Beschluß
der Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, January 15, 1990, BArch 
DA3/7.
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parties and other relevant groups, researchers and practitioners.352 Only a few days after the proposal 
was finished, on January 15, the media working group of the RT proposed to adopt and support its 
implementation by the People's Chamber.353 
Parallel to these domestic reforms and policy initiatives, facts were being created on the ground.
The former SED (now SED-PDS) executive committee announced that eleven of its sixteen newspaper 
publishers were to be transferred into publicly owned property (Volkseigentum).354 A survey based on 
ADN press releases on “new publications and publishers in the GDR” in early February, listed a (non-
comprehensive) total of sixteen new publications, four of them in explicit affiliation with West German
investors. Other publications had been established by civic groups or by different political parties as 
means of establishing grass-roots democratic print media, others were local initiatives by East German 
journalists and citizens partially in cooperation with publishers from the FRG. Several publications 
and/or publishers who had claimed their independence had established cooperations with West German
publishers. Those reached from printing services being done in the FRG to journalistic and technical 
support (see Chapter 6).355 At the same time, on February 1, several East and West German newspapers
reported that the Council of Ministers was in possession of a policy document that was “the result of 
'secret negotiations' between the East German Post and West German publishers over the Big Four 
(Springer, Bauer, Burda, Guner + Jahr) entering the East German press distribution market” (see 
Chapter 5).356 All of these developments happening simultaneously required some sort of legal 
foundation.
The Resolution on the Freedom of Information
Partly to provide new publications with some legal framework but mainly to break off old 
structures, the People's Chamber passed the resolution on “Guaranteeing the Freedom of Opinion, 
352Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. Sitzung, 15.1.1990, Gesetzgebungskommission Mediengesetz, Entwurf vom 9.1.1990, 
Beschluß der Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit, January 15, 
1990, BArch DA3/7.
353The Working Group included: Demokratischer Aufbruch, Demokratie Jetzt, Grüne Liga, Grüne Partei, Initiative Frieden
und Menschenrechte, Neues Forum, SPD, Unabhängiger Frauenbund, Vereinigte Linke. Round Table, Runder Tisch, 7. 
Sitzung, 15.1.1990, Vorlage Nr. 7, Arbeitsgruppe Medien – Beschlußantrag, January 15, 1990, BArch DA3/7.
354Information box, Infokasten 13./14.1.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von 
der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 22, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
355Survey, H. Leonhardt, Neue Periodika und Verlage in der DDR, ADN, Marketing, Verkauf und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, 
February 5, 1990, BArch DC9/1052. 
356“das Resultat von „Geheimverhandlungen“ zwischen Ost-Post und West-Verlagen über den Einstieg der Big Four 
(Springer, Bauer, Burda, Guner + Jahr) in den DDR-Pressevertriebsmarkt.”Information box, Infokasten 1.2.90, taz - 
DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur 
Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 71, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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Information and Media” on February 5, 1990.357 It was based on and adopted the major points of the 
January 9 proposal that had been ratified by the RT on January 15. While the resolution was to be 
temporary, it was a prime example for the close cooperation between the Modrow government and 
Round Table.358 
According to Ralf Bachmann, deputy spokesperson of the government and representative of the 
Press and Information Office, the most important gain of the resolution lay in a free exchange of the 
press. In an internal note, Bachmann underlined that the resolution was fundamentally geared to the 
free access of citizens to domestic and international information. All citizens, parties and organizations,
equal before the law, now had the right to publish, distribute and receive print media. The only 
constraints lay in the constitution, legal regulations and material resources.359 Others, however, voiced 
their concerns. Gerd Kurze, chairman of the union Association of Journalists of the GDR (Verband der 
Journalisten der DDR, VJD), for instance, had asked Modrow to defer a meeting of the Council of 
Ministers on February 1, during which the import and sale of West German publications were to be 
specified. Kurze argued, the VJD was in ignorance of the content and potential consequences of any 
such exchange and asked for further information to develop its own position in the matter.360 
The resolution meant a liberalization of sales and distribution by allowing for the direct sale of 
print media in the GDR and by ending the monopoly of Postal Distribution. In spite of its interim 
character, the resolution was to serve as the core document for all further media policy discussions and,
likewise, changed media relations with the FRG. According to the West German union magazine 
Publizistik und Kunst, it sent the needed signals to West German publishers.361 Early consequences 
were lined out by East German officials for the upcoming expert meeting on February 8, 1990. The 
guaranteed freedom of information had brought about a “lively newspaper exchange” especially in the 
border regions, and newspapers and magazines from West Germany were repeatedly distributed free of
charge or “for a symbolic price” in the GDR.362 Several times, these promotional give-aways, in fact, 
357Note: The archive signature BArch DC 9/1051 contains detailed documentation on the genesis of the resolution as part 
of a broader discussion on GDR new media law (drafts, correspondence, press releases, and various press clippings). 
358Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich 
Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, pp. 1-2, BArch DC9/1052. 
359Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich 
Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, pp. 1-2, BArch DC9/1052. 
360Letter, Gerd Kurze, Chairman of the VJD, to Hans Modrow, Ministerpräsident der DDR, Berlin, January 31, 1990, 
BArch DA3/34.
361Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.52, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07921. 
362“reger Zeitungsaustausch … gegen eine symbolische Bezahlung.” Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 
8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 2, BArch DC9/1052. 
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“caused chaotic conditions, with blocked traffic and damaged vehicles.”363 The most prominent 
example: the give-away of a special edition of the magazine Stern (Gruner + Jahr), containing the 
election programs of the East German parties in Berlin on February 2, which had caused a massive 
gathering of people. 
In preparing for the expert meeting, it was underlined that, “[t]he government of the GDR is, 
therefore [because of such demands], interested in a broad range of newspapers and magazines from 
the Federal Republic being offered in the GDR and vice versa. Problems arise from the limited 
capacities of Postal Distribution in the GDR and the lack of foreign currency for this purpose.”364 Notes
on the document underlining the keywords “broad range” and “vice versa” further hinted at other 
problems. In order for any exchange to happen, the real issue lay with the required increase of paper 
allocation for higher circulation numbers that would allow for any press exports (and consequently 
increased revenue for press imports). The document continued, however, that negotiations were being 
held with the four major West German publishers on the development of a joint-venture for press 
distribution. It guaranteed the universal import of West German publications and their distribution in 
the GDR (without any additional resources) (see Chapter 5).365 
While these negotiations seemed to take care of import and distribution issues, other problems 
related to East German press. The day the February 5 resolution was passed, a meeting took place at the
Press and Information Office. Attended by publishing directors and chief editors of East German 
dailies and weeklies, they claimed about 80 percent of the established East German papers were on the 
verge of collapse. Papers had no capital funds of their own, the rigid allocation of printing paper 
profoundly limited circulation rates, and ownership questions were left in the open.366 Also, West 
German print media had started circulating in the GDR while distribution posed additional growing 
challenges. With these problems increasing as time passed, they were to be discussed at the upcoming 
expert meeting.
363“chaotische Zustände entstanden, [bei denen] der Verkehr blockiert und Fahrzeuge beschädigt wurden.” Concept, 
Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 2, BArch 
DC9/1052. 
364“Die Regierung der DDR ist deshalb interessiert daran, daß so rasch wie moglich ein breites Spektrum an Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftentiteln aus der BRD in der DDR und umgekehrt angeboten wird. Probleme entstehen durch die geringe 
Kapazität des Postzeitungsvertriebs der DDR und durch faktische Fehlen von Valutamitteln zu diesem Zweck.” 
Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 
2, BArch DC9/1052. 
365Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 
2, BArch DC9/1052. 
366Handwritten note Niehof, “Beratung mit Verlagsdirektoren / Chefredakteure der DDR – Tages- und Wochenzeitungen –
Presseamt,“ February 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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An Expert Meeting on Press and Media 
The press and media expert group met for the German-German media talks (deutsch-deutsche 
Mediengespräche) at the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren, BMI) in 
Bonn on February 8 (see also Chapter 5). According to Bachmann, head of the East German 
delegation, the meeting took place on the initiative of the GDR.367 Much had happened since the 
meeting between Kohl and Modrow in mid-December. The delegation, thus, came with a six-page 
concept paper on issues that needed to be addressed, its focus: press distribution and broadcasting.368 
The first surprise, as Bachmann noted, “[o]ur little delegation [of seven] faced a 20-member West 
German delegation headed by state secretary Hans Neusel, joined by representatives of all Länder.”369 
Neusel opened the meeting by making clear that the purpose of this first get-together was “to skim the 
topics,” to then underline the great interest of the FRG in a free and independent press in the GDR and 
the great attention that had been paid to the media resolution.370 The provisions of the latter were 
undoubtedly important steps towards press freedom and the freedom of information. They did, 
however, not wholly correspond to West German positions (i.e. the establishing of a Media Control 
Council, or the take on inner press freedom [vs. Tendenzschutz]) (see Chapter 4). Still, the equal 
opportunity for all parties to access media before the elections was greatly supported by the FRG. 
Bachmann, on his part, underlined that the resolution was temporary in nature, owing much to 
current conditions and the upcoming elections. Once a comprehensive media act was in place, some of 
the language would no longer be necessary.371 Describing the current problems newspapers in the GDR 
encountered and the central role of distribution issues in them (i.e. the challenges of Postal 
Distribution, see Chapter 5), Bachmann pointed to the preconditions that needed to be met for a 
reciprocal opening of the West German market for East German papers. Though this point had been 
part of the Dresden agreement, it touched several issues that had yet not been discussed. Next to limited
367Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich 
Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, BArch DC9/1052. 
368Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), 
BArch DC9/1052. Also Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur 
Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, BArch DC9/1052. 
369“Unserer kleinen Delegation saß eine 20-kopfige BRD-Delegation unter Leitung von Staatssekretär Hans Neusel 
gegenüber, der Vertreter aller Bundesländer angehorten.” Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über 
Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, 
p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.  See also Delegation list, Delegationsliste, Expertengespräche DDR-BRD, Bonn, February 8, 
1990, BArch DC9/1052. Note: The West German delegation consisted of twenty-four members (see Chapter 5).
370“die Themen abzugrasen” Cited in Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD 
zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. 
371Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich 
Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. 
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paper allocations and a lack of hard (or foreign) currency for any such exports, it could be expected that
the name recognition of East German publications was considerably smaller in the FRG than it was, for
instance, for magazines such as Stern or Spiegel in the GDR. Bachmann concluded, an even exchange 
of print media needed “supporting advertising” in the FRG and an additional 25.000 tons of paper for 
offset and rotogravure printing to allow for the necessary increase in circulation numbers.372 Other 
suggestions were delayed payments of the GDR based on the revenue intake and the “solidarity support
with rotogravure printing capacities.”373 Neusel, declaring that all requests were to be assessed, in 
particular the delivery of needed paper, added that support could be provided also by the West German 
publishers' associations (Verlegerverbände).374 Immediately after the meeting, therefore, the East 
German delegation met with leading representatives of the Association of German Magazine Publishers
(Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger, VDZ) that held in close relations with the BMI (see Chapter 
5).375 
The expert talk was generally viewed positively by both sides, as was noted by Bachmann 
internally and announced the same day in a joint press release. They were to be continued with the 
participation of Round Table members.376 One issue that had initially been on the East German agenda, 
a request for material support to improve Postal Distribution and the use of federal jurisdictions to 
“stop the unregulated newspaper sale via private distribution enterprises” in the GDR,” was eventually 
dropped.377 It was deemed that any such interference was impossible in a free market economy. While 
distribution issues had come up during the expert meeting, the BMI had refrained from giving a too 
clear response to it. About a week later, however, the BMI held its own meetings on issues of press 
distribution in the GDR with several West German interest groups (see Chapter 5). The BMI made 
372“eine unterstützende Werbung.” Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur
Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052. 
373Full quote: “Auch die solidarische Unterstützung mit Tiefdruckkapazitäten sei wünschenswert.” Internal note, Ralf 
Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Presse, Funk und 
Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052. 
374Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich 
Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052. 
375Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich 
Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
376Joint press release, Gemeinsame Erklärung, Hans Neusel, Delegation der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, und Ralf 
Bachmann, Delegation der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch DC9/1052. Internal 
note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Presse, 
Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
377“der Unterbindung eines ungeregelten Zeitungsvertriebs über private Vertriebsorganisationen.” Concept, Konzeption für
die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 4, BArch DC9/1052. 
Handwritten note on concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. 
(February 8, 1990), p. 4, BArch DC9/1052. 
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clear that whatever the issues were, with a federal agenda of unification, the ministry expected the 
creation of new Länder in the GDR. Therefore, its upmost priority was “to ensure that structures were 
being built that were compatible” with those of the Federal Republic, “for a future united Germany.”378 
This was at a time when East German reform groups were still discussing political alternatives for the 
GDR and for German-German relations.
The Media Control Council and a Press in Transition
Founded by and on the principles of the February 5 resolution, the Media Control Council 
(Medienkontrollrat, MKR) had its constitutive meeting on February 13, 1990. Unique in German 
history and without an equivalent in the Federal Republic, the MKR was an independent and non-
partisan advisory body without legislative or executive powers. For this, it had famously been 
compared to a “wolf with no teeth,” a description it gladly accepted.379 “A wolf with no teeth indeed,” 
MKR member Wolfgang Kleinwächter stated, “the Media Control Council must bark, biting is the job 
of the executive branch.”380 The MKR was, as Schupbach Guzman calls it, “a watchdog agency with 
representatives from across the East German political spectrum,” its members were sent by parties, 
associations, churches and the Press and Information Service of the GDR government; the MKR 
secretary was Andreas Graf.381 Committed to the February 5 resolution, the council saw itself as “a 
morally appellative authority solely committed to the task of protecting the diversity of opinion and 
freedom of choice for responsible citizens from [old and] new concentration processes and from 
distorted marketing.”382 For this, the MKR held public hearings with media interests groups, and as “a 
constant in an unsettled media landscape” formulated recommendations and proposals for the 
378“dafür Sorge zu tragen sei, daß für ein künftig vereintes Deutschland Strukturen gebildet würden … die kompatibel 
seien.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema 
Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
379“Medienkontrollrat - ein Wolf ohne Zähne,” Ute Theon, die tageszeitung, April 3, 1990. Medienkontrollrat tritt ab. 
Nachruf auf eine DDR-Gremium, das viel gebellt aber wenig gebissen hat, Ute Thon, die tageszeitung, 9/21/90, BArch 
DC 9/1033 (2/2).
380Full quote: “Ein Wolf ohne Zähne. Dies ist in der Tat so. Aber das ist nicht zu bedauern, sondern das ist gewollt. Der 
Medienkontrollrat muß bellen, beißen muß dann die Exekutive, also der Ministerrat, der Minister oder andere Gremien, 
die für die Durchführung von Verordnungen zuständig sind.” MedienWende.p. 10 taz April 1990.
381See Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille. 2015. “East German Journalists and the Wende: A history on the collapse and
transformation of socialist journalism in Germany.” PhD Dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles, p. 5. Also 
rules of procedure, Geschäftsordnung, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, den 21.3.1990, March 21, 1990,  Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.
382“eine moralisch-appellative Instanz einzig der Aufgabe verpflichtet, die Meinungsvielfalt und Auswahlfreiheit für den 
mündigen Bürger vor erneuter Vermachtung ebenso zu schützen wie vor deformierter Vermarktung.” Protocol, 
Ergebnisprotokoll der letzten Medienkontrollratssitzung am 19.9.1990, Erklärung, Berlin, September 30, 1990, Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
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government until October 3, 1990.383 
Since its beginning, however, the council struggled with its own standing and an overload of 
tasks. This was partly due to the overall situation, partly also because it took on tasks that should have 
been handled by the executive branch, but, according to future minister Müller, “no one else was there 
who could have set cornerstones in the ... chaos.”384 The MKR filled a gap but was overwhelmed with 
problems especially if they asked for executive actions. Already at its constitutive meeting, the council 
was to decide on fundamental questions on press distribution (see Chapter 5) and joint venture 
activities (see Chapter 6) while it was still writing its own bylaws, structures and proceedings. Even 
basic technical equipment, three permanent posts, and facilities still needed to be requested.385 Neither 
was to be fully settled until late March.
Notes taken by MKR member Gerhard Bächer documented the amount of media-related issues 
the council faced: press distribution was under dispute, paper allocations for print media still existed, 
price dumping strategies of West German publishers took their toll on East German papers, West 
German publishers refrained from paying taxes, there were growing joint venture activities between 
East and West German publishers, and open questions regarding broadcast advertising, and radio 
frequencies for private broadcasters; also, the future of East German television and of the news agency 
ADN were in the open.386 In spite of this long list of tasks, Schupbach Guzman concludes that when it 
was time to take stock at the end of the council’s short eight-month tenure, “the report card was 
bleak.”387 Though according to Müller, the council had set “conceptual guidelines” and had stopped 
some undesirable developments during the transition, it had remained largely ineffective at shaping or 
changing the trajectory of the East German transformation. It, thus, became “little more than a footnote 
in history.”388 In an interview in April 1990, MKR member Kleinwächter himself, answering the 
383“eine Konstante in der unruhigen Medienlandschaft.” Jens Brüning, “Anwalt der Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt. 
DDR-Medienminister Müller vor dem Kontrollrat.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 27, 1990,  BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
384“es sei aber niemand sonst dagewesen, der im befürchteten Chaos hätte Eckpfeiler aufstellen konnen.” Jens Brüning, 
“Anwalt der Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt. DDR-Medienminister Müller vor dem Kontrollrat.”  Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, April 27, 1990, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
385Notes, Gerhard Bächer, March 7, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
Also Rules of procedure, Geschäftsordnung, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, den 21.3.1990, March 21, 1990,  
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. Also Letter, Wolfgang Meyer, Leiter des 
Presseamtes, to Sekretariat des Ministerrates der DDR, Berlin, February 15, 1990, BArch DC9/1051.
386See notes, Gerhard Bächer, March 7, 1990 [and March 14, 1990], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
387See Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille. 2015. “East German Journalists and the Wende: A history on the collapse and
transformation of socialist journalism in Germany.” PhD Dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles, p. 211.
388“konzeptionelle Linien.” Cited in “Für fairen Wettbewerb aller Medien,” Regierungspressedienst, 14/90, May 7, 1990, 
p. 5, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2). See Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille. 2015. “East German Journalists and the Wende:
A history on the collapse and transformation of socialist journalism in Germany.” PhD Dissertation. University of 
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question whether or not having such an advisory institution was of any use, pointed to “[f]or instance, 
the press market – West German publishers are gaining ground on it like there was no Media Control 
Council!”389 Andreas Graf added, he would “much rather bite than bark” with everything that was 
going on around them.390 Graf and Kleinwächter's take gave an idea of the impotence of a council that 
had been founded in the spirit  of democratic reform that was now facing increasing market pressures.
Regardless, during the transition period, the MKR became a venue where many of the major 
battles were waged, and it witnessed “on a small scale some of the larger forces shaping the East 
German fate in 1990.”391 These battles are presented in more detail in the chapters to come. They were 
closely intertwined and are crucial to understanding the shifting playing fields. 
Different Interests and Struggles of East German Papers 
Parallel to political reform initiatives, the press landscape and the situation of East German 
papers changed dramatically. New publications were founded and old papers claimed their 
independence at breathtaking speed. Already on January 13, 1990, the SED regional paper 
(Bezirkszeitung) Das Volk, with a circulation of about 400.000 copies, by general membership vote had
claimed its independence. It was the first SED party paper to do so. One immediate change: it started 
publishing the West German TV guide. Two days later, the Thüringer Allgemeine was founded. The 
press agency dpa later commented, “with this [the founding of the paper], the political revolution in the
GDR was followed by a media revolution.”392 More professional and trans-regional newspapers 
followed. On January 26, the first German-German “higgledy-piggledy tabloid” Wir in Leipzig (West 
German Frick Publisher) started its publication and by the end of June had reached an overall 
circulation of 120.000 copies.393 On February 1, Die Andere with five independent offices in Berlin, 
Leipzig, Magdeburg, Eisenach and Potsdam and a general circulation of 400.000 copies sold its first 
California, Los Angeles, p. 212. Note: While it might be due to this ineffectiveness that the council has escaped 
scholarly attention, Schupbach Guzman argues that precisely its failures make it “an informative window” from which 
to examine the limits of the East German media’s ability to determine its own path (p. 218). The question why that was, 
thus, stands in its own right. 
389“Zum Beispiel Pressemarkt – auf ihm machen sich BRD-Verlage breit, als gäbe es gar keinen Medienkontrollrat!” Mit 
beschränkten Vollmachten. Gespräch mit dem Mitglied des Medienkontrollrates Prof. Kleinwächter, BZ, 4/19/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07836. 
390Full quote: “Viel lieber beißen als bellen dürfen bei allem was man so sieht.” Cited in, Druck aus dem Westen, 
journalist Special - DDR, 7/90, p. 23. 
391See Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille. 2015. “East German Journalists and the Wende: A history on the collapse and
transformation of socialist journalism in Germany.” PhD Dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles, p. 213.
392“Damit folgte auf die politische Revolution in der DDR eine Medienrevolution.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 
'Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,' August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 5, BArch DC9/1050.
393“Kraut-und-Rüben-Boulevardblatt.” Journalist 7/90, cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der 
DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 11, BArch DC9/1050.
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edition. Three weeks later, the trans-regional weekly, Das Blatt sold its first edition of 250.000 copies 
at newsstands. And one month after Wir in Leipzig had started, the left-leaning taz DDR started 
circulating.394 All of these papers were founded on different economic premises and by different 
political and/or private groups. The taz DDR, for instance, was the East German offshoot of its left-
leaning West Berlin counterpart taz and was produced in close cooperation with it; its initial circulation
was 60.000 copies.395 
In February, the number of new publications and publishers in the GDR increased so fast, that 
surveys were taken on a bi-weekly basis. To the former sixteen “new” publications (four of them with 
explicit affiliations to West German investors), came an additional eleven (including three such 
affiliations) by February 15, and an additional twelve (including three affiliations) by February 28.396 
These numbers were based on surveys available to the East German ministries at the time. The need for
bi-weekly updates and their general reliance on press material, however, indicate how fast new 
publications were being founded, and how hard it was to keep track of them. For the city of East Berlin 
this meant that by the end of February, nine new papers had been founded (i.e. taz DDR, Die Andere, 
Das Blatt, and Die Wirtschaft) in addition to the increased circulations of nine existing papers (i.e. bloc 
party papers Der Morgen or Neue Zeit, or the sport magazine Sportecho).397 
All of them, however, still depended on the allocation of printing paper.398 Internal documents 
show how the government worked hard to supply needed paper, and due to imports from non-socialist 
(or NSW) countries, existing circulation numbers and those of newly registered publications could be 
394Deutsche Presse Agentur, 'Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,' August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 5, BArch DC9/1050.
395Letter, Wichtige Information an die Vertreter des Medienkontrollrat [sic], Anbau Verlag Tageszeitungsgesellschaft 
mbH, to Medienkontrollrat, February 14, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File
30. 
396Survey, H. Leonhardt, Neue Periodika und Verlage in der DDR (Teil 2 – Ergänzungen mit Stand vom 15. Februar 
1990), ADN, Marketing, Verkauf und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, February 15, 1990, BArch DC9/1052; Survey, H. 
Leonhardt, Neue Periodika und Verlage in der DDR (Teil 3 – Ergänzungen mit Stand vom 28. Februar 1990), ADN, 
Marketing, Verkauf und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, February 28, 1990, BArch DC9/1052. 
397Information sheet and attachment, “Information über Massnahmen und Schlußfolgerungen zur Umsetzung des 
Volkskammerbeschlusses zur 'Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit' auf dem Gebiet der 
Presseerzeugnisse” und Anlage Nachweis des Mehrbedarfs an Zeitungspapier, Wirtschaftskomitee, Abteilung Kultur, 
Gesundheitswesen und gesellschaftliche Konsumtion, n.d. [February 28, 1990], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
398Note: the newly founded papers were not insignificant in size, such as taz East (receiving 716.1 tons of paper) or Das 
Blatt (884.3 tons) compared to established but small bloc papers such as Der Morgen (280.0 tons) or Neue Zeit (206.0 
tons) or Sportecho (119.5 tons). The biggest paper in Berlin remained to be the former SED Berliner Zeitung with 
1.698.5 tons of paper. Information sheet and attachment, “Information über Massnahmen und Schlußfolgerungen zur 
Umsetzung des Volkskammerbeschlusses zur 'Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit' auf 
dem Gebiet der Presseerzeugnisse” und Anlage Nachweis des Mehrbedarfs an Zeitungspapier, Wirtschaftskomitee, 
Abteilung Kultur, Gesundheitswesen und gesellschaftliche Konsumtion, n.d. [February 28, 1990], Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
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secured for the first quarter of 1990.399 This did not allow, however, for any increase in volume for 
export purposes, and the preferential treatment of former SED papers was unbroken. By the end of 
February, no decision regarding paper supplies had been made for after March.400 Instead, several 
papers were informed by their printing facilities that any such supplies remained without any 
guarantee. The taz DDR, in response, urged the MKR to help support, according to its abilities, 
building the preconditions needed for regular publication.401 East German publishers, however, 
informed by the government that they needed to take their own measures for meeting their increased 
paper needs, “for instance, by securing their own means for importing printing paper.”402 How this task 
was to be accomplished by publishers that generally did not hold their own full economic and/or legal 
authority was not mentioned. Instead, it was expected that with increased prices for East German print 
media in combination with increased Western press imports, the demands for printing paper would 
decrease.403 Put differently, with the slow dying of East German papers, their need for paper also was to
go down.
Still, the founding of newspapers continued at high speed, and the Press and Information Office 
of the GDR government struggled to keep track of the number of publications in the country. By April 
6, it reported of twelve “central” (or trans-regional) and thirty-five regional dailies, and thirty-five 
weeklies.404 According to dpa, by the end of spring 1990, about 100 newspapers had been newly 
399Note: This included the increase according to a resolution of the Council of Ministers on December 21, 1989. 1.5 
kilotons came from the GDR, 5 kilotons were imported from NSW countries for the time period January until March. 
Information sheet and attachment, “Information über Massnahmen und Schlußfolgerungen zur Umsetzung des 
Volkskammerbeschlusses zur 'Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit' auf dem Gebiet der 
Presseerzeugnisse” und Anlage, Wirtschaftskomitee, Abteilung Kultur, Gesundheitswesen und gesellschaftliche 
Konsumtion, n.d. [February 28, 1990], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
400Information sheet and attachment, “Information über Massnahmen und Schlußfolgerungen zur Umsetzung des 
Volkskammerbeschlusses zur 'Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit' auf dem Gebiet der 
Presseerzeugnisse” und Anlage, Wirtschaftskomitee, Abteilung Kultur, Gesundheitswesen und gesellschaftliche 
Konsumtion, n.d. [February 28, 1990], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
401Letter, Wichtige Information an die Vertreter des Medienkontrollrat [sic], Anbau Verlag Tageszeitungsgesellschaft 
mbH, to Medienkontrollrat, February 14, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File
30. 
402“u.a. durch Eigenerwirtschaftung von Mittel für den Import von Zeitungsdruckpapier.” Information sheet, “Information 
über Massnahmen und Schlußfolgerungen zur Umsetzung des Volkskammerbeschlusses zur 'Gewährleistung der 
Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit' auf dem Gebiet der Presseerzeugnisse,” Wirtschaftskomitee, Abteilung 
Kultur, Gesundheitswesen und gesellschaftliche Konsumtion, n.d. [February 28, 1990], p. 2, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis /
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
403Information sheet, “Information über Massnahmen und Schlußfolgerungen zur Umsetzung des 
Volkskammerbeschlusses zur 'Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit' auf dem Gebiet der 
Presseerzeugnisse,” Wirtschaftskomitee, Abteilung Kultur, Gesundheitswesen und gesellschaftliche Konsumtion, n.d. 
[February 28, 1990], p. 2, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
404Overview, “Übersicht über Tages- und Wochenzeitungen der DDR” (Stand 6. April 1990), Presse- und 
Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 
30. 
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established, most of them had been initiated by opposition and reform groups who had successfully 
fought for an allocation of printing paper.405 Until the unification of both German states, this number 
lay at about 120 new newspapers. According to the West German Association of the Local Press 
(Verband der Lokalpresse), local papers were founded exclusively during this immediate transition 
period, generally by dedicated private individuals or medium-sized publishers who started from 
scratch.406 
This resulted in conflicting interests between newly established papers (either by reform 
movements or by individuals, partly with West German support), bloc party papers, and former SED 
regional papers. With regard to the latter, Die Andere pointed out how with the erosion of “[t]he 
monopoly over public opinion of the once leading party, … newspapers and magazines are changing 
names and owners,” making extensive use of the label “independent.”407 While this brought to the fore 
questions of internal reform (or the lack thereof), of guilt (for having formerly been complicit with the 
state) and the meaning of “independence,” Die Andere claimed that most journalists were merely 
“trying their independence” with no awareness for the economic realities.408 While the SED-PDS 
slowly gave up its media monopoly, 
the last sequel of this monopoly story has yet to be written. On a daily basis, the 
conditions of a future autonomy from parties and organizations are being debated in 
editorial offices for hours on end. These discussions over independence always come 
along with assessments of new dependencies: on advertising clients from the East and 
the West, on old-style paper allocations, on joint ventures with – and this is  meant 
literally – venturesome partners from the all so 'free' West.409 
And even with SED regional papers claiming their political independence, they were still the dominant 
papers in their respective regions. They stood in direct competition with newly established small 
405Deutsche Presse Agentur, 'Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,' August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 5, BArch DC9/1050.
406Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher 
nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten 
Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, 
Bonn, May 21, 1992, pp. 2-4, BArch B/106/156193.
407Full quote: “Das Meinungsmonopol der ehemals führende Partei zerfällt, Zeitungen und Zeitschriften wechseln ihren 
Name und Besitzer. Allenthalben wird das Etikett 'unabhängig' aufgeklebt.” Annette Leo, “Agitation ade,” Die Andere, 
April 1990, pp. 1-5, p. 1, archive Vistas Publishers.
408“proben die Unabhängigkeit.” Michael Hinze, “Journalisten proben die Unabhängigkeit,” Die Andere, April 1990, p. 5, 
archive Vistas Publishers.
409die letzte Fortsetzung dieser Monopolystory ist noch nicht geschrieben. Täglich werden in den Redaktionsstuben 
stundenlange Debatten um die Konditionen einer künftigen wirtschaftlichen Autonomie von Parteien und 
Organisationen geführt. Immer geht die Diskussion um Unabhängigkeit einher mit der Prüfung neuer Abhängigkeiten: 
Von Anzeigenkunden aus Ost und West, von Papierzuteilung alter Art, von joint-ventures mit – was wortlich zu nehmen
ist – risikofreudigen Partnern aus dem ach so 'freien' Westen.” Michael Hinze, “Journalisten proben die 
Unabhängigkeit,” Die Andere, April 1990, p. 5, archive Vistas Publishers.
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publications, but also with West German publishers who increasingly distributed their publications in 
the GDR. 
In an open letter on March 12, the former SED regional paper Leipziger Volkszeitung (LVZ) 
contested that “West German publishers are selling their products in unimpeded ways and are 
developing market strategies that greatly hamper the economic existence and competitiveness of East 
German newspaper publishers.”410 The LVZ pointed to dumping price strategies (see Chapter 4), issues 
of distribution (see Chapter 5), and the founding of new publications and/or joint ventures with already 
existing papers (see Chapter 6). Just one week earlier, the paper had addressed the Council of Ministers
“in the interest of your [publishers of the GDR]” and their survival “on a meanwhile open-to-all East 
German market.”411 While the government had not been able to stop or regulate market developments, 
they required action. Thus, LVZ urged for the “transfer of the full legal and economic authority to 
publishers” so that they could respond adequately and were able to compete with West German 
companies.412 East German papers, however, were on their own facing these developments.
While the inquiry remained unanswered, the open letter did not.413 In its response, the Council 
of Ministers argued that the opening of the GDR for publications from the Federal Republic had been a 
mutual act. It had been agreed upon by Modrow and Kohl in December 1989, and was based on CSCE 
agreements. If a publisher was still owned by a party and not legally independent, it required the 
decision of the respective party; the council, however, could not force any party to take such a step. 
Once independence was legally established, cooperative relationships with other (West German) 
publishers could be built. As to issues of distribution, the council suggested raising public awareness of
current unfair business practices by making use of their own available means (see Chapter 5).414 It 
further suggested that an informal alliance of East German publishers was a suitable means for facing a
“developing market, and rationalizing strategies.”415 “East German publishers themselves should make 
410“brd-verlage verkaufen ungehindert ihre produkte und entwickeln marktstrategien, die die wirtschaftliche existenz- und 
wettbewerbsfähigkeit der ddr-zeitungsverlage stark behindern.” Telegram, Offener Brief, Leipziger Volkszeitung to 
Ministerrat der DDR, Leipzig, March 12, 1990, BArch DC9/1051. 
411“im interesse ihrer [DDR Verlage] … am inzwischen fuer alle geoeffneten ddr-markt.” Telex, Leipziger Volkszeitung to
Ministerrat der DDR, protest der bezirklichen zeitungsverleger gegen den versuch, die presse- und verlegerische freiheit 
der verlage einzuschraenken, Leipzig, March 4, 1990, BArch DC9/1051. 
412“uebergabe der vollen juristischen und wirtschaftlichen kompetenz an die verlage.” Telex, Leipziger Volkszeitung to 
Ministerrat der DDR, protest der bezirklichen zeitungsverleger gegen den versuch, die presse- und verlegerische freiheit 
der verlage einzuschraenken, Leipzig, March 4, 1990, BArch DC9/1051. 
413Telex, Dr. Arnold, Sekretariats des Ministerrates, to Leipziger Volkszeitung, n.d. (after March 12, 1990), BArch 
DC9/1051. 
414Telex, Dr. Arnold, Sekretariats des Ministerrates, to Leipziger Volkszeitung, n.d. (after March 12, 1990), BArch 
DC9/1051. 
415“selbst Markt- und Rationalisierungsstrategien zu entwickeln.” Telex, Dr. Arnold, Sekretariats des Ministerrates, to 
Leipziger Volkszeitung, n.d. (after March 12, 1990), BArch DC9/1051. 
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maximum efforts to survive on a consistently changing market. The current government neither has the 
rights nor the resources to provide any financial aid.”416 Itself in transition, the government left 
publishers to their own devices. Pushing them to take initiative with no resources on their own, help 
was found in capital investments of West German publishing houses. 
After the election on March 18, joint venture negotiations skyrocketed also in the media sector 
(see Chapter 6). And while Die Andere asked how independent was a press “when the publishing 
empires of Springer, Bertelsmann, Gruner + Jahr reach with their strong arms into our media 
landscape,” the new government declared the press, broadcasting and television to be free.417 Lothar de 
Maizière underlined, “[a] democratic order requires independent media and competing opinions,” 
which could not, however, be left to a free market and be exposed “to the dangers of new processes of 
monopolization.”418 A few days later, the MKR decided on principles that would allow for the 
implementation of the February 5 resolution. Similar to de Maizière, its first point underlined that “to 
guarantee the freedom of information and a diversity of opinion on the territory of the GDR, any 
measures leading to monopoly positions of East German as well as foreign publishers, are to be 
omitted.”419 This referred to issues of sales but also to “majority shares of foreign publishers in 
publishing enterprises, editorial offices, printing facilities, distribution infrastructures of the GDR.”420 
The MKR called on the East German Office of Competition Protection (Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz), 
whose formation was to be made official the next day, on March 22, 1990. 
The office, however, was not to commence it work for some time, and the MKR's call remained
without response. Instead, as of April 1, subsidies for all newspapers ceased to exist. The importance of
this shift has been underlined earlier and cannot be overestimated. It forced newspapers and magazines 
416“Die DDR-Verlage sollten großtmogliche eigene Anstrengungen unternehmen, um auf einem sich weiter verändernden 
Markt bestehen zu konnen. Die gegenwärtige Regierung ist zu finanziellen Hilfen weder berechtigt noch in der Lage.” 
Telex, Dr. Arnold, Sekretariats des Ministerrates, to Leipziger Volkszeitung, n.d. (after March 12, 1990), BArch 
DC9/1051. 
417“wenn die Verlagsimperien Springer, Bertelsmann, Gruner + Jahr ihre kräftigen Arme in unsere Medienlandschaft 
stecken.”Annette Leo, “Agitation ade,” Die Andere, April 1990, p. 1, archive Vistas Publishers. 
418Full quote: “Presse, Rundfunk und Fernsehen sind frei. Eine demokratische Ordnung setzt unabhängige Medien und den
Wettbewerb der Meinungen voraus. Die Abkehr von dem früheren Informations- und Meinungsmonopol der SED und 
die Zuwendung zu einer pluralistischen Medienstruktur dürfen jedoch weder dem Selbstlauf überlassen und nicht der 
Gefahr neuerlicher Monopolbildung ausgesetzt werden.” Cited from government statement, Regierungserklärung des 
Ministerpräsidenten der DDR, Neues Deutschland, p. 6, April 20, 1990, BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 3. 
419“Um Informationsfreiheit und Meinungspluralismus auf dem Gebiet der DDR garantieren zu konnen, sind alle Schritte 
zu unterlassen, die zu Monopolstellungen sowohl der DDR – als auch ausländischer Verlage führen konnen.” Press 
release, Presseerklärung, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, March 21, 1990, p. 1, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
420Full quote: “Mehrheitsbeteiligungen ausländischer Anbieter (Verlage) an DDR-Verlagen, - Redaktionen, - Druckereien, 
Vertreibsstrukturen [sic] nicht statthaft sind.” Press release, Presseerklärung, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, March 21, 
1990, p. 2, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
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to find other sources of revenue, and most newspapers doubled or tripled their prices.421 The former 
SED-national Neues Deutschland, for instance, increased its price from 15 to 55 Pfennig, Junge Welt, 
with 40 Pfennig, became the lowest-priced national paper for retail sale in the GDR.422 Especially 
national papers, in particular Neues Deutschland and Junge Welt, experienced a tremendous drop in 
subscriptions partly because their subscriptions for entire factories and organizations had been 
canceled. By April 4, 1990, a total of 3.6 of 16.6 million newspaper and magazine subscriptions were 
canceled in the GDR. In April 1990 alone, East German papers lost 29 percent of their subscriptions.423 
With their core stream of revenue gone (subscriptions and subsidies), advertising and West German 
capital became the main source of financial support. Advertising, however, demanded for an entire 
infrastructure (i.e. sales and marketing offices), and West German marketing experts and sales men 
toured the country giving advice on advertising and marketing strategies.424
The Ministry of Media Policy
“The count down is over.
'The rocket is takin off.' I'm feelin sick.”
Gottfried Müller, six days before taking over office,
April 11, 1990425
In his government policy statement on April 20, 1990, Lothar de Maizière addressed at length 
the importance of breaking former monopolies over public opinion, media and information. Media 
needed to be pluralistic and free. To not run the danger of new monopolies, however, they could not be 
left to their own devices.426 It needed an institutional frame for their transition, and the Ministry of 
Media Policy (Ministerium für Medienpolitik, MfM) was to “bring together various efforts and to pave 
421Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.50, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
422Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 7, BArch DC9/1050.
423Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 7, BArch DC9/1050. Personal communication, Wolfgang Spickermann, interview, July 8, 2016. 
424 “'Sehen Sie, so einfach ist das.' In einem Crashkurs lernen Sportfunktionäre der DDR von Werbefachleuten aus dem 
Westen das kleine Einmaleins kapitalistischer Vermarktung / Gastgeber: ausgerechnet das 'Neue Deutschland,'”  
Thommes (taz vom 13.3.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung 
des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 92-93, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
425“der Count down ist zu Ende. 'Die Rakete fliegt.' Mir ist ganz übel.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), 
April 11, 1990, diary sent to author on January 12, 2017.
426Cited from Regierungserklärung des Ministerpräsidenten der DDR, Neues Deutschland, p. 6, April 20, 1990, BArch 
DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 3. 
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the way for a free and diverse media landscape.”427 
For this job, de Maizière chose Gottfried Müller (CDU), a theologist, former journalist and 
chief editor of the church paper Glaube und Heimat. Müller, like many others in the new government, 
was about to take on a job he had not been trained for. While Müller had co-authored the Weimar 
Letters (Weimarer Briefe), an early open demand for reform in the East German CDU, he did not 
consider himself to be a radical or political reformer, but he was driven by Christian values.428 To some,
the choice of Müller was “the worse that could have happened to the government,” for his 
inconsequential take on shifting economic pressures and his lack of insight did not match the needs of a
media in transition.429 Müller's minister's diary (see Introduction), however, bears proof that he was 
clearly aware of the great challenges East German media and his ministry were facing. 
When he took over office on April 17, 1990, his head and agenda were filled with appointments
and questions. To Müller's surprise, however, all he was being handed was an empty safe while his 
former superior, Rudolf Müller, and Ralf Bachmann, who had worked in the Press and Information 
Office under the Modrow government, introduced him to the ministry.430 Bachmann, whom Müller 
referred to as a “reliable source on all questions regarding the MfM's methodological approach,” was to
become a central figure in negotiations over distribution issues (see Chapter 5).431 Müller had also been 
assigned a group of West German consultants who, sent by the Federal Press Office 
(Bundespresseamt), in spite of their legal expertise lacked political insight and were, thus, only of 
limited help.432
When the ministry commenced its work, the problems it faced were pressing and manifold. In 
427“unterschiedliche Bemühungen zusammenzuführen und den Weg in eine freie und vielfältige Medienlandschaft zu 
bahnen.” Cited from Regierungserklärung des Ministerpräsidenten der DDR, Neues Deutschland, p. 6, April 20, 1990, 
BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 3. 
428Note: Müller himself had experienced repression and censorship partly exercised by Rudolf Müller. The latter had all 
the insights into the Ministry, was now to become Gottfried Müller's colleague, and according to Gottfried Müller ended
up doing good work. Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April 19, 1990), Email, 
January 30, 2017. See ACDP/01-611-001/5; ACDP/01-611-001/1; ACDP/01-611-001/5.
429“das Schlimmste was der DDR Regierung passieren konnte.” Personal communication, Christoph Links, interview, 
March 8, 2017. Also personal communication, Wolfgang Spickermann, interview, July 8, 2016. 
430Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April 17, 1990), Email, January 12, 2017.
431“zuverlässiger Gewährsmann für alle Fragen eines methodischen Vorgehens des MfM.” Gottfried Müller, personal 
communication, comments on minister diary (April 17, 1990), Email, January 30, 2017.
432Note: Known as “the administrators” (die Beamten) their reputation, with the exception of Walter J. Schütz, was one of 
arrogance with little feel and/or understanding for the issues at stake or concrete ideas as to how to put them their 
solutions into practice. Gottfried Müller in retrospect stated that their ties to the CDU seemed to have narrowed 
considerably their way of thinking (quote: “Ihr parteiliches CDU-West-Engagement schien mir gelegentlich ihren 
geistigen Horizont stark einzuengen.”). He added, however, that the resolution on distribution was mainly their work 
(quote: “es bleibt anzuerkennen: Wir verdankten ihnen den juristisch einwandfreien VO-Entwurf.”) and guessed that 
with all probability Schütz had done most of the work. Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on 
minister diary (April 24, 1990), Email, January 30, 2017.
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early May, the West German Handelsblatt gave an overview of these challenges: First, former party 
papers still had a competitive advantage. Second, “after the opening of the borders, a flood of 
publications met an outdated and timeworn Postal Distribution” that was continuously causing 
backlashes and was the source for “quite a few problems.”433 Third, no taxes were being paid in the 
retailing sector by West German publishers at a time when the GDR was more than ever dependent on 
tax revenues.434 Fourth was the general practice of newspaper promoters, even Post Office employees, 
“to take along ready-to-sign cancelation forms for an East German publication when promoting its 
Western [counterpart].”435 In addition, a variety of East German publications, especially smaller 
newspapers, had little chance on an increasingly cut-throat market, if just because of their lack of 
technological resources.436 
In spite of these issues, two days before Müller was to take over office, there were yet no clear 
jurisdictions and/or concrete goals of the ministry. Its legislative powers still needed to be obtained in 
the cabinet and assembled from other ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice or the MPF.437 Müller 
consistently found himself in the position of having to outline and explain the MfM's role and purpose, 
partly to underline difference to what had been common censorship practice in the GDR, partly because
there was no equivalent institution in the FRG. Well aware that the “mere existence of a Media 
Ministry will wake opposing forces,” and that it would have been smarter to simply “hide” it, for 
instance, in the Ministry of Culture, Müller did not tire to emphasize that the MfM was to work 
“exclusively during the time of transition from a centralistic, party-controlled to an open [media] 
system, in which self-regulation can exercise its regulative effects,” and that the MfM was not to 
“control media through the back door.”438 Instead, the ministry was to act as the “advocate of the 
433“nach der Öffnung der Grenze eine Flut von Titel auf ein überholtes und veraltetes Post-Zeitungvertriebsnetz stoßt … 
mancherlei Problem.” Die Post und private Grosso-Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am Lesermarkt bieten, 
Handelsblatt, p.8, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07777.
434“Wir haben nicht die Absicht, den Vertrieb westlicher Erzeugnisse zu drosseln oder zu reglementieren.” DDR schränkt 
Freiheit der Presse wieder ein, Dieter Dose, Die Welt, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07778.
435“mit dem Angebot einer westlichen Publikation schon die unterschriftsreife Abbestellung für ein DDR-Produkt 
mitnehmen.” Die Post und private Grosso-Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am Lesermarkt bieten, Handelsblatt, p.8, 
5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07777.
436Die Post und private Grosso-Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am Lesermarkt bieten, Handelsblatt, p.8, 5/10/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07777. Also Endlich Ordnung bei dem Presse-Wildwuchs, Vera Krause, 
Bauern Echo, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07779. 
437“Ich hore viel Autoradio.” Gespräch mit Gottfried Müller, Medienminister der DDR, die tageszeitung, Ute Thon, 
5/28/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC07998. Also Es fehlt an Informationen überall, textintern, 47, 5/9/90, p. 
2, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08029. Also in Also Spätere Kompetenz der Länder vorausahnen, Reinhart 
Bünger, Frankfurter Rundschau, 4/26/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
438Full quote: Auf Gebiet der Medien wird allein die Tatsache eines Medienministeriums die Gegenkräfte wecken … 
verstecken.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April 11, 1990), Email January 12, 2017. “Denn ein Medienministerium 
hat seine Funktion ausgesprochenermaßen in der Zeit des Überganges von einem zentralistischen, parteigelenkten 
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[future] Länder” in the organization of media jurisdictions.439  
About two weeks after the ministry started its work, on April 26, 1990, Müller had a first 
hearing at the MKR, and he made clear that an “acute need for action” lay in the press sector.440 “At 
this point, print media take the highest priority. Here, it is absolutely necessary to soon find a solution 
for issues of distribution,” Müller stated in an interview.441 At the MKR hearing, Müller emphasized the 
MfM's aim to quickly bring about a reorganization in distribution that complied with the MKR's 
guidelines of early March (see above).442 East German newspapers further requested for “protective 
measures for media in the GDR [that were] shaken by West German competition.”443 And while this set
the agenda,  what soon defined the work of the MfM was immense time pressure, a lack of jurisdiction 
and information, personnel issues, a soon-to-come overload with work, and the continuous need to 
defend its legitimacy.444 
Part of its struggle lay in a clash between its ideal, “[t]he less media policy comes to the fore, 
the better in and for media,” and the current situation on the ground that did not allow for such an 
approach.445 By May 1990, the MKR had received a constant stream of letters from East German 
publishers asking for regulations in press distribution, for a fair competition and fair prices while 
pointing to the increasing economic pressures on them. Between December 1989 and June 1990, the 
Systems zu einem offenen, in dem man ja moglichst die Selbstregulierungskräfte zur Wirkung kommen läßt. Und umso 
weniger Medienpolitik dann sichtbar ist, um so besser wird es dann in den Medien aussehen.” Cited in “Ich hore viel 
Autoradio.” Gespräch mit Gottfried Müller, Medienminister der DDR, die tageszeitung, Ute Thon, 5/28/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC07998. “kultivierten Übergang in die Medienfreiheit … durch die Hintertür die Medien 
[zu] beherrschen.” Cited in “Anwalt der Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt,” Jens Brünin, Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 27,
1990, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2). See also “Forstmeister im Blätterwald,” M. Schlegel, Neue Zeit, April 30, 1990, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07828. Also “Spätere Kompetenz der Länder vorausahnen,” Reinhart Bünger, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, April 26, 1990, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
439“Anwalt der Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt,” Jens Brüning, Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 27, 1990, BArch DC 9/1033 
(1/2). “Ich hore viel Autoradio.” Gespräch mit Gottfried Müller, Medienminister der DDR, die tageszeitung, Ute Thon, 
May 28, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC07998. Also “Spätere Kompetenz der Länder vorausahnen,” 
Reinhart Bünger, Frankfurter Rundschau, April 26, 1990, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
440“akuter Handlungsbedarf.” Jens Brüning, “Anwalt der Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt. DDR-Medienminister Müller 
vor dem Kontrollrat.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 27, 1990.
441“Ganz hohe Priorität hat im Moment der Bereich der Printmedien. Hier ist es unbedingt notwendig, daß in den 
Vertriebsfragen bald eine Losung gefunden wird.” Cited in Spätere Kompetenz der Länder vorausahnen, Reinhart 
Bünger, Frankfurter Rundschau, 4/26/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
442“akuter Handlungsbedarf.” Jens Brüning, “Anwalt der Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt. DDR-Medienminister Müller 
vor dem Kontrollrat.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 27, 1990.
443Full quote: “mit der drängendsten Frage … Schutzmaßnahmen für die durch die Westkonkurrenz gebeutelten DDR-
Medien.” Forstmeister im Blätterwald, M. Schlegel, Neue Zeit, 4/30/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07828. 
444Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), Email, January 12, 2017.
445“Denn ein Medienministerium hat seine Funktion ausgesprochenermaßen in der Zeit des Überganges von einem 
zentralistischen, parteigelenkten Systems zu einem offenen, in dem man ja moglichst die Selbstregulierungskräfte zur 
Wirkung kommen läßt. Und umso weniger Medienpolitik dann sichtbar ist, um so besser wird es dann in den Medien 
aussehen.” Cited in “Ich hore viel Autoradio.” Gespräch mit Gottfried Müller, Medienminister der DDR, die 
tageszeitung, Ute Thon, 5/28/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC07998.
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circulation numbers of old East German dailies decreased by about 2.8 million copies. While this 
related, again, mainly Junge Welt and Neues Deutschland, it opened market niches that were mostly 
filled by West German publications.446 This affected the press landscape and competition dynamics at 
large. Müller, thus, stated: 
We generally hold the opinion that our media need help to be able to better compete 
economically in a fair competition. It cannot be that an enormous Western economic 
power now limits press freedom and, thereby, does something similar to what formerly 
has been done by an enormous state power.447 
Emphasizing in interviews that the “tender shoots of press freedom must not be overgrown by old and 
recent weeds burgeoning on the press markets,” the MfM had little to set against either of them.448 The 
lack of resources and legislative responsibilities left the ministry largely “impotent;” its legislative 
measures (as in the case of the press distribution resolution) were handled by affiliated West German 
advisors and lagged behind realities on the ground. Further, the MfM “had no funds available for the 
press sector,” which left little leeway for media policies that would have required subsidies and/or 
financial support for independent, small publishers or press distributors.449 Müller, therefore, explicitly 
welcomed private initiatives and cooperations with West German businesses while underlining that 
basic issues and problems still needed to be solved in the GDR. It was no solution, so Müller, “to 
simply adopt or imitate Western models and ideas.”450 In making such argument, however, Müller 
missed the point that cooperations with West German businesses came at a price and were not, as Hans 
Modrow put it, done “out of Christian generosity … Instead, market economic principles have always 
been at work in the trade relations between the FRG and the GDR.”451 The same was true for the 
446Note: The circulation of the former FDJ-paper Junge Welt with the formerly widest (postal) circulation of 1.576.000 
copies had dropped to 445.300 copies in June 1990, and the one of the former SED-paper Neues Deutschland had 
decreased from 1.062.200 copies in December 1989 to 324.300 copies in June 1990. Until the monetary union in June 
1990, nationally distributed GDR dailies had kept a total circulation of about 1.1 million copies. Deutsche Presse 
Agentur, 'Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,' August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 2, BArch 
DC9/1050. 
447“Insgesamt sind wir der Meinung, daß unseren Medien geholfen werden muß, sich in einem fairen Wettbewerb 
wirtschaftlich besser zu behaupten. Es kann nicht angehen, daß jetzt übergroße Wirtschaftsmacht aus dem Westen die 
Pressefreiheit einengt und damit Ähnliches tut, was früher die übergroße Staatsmacht getan hat.” Gottfried Müller, 
minister diary (April 27, 1990), Email, January 12, 2017.
448“daß das zarte Pflänzchen Pressefreiheit nicht an altem und neuem Unkraut, das auf dem Pressemarkt auch wuchert, 
erstickt.” Zarte Pflanze Pressefreiheit, Klaus Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/15/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07761. 
449“Machtlosigkeit … [verfügte] im Bereich Presse über keinerlei Finanzmittel.” Gottfried Müller, personal 
communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), Email, January 30, 2017.
450“einfach westliche Modelle und Vorstellungen [zu] übernehmen oder imitieren.” DDR-Minister will erst 'horen und 
lernen', Klaus Wienert, Berliner Morgenpost, 4/27/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
451“aus christlicher Nächstenliebe … Sondern die marktwirtschaftlichen Prinzipien sind in den Außenhandelsbeziehungen 
zwischen der BRD und der DDR immer wirksam gewesen.” Interview, “Hans Modrow im ND-Interview: Deutschland, 
einig Vaterland? Nur, wenn die Selbstachtung der ehemaligen DDR-Bürger gestärkt wird,” Neues Deutschland, Feb. 1, 
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transition period and investments of West German interest groups in East German media; they 
simultaneously introduced (self-serving) Western models of a free press.
Kohl and Müller, and Dying Papers in the East
“[W]here moneymaking is the purpose of newspaper
and magazine publishing, the rules of the market 
also condition what is being thought and 
allowed to be written in editorial offices.”
Junge Welt, May 12, 1990452
When Müller met Kohl in Bonn on May 5, there was a broad consensus on the great importance
of a pluralistic media in the GDR. The focus of the meeting lay on the “cultural tasks of media” while 
their economic problems remained an absent topic.453 In his diary, Müller noted about the meeting, 
Kohl “philosophized on the German soul” and declared “the economic side was to be resolved, the 
problems of the soul stayed … That is why the media sector was so important.”454 Kohl argued for a 
diversity of regional papers and spoke out against monopolies of major publishing houses; “it could not
be that four or five major players ruled it all.”455 Only transparent and public negotiations could work 
against such dynamics. 
Initially, Müller was skeptical of Kohl's insight into the workings of the press market.456 Later, 
however, he appreciated “that Kohl, with regards to regulative policies, had expressed himself in a 
quotable fashion against publishersʼ cartels and in support of the regional press, in accordance with 
statements of other actors in the press sectors.”457 More concrete economic or political steps could not 
have been expected in early May 1990. First, because Kohl had no political power over press and/or 
1991, p. 6. ADS/Modrow-016 (1990-1994, Band I). 
452“Wo aber Zeitungen und Zeitschriften zum Zwecke des Geldverdienens herausgegeben werden, bestimmen auch die 
Gesetze des Marktes, was in den Redaktionsstuben gedacht und geschrieben werden darf.” Pressefreiheit adé, Frank 
Schumann, Junge Welt, May 12, 1990,  IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07754. 
453“Kulturauftrag der Medien.” “Identität des Landes in Medien,” Neues Deutschland, May 5, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07822. 
454“philosophierte über die deutsche Seele … [d]as Wirtschaftliche bekomme man in den Griff, die Probleme mit der Seele
blieben … Deshalb [sei] der Medienbereich so wichtig.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (May 5, 1990), Email, January 
12, 2017.
455“Es konne nicht sein, daß 4-5 Große alles beherrschten.” Cited in Gottfried Müller, minister diary (May 5, 1990), Email,
January 12, 2017.
456Gottfried Müller, minister diary (May 5, 1990), Email, January 12, 2017.
457“dass sich Kohl im Gespräch zitierfähig ordnungspolitisch gegen das Verlegerkartell und für Regionalzeitungen 
aussprach, im Einklang mit Äußerungen von vielen Akteuren in der Presseszene.” Gottfried Müller, personal 
communication, comments on minister diary (May 5, 1990), Email, January 12, 2017.
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distribution matters in the GDR, and, second, even with such power, the federal budget of 1990 had 
been set and no additional resources could have been made available.458 But in spite of this more 
conciliatory approach, also Müller admitted that with concrete political will, there would have been an 
alternative “for political action in the spirit of the CSCE [agreement] aiming to ease East-West 
relations.”459 The federal government could have set guidelines to support domestic media reform. In 
how far the CSCE agreement, indeed, served this purpose is debatable (see Conclusion). As it was, it 
served West German publishers and other West German interest groups as a rhetorical tool to occupy 
the space of concrete will.
The day of the Kohl meeting, Müller was invited to a work brunch at the hotel Maritim by the 
Federal Association of German Newspaper Publishers (Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, 
BDZV). Müller's impression: the BDZV “seems to consist of the major publishers only.”460 The 
purpose of the lunch meeting: BDZV representatives lobbied against upcoming legislation that was to 
limit the influence of the major publishers in distribution in the GDR (see Chapter 5).461 Both, 
economic interest groups and the federal government, based their actions on the assumption (and 
federal agenda) of a future united Germany. Different political parties, thus, emphasized the takeover 
of an “unaltered” federal framework legislation and the application of federal law in East Germany.462 
The media policy draft of the FDP media committee, for instance, underlined with regard to attempts to
create a comprehensive media law in the GDR, that such law to be of “interim” nature and needed to 
“take into account the basic legal structures of the press, as they exist in the Federal Republic.”463 The 
overall goal was to harmonize East German legislation with “the generally corresponding press laws of 
the federal Länder,” which included, for instance, private ownership of the press and the takeover of 
the Tendenzschutz postulate (see Chapter 4).464 This draft of the FDP media committee was circulated 
458Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (May 5, 1990), Email, January 12, 2017.
459“zu politischem Handeln im Geiste der auf Ost-West-Entspannung gerichteten KSZE.” Gottfried Müller, personal 
communication, comments on minister diary (May 5, 1990), Email, January 12, 2017.
460“scheint nur aus den großen Verlagen zu bestehen.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 5, 1990, 
sent to author on January 12, 2017.
461Policy document, Leitlinien liberaler Medienpolitik, Antrag zum F.D.P.-Bundesparteitag 11.-13.Juni in Münster, June 
11/13, 1993, p. 8, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24549. 
462“unbeschadet.” Draft, “Eckwerte für die Medienordnung in einem vereinigten Deutschland, Kommissionsentwurf,” 
Bonn, May 17, 1990, attached to letter Beate Damm, FDP Bundesmedienkommission, to Bernd Neumann, MdB, Bonn, 
May 17, 1990, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/25499.
463Full quote: “Deshalb ist darauf zu achten, daß ein für eine Übergangszeit zu erlassendes Mediengesetz der DDR die 
grundlegenden rechtlichen Strukturen der Presse, wie sie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bestehen, berücksichtigt.” 
Draft, “Eckwerte für die Medienordnung in einem vereinigten Deutschland, Kommissionsentwurf,” Bonn, May 17, 
1990, p. 6, attached to letter Beate Damm, FDP Bundesmedienkommission, to Bernd Neumann, MdB, Bonn, May 17, 
1990, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/25499.
464“die weitestgehend übereinstimmenden Pressegesetze der westdeutschen Länder.” Draft, “Eckwerte für die 
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by its member Renate Damm, a lawyer working in the legal department of Springer, on a Springer 
letter head. The committee (compared to those of other parties) was very well connected on the federal 
level. Throughout the 1980s its members were “high-profile members of federal ministries,” such as 
Juerg Ter-Nedden (Ministry of Economics), Erich Schaible (Ministry of the Interior), or D. Voth 
(Ministry of Justice).465 Estbalished in positions of power, some of these committee members became 
central to media policies also in the GDR.
The FDP policy draft as well as Kohl's take on the press situation in the GDR disregarded the 
existential economic struggles of East German publishers. The latter made use of the means available 
to them to make public what was being ignored. On May 11, Das Volksblatt reported “press of the 
GDR at the brink of collapse,” warning that “many publishers are verging on bankruptcy,” especially 
the many new publications of reform groups.466 A day later, Neue Zeit claimed, “If you want freedom, 
you must want diversity,” taking a stand on the unregulated takeover of the East German press by West
German publishers.467 The “flood-like, predatory competition by means of massive campaigns of some 
market domineering major publishers – lately even with dumping prices,” the paper argued, did “not 
fill gaps of free space but overgrows living spaces already occupied.”468 Soon after, the Berliner 
Zeitung reported “heavy turbulence on the media market,” declaring financial losses of East German 
papers, a tremendous decrease in readership, and the near folding of many dailies.469 The Junge Welt, 
acknowledging the initial help of West German publishers, put current developments into their larger 
context by asking for the long term consequences of a profit motive on a free press that had just been 
established. If only those with money enjoyed complete press freedom, the paper asked, how did such 
freedom look for East German publications with little financial resources.470 
Medienordnung in einem vereinigten Deutschland, Kommissionsentwurf,” Bonn, May 17, 1990, p. 7, attached to letter 
Beate Damm, FDP Bundesmedienkommission, to Bernd Neumann, MdB, Bonn, May 17, 1990, Archiv des 
Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/25499.
465“hochkarätige Beamte der Bundesministerien.” Hermanni, Alfred-Joachim, Medienpolitik in den 80er Jahren, 
Machtpolitische Strategien der Parteien im Zuge der Einführung des dualen Rundfunksystems, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008, p. 87.
466“stehen viele Presseverlage offenbar kurz vor dem Bankrott.” 'DDR-Presse steht vor dem Zusammenbruch,' Das 
Volksblatt, May 11, 1990, SSH, File 35a-b, DSC07776. 
467“Wer Freiheit will, muß Vielfalt wollen.” Tausend bunte Blätter? Manfred Meier, Neue Zeit, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07955. 
468“Überschwemmungs- und Verdrängungswettbewerb durch massive Offensiven einiger marktbeherrschender 
Großverlage und ihrer Vertriebssystem – neuerdings gar mit Dumping-Preisen – füllt nicht Freiräume, sondern 
überwuchert bereits besetzte Lebensräume.” Tausend bunte Blätter? Manfred Meier, Neue Zeit, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07755. 
469“Schwere Turbulenzen auf dem Medienmarkt,” Holger Haase, Berliner Zeitung, May 28, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
File 35c, DSC08009.
470Pressefreiheit adé, Frank Schumann, Junge Welt, May 12, 1990,  IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07754. 
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The media policy framework that could have provided some answers to these questions was 
developed the same day of the Kohl meeting, when Müller met the federal minister Hans “Johnny” 
Klein. In total seven policy goals for the East German media were determined, four of them related to 
the broadcasting sector. The overarching goal was a harmonization of both state systems.471 It was 
decided that a commercially-run press distribution according to the West German model, seeking to 
maximize the participation of small-scale businesses, was also the favorable model for the GDR (see 
Chapter 4 and 5).472 It was further emphasized that the licensing policy (which, in theory and practice 
did not exist anymore) needed to stop, and that all laws and regulations that had formerly controlled 
media needed to be lifted. This included “also a change of thinking in the highest government circles 
[who] partly still hold the opinion one could, for instance, ensure that only serious rather than 
entertaining literature should be consumed.”473 According to the trade publication textintern, it was also
during this meeting that a more aggressive push towards a comprehensive media act was decided.474 
The Press and Media Commission of the People's Chamber
To support the MKR and the MfM in their work, the People's Chamber created a Press and 
Media Commission (Ausschuß für Presse und Medien) that had its constitutive meeting on April 24, 
1990. Its members were elected proportionally from different parties (Parteienproporz). It was headed 
was Jürgen Schwarz (DSU), and among its thirteen permanent members were Lothar Bisky (PDS), 
Wolfgang Thierse (SPD), and Elke Lindemann (CDU).475 
Its immediate tasks were to clarify possible and needed cooperations with the MfM and the 
MKR. Talks were to be held with the head of the Association of German Magazine Publishers 
(Verband deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger, VDZ) and the MPF about press distribution, and progress  in 
drafting the media act needed to be pushed.476 Press-related issues were of primary concern until about 
mid-July when issues of broadcasting took priority. Müller, being asked how he viewed future 
471Note: This referred to the establishment of Länder competencies, and Länder broadcasting stations that then would join 
the ARD; the integration of GDR short-wave information radio broadcast in Deutsche Welle and Deutschlandfunk; the 
introduction of commercial broadcast radio. See Es fehlt an Informationen überall, textintern, 47, May 9, 1990, p. 2, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08029.
472Es fehlt an Informationen überall, textintern, 47, 5/9/90, p. 2, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08029.
473“auch ein Umdenken in hochsten Regierungsstellen, die teilweise noch der Meinung sind, man konnen z.B. dafür 
sorgen, daß nur ernste Literatur gelesen würde und nicht Unterhaltungsliteratur.” Cited in Es fehlt an Informationen 
überall, textintern, 47, 5/9/90, p. 2, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08029.
474Es fehlt an Informationen überall, textintern, 47, 5/9/90, p. 2, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08029.
475Minutes of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, Volkskammer der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, May 2, 1990 (April 24/26[?], 1990), BArch DA1/17579. 
476Minutes of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, Volkskammer der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, May 2, 1990 (April 24/26[?], 1990), BArch DA1/17579. 
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cooperations between the MfM, the MKR, and the Media Commission stated that his ministry was to 
work closely with both.477 While the cooperation between the MfM and the commission was somehow 
consistent, its quality varied and remained a constant issue between the three institutions.478 For 
instance: while the Media Commission's first meeting on May 9 was joined MKR's Andreas Graf and a 
MfM representative, the latter declared his will to become consistent participant of the commission's 
meetings to gain and share experiences, only to soon after drop out of them.479 
The first meeting of the commission was based on a broad but organized approach to its tasks 
that related to all aspects of media policy and involved all relevant media institutions (including media 
enterprises and associations).480 Similar to the MKR, the commission provided a venue for various 
interest groups to argue their case, voice their concerns and ask for support: On May 23, Müller was 
invited to report on the state of the media act (see below), and the MfM eventually requested a 
representative of the commission on its legislative committee of the media act 
(Mediengesetzgebungskommission).481 Two weeks later, on June 6, the head of the Postal Distribution, 
Dietrich Germer, informed the commission about the current situation of press distribution. Germer 
underlined, Postal Distribution needed to be “developed into a market-oriented [press] distributor, 
otherwise it was not competitive.”482 While the details are discussed in the upcoming chapters (see 
Chapter 5), for now, it suffices to point to Germer's urge that none of the policies of the government 
had been sufficient to help Postal Distribution and/or domestic papers.483 Germer was supported by the 
chairman of the newly founded (East) Berlin Association of Newspaper and Magazine Publishers 
(Berliner Verband der Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger, BVZZ). He pointed in particular to the 
problem of paper scarcity. “Price formation in this area is hitting the nerve of the publishers.”484 And 
477“Anwalt der Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt,” Jens Brünin, Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 27, 1990, BArch DC 9/1033 
(1/2). Also Für fairen Wettbewerb aller Medien, Regierungspressedienst, 14/90, May 7, 1990, p. 5, BArch DC 9/1033 
(1/2).
478Note:The file BArch DA1/17579 contains a complete documentation of the minutes of decision (Beschlussprotokoll) of 
each meeting from April 24 until July 18, 1990.
479Note: A commitment he dropped by June 6.
480Minutes of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 9. Mai 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, 
Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, May 10, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. 
481Minutes of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 23. Mai 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und 
Medien, Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, May 24, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. Also Minutes of 
Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 6. Juni 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, 
Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, June 7, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. 
482“müsse sich zur marktorientierten Vertriebsorganisation entwickeln, da er sonst nicht wettbewerbsfähig sei.” Minutes of
Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 6. Juni 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, 
Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, June 7, 1990, p. 1, BArch DA1/17579. 
483Minutes of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 6. Juni 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, 
Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, June 7, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. 
484“Die Preisgestaltung auf diesem Gebiet treffe den Nerv der Verlage.” Minutes of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die 
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while support and information was lacking from the state and letters to the MfM had remained 
unanswered, the BVZZ had received visits from the VDZ and the four West German major publishing 
houses who lobbied for their press distribution model in the GDR (see Chapter 5).485
On June 20, 1990, the Media Commission flew to Bonn. It had scheduled meetings with 
representative of the Federal Press Office, the Bundestag, and with politicians in charge of negotiating 
media issues for a future united Germany. On the list of topics of the East German delegation was the 
“incredibly hard chapter of print media … Because now a direct threat coming from the West is being 
felt.”486 While this resulted in “partly controversial discussions” on a future media landscape in a 
unified Germany, nothing with regard to current struggles of East German print and broadcast media 
came out of the meeting.487 
Different Interests and a Failed Media Act
Since the earliest reform processes, all media policy initiatives had been built on the overall 
goal of an eventual “comprehensive media legislation,” applicable to all media, safeguarding a 
complex set of freedoms.488 And while Glücksmann, already on November 5, 1989, had made clear that
there was no blueprint readily available because no such law existed in other socialist countries (see 
above), his idea of a legislative committee on media law had been put into place. This committee had 
met throughout March to work on the act.489 One result of (and step towards) this act had been the 
February 5 resolution. By early July, however, as the Neue Zeit underlined, the resolution was 
completely outdated. Information, rumors and half-truths were floating around and were used against 
attempts to draft a media act by creating panic and insecurities.490 
Ausschußtagung vom 6. Juni 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik, June 7, 1990, p. 2, BArch DA1/17579. 
485Note: The fact that the BVZZ, on its part, underlined its willingness to help drafting of a GDR media act (that would 
include also issues of distribution) indicates that these lobbying efforts were fruitless. Telegram, Wolfgang Fürstner, 
VDZ, to Gottfried Müller, Medien Ministerium, May 25, 1990, BArch DC9/1051. Minutes of Decisions, 
Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 6. Juni 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, Volkskammer der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, June 7, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. 
486“ungeheuer schwere Kapitel der Print-Medien … Denn jetzt ist aus dem Westen eine regelrechte Bedrohung zu 
verspüren.” Transcript of Interview, Rundfunk der DDR, Redaktion Monitor, DS Kultur, 8.05 Uhr, v. 20.6.90, 
Medienausschuß der Volkskammer in Bonn (Interview mit Hr. Schwarz), June 6, 1990, DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 2.
487“teilweise kontroversen Diskussion.” Protocol, Protokoll über den Besuch des Ausschusses für Presse und Medien am 
20. Juni 1990 in Bonn, Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, June 21, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. 
488“komplexes Mediengesetz.” “Zarte Pflanze Pressefreiheit,” Klaus Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, May 15, 1990, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07761. Note: The archive signature BArch DC 9/1051 contains detailed documenation 
on the genesis of the resolution as part of a broader discussion on GDR new media law (drafts, correspondence, press 
releases, various press clippings). 
489Concept, Pressevertrieb, [Medienkontrollrat, n.d.], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, 
File 30.   
490Friedrich Eismann, Einheitlich definieren, Neue Zeit, July 6, 1990, BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 2. 
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What made the work on the media act so difficult? Glücksmann, having pointed to other 
socialist countries, had left unmentioned that no such legislation existed in the Federal Republic either. 
Here, the jurisdiction over media lay with individual Länder whose media legislation referred mainly to
broadcast media. According to Beate Schneider, this was “because the regulatory needs and 
possibilities of influence were regarded higher for broadcast media.”491 Though press laws existed also 
on the Länder-level, the more relevant federal framework legislation for print media was based on 
Article 5 of the Basic Law and had been developed by precedents of Federal Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) for years.492 A comprehensive media act would, thus, have contradicted and 
made more difficult the unilateral takeover of unaltered federal structures in the future East German 
Länder.
On May 15, the Berliner Zeitung, thus, rightly asked if a media act was still in the making or if, 
with the GDR joining the Federal Republic, the act had become obsolete.493 “On the contrary,” Müller 
claimed, “our ministry has now taken the leadership in drafting such legislation,” which was to be 
finished by late summer.494 “With this newly created East German media order,” Müller underlined “we
will enter unification negotiations with the Federal Republic,” and no one knows at this point what 
their results will be.495 Ironically, in making his argument for the act, Müller pointed to the one thing 
major West German interest groups were not interested in: uncertain consequences for federal media 
structures.
In retrospect, Müller stated that the resolution on press distribution on May 10, 1990 (see 
Chapter 5) put an end to the idea of a comprehensive media act. One resolution gave way to separate 
491“da der Regelungsbedarf und Einflußmoglichkeiten bei den Funkmedien hoher eingestuft würden.” Protocol, Protokoll 
der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 4, Archiv des 
Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
492Note: After WWII, the Western Allied occupational forces had stipulated that matters of culture (i.e. education, and 
media etc.) were not to be centrally controlled but organized federally. Thus, in the FRG, media matters were matters of 
the Länder (states), which referred mainly to broadcasting policies but also to press matters. Without a specific media 
legislation, principles of press freedom, closely connected to the freedom of opinion and expression, are manifested in 
Article 5 of the Basic Law and find their legal and practical framework has been established by de facto experience, and 
case-specific decisions of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). Discussed in Protocol, Protokoll der 4. 
Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 4, Archiv des 
Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
493Zarte Pflanze Pressefreiheit, Klaus Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/15/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07761. 
494“Im Gegenteil, unser Ministerium hat jetzt die Federführung bei der Ausarbeitung eines solchen Gesetzes 
übernommen.” Zarte Pflanze Pressefreiheit, Klaus Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/15/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-
b, DSC07761. 
495“Mit der so geschaffenen neuen Medienordnung der DDR werden wir in die Vereinigungsverhandlungen mit der 
Bundesrepublik gehen.” Zarte Pflanze Pressefreiheit, Klaus Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/15/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR,
File 35a-b, DSC07761. 
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acts, and the same day, de Maizière asked Müller to draft a broadcasting act (Rundfunkgesetz).496 
“Considering the pressure,” Müller explained later, “we decided to give priority to broadcasting and to 
elaborate a Broadcasting Transition Act” to set the political conditions for harmonizing both 
broadcasting systems.497 Pressing issues were the allocation of radio frequencies, private broadcasting 
and advertising, the authority of Länder in broadcasting matters, and the institutional future of East 
German television and broadcast radio. It was only when Müller was invited to the Media Commission 
at the People's Chamber on May 23, however, that he informed the commission that the initial intention
of developing a comprehensive media act had been given up. The People's Chamber was to receive a 
draft of the broadcasting act by June, and was to form its own position on it.498 By July, the work on the
act was in full swing with different proposals submitted by different parties and interest groups.499 With
legislation on broadcasting urgently needed, and in compliance with West German customs, the 
Broadcasting Transition Act was generally looked upon with favorable eyes.
The idea of comprehensive media legislation was not entirely dead however. On June 7, 1990, 
ADN reported that the working group on “principles questions” (Grundsatzfragen) of the Media 
Commission, in charge of media legislation, was to amend the February 5 resolution to create a 
“comprehensive and autonomous media act of the GDR.”500 The first draft was to be finished in the 
next weeks and to be presented to the People's Chamber before its summer break in August. The “fast 
developments towards German unity with new laws becoming applicable on July 1, with the 
forthcoming building of Länder-structures holding jurisdiction over matters of culture and media, and 
the necessity to close holes of the earlier resolution,” had made it necessary to act fast.501 While the 
MfM had opted for a reduction of content, the commission had opted for speed. Their conflicting 
496Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 10, 1990, sent to author on January 12, 2017.
497“weil in bestimmten Bereichen ein vordringlicher Handlungsbedarf existiert. Und so haben wir uns unter dem Druck … 
entschlossen, den Bereich Rundfunk vorzuziehen und ein Rundfunk-Überleitungsgesetz zu erarbeiten,” Cited in Keine 
lange Schonfristen für das offentlich-rechtliche System, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kultur, 7/90, BArch DC 9/1033 
(1/2).
498Minutes of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 23. Mai 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und 
Medien, Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, May 24, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. 
499Minutes of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 4. Juli 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, 
Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, July 5, 1990, BArch DA1/17579; also Minutes of Decisions, 
Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 18. Juli 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, Volkskammer der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, July 19, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. 
500“umfassenden und selbstständigen Mediengesetz der DDR.” Press release, “Medienbeschluß der Volkskammer soll 
noveliert werden,” ADN, press release, June 7, 1990, BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 3. 
501“schnellen Entwicklung zur deutschen Einheit, mit den ab dem 1. Juli geltenden neuen Rechtsvorschriften, dem 
baldigen Aufbau der Länderstrukturen mit Kultur- und Medienhoheit sowie der Notwendigkeit, Lücken des früheren 
Beschlusses auszufüllen.” Press release, “Medienbeschluß der Volkskammer soll noveliert werden,” ADN, press release,
June 7, 1990, BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 3. 
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messages were due to unclear responsibilities of and communication between both institutions. 
According to the commission, its “all-outshining task” was to work out a media act while the MfM had 
taken on the same task (see above).502 Both initially aimed for an independent contribution of the GDR 
to German unity in media matters; the commission upheld this idea longer than the MfM. When it flew 
to Bonn on June 20, 1990, Schwarz stated that his delegation aimed to suggest a “hopefully completely 
new media framework legislation for all of Germany.”503 Unification did not necessarily mean the GDR
had to adopt the system of the Federal Republic, rather there were “incredibly many ideas of what can 
still become of media in the GDR.”504 
Similarly, and in spite of a fast approaching German unity, the PDS committee for media policy
drafted its own guidelines on June 14, 1990, precisely because the “GDR is going to still exist for the 
foreseeable future.”505 While it was clear that existing monopoly structures needed to be broken, the 
committee underlined that current and future developments “were denying any fundamental 
changes.”506 “The mechanisms of media, [and] the market and power relations of the federal media 
landscape will soon work also here in an unrestrained manner.”507 Any “democratic reorganization of 
media and media culture” made necessary their reform and a democratic constitution (as the draft 
presented by the RT) “that prevents any monopolization of public opinion by economic and political 
means.”508 This required market regulation.
The West German FDP took a different approach as laid out in its “Principles of Liberal Media 
Policy.” Arguing that all attempts to establish dictatorships (as in the GDR) have started with 
502“alles überstrahlende Aufgabe.” Cited in “Ich hore viel Autoradio.” Gespräch mit Gottfried Müller, Medienminister der 
DDR, die tageszeitung, Ute Thon, May 28, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC07998.
503“hoffentlich ganz neuen Medienordnung für ganz Deutschland.” Transcript of Interview, Rundfunk der DDR, Redaktion
Monitor, DS Kultur, 8.05 Uhr, v. 20.6.90, Medienausschuß der Volkskammer in Bonn (Interview mit Hr. Schwarz), 
June 6, 1990, BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 2.
504“unvorstellbar viele Vorstellungen, was aus den Medien der DDR noch werden kann.” Transcript of Interview, 
Rundfunk der DDR, Redaktion Monitor, DS Kultur, 8.05 Uhr, v. 20.6.90, Medienausschuß der Volkskammer in Bonn 
(Interview mit Hr. Schwarz), June 6, 1990, BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 2.
505“DDR wird noch für absehbaren Zeitraum existieren.” Concept draft, Entwurf “Medienpolitische Grundlinien der PDS 
mit Blick auf die Einheit Deutschlands,” Vorlage für das Präsidium, Kommission Medienpolitik, Berlin, June 14, 1990, 
p. 1, ADS/PDS-PV-349 (Januar – November 1990, Band II). 
506“Alle grundlegenden Veränderungen werden negiert.” Concept draft, Entwurf “Medienpolitische Grundlinien der PDS 
mit Blick auf die Einheit Deutschlands,” Vorlage für das Präsidium, Kommission Medienpolitik, Berlin, June 14, 1990, 
p. 1, ADS/PDS-PV-349 (Januar – November 1990, Band II). 
507“Die Medienmechanismen, die Markt- und Machtverhältnisse der bundesdeutschen Medienlandschaft werden künftig 
auch bei uns ungehemmt wirken.” Concept draft, Entwurf “Medienpolitische Grundlinien der PDS mit Blick auf die 
Einheit Deutschlands,” Vorlage für das Präsidium, Kommission Medienpolitik, Berlin, June 14, 1990, p. 1, ADS/PDS-
PV-349 (Januar – November 1990, Band II). 
508“demokratische Neugestaltung der Medienstruktur und der Medienkultur … die jegliche okonomische und politisch 
bedingte Monopolisierung von offentlicher Meinung verhindert.” Concept draft, Entwurf “Medienpolitische Grundlinien
der PDS mit Blick auf die Einheit Deutschlands,” Vorlage für das Präsidium, Kommission Medienpolitik, Berlin, June 
14, 1990, p. 2, ADS/PDS-PV-349 (Januar – November 1990, Band II). 
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legislative state interventions, democratic states rejected any such interventions.
Experience shows that the hope of the legislator to take a formative role by means of 
media policy is amiss. Private sector media are only subject to the laws of the market. In
their subsequent dependence on the recipient simultaneously lies their democratic 
legitimacy and strength, if concerned with defending the liberal order.509 
This market-based approach to a free press meant, “yes” to Tendenzschutz  (publishers' provisions), 
“no” to Redaktionsstatute (editorial provisions), “no” to unions, and “no” to subsidies (see Chapter 
4).510 The FDP made clear that this agenda was to be applicable to the GDR, in that also there “the 
media framework legislation, similar to us, [is to be] based on Article 5 of the Basic Law and Länder 
press laws are to be implemented.”511 
The Jurisdiction of Future Länder
The idea of a comprehensive media act remained alive until July 26, 1990, when the working 
group of the Media Commission met at the MfM, and twenty-three participants from different East 
German media institutions attended the meeting.512 Next to issues on broadcasting, the core point on the
agenda was the revision of the February 5 resolution. Several suggestions and proposals had been 
made, and it needed to be discussed if any such revised policy proposal, “into which the group has 
always put its greatest efforts” was, indeed, beneficial.513 The meeting was difficult. Handicapped by a 
generally bad information infrastructure (i.e. delayed deliveries of documents etc.), it ended with the 
conclusion that no more work was to be put into revising the proposal. Since it would likely lessen, not 
increase the effectiveness of current legislation, also no new comprehensive legislation should be 
drafted.514 It was made clear 
509“Die Erfahrung zeigt, daß die Hoffnung auf die medienpolitische Gestaltungskraft des Gesetzgebers verfehlt ist. 
Privatwirtschaftlich strukturierte Medien sind nur einem Marktgesetz unterworfen. In der damit verbundenen 
Abhängigkeit der Rezipienten liegt zugleich ihre demokratische Legitimation und ihre Stärke, wenn es um die 
Verteidigung der freiheitlichen Ordnung geht.” Policy document, Leitlinien liberaler Medienpolitik, Antrag zum F.D.P.-
Bundesparteitag 11.-13.Juni in Münster, June 11/13, 1993, p. 8, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP 
Medienkommission/24549. 
510Policy document, Leitlinien liberaler Medienpolitik, Antrag zum F.D.P.-Bundesparteitag 11.-13.Juni in Münster, June 
11/13, 1993, p. 8, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24549. 
511“die Medienordnung ähnlich wie bei uns nach Artikel 5 des Grundgesetzes auszurichten und Landespressegesetze zu 
erlassen.” Protocol, Protokoll der Sitzung der Bundesmedienkommission vom 31.05. 1990, May 31, 1990, Archiv des 
Liberalismus, FDP Präsidium/15469.
512Note: This included state secretary Becker, Ralf Bachmann and Dr. Bender from the ministry (the latter in charge of the 
revisions) and Prof. Hallbach who would later work intensely on the media law for Saxony. Protocol, “Protokoll über 
die Beratung der Arbeitsgruppe 'Grundsatzfragen' der Gesetzgebungskommission 'Mediengesetz' im Ministerium für 
Medienpolitik am 26. Juli 1990,” p. 3, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
513“für das die Gesetzgebungskommission sich stets mit voller Energie eingesetzt hat.” Protocol, “Protokoll über die 
Beratung der Arbeitsgruppe 'Grundsatzfragen' der Gesetzgebungskommission 'Mediengesetz' im Ministerium für 
Medienpolitik am 26. Juli 1990,” p. 3, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
514Full quote: “weil eine solche die Wirksamkeit desselben nicht erhohen, sondern voraussichtlich eher vermindern würde.”
107
that the increasingly faster speed to unify both German states does not make it 
reasonable to now aim for a legislation applicable only to today's territory of the GDR 
in matters that, in a united Germany, will anyway be under the jurisdiction of the 
Länder, as they have been … in the Federal Republic all along.515 
And that was the end to a comprehensive media legislation in the GDR. Instead, it was decided to shift 
focus and to help different future East German Länder prepare their individual media laws. The Media 
Commission made clear that any such Land legislation needed to include “questions of the 
responsibility of journalists, of distribution, the inner structures of print media or advertising,” only to 
name a few.516 This clearly differed from West German blueprints, and participants of the meeting were
asked to send their ideas and proposal to the MfM by August 15, 1990. A small working group on print
media legislation in the MfM was to discuss them in its meeting on August 17, and was to provide 
suggestions for legislations to different Länder.
Thus, by August 1990, the MfM became “the advocate of Länder that do not yet exist.”517 It was
given several suggestions, including a nineteen-page overview over press legislation in the FRG 
compiled by the VDZ.518 The eventual blueprint for the new East German Länder legislation, however, 
was a proposal discussed by the Media Law Initiative Saxony (Initiative Sächsisches 
Landesmediengesetz) in Leipzig, Saxony, on August 13, 1990.519 While legal regulations on several 
aspects were copied directly from those of West German Länder (i.e. the right-of-reply, confiscation of 
media or criminal liability), the proposal differed substantially in other aspects. It included a two-page 
definition of press freedom, and of inner press freedom on three pages. It further stipulated that “the 
Protocol, “Protokoll über die Beratung der Arbeitsgruppe 'Grundsatzfragen' der Gesetzgebungskommission 
'Mediengesetz' im Ministerium für Medienpolitik am 26. Juli 1990,” p. 3, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
515“daß das immer schneller werdende Tempo der Vereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten es nicht sinnvoll erscheinen 
läßt, jetzt noch eine Gesetzgebung mit Geltung für das heutige Gebiet der DR [sic] in Angelegenheiten anzustreben, die 
sowieso in einem vereinten Deutschland Zuständigkeit der Länder sein werden, und es in den Ländern der heutigen 
Bundesrepublik von jeher sind.” Protocol, “Protokoll über die Beratung der Arbeitsgruppe 'Grundsatzfragen' der 
Gesetzgebungskommission 'Mediengesetz' im Ministerium für Medienpolitik am 26. Juli 1990,” p. 3, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
516Protocol, “Protokoll über die Beratung der Arbeitsgruppe 'Grundsatzfragen' der Gesetzgebungskommission 
'Mediengesetz' im Ministerium für Medienpolitik am 26. Juli 1990,” p. 4, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
517“Anwalt der Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt.” Jens Brüning, “Anwalt der Länder, die es noch gar nicht gibt. DDR-
Medienminister Müller vor dem Kontrollrat.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 27, 1990.
518Note: Neubert's proposal was the only one sent on time. Policy draft, “Vorschlag für Enpfehlungen zu Grundsaetzen in 
Landesmediengesetzen,” Prof. Dr. Wolfram Neubert, August 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. Letter and attachment, Pressegesetzgebung, Winfried Reske, VDZ, to Gottfried Müller, 
Minister für Medienpolitik, Bonn, August 15, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30,
File 30. 
519Letter and attachments, “Vorschläge für Muster,” Prof. Hallbach, to, Ministerium für Medienpolitik, August 14, 1990, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. Note: The here given and quoted text is 
based also on the notes put onto the document. 
108
abuse of economic and political power positions is to be prevented. Editors, publishers and editorial 
workers in particular are bound to the humanist purpose of culture and education.”520 Different from 
common federal law, the proposal shifted the power balance away from media institutions and to the 
rights and duties of individual journalists. It made clear that those working in the press sector “are 
personally responsible for fulfilling their public duty,” which meant, they had “the right to refuse to 
work on a particular story … if content or production contradict their personal beliefs.521 This clause, 
taken from the early proposal submitted by the SPD (GDR) on January 3, ratified by the RT and 
adopted in the February 5 resolution, clearly went against the established Tendenzschutz in the Federal 
Republic (see Chapter 4).522 
Also the People's Chamber had its on take on media freedom. It worked on recommendations 
for media legislation for the different Länder, which circulated among different institutions until after 
unification. It defined media freedom, first, as the right of citizens “for truthful, inclusive, various and 
balanced information by mass media” to exchange their ideas based on them.523 Second, as the freedom
of mass media, its owners and media workers to independently spread opinions and information in 
print, sound and images “in compliance with democratic and humanist principles of freedom and 
responsibility, diversity and truthfulness, international solidarity and national autonomy, and openness 
in information processes.”524 Both proposals, that of the People's Chamber and of the Media Law 
Initiative Saxony, were rooted deeply in the East German media experience and history. They diverted 
520“Der Missbrauch wirtschaftlicher und politischer Machstellung ist zu verhindern. Herausgeber, Verleger und 
redaktionelle Mitarbeiter sind in besonderer Weise dem humanistischen Kultur- und Bildungsauftrag verpflichtet.” 
Draft, Entwurf, Gesetz über die Freiheiten, Rechte und Pflichten der Presse in Sachsen, Leipzig, August, 13, 1990, p. 1, 
attached to letter, “Vorschläge für Muster,” Prof. Hallbach, to, Ministerium für Medienpolitik, August 14, 1990, Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.  
521Full quote: “haben das Recht, die Ausarbeitung eines Beitrages oder eine entsprechende Mitwirkung zu verweigern, 
wenn Inhalt und Herstellungsweise ihren personlichen Überzeugungen widersprechen.” Draft, Entwurf, Abschnitt 
“innere Pressefreiheit,” Gesetz über die Freiheiten, Rechte und Pflichten der Presse in Sachsen, Leipzig, August, 13, 
1990, p. 1, attached to letter, “Vorschläge für Muster,” Prof. Hallbach, to, Ministerium für Medienpolitik, August 14, 
1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.  
522Note: The small working group on print media met again on August 17, part of the group were Bachmann and Bender, 
as well as Prof. Hallbach; they discussed and amended Neubert's proposal, and the results were discussed again on 
August 30. Protocol, “Protokoll über die Zusammenkunft der Arbeitsgruppe 'Printmedien' am 17. August 1990,” Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
523“auf wahrhaftige, umfassende, vielfältige und ausgewognen Informationen durch die Massenmedien” See Policy 
recommendations, Grundsatzempfehlungen für die Mediengesetzgebung in den Ländern Berlin, Brandenburg [etc.],” 
Volkskammerausschuss, [n.d.], pp. 2-3, attached to letter, Gerhard Bächer, to, Landesverbände Grüne Partei, Oktober 5, 
1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
524“auf wahrhaftige, umfassende, vielfältige und ausgewogene Informationen durch die Massenmedien … unter Wahrung 
der demokratischen und humanistischen Prinzipien der Freiheit und Verantwortung, Vielfalt und Wahrhaftigkeit, 
internationalen Verbundenheit und nationalen Eigenständigkeit und Offenheit im Informationsleben.” See Policy 
recommendations, Grundsatzempfehlungen für die Mediengesetzgebung in den Ländern Berlin, Brandenburg [etc.],” 
Volkskammerausschuss, [n.d.], pp. 2-3, attached to letter, Gerhard Bächer, to, Landesverbände Grüne Partei, Oktober 5, 
1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
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from the federal legislative framework in that both defined press and media freedom according to their 
broadest possible scope, including issues of inner press freedom by giving explicit agency to media 
workers. They, thereby, contradicted claims that “the spark of the East German reform movements 
regarding media is as good as dead,” due to market-driven reforms pushed by Western interests.525 
While it was certainly the case that goals had changed, the reform spark of many officials working in 
the field had not died but shifted. Eventually, several of these “takes” on media freedom found their 
way into legislation. Press legislation for Brandenburg, for instance, included the provision of 
Redaktionsstatute, which the VDZ interpreted as a limitation of press freedom and attempts of state 
control.526 
Conclusion – The Media Costs of Unification
“[T]he old saying of Marx holds true for today's business affairs:
One would literally walk over dead bodies if there was sufficient
profit in the store. Though the deceased in our case are
newspapers, their passing is still distressing:
With the dying of East German papers,
 dies also the freedom of the press.”
Junge Welt, May 12, 1990527
Why was the development of the media act and its eventual failing so important? According to 
Dussel, the act was the consecutive step to the February 5 resolution that had broken the information 
monopoly of the SED.528 Both the act and the resolution were deeply rooted in the East German 
(media) experience and stood for the hope of East German self-determination in media and press 
matters, one of the most central reform demands during the fall revolution. 
According to Jürgen Schwarz (DSU), media under SED control had “broken many people's 
backs,” to others, the SED-propaganda monopoly had been a “trash can … that constantly spilt its 
525“Der Funke der DDR-Reformbewegungen – auf dem Gebiet der Medien – ist ja schon so gut wie erloschen.” “Das 
Jahrzehnt der Goldgräber” Ulrich Briefs, Revier, April 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; 
Box 27-30, File 21.
526Protocol, Protokoll der 7. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 19./20. Mai 1993 in München, May 19/20, 1993, Archiv
des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24549. 
527“Ich denke schon, der alte Marx-Satz gilt im heutigen Geschäftsleben noch: Wenn auskommlich Profit winkt, geht man 
über Leichen. Auch wenn diese aus Papier sind, ist ihr Hinscheiden nicht weniger bedauerlich: Mit den DDR-Zeitungen 
stirbt auch die Pressefreiheit.” Pressefreiheit adé, Frank Schumann, Junge Welt, 5/12/90,  IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 
35a-b, DSC07754. 
528See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 243, Corporate 
Archives of Axel Springer SE.
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garbage over the people;” PDS spokesperson Lothar Bisky underlined that the honest reappraisal of 
East German journalism needed honest media, and Media Minister Müller asked for “solidarity with 
[East German] media” to ensure a transition process “to open and independent media.”529 The freedom 
of media and the press were seen as being closely connected to the freedom of information. All were 
defined in their broadest possible terms. The press was to be free from political information monopoly 
and economic constraints, and free to be a platform of public debate, for opinion-building processes, 
and for individual agency and responsibility. The underlying normative approach to what a free press 
ought to be was criticized by West German interest groups as a limitation of a free press defined by a 
free market. These groups, in particular publishers' associations, the federal government, and individual
political parties, saw the greatest guarantee for a free press in the market, not in legislation. Though the 
newly elected East German government shared this belief, it was also aware that a reliance on the 
market alone would prove disastrous in a transitioning political economy that had no barriers, customs 
or legislation to regulate such free market developments. As the Berliner Zeitung put it, a “stable [and 
historically grown] media policy fundament, coherent with the conditions of a market economy, is 
missing in the GDR,” and this meant, there was little to no counterweight to (West German) market 
impediments pushing East. 530 East German media policies and institutions, however, failed to set any 
such directions. But because ineffectiveness does not equal irrelevance, the question “why” remains. 
Media and press matters received upmost importance during the fall revolution and the 
subsequent transformation period. By the end of May 1990, three different institutions were concerned 
with media policy issues. First, the MKR, the “oldest” institution that had been put in place by the 
Round Table. Its purpose was to supervise a general adherence to the February 5 media resolution. 
Second, the MfM, which had been stablished after the elections in March 1990. It, ironically, held its 
offices in the former building of the SED Press Office, which before had been used by Goebbels' 
Propaganda Ministry. Finally, in April 1990, the People's Chamber put in place a Press and Media 
Commission.531 While the MKR was mainly an advisory board, the MfM and the commission were 
concerned with media policy issues. All three quarreled over jurisdictions and overall goals but barely 
529“vielen Menschen im Land das Rückgrat gebrochen … Mülleimer … der ständig seinen Unrat über das Volk ergoß … 
Solidarität mit den Medien … zu offenen, eigenständigen und unabhängigen Medien.” All cited in press release, 
Abrechnung mit der Vergangenheit – Mediendebatte im Parlament,  ADN, July 5, 1990, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
530“Ein solches festes, marktwirtschaftlichen Bedingungen entsprechendes medienpolitisches Fundament fehlt in der 
DDR.” Zarte Pflanze Pressefreiheit, Klaus Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/15/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07761. 
531“Ich hore viel Autoradio.” Gespräch mit Gottfried Müller, Medienminister der DDR, die tageszeitung, Ute Thon, May, 
28, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC07998.
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had time to set them straight.532 The urgent need to respond to early market pressures that had 
developed due to the legal vacuum, joined by the early monetary and economic union, added to the 
challenges of breaking still existent information monopoly infrastructures of the SED.  
Various newspapers documented the consequences of this shift. The paper Publizistik und 
Kunst wrote that “after most former [SED] party papers had officially declared themselves 
independent, pressures now shifted from ideological constraints to those of the markets and the 
pressure of the reader,” and the activities of West German publishers, “in various ways carrying an 
early capitalist conduct,” increased already exciting insecurities in the GDR.533 The baseline for this 
competition was “extremely uneven” and came along with, as the Neue Zeit pointed out, new 
concentration processes.534 The Junge Welt concluded that if the majority of publications is being 
published by only four corporations that have bought up most publishers in the GDR while “holding 
similar ambitions, not much is left of the readers' freedom to form their own opinions.”535 
Likewise, with East German reform processes being set against Western ideas and concepts of a
free press, the latter disallowed for the full fruition of the former. And just as the MKR has been 
described a “small, ineffectual body” and “a failed relic of a short period of reformative optimism,” 
East German media policies and their institutionalization at large did not emancipate themselves from 
Western ideas, influences and dependencies.536 This was largely due to the realities on the ground that 
soon captured the East German media landscape and left policy matters in limbo when ideas of a 
participatory (media) democracy met the realities of a press market in the FRG. Publizisitk & Kunst 
concluded that “against the dynamics of a new private media economy in the GDR,” no Round Table, 
People's Chamber or MKR could do too much about.537 The following chapters document closer these 
processes during the final months of the GDR. They show that the range of involved and active interest
groups was broad, diverse and often contradictory. 
532Spätere Kompetenz der Länder vorausahnen, Reinhart Bünger, Frankfurter Rundschau, April, 26, 1990, BArch DC 
9/1033 (1/2). 
533“Nach der offiziellen Unabhängigkeitserklärung der meisten früheren Parteiblätter folgt jetzt dem ideologischen Druck 
der marktwirtschaftliche Druck und der Druck des Lesers … gebärden sich in vielfältiger Weise frühkapitalistisch.” 
Vom Regen in die Traufe, Manfred Präcklein, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p. 51, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 
35a-b, DSC07920. 
534“Ausgangslage ist extrem ungleich.” Tausend bunte Blätter? Manfred Meier, Neue Zeit, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07955. 
535“mit den gleichen Ambitionen, bleibt von freier Meinungsbildung der Leser auch nicht viel.” Pressefreiheit adé, Frank 
Schumann, Junge Welt, 5/12/90,  IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07754. 
536See Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille. 2015. “East German Journalists and the Wende: A history on the collapse and
transformation of socialist journalism in Germany.” PhD Dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles, p. 212.
537“gegen die neue privatwirtschaftliche Mediendynamik in der DDR.” “Medien in der DDR: Vom totalitären Zwang zum 
manipulativen Kommerz” Ulrich Briefs, Publizisitk & Kunst, Zeitschrift der IG - Medien, No. 7/90, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 21. 
112
When the Media Commission, as the People's Chamber itself, eventually adopted the 
Unification Treaty (Einigungsvertrag), its members were well aware that they agreed to the dissolution 
of their own work into federal structures and legislation.538 This, however, was just the consequential 
step in a longer trajectory defined by the federal government's agenda of the GDR's takeover of an 
“unaltered” federal framework legislation.539 In can be argued, however, that with this takeover of West
German institutional, political and economic structures, the costs of unification went beyond those paid
by means of future massive capital transfers. On a media policy level, they meant a loss of radical-
democratic visions and immensely valuable work that had been upheld and put into place by reformers 
and politicians, journalists and editors, by civic groups and everyday citizens. The MKR, the RT, 
editorial offices and society at large, had been venues where different and competing ideas of a free 
press had been debated. These conflicts had brought to the fore questions of guilt and truth, of 
responsibility and individual agency and, subsequently, a different take on questions of press freedom. 
These valuable conclusions, however, did not inform a legislation and/or the organization of the press 
in a united Germany, at the cost of the press itself.
Schupbach Guzman documents how struggles, for instance, in editorial offices were not simply 
a way to “philosophical self-discovery,” but they manifested themselves in daily practice. They 
influenced journalists' relationship to their institutions and leadership: 
Many newspapers introduced democratic administrative principles, allowing the staff to 
remove editors and managers. Journalists were also granted greater leeway in their 
assignments. … Without the dictates from the party leadership or fear of professional 
reprisals, the practice of journalism and news making became more collaborative as 
journalists and editors worked together to determine the future spirit and structure of the
organization.540 
This could have benefitted the press in a united Germany but went against the vested interests of the 
major publishers. Likewise, discussions on inner press freedom and on Redaktionssstatute, which had 
been heated in the Federal Republic in the 1970s, were now being lamented, for instance by the FDP, 
for their unnecessary revival.541 While those “unnecessary” discussions, in fact, corresponded to the 
538Letter, Jürgen Schwarz to Dr. Sabine Bergmann-Pohl, Ausschuß Deutsche Einheit, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, 
Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, September 12, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. 
539“unbeschadet.” Draft, “Eckwerte für die Medienordnung in einem vereinigten Deutschland, Kommissionsentwurf,” 
Bonn, May 17, 1990, attached to letter Beate Damm, FDP Bundesmedienkommission, to Bernd Neumann, MdB, Bonn, 
May 17, 1990, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/25499.
540Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille. 2015. “East German Journalists and the Wende: A history on the collapse and 
transformation of socialist journalism in Germany.” PhD Dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles, p. 193.
541Protocol, Protokoll der Sitzung des Medien-Beirats am Freitag, den 14.5.1992 bis Samstag, den 15.5.1992 in Koln/RTL 
plus, May 14-15, 1992, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548.
113
demands unions in the Federal Republic had made for years, they, more importantly, spoke to the East 
German experience that institutions alone did not define or make for press freedom. 
Ironically, in June 1990, it was the SED successor party PDS to point out that oppositional 
parties, civic groups and other social groups in the GDR stood in line on the fundamental principles of 
a democratic media policy. These principles were the basis for broad alliances and media policy 
institutions (i.e. the MKR, the Media Commission of the People's Chamber etc.). All resembled grass-
roots level structures of the RT and needed to be kept “since they allow for a democratic representation 
of interests of all political, social and cultural groups in our country in questions of media policy.”542 In 
the end, however, none of them survived October 3, 1990. This meant an unresolved past, an 
unfinished (media) revolution, and a missed chance for a united Germany to draw from the East 
German experience. In the end, it was for matters of maintaining the federal political economic media 
order that led to a missed chance for true reform, largely to not endanger the interests of those that 
profited from the established federal system. 
Economic shifts took their toll and had long-lasting consequences for the East German press 
landscape. By May 1992, the number of newspapers in East Germany had decreased drastically: of an 
initial 120 papers in mid-1990, only about sixty-five publications of around fifty publishers were left; 
by November the number had fallen to fifty publication by thirty-five publishers.543 Local dailies had 
decreased from ninety-eight to forty papers of twenty-three publishers, of which, in fact, only thirty 
papers (by fifteen publishers) were original start-ups “without affiliation to their established 
distribution area in the old Länder.”544 By November, this number had fallen to thirty publications of 
nineteen publishers.545 The Association of the Local Press called it a “sad outcome” largely due to a 
shift of former SED newspaper monopolies to oligopolies of the major West German publishing houses
542“da sie eine demokratische Interessenvertretung aller politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Gruppen unseres Landes in 
Fragen der Medienpolitik ermoglichen.” Concept draft, Entwurf “Medienpolitische Grundlinien der PDS mit Blick auf 
die Einheit Deutschlands,” Vorlage für das Präsidium, Kommission Medienpolitik, Berlin, June 14, 1990, p. 4, 
ADS/PDS-PV-349 (Januar – November 1990, Band II). 
543Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher 
nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten 
Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, 
Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193. Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21.
November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 2, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548.
544“ohne Anschluss an ihr angestammtes Verbreitungsgebiet in den alten Bundesländern.” Memorandum, “Notwendige 
Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des 
staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen 
Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 2, 
BArch B/106/156193.
545Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 
1992, p. 2, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548.
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(see Chapter 6).546 According to the BMI, by June 1992, only eighteen local papers were left, next to 
fifteen former SED regional papers (with a consistently high circulation of 4.3 million copies in total) 
and a newly established tabloid press (with a circulation of 1.7 million copies).547 It was not much 
different in the magazine sector. According to VDZ managing director Winfried Reske, of initially 
twenty-four magazine publishers in the GDR, only seven survived the immediate transition period. By 
May 1993, the number had increased again to seventeen due to investments of, and joint ventures with 
West German publishers.548  
546“trauriges Ergebnis.” Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler 
Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur 
unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” 
Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 3, BArch B/106/156193.
547Note: Of those, only one paper was completely self-sufficient, seven were in cooperation with smaller West German 
publishers, three were the local editions of West German publishers, three cooperated with West German publishing 
houses, and four had developed out of former bloc party publications. Letter, Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen 
Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344
242-2/0, June 29, 1992, pp. 4-5, BArch B/106/156193.
548Protocol, Protokoll der 7. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 19./20. Mai 1993 in München, May 19/20, 1993, p. 2, 
Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24549. 
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CHAPTER 4: A NEW PRESS MARKET
“Currently, there is a mentality among West German publishers to
approach the GDR as as sort of Wild West. [They are]
establishing themselves 
with elbowing tactics, which in a halfway civilized 
market-economy … would by never be possible.
But somehow they seem to think, here, they can here act out again
19th century capitalism.”
Jürgen Kuttner, managing director of taz DDR, May 1990549
According to the press agency dpa, the political turn in the GDR and the subsequent opening of 
its borders “opened up highly interesting market opportunities for West German publishing houses.”550 
Unmet demand in the magazine sector came along with a nationally circulating party press whose 
“significant losses in circulation had created easily predictable, upcoming large-scale market niches.”551
Respectively, only two weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the marketing department of Axel 
Springer had a detailed eighty-page market analysis of the GDR ready to present to its board 
members.552
The fear of missing new market opportunities and a potential future readership led to import 
activities in early 1990. Already by February 14, 1990, however, imports had increased to such a 
degree that the BMI declared, now, there were “regulatory needs since many activities of publishers 
were taking place in legal grey zones; the import of West German publications touched on tariff 
regulations, laws on pricing etc., and they were being handled differently by East German 
administrators, these activities are being tolerated at best.”553 In May 1990, Publizistik und Kunst 
549“[Ich habe den] Eindruck, daß jetzt unter den westdeutschen Verlegern die Mentalität herrscht, det Jebiet [sic] der DDR 
als Wilden Westen zu betrachten und sich mit einer Ellenbogenmentalität zu etablieren, die in 'ner [sic] halbwegs 
zivilisierten Marktwirtschaft, wie ick'se [sic] in der Bundesrepublik voraussetze, überhaupt nicht moglich wäre. Aber 
man denkt, daß man hier nochmal, irgendwie den Kapitalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts durchspielen kann.” Marketing in 
ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp. 50-54, p.51, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-
b, DSC07920. 
550“für bundesdeutsche Verlage ein hochinteressanter Markt.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der 
DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050.
551“bei denen hohe Auflagenverluste, d.h. große Marktnischen klar vorauszusehen waren.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 
“Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 2, BArch 
DC9/1050.
552Axel Springer Verlag AG, DDR am Wendepunkt. Wirtschaft, Medien und Gesellschaft vor neuen Herausforderung-en, 
Axel Springer Verlag AG, Marketing Anzeigen, November 1989, Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
553“daß jetzt bereits Regelungsbedarf gegeben sei, da sich viele Aktivitäten von Verlagen in rechtlichen Grauzonen 
abspielten; Zollbestimmungen, Preisauszeichnungsvorschriften etc. beim Import bundesdeutscher Presse berührt seien 
und zur Zeit von DDR-Behorden unterschiedlich gehandhabt, allenfalls Aktivitäten geduldet würden.” Protocol, 
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proclaimed that the “West German press [was] flooding the East German newspaper market.”554 
Around the same time when Müller met Kohl in Bonn to discuss the importance of a free press in the 
GDR (see Chapter 3), the magazine observed that “[a]t present, the GDR is being discovered as a new 
lucrative market, and all major players in the West German publishing industry are busy between [the 
northern town of] Rostock and [southern town of] Dresden.”555 What had developed was “a fierce 
competition between West German publishing giants,” namely Bauer, Burda, Gruner+Jahr, and 
Springer, who were “fighting intense battles over market leadership,” and their means in their 
expanding competition was largely an “aggressive price strategy.”556 Wolfgang Fürstner, in charge of 
East German activities of the Association of German Magazine Publishers (Verband deutscher 
Zeitschriftenverleger, VDZ) agreed. According to him, with increasing unification dynamics West 
German publishing houses had changed their strategies. “Instead of cooperation efforts, the agenda is 
now to capture the reader with West German publications.”557 
The institution that early on kept close track of the import and circulation of West German 
publications in the GDR was the German Information Association for Ascertaining the Distribution of 
Advertising Media (Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e. 
V., IVW).558 For the four quarters of the year 1990, the IVW – in combination with its regular reports – 
published supplementary reports for circulation numbers of IVW affiliated publications in the GDR 
(DDR-Auflagen IVW-angeschlossener Titel). These reports documented the increase of West German 
publications, particular in the second and third quarter of 1990. While in the first quarter, the total 
circulation of West German publications lay at 1.246.959 million copies (of which dailies made 
Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR,
Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
554“BRD-Presse überflutet den DDR-Zeitungsmarkt.” Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik 
und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
555“Die DDR wird derzeit als neuer lukrativer Markt entdeckt, und alles, was in der bundesdeutschen Verlagsszene Rang 
und Namen hat, ist unterwegs zwischen Rostock und Dresden.” Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, 
Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.51, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
556“[ist] inzwischen die Konkurrenz der bundesdeutschen Verlagsriesen heftig entbrannt … liefern sich harte Gefechte um 
die Marktführerschaft … Den Hebel für einen ausweitenden Konkurrenzkampf auf dem DDR-Printmarkt bildet vor 
allem eine aggressive Preispolitik.” Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, 
pp. 50-54, p. 50-51, p. 54, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
557“Statt Kooperationsbemühungen steht jetzt die Eroberung der Leser mit Westware auf der Tagesordnung.” Schlechte 
Karten, journalist, 5/90, p.40, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07767.
558Note: Since 1950, the IVW publishes regular quarterly reports on the circulation of newspapers, magazines and other 
periodically published press in the Federal Republic. Reports contain numbers of average circulation of a newspaper per 
day for each day of a quarter year. Circulation numbers are being broken down to print run, distribution, sale and free 
copies. Paid circulation is further broken down according to sales channels (subscription, individual sale, reading clubs, 
in-flight copies and miscellaneous sales). All IVW reports (1950-1997) are available at the IVW website. See IVW, 
Archivbestände zur IVW-Auflagenliste, Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e.
V. (IVW). Accessed January 23, 2018. http://www.ivw.eu/print/archivbestände-zur-ivw-auflagenliste. 
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278.529), in the second quarter, a circulation of about 470.000 dailies (per edition), and about 4.3 
million copies West German magazines were sold in the GDR. It can be expected that these numbers 
were higher, since various publishers had not reported their distribution numbers.559 The withholding of
circulation numbers continued in the third quarter, when it was estimated that now dailies made only 
for 300.000 copies and magazines about 4.6 million. Considering, however, the “all positive 
development” in the publishing sector in the Federal Republic, with dailies having increased by 
240.000 copies per day (in addition to the second quarter increase of 400.000 copies), it is can be 
expected that also sales in the GDR had increased.560 
The withholding of information itself is indicative. Examples for publications not found on the 
IVW (GDR) lists: the largest West German tabloid, Springer's Bild, and Bauer's magazine Bunte (that 
disappeared from the list in the third quarter). Reasons for withholding sales numbers likely rooted, 
first, in the unwillingness of the publishers to share market information to keep a competitive 
advantage; second, to legal issues, as many publishers refrained from paying taxes, and, third, in the 
general aim to keep a low profile as the controversy about massive imports had steered political 
initiatives. Springer's Bild, in fact, became a prime example for the success of West German 
publications in the East. By the end of March 1990, about 400.000 copies were being sold daily 
throughout the entire GDR. During the first days after the March election, Bild even sold 800.000 
copies, and Springer spokesperson Heiner Bremer was certain that the circulation will “easily level out 
at one million” once the printing capacities were available.561 In early June, Bild reported that with over
one million sold copies, it had become the biggest daily paper also in the GDR.562 Shortly after, ADN 
headlined: “One out of two GDR citizen reads Bild.”563 
West German publishers had their own take on the situation: while some, such as Bauer had had
longterm relations with the GDR (see Chapter 5), to most others (small and medium-sized, and major 
559“DDR-Auflagen IVW-angeschlossener Titel,” 1. Quartal, Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung 
von Werbeträgern e. V. (IVW), p. 1. Accessed January 23, 2018. 
http://www.ivw.de/ali/19901_ivw_auflagenliste_ddr.pdf. “Auflagenliste,” 2. Quartal, Informationsgemeinschaft zur 
Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e. V. (IVW), p. 3. Accessed January 23, 2018 
.http://www.ivw.de/ali/19902_ivw_auflagenliste.pdf. 
560“durchweg positive Entwicklung.” Auflagenliste, 3. Quartal, Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung
von Werbeträgern e. V. (IVW), p. 3. Accessed January 23, 2018. http://www.ivw.de/ali/19903_ivw_auflagenliste.pdf.
561“locker bei einer Million einpendeln.” Cited in Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und 
Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.54, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07924. 
562„Bild-Rechnung“ nach Wunsch, BZ am Abend, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08074. Also dpa, 
Neuorganisation der DDR-Verlage bringt viele Arbeitsplätze, Dietmer von Ladiges, press release, 6/20/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, 35e, DSC08190. 
563“Jeder zweite DDR-Bürger liest die 'Bild'-Zeitung', meldete ADN am 7. Juni.” Cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, 
“Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 14, BArch 
DC9/1050.
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publishers), the East German state was largely unknown territory. Burda owner Hubert Burda described
the situation in the GDR and the publishers' efforts in it as a “marketing in starving markets,” and he 
drew lines to the 1950s in the Federal Republic. The East German readership was literally “starving” 
for new publications, and what was needed were inexpensive publications, on the one hand, and 
magazines that promoted a high standard of living, on the other. Also Western dailies, way superior to 
East German papers with regard to the scope of information, volume of advertisements, and layouts 
attracted a great interest among the East German readership, which needed to be satisfied.564 Hubert 
Burda's statement is significant because of his comparison to post-War Germany but more so because it
gave early insights into what changing (and reforming) the East German press landscape meant: first 
and foremost, the import of West German publications. 
In May 1990, Alexander Jahr (Gruner + Jahr), who specialized in special interest magazines, 
therefore, predicted that “95 percent of the East German publishers are going to collapse” because they 
were “rundown,” and he made clear that for his magazines, the GDR was really “just one more [West 
German] state.”565 The foreseen dying of East German publishers was commented on by Stefan 
Reschke, spokesperson of the publishing house Jahreszeiten, with the statement that “we do not want to
preserve what East German citizens do not want [to keep] anymore.”566 While Jahr made his agenda 
more obvious than others, Reschke's take suggests equal market chances on an even market and the 
choice of the reader deciding over the future of a paper. As will be shown in this chapter, the situation 
was more complicated than that. 
This chapter follows the development of increasing sales of West German publications in the 
GDR. The dpa concluded that the opening of the borders to West German print media had opened the 
way in (and marked the first step of) the all-encompassing involvement of West German publishing 
houses in the GDR.567 Looking at this initial step and early attempts of different West German 
publishers to distribute sell their products in the GDR, this chapter focuses on the various battles fought
over imports and sales. While the GDR might have been an unexplored market, it was also a sovereign 
country with regulations and jurisdictions over imports, distribution, and prices. And though the need 
to allow for press imports from West Germany was recognized by East German officials early on, the 
564Cited in Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, pp.51-52, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07921. 
565“95 Prozent der DDR-Verlage werden eingehen … heruntergekommen … schlicht ein Bundesland mehr.” Schlechte 
Karten, journalist, 5/90, p.40, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07767.
566“Wir wollen nicht bewahren, was die DDR-Bürger nicht mehr wollen.” Schlechte Karten, journalist, 5/90, p.40, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07767.
567Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050.
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question over policies on how to bring this about brought to the fore diverting interests, internal 
struggles and policy initiatives that generally lagged behind economic realities. The GDR soon became 
a new territory for a market competition exclusively between West German publishers. The latter 
introduced not merely new publications but, more importantly, a market rationale of a privately-owned 
press to a press landscape that had neither the market background nor the financial or technological 
resources to compete with materially superior publications and/or aggressive market strategies. And 
since none of these developments refer exclusively to the GDR but are closely connected to press and 
media matters in the FRG, a short overview over major Western players sets the background for 
subsequent developments in a transitioning GDR.
The Press and Press Freedom in the Federal Republic
“Our ground rules [for the press] have been and will be:
We do not need more state but less; we do not need less but more
personal freedom.”
Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the general meeting of the
Association of German Newspaper Publishers,
September 28, 1983568
In 1989/1990, around three thousand publications were being published periodically and/or 
non-periodically, and sold at around one hundred-thousand retail locations in the FRG.569 According to 
the information service Rundfunk-Berichte, informing the MKR of concentration processes in the 
Federal Republic, more than half of the circulation of around 24 million dailies was produced by eleven
corporate media groups, the market leader was Springer. With a share of 26.89 percent in the first 
quarter of 1989, it held about the same market share as the following ten publishers together.570 In the 
magazine market, there were four publishers, namely Bauer (32.38 percent), Burda (10.09 percent), 
Springer (16.84 percent) and Gruner + Jahr (6.33 percent) that, in 1988, made for two-thirds (or 105 
568“Unsere Grundregeln waren und bleiben: Wir brauchen nicht mehr Staat, sondern weniger; wir brauchen nicht weniger, 
sondern mehr personliche Freiheit.” Die Bedeutung der neuen Medien für Freiheit und Meinungsvielfalt, Rede des 
Bundeskanzlers in Bonn vor dem Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungserleger, Presse- und Informationsdienst der 
Bundesregierung - Bulletin, No.100/p.922, 9/30/83, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
569Document, Dokument, Zur Versorgung der DDR mit Presse aus der BRD, n.d., BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). Note: For 
more information on the document see Chapter 5.
570Note: This included Stuttgarter Zeitungsverlag (3.15 percent), WAZ (6.02 percent), Dumont-Schaumberg (3.25 percent)
or FAZ (2.44 percent). Table, “Publizistische Konzentration der bundesdeutschen Tagespresse.” Attachment to letter, 
Friedrich Weber, Rundfunk-Berichte, Informationsdienst für den Wirtschaftsbereich Horfunk und Fernsehen, to the 
Media Control Council, April 26, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 28.
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million copies) of the overall circulation.571 According to the 1989 VDZ report, magazine publishing 
grew consistently. While in 1986, there had been a total of 6.908 magazines, by 1987, this number had 
increased to 7.642 (1.440 were general interest magazines or Publikumszeitschriften) out of which 98 
publications with a circulation of 500.000 or more copies made 49.1 percent of the overall sale of a 
total of 78.2 million copies.572 The overall revenue in magazine publishing in 1987 lay at 11.532 
million DM (5.302 million DM came from advertising). While the revenue of 649 publishers (36.5 
percent) was 500.000 DM or less, twelve publishers (or 0.7 percent) had revenue intakes of 100 million
DM or more.573 In 1987, the magazine sector alone employed about 86.131 in total. Of this, 1.053 
small-scale enterprises with up to nine employees employed 5.4 percent (4.073 employees), while 
twenty-three publishers employed 30.252 people, or 40.2 percent of the total staff.574 In an interview on
September 14, 1989, Werner Hippe, president of the VDZ, claimed that while “competition is 
becoming harder and harder,” the magazine market was a “prime example for functioning 
competition.”575 It was also a prime example for a highly concentrated market.
The VDZ was next to the Federal Association of German Newspaper Publishers 
(Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, BDZV) the biggest and most influential trade association 
of publishers in the Federal Republic. Both were self-regulatory bodies that represented the interests of 
the publishers, and, therefore, had similar agendas: They fiercely defended the Tendenzschutz,“the 
right of a publisher to set the ideological and/or political orientation of a publication, thereby, 
preventing any calling into question the authority of the publisher with regard to journalistic and staff 
matters under the laws.”576 Accordingly, both associations defined press freedom by taking a publisher-
571Table, “Marktanteile der vier großen Zeitschriftengruppen.” Attachment to letter, Friedrich Weber, Rundfunk-Berichte, 
Informationsdienst für den Wirtschaftsbereich Horfunk und Fernsehen, to the Media Control Council, April 26, 1990, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 28.
572Note: For Publikumszeitschriften, individual retail sale made for 60.3 percent of the sold copies (while over 95 percent 
of trade and religious journals were sold on subscription base, 82.8 percent via the German Post), and advertisement 
made for about 23.1 percent of the overall content, 22.3 percent for Fachzeitschriften or trade journals). In the year 
1987, the overall advertisement revenue of Publikumszeitschriften had been 2.748 million DM (an increase of 6.2 
percent compared to the year before), and 2.828 million DM (a plus of 2.5 percent) in 1988. For Fachzeitschriften, 
advertising revenues in 1987 had been 1.622 million DM (a plus of 8.2 percent), and 1.708 (a plus of 5.3 percent) in 
1988. VDZ, Zeitschriftenpresse in Zahlen, Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., 1989, pp. 1-5, pp. 6-7, p. 15, p.
20, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
573VDZ, Zeitschriftenpresse in Zahlen, Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., 1989, p. 19, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
574VDZ, Zeitschriftenpresse in Zahlen, Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., 1989, p. 21, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
575“Paradebeispiel funktionierenden Wettbewerbs.” Dpa interview, “VDZ-Präsident Hippe: Wettbewerb wird immer 
härter,” Dpa-Informationen 37/89, September 14, 1989, pp. 2-6, p. 3,  BArch B/106/156321.
576“das Recht des Verlegers, die geistig-ideelle Zielsetzung eines Presseerzeugnisses zu bestimmen und damit die 
publizistischen und personellen Kompetenzen des Verlegers im Rahmen der Gesetze nicht zur Disposition gestellt 
werden konnen.” Draft, “Eckwerte für die Medienordnung in einem vereinigten Deutschland, Kommissionsentwurf,” 
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centered approach focused on the freedom of institutions. Both opposed union demands for 
Redaktionsstatute, that is provisions formulated by editorial workers on their rights and duties in 
editorial offices touching closely on discussions of inner press freedom that emphasized journalistic 
autonomy and freedom within press institutions. Most importantly, both associations stood in a 
mutually close relationship with the Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren, BMI) and
the federal government (see Chapter 5 and 6).
The general meetings of the VDZ were regularly joined by representatives of the federal 
government. On November 10, 1988, the Minister of the Interior Dr. Friedrich Zimmermann, gave a 
speech on “magazines in tomorrow's media landscape,” in which he supported deregulation and “the 
removal of material, technical and tax barriers … for cross-border economic activities of magazine 
publishers” on the European market.577 To Zimmermann, the great diversity and economic gains of 
(West) German magazine publishers were proof of their capacity of innovation “as it can only be 
expected under the conditions of press freedom, private ownership and competition.”578 He underlined 
that in facing new challenges, “the federal government will stand by the side of the press and will 
support it in any way possible.”579 Its basic principles (Grundsatzpositionen) were that the press (or 
better publishers) needed to remain “free from state or union infringements, … full Tendenzschutz, 
therefore, remains necessary.”580 Instead, self-regulation held a key role; “the press must work out its 
own journalistic principles and watch over the compliance with them,” Zimmermann underlined.581 
Bonn, May 17, 1990, p. 7, attached to letter Beate Damm, FDP Bundesmedienkommission, to Bernd Neumann, MdB, 
Bonn, May 17, 1990, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/25499.
577“Die Beseitigung materieller, technischer und steuerlicher Schranken …  für die grenzüberschreitende wirtschaftliche 
Betätigung der Zeitschriftenverlage.” Die Zukunft der Zeitschriften in der Medienlandschaft von morgen, Rede des 
Bundesministers des Inneren vor dem Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger in Koln, Presse- und Informationsdienst 
der Bundesregierung - Bulletin, No.154/p. 1373, 11/15/88, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
578Full quote: “Die große publizistische und wirtschaftliche Leistung der [westdeutschen] Zeitschriftenpresse ist ein 
Beweis für die Innovationsfähigkeit wie sie nur unter den Bedingungen der Pressefreiheit, der Privatinitiative und des 
Wettbewerbs zu erwarten ist.” Die Zukunft der Zeitschriften in der Medienlandschaft von morgen, Rede des 
Bundesministers des Inneren vor dem Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger in Koln, Presse- und Informationsdienst 
der Bundesregierung - Bulletin, No.154/pp. 1374-1375, 11/15/88, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
579Full quote: “Die Bundesregierung wird in dieser Herausforderung an der Seite der Presse stehen und sie im Rahmen 
ihrer Moglichkeiten unterstützen.” Die Zukunft der Zeitschriften in der Medienlandschaft von morgen, Rede des 
Bundesministers des Inneren vor dem Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger in Koln, Presse- und Informationsdienst 
der Bundesregierung - Bulletin, No.154/pp. 1374-1375, 11/15/88, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
580Full quote: “frei von staatlichen und gewerkschaftlichen Eingriffen ... Der Tendenzschutz bleibt daher in vollem 
Umfang notwendig … Es ist nicht die Aufgabe des Gesetzgebers, als Schiedsrichter oder gar Zensor hinsichtlich 
journalistischer Fairneß und Sorgfalt zu wirken. Die Presse muß sich ihre eigenen publizistischen Grundsätze geben und 
über ihre Einhaltung wachen.” Die Zukunft der Zeitschriften in der Medienlandschaft von morgen, Rede des 
Bundesministers des Inneren vor dem Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger in Koln, Presse- und Informationsdienst 
der Bundesregierung - Bulletin, No.154/p. 1375, 11/15/88, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
581For full quote see above (fn 579). Die Zukunft der Zeitschriften in der Medienlandschaft von morgen, Rede des 
Bundesministers des Inneren vor dem Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger in Koln, Presse- und Informationsdienst 
der Bundesregierung - Bulletin, No.154/p. 1375, 11/15/88, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
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Both a small state in press matters and the reliance of self-regulative principles were based on the 
premise of “an economically sound press,” which was “the best basis for maintaining a diversity of the 
press;” the role of the state in this was to give mere “assistance … to broaden the freedom of the press 
for its journalistic and economic development.”582 Since major German magazine publishers already 
possessed considerable experience in export and knowledge of foreign markets, Zimmermann argued, 
they had an advantage on an all-European market.583 
About five years earlier, German chancellor Helmut Kohl had taken a similar approach at the 
VDZ general meeting in his talk on “the meaning of new media for freedom, and the diversity of 
opinion.” Also Kohl drew a close connections between a free press and overall economic markets of 
Western societies, promoting “without ifs or buts” the “principle of a free flow of information across 
borders,” and cross-border activities of West German publishers.584 Both, Zimmermann and Kohl, 
emphasized the all-German approach of media in the Federal Republic and the continuing efforts of the
government “that also the people in the GDR can inform themselves freely via the free press of the 
Federal Republic.”585 “As the free part of our fatherland,” Kohl stated, “we carry a special 
responsibility here also. The richness of information and the diversity of opinions must be a common 
good for a common German public. Especially media help to maintain the unity of the nation and keep 
awake the feeling of togetherness.”586 The federal government and the trade associations defined press 
freedom on the principle of private ownership closely connected to the economic and journalistic 
authority of the publisher. Private ownership gave the greatest possible guarantee for the competition of
582Full quote: “Eine wirtschaftlich gesunde Presse ist das beste Mittel zur Erhaltung der Pressevielfalt. … Hilfestellung ... 
die Freiräume zur publizistischen und wirtschaftlichen Entfaltung der Presse zu erweitern.” Die Zukunft der 
Zeitschriften in der Medienlandschaft von morgen, Rede des Bundesministers des Inneren vor dem Verband Deutscher 
Zeitschriftenverleger in Koln, Presse- und Informationsdienst der Bundesregierung - Bulletin, No.154/p. 1376, 
11/15/88, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
583Die Zukunft der Zeitschriften in der Medienlandschaft von morgen, Rede des Bundesministers des Inneren vor dem 
Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger in Koln, Presse- und Informationsdienst der Bundesregierung - Bulletin, 
No.154/p. 1373, 11/15/88, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
584“ohne Wenn und Aber …  Grundsatz des freien Informationsflusses über die Grenzen.” Die Bedeutung der neuen 
Medien für Freiheit und Meinungsvielfalt, Rede des Bundeskanzlers in Bonn vor dem Bundesverband Deutscher 
Zeitungserleger, Presse- und Informationsdienst der Bundesregierung - Bulletin, No.100/p.922, 9/30/83, BArch DC 
9/1033 (2/2).
585“daß sich auch die Menschen in der DDR ungehindert aus der freien Presse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
informieren konnen.” Die Zukunft der Zeitschriften in der Medienlandschaft von morgen, Rede des Bundesministers des
Inneren vor dem Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger in Koln, Presse- und Informationsdienst der Bundesregierung
- Bulletin, No.154/p. 1376, 11/15/88, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
586“Als freier Teil unseres Vaterlandes, tragen wir auch hier ein besondere Verantwortung. Der Reichtum von 
Informationen und die Vielfalt von Meinungen sollen Gemeingut der gemeinsamen deutschen Öffentlichkeit bleiben. 
Gerade die Medien helfen, die Einheit der Nation zu wahren und das Gefühl der Verbundenheit wachzuhalten.” Die 
Bedeutung der neuen Medien für Freiheit und Meinungsvielfalt, Rede des Bundeskanzlers in Bonn vor dem 
Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungserleger, Presse- und Informationsdienst der Bundesregierung - Bulletin, 
No.100/p.925, 9/30/83, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
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ideas on a free market, which called for a small state and the freedom of the publisher to set the agenda 
of a publication. These principles and the close connection between the publishers' associations and the
federal government were to become the defining features in the federal approach on media and press 
related matters in the GDR.
Matters of Distribution in the Federal Republic
“The system of press distribution is too sensitive 
and too closely connected to the constitutional 
right of press freedom to be left 
exposed to the free play of economic forces.”
Wolfgang Fürstner, Association of German Newspaper
Publishers, March 21, 1990587
According to Wolfgang Fürstner, the unmatched diversity of the press in the Federal Republic 
was “exclusively due to the distribution system” that, in fact, was highly regulated.588 With some 
exceptions, wholesale and distribution were organized by privately owned, medium-sized independent 
companies (Grossisten).589 Grossisten (wholesalers) received publications directly from the publishers 
and delivered them to the retail locations, which made Grosso-enterprises and retail sale “the link 
between publishers and consumers.”590 In 1990, seventy-four Grossisten of a total of eighty-one were 
organized in the Association Presse-Grosso (Verband Presse-Grosso).591 Presse-Grosso, with a 50 
percent marketshare in distribution, reported an annual revenue of about 4.3 billion DM in 1989.592 
587“[D]as System des Pressevertriebs ist zu sensibel und zu eng mit dem Grundrecht der Pressefreiheit verknüpft, als daß es
dem freien Spiel wirtschaftlicher Kräfte [und den dahinterstehenden Gruppeninteressen] ausgesetzt werden dürfte.” 
“'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, 
March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 11, p. 12, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
588“ausschliesslich auf [das in der BRD existierende] Vertriebssystem zurückzuführen.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' 
Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 12, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29. See also Document, “Grundsätze des 
Deutschen Pressevertriebssystems,” Wolfgang Fürstner, Bonn March 28, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
589Note: Other ways printing matter were distributed and sold were at train station bookstores (Bahnhofsbuchhandel), 
advertising book and magazine trade (Werbender Buch- und Zeitschriftenhandel), publishers' subscription-based 
business (Verlagseigenes Abonnement-Geschäft), and reading circle enterprises (Lesezirkelunternehmen). 
590Full quote: “Presse-Großhandel bezieht seine Ware von den Verlagen und liefert diese an den Einzelhandel. Groß- und 
Einzelhandel sind das Bindeglied zwischen Verlagen und Lesern.” Brochure, Presse-Grosso, Der Presse-Großhandel 
als Garant für Pressefreiheit und Pressevielfalt, Verband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V., 
n.d., p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
591Telegram, Gerd Kapp, Geschäftsführer, Verband Presse-Grosso, to Dr. Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernwesen, 
January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Note: Numbers differ. According to a concept of the Media Control 
Council, thre were sixty-nice Grossisten in the FRG, of which five were owned or affiliated to publishers. See Concept, 
Pressevertrieb, [Medienkontrollrat, n.d.] Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
592Stern und Geo für Suhl und Gera. Vier westdeutsche Verlage wollen ein Vertriebssystem in der DDR aufbauen, Andreas
Kühner, Horizont, January 26, 1990, attachment V to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, 
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According to the association, around eighty Grossisten supplied about 91.000 fixed sales points 
(stationäre Verkaufsstellen) and more than 14.000 itinerant traders (ambulante Händler) with a range of
about 2.600 publications (incl. foreign newspapers and magazines), 400 dailies, 200 magazines 
(comics, paperbacks etc.) in all of the Federal Republic; about 9.000 people worked in the sector.593
Presse-Grosso underlined three features that made press-wholesale (Grosso) different from 
wholesale in other sectors: First, a full return policy (Remissionsrecht) of whole and retail sale for 
unsold copies for the full purchasing price. Second, exclusive distribution rights (Alleinauslieferung) of
individual Grossisten in their designated areas. For these quasi-monopoly rights, a Grossist was 
obliged to supply also unprofitable retail points (to guarantee universal availability of and supply with 
all publications) and to distribute also small, thus, for the Grossist unprofitable publications (to 
guarantee press diversity). Third, fixed prices ensured that each publication was available everywhere 
for the same price.594 In short, demands of universal supply and press diversity by law superseded 
concerns of profitability, or as put by to Wolfgang Fürstner: “This restriction (of economic 
competition) is an essential precondition for a functioning competition of opinions (journalistic 
competition) and, thereby, for press diversity.”595 
And Presse-Grosso provided the numbers for this estimate. Underlining that revenues greatly 
fluctuated among different retail outlets, 89 percent of the annual revenue came from about 45.500 
lucrative sales points, the remaining 11 percent of the revenue came from likewise around 45.500 sales 
points.596 Similarly, with about 2.600 publications being delivered to each Grossist, “70 percent of the 
revenue is being made with around 70 mass-circulating publications, the other 2.530 publications make
about 30 percent of the revenue.”597 That meant that mass publications of the major publishers were the 
economic basis of each Grossist.
Presse-Grosso pointed out that though press wholesale was highly regulated (for instance by 
Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
593Brochure, Presse-Grosso, Der Großhandel mit Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, Verband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V., n.d., pp. 1-2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
594Brochure, Presse-Grosso, Der Großhandel mit Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, Verband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V., n.d.., p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
595“Diese Wettbewerbsbeschränkung (des okonomischen Wettbewerbs) ist also eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für einen 
funktionsfähigen Wettbewerb der Meinungen (des publizistischen Wettbewerbs) und damit der Pressevielfalt.” 
Document, “Grundsätze des Deutschen Pressevertriebssystems,” Wolfgang Fürstner, Bonn, March 28, 1990, Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
596Brochure, Presse-Grosso, Der Presse-Großhandel als Garant für Pressefreiheit und Pressevielfalt, Verband Deutscher 
Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V., n.d., p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
597“70 Prozent des Umsatzes einer Presse-Großhandlung werden mit ca. 70 Titeln der hochauflagigen Massenpresse 
erzielt, auf die restlichen ca. 2.530 Titel entfallen ca. 30% des Umsatzes.” Brochure, Presse-Grosso, Der Presse-
Großhandel als Garant für Pressefreiheit und Pressevielfalt, Verband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-
Grossisten e.V., n.d., p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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providing local monopoly rights), regular market criteria were still applicable to Grossisten who faced 
high performance targets and fixed trade margins on the suppliers side and relinquished profit 
maximization. “The constitutional task and the special position of the press obligate the Grossist to 
subordinate economic rationales to legal and media policy demands.”598 The overall goal of the Grosso-
system was to safeguard press diversity by distribution neutrality. 
And while the general tendency was that this neutrality was guaranteed best if no publishers 
were involved, there were exceptions. In particular Springer had not only built up its own distribution 
network for its newspapers and magazines, but it also held shares in several Grosso-enterprises, 
delivering to over 90.000 sales points daily, and several national and international publishers used 
Springer's infrastructures in the distribution and transportation sector.599 In five regions of the FRG, 
there were Grossisten that were partly or completely owned by major publishing houses; in the region 
around Mannheim, for instance, a joint venture of several publishers had bought a Grosso-enterprise 
that had gone bankrupt. The idea was that while a Grossist with publishers' shares needed not per se be 
unfair or biased in distribution, neutrality needed to be regulated and its probability increased with the 
diversity and balance of shareholders.600  The question whether or not the “Mannheim Model” 
(Mannheimer Modell) was “the only true Grosso concept” was to become a bone of contention in the 
struggle over press distribution in the GDR when federal legislation and customs were pushed onto its 
agenda (see Chapter 5).601 
598“Der verfassungsmäßige Auftrag und die Sonderstellung der Presse verpflichten den Grossisten, 
betriebswirtschaftlichees Denken medienrechtlichen und -politischen Erfordernissen unterzuordnen.” Brochure, Presse-
Grosso, Der Presse-Großhandel als Garant für Pressefreiheit und Pressevielfalt, Verband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- 
und Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V., n.d., p. 10, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
599Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, pp. 1-2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
600Concept, Pressevertrieb, [Medienkontrollrat, n.d.], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, 
File 30.  
601“als allein selig machendes Grosso-Konzept.” Stern und Geo für Suhl und Gera. Vier westdeutsche Verlage wollen ein 
Vertriebssystem in der DDR aufbauen, Andreas Kühner, Horizont, January 26, 1990, attachment V to letter, Thomas 
Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
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West German Publications in the GDR 
“West German publishing houses are trying to conquer the  press
market in the GDR. In doing so, they are hitting hard East
German papers ... in the most vulnerable period in our history.”
Interview, Gottfried Müller, May 1990602
In November 1989, the political demand of the population for access to West German print 
media was fully recognized by officials in the GDR. Not only had insufficient supplies in the 
subscription and retail of domestic newspapers for years caused irritations among the East German 
population, but in November 1989, the number of imported newspapers and magazines from West 
Germany, West Berlin or other Western countries was “extremely limited” (see Chapter 3).603 It was 
clear, as Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Postal and Telecommunication 
(Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, MPF), made clear that “the population is expecting fast 
solutions here.”604 The Modrow government, thus, aimed at satisfying current demand through ad-hoc 
policies. The baseline assumption in all these initiatives was that, as with all press matters, imports too 
needed to be bought from publishers (generally for foreign or hard currency) by the GDR, to then be 
distributed and sold to its population. This made all questions of import a matter of state financing in a 
broken state.
The take of West German publishers was different: In November 1989, they individually 
approached various East German institutions and made direct inquiries, held telephone conversations 
and wrote letters on the possibility of trade relations with the GDR.605 The first documented inquiry 
came the day after the fall of the Berlin Wall, on November 10, 1989 by a lawyer in Dresden who had 
received the offer to produce and distribute East German dailies in the FRG.606 By the end of 
602Full quote: “Westliche Verlage versuchen, den DDR-Zeitungsmarkt zu erobern. Sie treffen damit die Zeitungen unseres 
Landes – die durchaus bereit sind sich dem Wettbewerb zu stellen – in der verwundbarsten Phase ihrer Geschichte.” 
Cited in Zarte Pflanze Pressefreiheit, Klaus Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/15/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07761. 
603Letter (draft), Entwurf, Brief, Meyer to Modrow, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
604“die Bevolkerung hier schnelle Losungen erwartet.” Position Paper, Position und Losungsvorschläge für den Import und
den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen Ländern des nichtsozialistischen 
Wirtschaftsgebietes in der DDR, attachment to letter, Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to Rudi 
Müller, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 13, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
605Letter, Minister für Post und Fernmeldewesen, to Wolfgang Meyer, Regierungssprecher und Leiter des Presseamtes der 
DDR, November 24, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
606Attachement, Standpunkt zum Import von Presseerzeugnissen von BRD-Verlagen, Ministerium der Finanzen und 
Preise, Berlin, den 14.12. 1989, attachment to letter, Standpunk zur Preisbildung für Presseerzeugnisse aus der BRD und
WB, Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise to Presse und Informationsdienst, Berlin, December 8, 1989, BArch 
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November, numerous inquires of West German/Berlin publishers, editorial offices and Grossisten 
asked about changed import/export relations.607 
On November 29, only three weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a letter to Modrow 
summarized press-related inquiries. They concerned three major issues: First, several West German 
companies had made offers to print and distribute East German dailies in the Federal Republic, an 
option that was considered to be favorable because it did not require additional printing paper on the 
side of the GDR.608 It was thought that selected dailies, such as Neues Deutschland, the SED regional 
paper Sächsische Zeitung or Der Morgen could be printed in West Germany and distributed the same 
day in the GDR. With circulation numbers between 50.000 to 100.000 copies per edition, the additional
hard currency revenue was estimated to amount to 15.000 to 30.000 DM.609 Second, “representatives of
renowned publishing houses from the FRG and (West) Berlin” had shown interest in selling their 
publications in the GDR, for instance Stern (G+J), Spiegel (Spiegel Publishers), and Tagesspiegel 
(Tagesspiegel Group).610 A list of offers made to East German institutions gave the specifics: It 
included requests of major publishers, such as Axel Springer, but also various small publishers, such as
Sport-Verlag Sindelfingen, or Disco-Post-Verlag Montabaur. Gruner +Jahr was interested in offering 
its magazine Stern at all news stand across the GDR and “to distribute a large-scale free special edition 
[of it] and to negotiate with an East German partner the financial provisions (sales in East German 
currency, Mark).”611 Similarly, the magazine Spiegel aimed for a country-wide distribution, for which it
considered West German sponsorship-subscriptions for readers in the GDR and potentially a joined 
editorial office “to develop a Spiegel supplement with East German journalists, creating a supplement 
especially for the East German readership.”612 The daily Tagesspiegel proposed to donate its sales 
revenue in Mark to non-profit purposes in the GDR.613 These examples were by no means exclusive. It 
DC9/1052.
607Note: According to Bernd Morchutt, managing director of the East German Sportecho, negotiations between West 
German publishing houses and GDR institutions had started already in September/October 1989, as soon as it was clear 
that changes were to take place in the GDR. Personal communication, Bernd Morchutt, interview, March 22, 2017.
608Letter, Meyer to Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
609Attachment, Angebote von Redaktionen der BRD und Berlin (West), attachment to Letter (draft), Entwurf, Brief, Meyer
an Modrow, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
610“Vertreter renommierter Verlagshäuser der BRD und aus Berlin (West).” Letter, Meyer to Modrow, November 29, 
1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
611“eine Extra-Ausgabe mit hoher Auflage kostenlos zur Verfügung zu stellen und mit einem Partner in der DDR die 
finanziellen Regelungen (Verkauf in DDR-Währung) auszuhandeln.” Attachment, Angebote von Redaktionen der BRD 
und Berlin (West), attachment to Letter (draft), Entwurf, Brief, Meyer an , November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
612“um eine 'Spiegel'-Beilage zu erarbeiten, wo DDR-Journalisten die spezielle Beilage für die DDR-Leser gestalten.” 
Attachment, Angebote von Redaktionen der BRD und Berlin (West), attachment to Letter (draft), Entwurf, Brief, Meyer
an Modrow, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
613Attachment, Angebote von Redaktionen der BRD und Berlin (West), attachment to Letter (draft), Entwurf, Brief, Meyer
128
was underlined to Modrow “that Western firms had approached other publishers, editorial offices and 
institutions with these or similar requests,” which made necessary political decisions on how to deal 
with such offers.614 
In fact, the same day Modrow was informed of these initiatives, on November 29, the chief 
executive of Gruner+Jahr, Gerd Schulte-Hillen contacted Modrow to outline general business interests 
of G+J in the GDR.615 According to Schulte-Hillen, G+J was interested also in “founding a political and
economic weekly or news magazine; a weekly, bi-weekly or monthly women's magazine; [and] in 
starting a weekly magazine or a regional or national daily newspaper. Our preference,” Schulte-Hillen 
made clear, “are projects we can execute in cooperation with partners from the GDR.”616 
The third major issue of inquiry was that of advertising; it was made clear that a “great number 
of companies … are very interested in publishing advertisements in our publications.”617 These requests
were increasing rapidly, and it was uncertain what should be done with them. At this point, they 
“needed, as has been the case hitherto, to be submitted to [central East German agency] Interwerbung 
mbh and be decided by it in cooperation with the respective publishers and editorial offices in 
consideration of the interests of the GDR.”618 For this, a concept was to be developed by December 4 
that was to lay out how advertising should be channeled via Interwerbung in the future [see below].619 
As with advertising, most of these requests were put on hold, due to the unclear legal situation. 
What complicated the matter was that inquiries were being made to individual institutions such as 
newspapers or publishers, minor parts in a centrally structured, hierarchical administration. It was, thus,
hard to keep track of individual efforts made by West German interests. They were being documented 
an Modrow, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
614“daß sich westliche Bewerber an weitere Verlage, Redaktionen und Institutionen mit diesen oder ähnlichen Wünschen 
gewandt haben.” Letter, Meyer to Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
615“Im Zuge der zunehmenden wirtschaftlichen Kooperation beider deutscher Staaten interessieren wir uns für 
Kooperationen, Joint-ventures oder eigenständige wirtschaftliche Tätigkeiten in der DDR.” Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, 
Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
616“Gründung einer aktuellen politisch-wirtschaftlich orientierten Wochenzeitschrift oder eines Nachrichtenmagazins, 
einer wochentlichen, vierzehntägigen oder monatlichen erscheinenden Frauenzeitschrift, den Start einer Wochenzeitung 
oder regionaler oder überregionaler Tageszeitungen. Präferenz hätten für uns Unternehmungen, die wir in Kooperation 
mit Partnern aus der DDR durchführen konnen.” Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, 
Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, November 29, 1989, pp. 1-2, BArch DC9/1052. 
617“Vielzahl von Firmen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) sind sehr an der Veroffentlichung von Werbeanzeigen in 
Publikationen bei uns interessiert.” Letter, Meyer to Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
618“sollten wie bisher bei der Interwerbung mbH eingereicht und von dieser Institution in Zusammenarbeit mit den 
betreffenden Verlagen und Redaktionen ja nach Interessenlage der DDR entschieden werden.” Letter (draft), Entwurf, 
Brief, Meyer an Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052. Note: Interwerbung or the Company for 
Advertising and Foreign Trade Fairs (Gesellschaft für Werbung und Auslandsmessen), was responsible for international 
advertising as well as for advertisning for international clients in the GDR.
619Concept, Interwerbung, Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf dem Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere 
aus dem NSW' in der DDR, December 4, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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and reported to the government in relation to a variety of press-related issues, such as distribution, a 
new media law, import/export, or pricing.620 
And while import offers of West German publishers were generally looked upon with a friendly
eye, not the least in the hope of a mutual press exchange, they also raised concerns for political reasons.
“Next to commercial interests,” it was outlined to Modrow, “these offers clearly have the simultaneous 
political backdrop of selling a magnitude of political dailies and magazines in the GDR,” which could 
have a destabilizing effect.621 Still, the goal was a press exchange between both German states “based 
on the unrestricted sale of publications according to the principle of reciprocity.”622 This required an 
increase of printing paper for export purposes on side of the GDR, which “would not be acceptable [to 
do] at the cost of the domestic press supply.”623 Modrow was advised to make the commercial press 
exchange part of his upcoming talk with the head of the Office of the German Chancellery Rudolf 
Seiters. It was also suggested to create a temporary working group under the leadership of the MPF in 
cooperation with the Ministries of Culture (MfK), Foreign Trade, Foreign Relations, and Finances and 
Prices and the Spokesman of the Government and Head of the Press Office to assess and develop 
proposals.624 
On December 5, the same day Seiters came to East Berlin to meet with Modrow and to prepare 
the upcoming visit of Kohl, the suggestions made to Modrow were forwarded to the new MPF 
minister, Klaus Wolf.625 Being asked to evaluate them, Wolf consulted his colleague Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer for advice on further steps, and Hammer would become one of the central negotiators on 
matters of press import and distribution.
620Letter, Minister für Post und Fernmeldewesen, to Wolfgang Meyer, Regierungssprecher und Leiter des Presseamtes der 
DDR, November 24, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
621“Diese Angebote haben offensichtlich neben dem kommerziellen Interesse den politischen Hintergrund, im 'Gegenzug' 
in der DDR politische Tageszeitungen und Illustrierte in Großenordnungen zu verkaufen.” Letter (draft), Entwurf, Brief,
Meyer an Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
622Full quote: “Dieser Austausch sollte auf der Basis des freien Verkaufs dieser Publikationen nach dem Prinzip der 
Gegenseitigkeit erfolgen.” Letter, Meyer to Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
623Full quote: “erhohter Export zu Lasten des Presseangebots im Inland wäre nicht vertretbar.” Letter (draft), Entwurf, 
Brief, Meyer an Modrow, November 29, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
624Letter, Meyer to Modrow, November 29, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
625Letter, Arnold, Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, to Klaus Wolf, Minister für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, December 5, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
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Issues of Import – The GDR Policy Level
“The basic principle for all decisions [regarding press imports]
must be to meet the needs of the East German population ...
primarily with domestic publications. The role of press imports
can only be to provide supplementary information.”
Position paper on press imports, Hans-Jürgen Hammer,
December 13, 1989626
In November and December 1989, questions of West German press imports were being 
discussed in close relation to reforming the Postal (Newspaper) Distribution (Postzeitungsvertrieb, 
PZV) in the GDR. Here, plans were being created on how publications could be imported, distributed 
and marketed in the GDR via a joint venture with one or several West German major publishing 
houses, and lists with publications intended for distribution were gathered in close cooperation with 
them (see Chapter 5). The core problem in these talks were finances. According to Dietrich Germer, 
director of Postal Distribution, the annual profit in newspaper distribution in 1989 was about 54 million
Mark with an annual revenue of about 900 million Mark.627 Still, with the worsened economic situation 
and a general lack of resources, press distribution needed to be reformed and improved “without 
additional Valuta [hard currency] expenditures.”628 This meant, no convertible currency was to be spent
on any reforms or needed expansions for the import and distribution of publications from West 
Germany. 
The Struggle over the ʻConcept of Universal Importʼ
 Already in December 1989, the “concept of universal import of Western press products into the
GDR” was drafted under the leadership of the MfK and was to be submitted to the Council of 
Ministers.629 According to the notes of Dietrich Germer, the person in charge was Manfred Schuberth, 
626Full quote: “Grundsatz für alle Entscheidungen muß sein, die Bedürfnisse der Bevolkerung der DDR nach 
Presseerzeugnissen primär mit Presseerzeugnissen der DDR zu befriedigen. Der Import von Presseerzeugnissen kann 
nur die Funktion einer ergänzenden Information haben.” Position Paper, Position und Losungsvorschläge für den Import
und den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen Ländern des nichtsozialistischen 
Wirtschaftsgebietes in der DDR, attachment to letter, Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to Rudi 
Müller, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 13, 1989, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052.
627Letter, Dietrich Germer (Director), Stellungnahme zur Ministerratsvorlage „Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung 
westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR“, December 19, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
628“ohne zusätzlichen Valutaaufwand.” Beratungsmaterial, Grundsätze für den Import und den Vertrieb von 
Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) in der DDR, n.d. [January 11, 1990?], p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3). Copy also available in BArch DC9/1052.
629Note: Four different drafts of this policy document exist in the national archives in Berlin, either in the personal 
reference files of Rudolf Müller, Director of the Interior and Organization at the Ministry of Media Policy (part of the 
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head of the Center for Foreign Cultural Relations (Zentrum für kulturelle Verbindungen mit dem 
Ausland) at the MfK of which Peter Lorf was the Deputy Minister.630 And while the title of the 
proposal suggested a focus on press import, its core purpose was, in fact, the building of a national 
press distribution enterprise (nationales Pressevertriebssystem, NPV) in the GDR. In the second of all-
together four drafts, the MfK made clear why one could not be looked at without the other. Any 
imports presupposed the “reorganization of the VE [or press] distribution system … to significantly 
increase transshipment capacities.”631 Underlining the direct link between press imports and the need 
for a quick improvement of press distribution, the draft made clear that an equal distribution of print 
media was part of a democratic media; thus, matters of distribution were political issues that asked for 
legislative measures. With this overall goal, the specifics of the individual proposals were significantly 
different. 
The third draft of the proposal was to be submitted to the Council of Ministers the week of 
December 18, the distributor was to be built by February 1, and the import of West German print media
was to begin on Monday, February 5, 1990.632 Due to competing interests and internal struggles 
between different East German ministries, however, the leadership over negotiations and the drafting of
a new proposal moved to the MPF. By January 4, 1990, the MPF's proposal was ready to be submitted 
Press Office of the Chair of the Council of Ministers of the GDR) until March 1990, or the holdings of the Ministry of 
Postal and Telecommunication of the GDR (MPF). Though none of the documents contain a specific date, the progress 
in content and wording as well as references to events and actors give implications for their temporal order. 
Furthermore, since the earliest draft contains a reference to the month of December, and the earliest follow-up 
communication regarding the third draft is dated December 19, it is save to assume, that the first three drafts, including 
the eventual policy proposal, originate from before that date. See policy draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, 
Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3). Note: Though no explicit date is given on the document, the revision date of the different ministries is
January 4, 1990. Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung 
westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3); Policy draft II, Vorlage für 
den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d., 
BArch DC9/1052, note: a copy of this version is also available in BArch DM3/21121 (2/3); Policy draft I, Vorlage für 
den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der 
Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., BArch DC9/1052. 
630Internal Note, Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, 
am 18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat
der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], 
BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
631“Neuorganisierung des VE Vertriebssystems ... mit dem Ziel die Umschlagskapazitäten wesentlich zu erweitern.” Policy
draft II, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in 
die DDR, n.d., p. 5, BArch DC9/1052.
632Internal Note, Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, 
am 18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, pp. 1-3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den 
Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. 
[Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur 
umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 
(2/3).
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to the Council of Ministers; the person in charge was Dr. Hans-Jürgen Hammer (see Chapter 5).633 
While the following chapter outlines in detail the earlier and subsequent developments 
regarding these proposals, the focus of this sub-chapter lies on the documents themselves. The means 
of reform (in imports, distribution and sales) discussed in them became the baseline concepts for all 
following negotiations on a much wider spectrum. Thus, the first three out of the four policy proposals 
are put into comparative perspective, and the central role and aims of different individuals and 
institutions, such as the MfK, are highlighted. As will be seen, West German publishers took a central 
position in these early proposals, partly because the “participation of economically strong publishing 
houses of the FRG and (West) Berlin” was to take care of the financing issue.634 More importantly, 
however, all proposals were based on early lobby work of the major West German publisher Gruner + 
Jahr (see Chapter 5). 
The First Policy Draft
The broadest of all proposal drafts was the first entitled “Concept of Universal Import of 
Western Press Products into the GDR in the Recognition of the Commitment of Kob 3, the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Vienna Follow-up Conference.”635 As the title suggests, the focus of this seven-page 
document lay on the “the objective of allowing free access to Western print media in the GDR,” 
according to international agreements, “and in ensuring reasonable political and economic basic 
conditions for this process.”636 Attached to it was an additional two-page document, outlining a 
financing concept for the import of Western publications.637 
The proposal was based on six premisses: the strengthening of the Modrow government at the 
633Policy draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
634“Beteiligung leistungsstarker Verlagshäuser der BRD und Berlin (West).” Beratungsmaterial, Grundsätze für den Import
und den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) in der DDR, n.d. [January 11, 1990?], p. 1, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Copy also available in BArch DC9/1052.
635Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der 
DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., 
BArch DC9/1052.
636“Mit dem Ziel der Gewährleistung des freien Zugangs westlicher Print-Medien in der DDR und der Sicherung politisch 
und okonomisch tragbarer Rahmenbedingungen für diesen Prozeß.” Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR,
Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, 
der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
637Explanatory notes, Erläuterungen eines Finanzierungsmechanismus für den Zeitschriften-Import entsprechend der 
Konzeption …., Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der 
DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., 
Attachment to policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der 
Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., BArch DC9/1052.
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Round Table talks, the “full implementation” of CSCE obligations, ensuring “economically favorable 
conditions that preempt an additional hard currency burden on the state budget,” while simultaneously 
“preventing monopoly positions of individual Western media companies in the GDR”638 What was 
desired instead was a “cooperation with economically strong and politically independent Western 
partner;” all of these measures were to serve the objective of “expanding the possibilities for a 
sovereign self-representation of the GDR in international mass media in the interest of strengthening 
state sovereignty.”639 
For this, it sought the “building of a strong, market-oriented national press distribution system 
(NVP) as a joint-venture with a Western partner,” while existing distribution infrastructures were to be 
expanded and economized.640 The Post was to keep its monopoly rights over subscription services, 
while the NPV was to provide a country-wide supply of national and international press. For this, it 
was to take over retail facilities of the Post (with the exception of Post offices).641 Prices were to be 
fixed with a “reasonable” profit margin, and the NPV was obliged to “distribute domestic and foreign 
press products on an equal basis regardless their political orientation.”642 A Außenhandelsbetrieb, that 
is a GDR enterprise specialized on international trade, working in the cultural sector was to be in 
charge of the import and export of domestic and international press matters. This was to be done in 
cooperation with an international media corporation. The Außenhandelsbetrieb was to “simultaneously 
be in charge of marketing the advertising rights for imported print media” according to fixed quotas 
638“Uneingeschränkte Erfüllung … Sicherung okonomisch vorteilhafter gewinnorientierter Rahmenbedingungen, die eine 
zusätzliche valutaseitige Belastung des Staatshaushaltes ausschließt … Verhinderung der Monopolisierung von 
Positionen einzelner westlicher Medienkonzerne in der DDR.” Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, 
Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, 
der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
639“Zusammenarbeit mit wirtschaftlich leistungsfähigen und politisch unabhängigen westlichen Kooperationspartnern … 
Erweiterung der Moglichkeiten zur souveränen Selbstdarstellung der DDR in den internationalen Massenmedien im 
Sinne der Stärkung der Eigenstaatlichkeit.” Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von
Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
640“Gründung eines leistungsstarken am DDR-Markt orientierten nationalen Pressevertriebssystems (NPV) als 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmen mit einem westlichen Partner.” Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, 
Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, 
der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
641The exact quote: “Gewährleistung einer flächendeckenden Versorgung mit nationalen und internationalen Print-
Medienerzeugnissen durch das Gemeinschaftsunternehmen bei Übernahme der Verkaufseinrichtungen (außer 
Postämter) der Deutschen Post und Nutzung der Handelsorganisationen sowie anderer Einrichtungen der DDR.” Policy 
draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur 
Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 2, 
BArch DC9/1052.
642“angemessener … in- und ausländischen Presseerzeugnisse gleichberechtigt zu vertreiben, unabhängig von ihrer 
politischen Ausrichtung.” Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der 
Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
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“based exclusively on economic feasibility.”643 Existing import and export agreements were to be 
maintained and developed as long as they did not obstruct better political and economic options.644 
Advertising as the Main Source of Revenue 
 Hard currency needed for importing Western print media was to be “generated entirely through
advertising revenue” mainly via selling advertising airtime on East German public television (FS-DDR)
to Western companies.645 Estimated revenues for the GDR were to increase in proportion to the 
increase of adverting airtime: While in the year 1990, thirty minutes of advertising per day were to 
generate a revenue of sixty million DM, two years later, with the doubling of airtime to sixty minutes 
per day, the revenue was expected to double to 120 million DM. The advertising slots were to be 
marketed by the same Western media company that was also to be partner in the NPV joint-venture as 
well as co-partner in the Außenhandelsbetrieb, the enterprise responsible for importing and exporting 
domestic and international press. For its marketing activities, this company was to receive a provision 
of 15 percent.646 
In the first year, thirty million DM, that is 50 percent of the net revenue, was to go to FS-DDR 
for the development of its programming, the other 50 percent was to be “made available for the 
purchase of print media.”647 An attached document, entitled “Explanatory Notes on the Financing 
Mechanism …” gave more specifics on that point.648 It outlined the import-revenue ratio according to 
individual prices: Given a profit of thirty million DM per year with fifty-two annual weeks, the amount 
643“wird gleichzeitig zur Vermarktung von Werberechten für die einzuführenden Print-Medien beauftragt … die sich 
ausschließlich an der okonomischen Realisierbarkeit orientieren.” Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, 
Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, 
der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 3, BArch DC9/1052.
644Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der 
DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., 
p. 3, BArch DC9/1052.
645“vollständig aus Werbeeinnahmen erwirtschaftet” Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von
Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 3, BArch DC9/1052.
646Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der 
DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., 
p. 4, BArch DC9/1052. Note: For 1991, it was an estimated annual revenue of ninety million DM for forty-five minutes 
of airtime per day.
647“für den Kauf der Print-Medien über den Außenhandelsbetrieb zur Verfügung gestellt.” Policy draft I, Vorlage für den 
Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der 
Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 4, BArch DC9/1052.
648Explanatory notes, Erläuterungen eines Finanzierungsmechanismus für den Zeitschriften-Import entsprechend der 
Konzeption …., Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der 
DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., 
Attachment to policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der 
Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., BArch DC9/1052.
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to be spent on import was 600.000 DM per week. With an average import price of 0.50 DM for a 
newspaper and 1.50 DM for a magazine, a weekly import of about 300.000 newspapers (50.000 copies 
per day) and 300.000 magazines was deemed possible. Retail prices in Mark (GDR) were to be 
rounded up according to a 1:5 ratio based on import prices in DM (FRG). That meant a newspaper 
selling for 0.50 DM was to cost 2.50 Mark in the GDR, a magazine for 1.75 DM was to cost 9 Mark.649 
For an additional 25.000 to 30.000 DM, the amount of imported magazines could be further increased 
by about 100.000 copies through the sale of unsold and returned copies (Remittenden). It was 
emphasized that “[b]y including these additional financing sources … the amount of copies made 
available increases [further],” which was considered to be the overarching goal.650 All profits were to be
used for the purpose of importing West German print media.651 No references were given as to what 
these estimates were based on, either relating to general concepts or specific estimates on prices and 
revenues. 
While a closer analysis of this document is given below, three remarks deserve mentioning 
here. First, the proposal pointed to the imperatives of a free press; it emphasized on the importance of 
access to and a sufficient supply of a variety of print media. Both were regarded to be deeply political 
matters that were, secondly, to be brought about by advertising revenue as the main source of revenue 
as a means of financing the reform of press distribution. Third, all activities relating to West German 
print media were to happen via the NPV, including imports/exports, the majority of distribution as well 
as the management of advertising, in close cooperation with also only one West German partner. Thus, 
though the draft made it an explicit point to avoid any monopoly position of a West German media 
company in the GDR, the solutions presented gave leeway to (and, in fact, fostered) such a position.
649Explanatory notes, Erläuterungen eines Finanzierungsmechanismus für den Zeitschriften-Import entsprechend der 
Konzeption …., Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der 
DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., 
p. 1, Attachment to policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der 
Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., BArch DC9/1052.
650“Die Einbeziehung der in der Konzeption genannten weiteren Finanzierungsquellen erhoht die zur Verfügung stehenden
Stückzahlen.” Explanatory notes, Erläuterungen eines Finanzierungsmechanismus für den Zeitschriften-Import 
entsprechend der Konzeption …., Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der 
Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 2, Attachment to policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von
Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., BArch DC9/1052.
651Policy draft I, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der 
DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., 
p. 4, BArch DC9/1052.
136
Following Drafts 
This draft was reworked several times under great pressure, until its final version was discussed 
during a meeting between Germer, Deputy Minister of Culture Peter Lorf, and Manfred Schuberth on 
December 18, 1989. During the meeting, Schuberth made clear that the core content of the proposal 
was to eliminate existing quota and admission rules for press imports from West Germany. He also 
explained that it had furthermore been decided to aim for a “mandate for negotiating with the 
publishing group Gruner+Jahr … over the building of a joint-venture enterprise for press distribution 
for retail sale in the GDR.”652 Respectively, the third draft referred solely to Gruner+Jahr (G+J) as the 
exclusive joint-venture partner for all planned cooperation, and it was to be submitted to the GDR 
Council of Ministers that same week.653 
The proposal was officially developed by Peter Lorf and submitted by Dr. Dietmar Keller 
(Minister of Culture).654 Similar to the initial draft, the reasons for the proposal, next to CSCE 
obligations, were that: 
The free access to international print media for the people of the GDR can be an important
signal for the population regarding the sincerity of the coalition government' intentions, 
and, thus, have a stabilizing influence on the situation in the GDR. This step can be taken 
fast and without any costs for the GDR.655 
For this, the Minister of Culture was to be authorized “to come to an agreement with the West German 
publishing house Gruner + Jahr to guarantee the extensive import of Western print media into the GDR
on favorable terms. Import must start by Monday, February 5, 1990.”656 That was the day, the media 
652“ein Mandat für Verhandlungen mit der BRD-Verlagsgruppe Gruner und Jahr … über die Gründung eines 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmens für den Pressevertrieb im Einzelverkauf in der DDR.” Internal Note, Dietrich Germer, 
Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, am 18.12.1989, December 19, 
1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption 
zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
653Internal Note, Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, 
am 18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den 
Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. 
[Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
654Note: Further by Wolfgang Meyer (Spokesman of the Government and Head of the Press Office ), Dr. Klaus Wolf 
(Minister of Posts and Telecommunication), Hans Bentzien (Director of FS-DDR) and Heinz Kamnitzer (President of 
the state bank). Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung 
westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
655“Der freie Zugang internationaler Presseerzeugnisse zu den Menschen in der DDR kann für die Bevolkerung ein 
wichtiges Signal für die Ernsthaftigkeit der Absichten der Koalitionsregierung sein und damit stabilisierenden Einfluß 
auf die Lage in der DDR ausüben. Dieser Schritt kann schnell und ohne Kosten für die DDR getan werden.” Policy draft
III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die 
DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
656“mit dem BRD-Verlagsunternehmen Gruner und Jahr eine Vereinbarung herbeizuführen, mit der die umfassende 
Einfuhr westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR zu günstigen Konditionen gewährleistet wird. Der Beginn des Imports 
muß bis Montag, 5. Februar 1990, erfolgen.” Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur 
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resolution was to lift the postal monopoly over distribution. 
The draft proposed the same measures as did the initial one, only this time with G+J as the 
exclusive Western partner. Accordingly, a national press distribution system (NPV) was to be built as a
limited liability company in joint venture with G+J who was not to hold more than 49 percent. The 
share of the GDR was to be held by Postal Distribution of the MPF. The state bank of the GDR was to 
secure its financing.657  
While the monopoly of the Post for delivery and subscription services was to be maintained (a 
statement that was missing in the second draft), the NPV was to distribute all domestic and 
international print media that did not conflict with constitutional principles on an equal basis, 
regardless their political orientation. It furthermore, with the support of G+J, was to promote the export
of domestic publications. The GDR Außenhandelsbetrieb handling the import and export activities was 
Buchexport Leipzig.658 
The NPV was also to be in charge of marketing press advertising rights. Existing import/export 
agreements were to be kept and developed further.659 Necessary hard currency funds for the import of 
Western press products were to be generated entirely by providing advertising airtime for “Western 
companies” on FS-DDR.660 The three year revenue scheme was the same one as in the initial draft. The 
sale of advertising was to happen via an advertising agency affiliated with the NPV, G+J was to take 
over the marketing in the West and receive a 15 percent provision. As a hand written note on the final 
document made clear, that meant during the first year, G+J was to receive 9 million DM of the 
advertising profit.661 And while in an earlier draft, FS-DDR was to receive 50 percent of all net ad 
revenue, in this final version, it had been cut down to 40 percent. The remaining 60 percent was to be 
spent for the acquisition and import of print media.662
umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3). Note: In the second proposal, also Klaus Wolf, Minister of Posts and Telecommunication, was included in this 
paragraph.
657Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
658Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Note: In the second draft, it stated 
that this was to be done “in firm cooperation” (“in fester Kooperation”), a part that got erased in the final draft.
659Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
660“für Firmen aus dem westlichen Ausland.” Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur 
umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3).
661Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
662Policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
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While the most points in the second and the final draft relating to the NPV differed only in 
detail from the initial proposal, other points had changed: the tasks of the advertising agency that was 
to be part of the NPV had been reduced significantly in the final draft, other competencies of the NPV 
were to be expanded: a publisher was to be founded for a new weekly, and daily newspaper “gradually 
and in correspondence to the economic means,” also in cooperation with G+J.663  
Rejection of the Proposal 
During the meeting on December 18, Germer, Lorf and Schuberth talked over the final draft. 
Though it was to be submitted to the Council of Ministers that same week, by the end of the meeting, 
Germer asked for a delay to allow the administration of the MPF to submit a “well-founded position on
the plans.”664 One day later, he wrote a two page statement in which he gave a clear and unambiguous 
response to the proposed plans. Germer claimed, “the proposal cannot be accepted in its current form” 
because “there [are] no advantages for the German Post in the proposal.”665 Germer's main points of 
criticism: the national distributor “is, de facto, to be put 'next to the German Post'.”666 This meant, as he 
noted after the meeting with Schuberth, “[t]he monopoly of the state over distribution for retail sale is 
to be transferred from the MPF to the company.”667 In his official statement he emphasized why this 
was problematic: “The cost-intensive subscription service is to remain with the DP [German Post] 
while the low-cost distribution for retail sale … is to be managed by the new enterprise (also for print 
media from the GDR!).”668 Germer's criticism did not touch upon the fact that G+J was to be the 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
663Full quote: “Im Rahmen des NPV wird schrittweise und im Einklang mit den okonomischen Moglichkeiten ein Verlag 
gebildet, der eine unabhängige Wochenzeitschrift und eine unabhängige Tageszeitung herausbringt.” Policy draft III, 
Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die 
DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
664“fundierten Standpunkt zum Vorhaben.” Internal Note, Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim Stellvertreter
des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, am 18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment 
to policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
665“Der Vorlage kann in dieser Form nicht zugestimmt werden ... in der Konzeption [sind] keine Vorteile für die DP 
erkennbar.” Statement, Dietrich Germer (Director), Stellungnahme zur Ministerratsvorlage „Konzeption zur 
umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR“, December 19, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
666“soll faktisch 'neben die DP' gestellt werden.” Letter, Dietrich Germer (Director), Stellungnahme zur 
Ministerratsvorlage „Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR“, December 19,
1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
667“Das staatliche Vertriebsmonopol soll für den Einzelverkauf vom MPF auf das Unternehmen übertragen werden.” 
Internal Note, Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, 
am 18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den 
Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. 
[Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
668Full quote: “Der kostenaufwendige Abonnementsvertrieb soll bei der DP verbleiben, während der kostengünstige 
Vertrieb im Einzelverkauf, der noch grosse Wachstumsreserven hat, von dem neuen Unternehmen wahrgenommen 
werden soll (auch für die Presseerzeugnisse der DDR!).” Statement, Dietrich Germer (Director), Stellungnahme zur 
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exclusive partner but was rather concerned with the shaky monopoly position of the German Post. 
Germerʼs criticism corresponded to two documents that very likely date from that time, and 
circulated in the MPF. One gave details on the distribution “Models of the MfK,” the other gave 
responding “Basic Principles of the MPF on the Plans of the MfK” regarding press distribution.669 Both
documents underlined the importance and the central position of the Post, and its non-negotiable stand 
on its monopoly rights over distribution for press retail and subscription.670 The two MfK distribution 
models, one being a limited liability company in joint venture with the German Post, one without, both 
envisioned G+J as the sole West German partner for the distribution in retail sale. Neither was 
supported by the DP.
In his response to the final draft, Germer emphasized there was considerable potential for future
growth in the retail sector, and he feared it would hurt the Post not to participate. Judging from current 
conditions, the solution offered, meant an annual loss in profit of 20 million Mark, with an overall 
revenue loss of 300 million Mark. These estimates did not include the additional loss of at least 10 
million Mark (tendency increasing) from distributing West German print media.671 If the latter was 
done by the Post, given an annual turnover of 150 million Mark, Germer estimated that about 10 
million Mark as well about about 10 million DM (hard currency) could be generated on an annual 
basis.672 And while Germer recognized the proposal's financing model to allow for the import of West 
German print media for hard currency, he noted: “it is a disadvantage that these resources need to be 
generated in a different sector [advertising], which, thus, creates a direct dependency of press imports 
on these activities.”673 This point remained a side note in his overall aim to push for a stronger position 
of the Post, hoping it would keep its exclusive rights. If this was not feasible, at least the overall 
competencies of the distribution company needed to be limited to press distribution for retail only, 
Ministerratsvorlage „Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR“, December 19,
1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
669Document, Modelle des MfK, and, Grundpositionen des MPF zum Pressevertrieb, n.d. [December 1989], BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
670Document, Modelle des MfK, and, Grundpositionen des MPF zum Pressevertrieb, n.d. [December 1989], BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
671Statement, Dietrich Germer (Director), Stellungnahme zur Ministerratsvorlage „Konzeption zur umfassenden 
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR“, December 19, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
672Statement, Dietrich Germer (Director), Stellungnahme zur Ministerratsvorlage „Konzeption zur umfassenden 
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR“, December 19, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
673“Nachteilig ist, daß diese Mittel auf anderen Gebieten erwirtschaftet werden müssen und somit eine direkte 
Abhängigkeit der Presseimporte von diesen Aktivitäten besteht.” Internal Note, Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein 
Gespräch beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, am 18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, p. 3, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden 
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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while advertising and/or publishing in joint-venture with G+J should be part of a separate company.674 
And since there were “no advantages for the German Post whatsoever, the Post should at least be the 
sole shareholder on parts of the GDR.”675 In his official statement, Germer reasoned this was to tie the 
distributor closer to the Post and to make better use of the opportunities for postal and press services.676 
The Post was to bring in its gross capital assets (Grundmittelbestand677), which according to a hand 
written note on the document were estimated to about 230 million Mark.678 In return, it asked for a 20 
percent share of the advertising net revenue (in hard currency). 
On December 20, 1989, a letter was drafted in the MPF to different ministries, including the 
MfK, in which the postal minister rejected the “Concept of Universal Import” and the idea of founding 
a distribution company that contained “the complete divestment of press distribution for the retail 
sector from the German Post.”679 The minister argued that during the meeting on December 18, Lorf 
had not given the full picture. Any reorganization of distribution was only possible with the German 
Post, and according to the “Postal and Telecommunications Act, the German Post has to administer 
press distribution as a single task, meaning for subscription and retail.”680 Adapting the language of the 
earlier mentioned “Basic Principles of the MPF on the Plans of the MfK,” the letter underlined that 
both were integral parts of a complex system of Postal Distribution that included the transport, 
handling, processing and distribution of press material, and could only be realized efficiently when 
being “closely interlocked.”681 The MPF now aimed for “direct negotiation with the distribution 
674Statement, Dietrich Germer (Director), Stellungnahme zur Ministerratsvorlage „Konzeption zur umfassenden 
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR“, December 19, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
675“keinerlei Vorteile für die DP, so sollte de DP zumindest Alleingesellschafter auf DDR-Seite werden.” Internal Note, 
Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, am 
18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den 
Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. 
[Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
676Statement, Dietrich Germer (Director), Stellungnahme zur Ministerratsvorlage „Konzeption zur umfassenden 
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR“, December 19, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
677For a discussion of the term Grundmittelbestand see: Andreas Spillner, Volker Russig, Susanne Deutsch, Branchenbild 
Bauwirtschaft, Berlin / Munich: Duncker und Humboldt, 1996, p. 132.
678Statement, Dietrich Germer (Director), Stellungnahme zur Ministerratsvorlage „Konzeption zur umfassenden 
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR“, December 19, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
679“die vollige Loslosung des Pressevertriebs im Einzelverkauf von der Deutschen Post.” Letter (draft), Entwurf, Minister 
Post und Fernmeldewesen, to Dr. Keller, Minister für Kultur, December 20, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). Note: The 
letter was sent to Dr. Keller (Minister of Culture), Wolfgang Meyer (Spokesman of the Government and Head of the 
Press Office), and Dr. Beil (Minister for Foreign Trade).
680“Gesetz über das Post- und Fernmeldewesen hat die Deutsche Post den Pressevertrieb als einheitliche Aufgabe, d.h. im 
Abonnement und im Einzelverkauf, wahrzunehmen.” Letter (draft), Entwurf, Minister Post und Fernmeldewesen, to 
Meyer, Regierungssprecher und Leiter des Presse- und Informationsdienstes der Regierung der DDR, December 20, 
1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
681“in enger Verzahnung.” Letter (draft), Entwurf, Minister Post und Fernmeldewesen, to Meyer, Regierungssprecher und 
Leiter des Presse- und Informationsdienstes der Regierung der DDR, December 20, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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company Gruner + Jahr” on the reorganization of distribution in the GDR.682 Assigning the senior head 
of the Department of Post and Press Operations and Transport (Hauptabteilung Betrieb und Verkehr 
des Post- und Zeitungswesens), Heinz Schunke, as the representative for the MPF for further 
negotiations, Wolf asked other ministries to do the same.683 A day later, the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
sent Norbert Mahn, and the MfK re-assigned Manfred Schuberth for further negotiations. From that 
point on, the MPF was the central institution that took charge in the negotiations over press import and 
distribution.
The MPF Proposal
In taking the lead in negotiations, the MPF had some guiding principles. In the document that 
laid out and rejected the two distribution models of the MfK, the MPF hinted at its own “alternative” 
that needed to be discussed.684 The attached two-page document, “Principles for the Distribution of 
Press Products from the FRG and (West) Berlin,” outlined in ten bullet points, how the MPF 
envisioned a reformed press import and distribution. Any print media from the Federal Republic (and 
West Berlin) was to be for retail only and was to be sold only at retail locations of the Post (with direct 
supplies by publishers only in exceptional cases). The MPF adopted the advertising-based revenue 
scheme of the initial proposal, “[s]ince no hard currency fonds are available,” the conclusion was that 
“imports can only be financed through the revenue of broadcast and television advertisement or the 
export of East German publications.”685 Prices in Mark were to be determined according to a 1:3 
exchange ratio based on the original retail price in DM. Distribution was to be expanded gradually, 
starting with “selected national dailies and weeklies … Here, publications are to be chosen that do not 
jeopardize the existence of East German papers.”686 According to the MPF, any import and/or export 
activities were to be handled exclusively between the Press Distribution Office (Zeitungsvertriebsamt, 
ZVA), an “autonomous department within the German Post,” and the West German partner G+J via a 
682“direkte Beratungen mit dem Vertriebsunternhmen Gruner und Jahr.” Letter (draft), Entwurf, Minister Post und 
Fernmeldewesen, to Meyer, Regierungssprecher und Leiter des Presse- und Informationsdienstes der Regierung der 
DDR, December 20, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
683Letter (draft), Entwurf, Minister Post und Fernmeldewesen, to Dr. Keller, Minister für Kultur, December 20, 1989, 
BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
684“Alternative dazu.” Document, Modelle des MfK,  n.d. [December 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
685“Da keine Valutafonds zur Verfügung stehen, kann die Finanzierung des Imports nur aus Einnahmen von Rundfunk- 
und Fernsehwerbung bzw. aus dem Export von DDR-Presseerzeugnissen vorgenommen werden.” Document, 
Grundsätze für den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin(West), n.d. [December 1989], p. 1, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
686“ausgewählten überregionalen Tages- und Wochenzeitungen … Dabei sind solche Presseerezugnisse auszuwählen, die 
eine Existenz von DDR-Zeitungen nicht gefährden.” Document, Grundsätze für den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen 
aus der BRD und Berlin(West), n.d. [December 1989], p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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limited liability press distribution joint venture.687 An advertising agency was to be incorporated within 
the latter as a means for securing the financial basis for press imports.688 In order to ensure competitive 
prices, however, negotiations over imported publications were be led not with one but with various 
publishers, while the amount of publications and their circulation numbers were to be based on the cost 
coverage and on agreed trade margins.689 While the effective organization of distribution was to based 
on the already existing infrastructure, the building of an additional separate distribution, “exclusively 
for those publications [from West Germany],” required additional handling and transportation 
capacities.690 Needed technological and organizational requirements for this undertaking were to be 
provided by the ZVA. Eventually, both distribution systems, for East and West German publications, 
were to be merged. Based on these estimates, the MPF concluded, the distribution of West German 
publications could start by February 1990.691 
On January 4, 1990, the MPF's concept was ready to be submitted to the Council of Ministers 
by the MPF minister Klaus Wolf.692 Much of the wording of the third draft had been adapted and 
remained the same, as had its core purpose: the building of an effective limited liability joint-venture 
distributor. Now, however, the minister of the MPF (not the MfK) was commissioned to negotiate with 
G+J, and other East German institutions for the building of such an enterprise. Different also, the joint 
venture was to gradually take over all export activities of publications to the FRG.693 With this clause, 
AHB Buchexport Leipzig, which had been the central institutions for import-export-questions in 
former drafts was out of the picture (see below). The proposal, thus, contained an exclusive deal 
between “the Press Distribution Office of the German Post and the publishing house Gruner + Jahr.”694 
687“selbständiger Betrieb der Deutschen Post.” Document, Grundsätze für den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der 
BRD und Berlin(West), n.d. [December 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
688Document, Grundsätze für den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin(West), n.d. [December 1989], 
BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
689Document, Grundsätze für den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin(West), n.d. [December 1989], 
p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
690“ausschließlich für diese Presseerzeugnisse.” Document, Grundsätze für den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der 
BRD und Berlin(West), n.d. [December 1989], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
691Document, Grundsätze für den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin (West), n.d. [December 1989], 
p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
692Note: As well as by Dr. Dietmar Keller (Minister of Culture), Wolfgang Meyer (Spokesman of the Government and 
Head of the Press Office ), and Hans Bentzien (Director of FS-DDR). Policy draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der 
DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], BArch
DM3/21121 (2/3).
693Policy draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
694“dem Zeitungsvertriebsamt der Deutschen Post und dem Verlagshaus Gruner & Jahr.” Policy draft IV, Vorlage für den 
Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 
4, 1990], p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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The latter was chosen because it “was the only firm guaranteeing a closed financial concept for imports
… whose basis is the sale of advertising services of institutions of the GDR.”695 This made advertising 
and a detailed advertising revenue plan the principle part of the policy proposal. Not only was any hard 
currency needed for the import and export of print media to be “generated by advertising revenue,” but 
it gave an even more detailed revenue scheme.696 First, similar to earlier proposals, FS-DDR was to 
broadcast advertising for Western companies for which it was to receive fifty (rather then forty) percent
of the net revenue. For this, it was to guarantee “the placement of all advertising orders given to the 
advertising agency.”697 While estimated annual revenue numbers remained the same (see above), G+J 
was to receive up to fifteen percent commission for its sale of ad-time in the Federal Republic, this time
Gruner + Jahr guaranteed the level of volume and revenue.698 The second source of ad revenue: the 
marketing of country-wide advertising space and billboards.699 For its set-up, the advertising agency 
received the exclusive rights and, in return, guaranteed a profit share of the respective communities and
cities. Fifty percent of all ad revenue (television as well as the marketing of advertising space) were to 
be spent for the import of West German print media that were to be sold in Mark (for the currency 
exchange ration of 1:3) at retail locations of the Post.700 
Distribution is to be expanded gradually, starting with selected national dailies and 
weeklies according to an estimated demand. The authorization for distributing these 
publications in the GDR lays with the Minister of Postal and Telecommunication in 
consultation with the government spokesperson and the head of the Office for Press and 
Information Service of the government of the GDR.701 
695“gewährleistet als einziger Anbieter ein geschlossenes Finanzierungsprojekt für den Import von Presseerzeugnissen aus 
der BRD und Berlin(West), dessen Grundlage der Verkauf von Werbeleistungen der Einrichtungen der DDR ist.” Policy
draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in
die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
696“aus den Werbeeinnahmen sowie aus dem Export von Presseerzeugnissen der DDR in die BRD und Berlin(West) (z.Z. 
ca. 3.6 Mill VM) erwirtschaftet … ” Policy draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
697Full quote: “für die Sicherung der Einordnung aller von der Werbeagentur des Vertriebsunternehmens übergebenen 
Werbeaufträge in die Programme.” Policy draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden 
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
698Policy draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
699This point had been part of the second draft of the policy proposal but was later erased. See Policy draft II, Vorlage für 
den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d., p. 3, 
BArch DC9/1052.
700Policy draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
701“Der Vertrieb ist schrittweise, beginnened mit ausgewählten überregionalen Tages- und Wochenzeitugen, bei 
annähernder Bedarfsdeckung auszubauen. Die Entscheidung über die Zulassung zum Vertrieb dieser Presseerzeugnisse 
in der DDR wird vom Minister für Post- und Fernmeldewesen in Abstimmung mit dem Regierungssprecher und Leiter 
des Presse und Informationsdienstes der Regierung der DDR getroffen.” Policy draft IV, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der
DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [January 4, 1990], p. 5, 
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Based on the gradual expansion of press imports, additional capacities for handling and transportation 
were to be created by the distribution joint venture.
Analysis
Only weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the proposed means of reforming and financing 
press distribution in the GDR were market-based revenue schemes with a strong Western partner. This 
presented a rigorous break with socialist concepts of a “free press” and must be read as an ad-hoc “low 
cost” solution to domestic demands for the free access to press and information. In particular the first 
proposal gave evidence of the complex and close relation between political and economic objectives in 
the print media sector in the GDR. 
All proposals took a universal and centralist approach, and blurred the lines between media (i.e. 
press and broadcasting), revenue and financing, production and distribution. They all approached 
media as one closed apparatus within which press imports and distribution necessarily affected all 
others. All were further based on the idea of a Western partner attaining a quasi-monopoly position on 
the territory of the GDR. And while Germerʼs critique of this position was based on his fear of the Post 
losing its exclusive rights to the same extent that the NVP received its separate responsibilities, nothing
changed substantially in the last proposal of the MPF. As in the former three of the MfK, advertising 
was the main or sole source of revenue for needed reforms and imports. The major difference: it 
offered a financing scheme that went well beyond the broadcasting of advertising; it incorporated the 
country-wide setup of billboards, the sale and management of advertising space, and the offer of an 
entire advertising service exercised exclusively within one semi-governmental body (in joint-venture 
with G+J). 
This overall prominent role of formerly almost non-existent advertising in the GDR is a curious 
one. While it can be expected that the given infrastructures and financing mechanisms of a state media 
system in a planned economy did influence certain measures proposed, they do not sufficiently explain 
what can be found in these proposals. The key to understand the latter is that all drafts were based on 
an initial business proposal provided by G+J (see Chapter 5). Adapted for policy means and amended 
with detailed political imperatives in the first proposal, continuous negotiations with the publishing 
house brought to the fore again the central role of G+J in the later drafts. The all-inclusive take on East 
German media can, therefore, also be seen as an attempt of G+J to attain the quasi-monopoly position 
of one exclusive Western partner in all media-related matters in the GDR. As will be seen later, G+J 
BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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was not the only publisher with such ambitions, nor was it the first, and when the MPF's policy 
proposal was ready to be presented to the Council of Ministers on January 4, 1990, the situation had 
changed. The MfK, the MPF and other ministries had received various offers of different publishing 
houses for reorganizing the import, distribution and sale of West German publications in the GDR. In 
the meantime, also a lively, informal exchange of print media between both German states had 
developed especially in the border regions. Given these changed circumstances and the continuous 
stream of inquiries, the MPF proposal based on the G+J being the sole West German partner fell 
through. The MPF, in its aim to maintain control over distribution, took over negotiations entirely, 
aiming at exploiting this competitive situation of various West German publishers for its own 
advantage (see Chapter 5). 
Diverging Interests of East German Institutions 
“It is vital to make use of the interests of different West German
publishing houses in a bigger market 
share in the GDR to our economic advantage. 
This requires a uniform stand.”
Ministry of Finances and Prices, December 8, 1989702
The proposals of the MfK and the MPF sparked debates within and among various ministries on
how to import West German print media. All needed to respond to changing political imperatives and 
increasing market interests in the GDR, all had their own interests at stake and their own ideas on how 
to deal with changing demands. Early examples for this: the estimates of the Ministry of Finances and 
Prices (Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise) for different import and pricing options, and 
Interwerbung's concepts on how to handle import and “the currently massive demand of Western 
companies for advertising in the GDR.”703
While the Ministry of Finances and Prices welcomed the GDR's adherence to CSCE 
agreements, it pointed to the many uncertainties on how to develop and implement needed economic 
702“Es gilt, das Interesse der verschiedenen BRD-Verlagshäuser an einem großeren DDR-Marktanteil okonomisch für uns 
zu nutzen. Das erfordert ein einheitliches Auftreten.” Letter, Standpunkt zur Preisbildung für Presseerzeugnisse aus der 
BRD und WB, Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise to Presse und Informationsdienst, Berlin, December 8, 1989, p. 1, 
BArch DC9/1052.
703“die gegenwärtig enorme Nachfrage westlicher Firmen nach Werbung in der DDR.” Document, “Zur weiteren 
Verfahrensweise auf dem Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere aus dem NSW' in der DDR,” 
Interwerbung, Berlin, December 4, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
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conditions and concrete policies. With a limited amount of foreign currency, and no capacities for 
increasing export activities (financing imports in return), the options for importing Western 
publications were: first, to somehow provide for the regular intake of foreign currency; second, to 
import publications on favorable conditions for foreign currency; third, to pay for imports with East 
German currency with all revenues remaining on domestic accounts; and fourth, the free distribution of
publications. Each option required a different model for the estimation of prices (see below).704
As with regard to issues of advertising, on December 1, 1989, the Council of Ministers 
approached Interwerbung for ideas on how to deal with offers made by foreign companies.705 
Schupbach Guzman provides the context for this inquiry. She writes that 
[w]hen the wall opened, West German advertisers jumped at the opportunity to reach the
untapped East German market. East German newspapers were flooded with advertising 
offers that by law had to be re-routed through Interwerbung. This cumbersome process 
vexed both the western advertisers and the East German publishers who were eager for 
the extra revenue. Some newspapers ignored the law and sold advertising space to 
western advertisers directly, but Interwerbung fought to hold on to its authority.706 
It did so by providing its own concept “On Further Procedures Regarding 'Advertising of Foreign 
Companies, Especially from Non-Socialist Countries' in the GDR,” which emphasized that it held the 
“exclusive rights for advertising of western companies in the GDR;” this needed to be confirmed by the
Council of Ministers to its subordinate institutions.707 While there needed to be a principle of 
liberalization regarding western advertising in the GDR (also with regard to the CSCE resolution), the 
practice of channeling all foreign advertising through its institution needed to be maintained. Only such
a monopoly over all Western advertising capacities guaranteed that the competitive markets in non-
socialist countries could be used to a GDR advantage. Newspapers, on the other hand, aiming to 
“generate revenue on their own” through advertising, had “absolutely no commercial experience.”708 
They had “no knowledge of the market, of international prices and pricing schemes, no commercial 
704Letter, Standpunk zur Preisbildung für Presseerzeugnisse aus der BRD und WB, Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise to
Presse und Informationsdienst, Berlin, December 8, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
705Letter, Schäfer, Interwerbung, to K.-Heinz Arnold, Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin, 
December 4, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
706See Schupbach Guzman, Morgan Morille. 2015. “East German Journalists and the Wende: A history on the collapse and
transformation of socialist journalism in Germany.” PhD Dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles, p. (156) 
5. Also rules of procedure, Geschäftsordnung, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, den 21.3.1990, March 21, 1990,  
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.
707“Exklusivrecht für die Werbung westlicher Firmen in der DDR.” Document, “Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf dem 
Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere aus dem NSW' in der DDR,” Interwerbung, Berlin, December 4, 
1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
708“Eigenerwirtschaftung … keinerlei kommerzielle Erfahrungen.” Document, “Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf dem 
Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere aus dem NSW' in der DDR,” Interwerbung, Berlin, December 4, 
1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
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files etc.”709 Interwerbung, in comparison, had more than thirty years of experience and, indispensable 
for any ad business, a worldwide network of agencies. With current “pressing demands for advertising 
services in the GDR,” only a monopoly on such ad imports would guarantee monopoly prices.710 
Interwerbung further underlined the high demand rooted in the so-called “first-time situation” 
(Premierensituation) in the GDR. Experiences from the Soviet Union and Mongolia from after the 
opening of their markets to advertising “prove clearly, that this initial euphoria is of short-term 
character.”711 In the medium and long run, advertising activities of western companies were going to 
“exclusively be based on real sales opportunities.”712 Thus, to avoid “the development of an internal 
competitive situation … inevitably resulting in price inflation” and to secure a long-term intake of hard 
currency, it needed the monopoly of Interwerbung.713 While according to current GDR legislation, all 
hard currency intake from advertising had to be paid “fully into the state budget,” for the future, 
Interwerbung envisioned a proportional division of revenue paid to the state and channeled to media.714 
With regard to press imports from West Germany, Interwerbung made the point that any such 
imports needed to be “be decided exclusively based on commercial considerations, since they [the 
publications] are advertising media whose market value increases with an expanding range of  
distribution.”715 Decision-making-process based on commercial considerations freed the government 
from having to make any decisions on issues of content. Thus, any import and distribution of Western 
print media needed to be based on contractual agreements between Interwerbung and each of these 
709“keine Marktkenntnis, keine Kenntnis internationaler Preise und Preisbildungsmechanismen, keiner kommerziellen 
Unterlagen usw.” Document, “Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf dem Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, 
insbesondere aus dem NSW' in der DDR,” Interwerbung, Berlin, December 4, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
710“enormen Nachfragedruck nach werblichen Leistungen in der DDR.” Document, “Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf 
dem Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere aus dem NSW' in der DDR,” Interwerbung, Berlin, December
4, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
711“beweisen eindeutig, daß diese anfängliche Euphorie kurzzeitigen Character trägt.” Document, “Zur weiteren 
Verfahrensweise auf dem Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere aus dem NSW' in der DDR,” 
Interwerbung, Berlin, December 4, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
712“ausschließlich an den realen Absatzmoglichkeiten orientieren.” Document, “Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf dem 
Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere aus dem NSW' in der DDR,” Interwerbung, Berlin, December 4, 
1989, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
713“the Herausbildung einer DDR-internen Konkurrenzsituation … was zwangsläufig einen Preisverfall zur Folge hätte.” 
Document, “Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf dem Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere aus dem 
NSW' in der DDR,” Interwerbung, Berlin, December 4, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
714“vollständig an den Staatshaushalt.” Document, “Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf dem Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer
Firmen, insbesondere aus dem NSW' in der DDR,” Interwerbung, Berlin, December 4, 1989, p. 1, p. 4, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3). 
715“ausschließlich under dem kommerziellen Aspekt zu entscheiden, daß [sic] es sich dabei um Werbeträger handelt, deren
Marktwert durch die Ausdehnung des Verbreitungsgebietes erhoht wird.” Document, “Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf
dem Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere aus dem NSW' in der DDR,” Interwerbung, Berlin, December
4, 1989, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
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“advertising vehicles” (Werbeträger).716 
While Interwerbung argued its case, its efforts were in vain. On the one hand, individual 
negotiations between East German newspapers and West German firms (in close relation with West 
German publishers) were growing strong and fast. On the other hand, they received no policy back-up. 
Forwarded for further considerations to MPF's minister Wolf in early December, the MPF (as seen 
above) had its own plans, and those came along with shifting advertising activities to an agency 
affiliated with a soon to be created distribution company.
Ministries (and Publishers) in Early December 
A day after Interwerbung sent off its concept and the same day Seiters came to East Berlin, on 
December 5, representatives of different ministries (the MfK, the MPF, the Office Press and 
Information Services etc.) met to the discuss future steps in press related matters; current political 
developments and the fast changing situation on the ground urged for immediate action.717 It was 
decided that the special permit policy (Sondergenehmigungen) for receiving publications from non-
socialist countries was to be repealed with immediate effect. Also with immediate effect, the Press and 
Information Office declared to not take any more influence on any press imports; instead, any decisions
were to be made by the MfK alone and according to financial capabilities.718 As seen above, the MPF 
soon challenged the MfK's jurisdiction in the matter by taking over negotiations on imports and 
distribution. 
Discussed during the meeting: the undermining of current legislation by publishers and 
newspapers on both sides. Some East German newspapers (and special permit holders), “lacking [their]
own resources, are letting West German publishers produce their newspapers or magazines and are 
[now] only in charge of  distributing them in the GDR.”719 They, thereby, redefined import permits in 
716Document, “Zur weiteren Verfahrensweise auf dem Gebiet 'Werbung ausländischer Firmen, insbesondere aus dem 
NSW' in der DDR,” Interwerbung, Berlin, December 4, 1989, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
717Note: Participating ministries were the Office of Customs (Zollverwaltung der DDR, Abt Zollrecht), the Ministry of 
Culture, the Department on Newspaper Imports, and the Press and Information Office. Internal note, Vermerk über eine 
Beratung des Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR am 05.12.1989, M. Wolter, Presse und 
Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 6, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
718Full quote: “keinen Einfluß mehr auszuüben beabsichtigte auf die Einfuhr von NSW-Druckerzeugnisse für 
Kontingentträger.” Internal note, Vermerk über eine Beratung des Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der 
DDR am 05.12.1989, M. Wolter, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 6, 1989, p. 
1, BArch DC9/1052.
719Full quote: “einige der derzeit 576 SG beinhalten Einfuhren von Presseerzeugnissen in einer Auflage von mehreren 
hundert bis über tausend Exemplare. Offensichtlich lassen sich die Berechtigten in Ermangelung eigener Kapazitäten 
ihre Zeitungen bzw. Zeitschriften durch westliche Verlage herstellen und übernehmen nur den Vertrieb in der DDR.” 
Internal note, Vermerk über eine Beratung des Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR am 05.12.1989, 
M. Wolter, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 6, 1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
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ways other than intended, and created cross-border economic cooperations without precedent or legal 
basis. Other West German publishers (i.e. Spiegel) were “testing customs' handling of current 
legislation or, under direct violation of foreign currency regulations, [were] animating citizens of the 
GDR to purchase subscriptions for publications from non-socialist countries.”720 Since these shipping 
methods directly infringed on questions of national sovereignty, it was proposed to ask the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to take suitable measures. 
These and other issues came up two days later, on December 7, during the “first meeting on the 
press imports and exports” at the Office for Press and Information Services.721 Representatives of 
thirteen different institutions affected by, and in charge of press-related issues were present at the 
meeting, i.e. the Ministry for Foreign Trade, the MPF, the MfK, the Center for Foreign Cultural 
Relations (MfK), AHB Buchexport, Interwerbung, Zentrag and its affiliated Berlin publishing house, 
Berliner Verlag.722 While the political imperative was clear ‒ any press imports and exports were to be 
organized according to the CSCE resolution ‒ the competing interests of the different institutions made 
it difficult to come to a solution on how to bring this about.723 It was acknowledged that “very concrete 
negotiations are currently being held with West German publishers” (see above); the overall goal was, 
therefore, to develop a joint proposal of the ministries for the Council of Ministers.724 While all 
ministries agreed that any decisions needed to be made in the general economic interest of the GDR, 
the two most important questions were: how could possible export demands be met, and where was the 
hard currency (Valuta) for imports going to come from? A conundrum, considering that one 
presupposed the other when “increased exports of East German newspapers and magazine can generate
720“die Handhabung der gegenwärtig gültigen Rechtsnormen durch den Zoll zu testen bzw. DDR-Bürger direkt unter 
Verstoß von Devisenbestimmungen zu Abonnements von NSW-Presseerzeugnissen zu animieren.” Internal note, 
Vermerk über eine Beratung des Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR am 05.12.1989, M. Wolter, 
Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 6, 1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
721“erste Beratung zur Ein- und Ausfuhr von Presseerzeugnissen.” Letter, Holzel, Berliner Verlag, to Rudi Müller, Presse 
und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 15, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. Also internal note, 
Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE AHB 
Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). Note: The following paragraphs are based on the 
protocol of the meeting itself, as well as on the follow-up communication sent to the Press and Information Service. 
722Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
723Note: This meant, no limitations on press products in import and export according to questions of content. Internal note, 
Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE AHB 
Buchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). See also letter, Mahn, AHB Buchexport, to Rudi 
Müller, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Leipzig, December 12, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. Also 
internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Buchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
724“da z.Z. bereits sehr konkrete Verhandlungen mit BRD-Verlagen geführt werden.” Letter, Standpunk zur Preisbildung 
für Presseerzeugnisse aus der BRD und WB, Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise to Presse und Informationsdienst, 
Berlin, December 8, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
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higher foreign revenue to be allocated to the import of foreign newspapers/magazines.”725 Where, 
however, was the additional paper for such exports to come from and who was going to be in charge of 
any such transactions?
While the Ministry of Foreign Trade took a conservative approach and pointed to plan tasks 
(Planaufgaben) and the jurisdictions of state planning commissions (staatliche Planungkommision) in 
negotiations with the MfK over “newspaper exchange” questions, AHB Buchexport and the Berliner 
Verlag took a different stand.726 Both emphasized the need for a “concerted and coordinated course of 
action” and “a concerted stand on all principle questions regarding [the interests of] foreign companies”
in the GDR.727 This included the assessment and pricing of (and compensation for) East German goods 
and services, and negotiations over business and financing projects in ways that allowed to determine 
the future standing of the GDR on the international and national market.728 Berliner Verlag emphasized 
the need for the “central fixing” of prices for West German publications not on a 1:1 ratio, the omission
of Sperrzeichen (see Chapter 3) for all publications, and in case “a joint venture press should develop, 
it must comply with all [East German] legal regulations and prerequisites” that were to be reformed in 
a new media law.729 AHB Buchexport was to remain the “exclusive foreign trade institution” for print 
media, a position also underlined by other institutions (i.e. the Department of Literature Distribution 
and Propaganda), and by AHB Buchexport (AHB) itself.730 The latter argued that only the bundling of 
725“Ob durch eine Steigerung des Exports von DDR- Zeitungen und Zeitschriften hohere Valutaeinnahmen für den Import 
von ausländischen Zeitungen/Zeitschriften erwirtschaftet und bereitgestellt werden konnen, muß mit dem 
entsprechenden Planteil beschlossen werden.” Statement, Betreff: Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenhandel, Dr. Schütz, 
Ministerium für Außenwirtschaft [?] to Abteilung Information und Presse, Stellungnahme zu den Vorstellungen des 
Informations- und Pressedienstes des Ministerrates, Berlin, December 13, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
726Note: According to the Ministry, the term “newspaper exchange” (“Zeitungsaustausch”) had for years had related to the 
border-crossing exchange of documents between GDR institutions (libraries etc.) and foreign institutions. It was now put
into broader, but incorrect use. Statement, Betreff: Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenhandel, Dr. Schütz, Ministerium für 
Außenwirtschaft [?] to Abteilung Information und Presse, Stellungnahme zu den Vorstellungen des Informations- und 
Pressedienstes des Ministerrates, Berlin, December 13, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
727“abgestimmtes und koordiniertes Vorgehen.” Letter, Holzel, Berliner Verlag, to Rudi Müller, Presse und 
Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 15, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052; “ein abgestimmtes 
Auftreten gegenüber ausländischen Firmen in allen grundsätzlichen Fragen.” Attachment, Anlage zum Brief an das Amt 
für Presse und Informationsdienst vom 12. Dezember 1989, attachment to letter, Mahn, AHB Buchexport, to Rudi 
Müller, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Leipzig, December 12, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
728“mit für den Außen- und Binnenmarkt zukunftsbestimmenden Charakter.” Attachment, Anlage zum Brief an das Amt 
für Presse und Informationsdienst vom 12. Dezember 1989, attachment to letter, Mahn, AHB Buchexport, to Rudi 
Müller, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Leipzig, December 12, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
729“zentrale Festlegungen … Sollten sich Gemeinschaftspresseerzeugnisse ergeben, kann das nur auf der Basis aller 
gesetzlichen Regelungen und Voraussetzungen erfolgen.” Letter, Holzel, Berliner Verlag, to Rudi Müller, Presse und 
Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 15, 1989, p. 1, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052; 
730“in der DDR alleiniges Außenhandelsunternehmen für Literatur.” Letter, Betreff: Zusätzliche Importe von 
Zeitungen/Zeitschriften aus der BRD und Westberlin, Hartwich, Abteilung Literaturverbreitung- und propganda, to Rudi
Müller, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 14, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. 
Note: The department was affiliated with the MfK in that is was located in the Ministry's subdivision and Central 
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import and export activities via AHB and specialized Grossisten in the FRG allowed for the “best 
representation of common economic interests” of all participating East German publishers.731 
“Otherwise we will need to face a unilateral increase in domestic demands and respective external 
supply pressures.”732 After the meeting, AHB took immediate measures and sent its position paper on 
the matter to the Press Office and other participants of the meeting.733
Already before December 7, AHB Buchexport had been in negotiations with a Grossist from 
the Federal Republic. At a meeting on November 29, with the executive director of the press distributor
Zeitungsvertrieb Gebrüder Petermann GmbH und CoKG, the Grossist was made the “sole partner for 
distributing East German dailies” in the FRG.734 For years, the company had worked with AHB 
Buchexport and now became the exclusive partner for exporting East German publications for retail 
sale in the FRG and Berlin (West), and for the “potential distribution of dailies from the FRG or Berlin 
(West) for retail sale in the GDR.”735 The plan was to soon adjust order numbers, to expand the product
range, to specify prices and return policies, and to put them all into binding regulations before the end 
of the year.736 
The Ministry of Foreign Trade, however, pointed to the potential issue in this. While AHB 
Buchexport was responsible for “trading (exporting and importing) newspapers and magazines on a 
commercial basis,” the ministry underlined that “[t]he political decision … whether or not a 
Administration for Publishers and Book Trade (Hauptverwaltung Verlage und Buchhandel).
731“optimale Vertretung gemeinsamer und volkswirtschaftlicher Interessen.” Attachment, Anlage zum Brief an das Amt für
Presse und Informationsdienst vom 12. Dezember 1989, attachment to letter, Mahn, AHB Buchexport, to Rudi Müller, 
Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Leipzig, December 12, 1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
732“Andernfalls sehen wir uns einseitig zunehmenden Inlandsbedarfforderungen und entsprechendem Angebotsdruck von 
außen ausgesetzt.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, 
am 7.12.1989, VE AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
733Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
734“alleiniger partner fuer lieferungen von tageszeitungen der ddr.” Telex, Export von Tageszeitungen nach der BRD und 
Berlin (west), Mahn, AHB Buchexport, to Presseamt bei Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, Stellvertreter Müller 
Zentrag Generaldirektor Würzberger, Verlag Neues Deutschland Verlagsdirektor Danek, Zeitungsvertriebsamt Direkt 
Scheibe, Berliner Zeitung Verlagsdirektor Holzel, November 30, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
735“eventuellen lieferungen von tageszeitungen fuer den freiverkauf aus der brd bzw. berlin (west) in die ddr.” Telex, 
Export von Tageszeitungen nach der BRD und Berlin (west), Mahn, AHB Buchexport, to Presseamt bei Vorsitzenden 
des Ministerrates der DDR, Stellvertreter Müller Zentrag Generaldirektor Würzberger, Verlag Neues Deutschland 
Verlagsdirektor Danek, Zeitungsvertriebsamt Direkt Scheibe, Berliner Zeitung Verlagsdirektor Holzel, November 30, 
1989, BArch DC9/1052.
736Note: As of December 12, 1989, Petermann requested a set amount of newspapers (without the right to return) for retail 
sale in the FRG and Berlin West only: 15.000 copies of Neues Deutschland (suggested retail price incl. MWS: 1.20 
DM); 5.000 copies of Berliner Zeitung (0.90 DM); 5.000 copies of BZ am Abend (0.50 DM). Telex, Export von 
Tageszeitungen nach der BRD und Berlin (west), Mahn, AHB Buchexport, to Presseamt bei Vorsitzenden des 
Ministerrates der DDR, Stellvertreter Müller Zentrag Generaldirektor Würzberger, Verlag Neues Deutschland 
Verlagsdirektor Danek, Zeitungsvertriebsamt Direkt Scheibe, Berliner Zeitung Verlagsdirektor Holzel, November 30, 
1989, BArch DC9/1052.
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newspaper/magazine can be imported legally cannot be imposed upon AHB Buchexport.”737 Such 
decisions went far beyond issues of trade and should not, underlined also by AHB, be made by a 
commercial enterprise whose sole purpose was to do business. “Decisions regarding demand and 
content need to be made where political responsibility lies or where import orders are being issued.”738 
The issue of selection for now remained unresolved and would later become the reason for great 
dispute. And though all institutions, including the MfK and Hans-Jürgen Hammer from the MPF, 
argued for AHB Buchexport to remain the central institution in matters of press imports and exports, as
was indicated above, with the “Concept of Universal Import,” AHB's future was to be one of 
irrelevance.739 Instead, the concept pushed further the interests of the MPF. Hammer outlined  at the 
meeting that “[t]he distribution monopoly of the German Post [needed] to be maintained,” and that also
“[a]ny distribution of press imports [needed] to be executed by the German Post.”740 Both goals would 
likewise be challenged soon enough.
One general concern shared by all institutions was that of prices and price fixing of West 
German publications in relation to East German currency and East German publications. The Ministry 
of Finances and Prices outlined the problem in more detail: To cover all expenses (in importing West 
German publications for foreign currency), required prices that included import costs, and the risk and 
trade margins, and this (EVP) price would be far higher than retail prices in the FRG and those of East 
German publications. On the other hand, the ministry acknowledged that West German publishers had 
already created a situation on the ground: 
737Full quote: “Der Handel (Export und Import) von Zeitungen und Zeitschriften erfolgt auf kommerzieller Basis  über den
AHB Buchexport, der dem Ministerium für Kultur untersteht … Fragen der kostenlosen Einfuhr westlicher 
Druckerzeugnisse oder gegen Mark der DDR sind vom Ministerium für Kultur zu entscheiden [Zollbestimmungen durch
Ministerium für Aussenwirtschaft] ... Dem AHB Buchexport kann jedoch nicht die politische Entscheidung auferlegt 
werden, ob eine Zeitschrift/Zeitung verfassungsrechtlich eingeführt werden kann oder nicht.” Statement, Betreff: 
Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenhandel, Dr. Schütz, Ministerium für Außenwirtschaft [?] to Abteilung Information und 
Presse, Stellungnahme zu den Vorstellungen des Informations- und Pressedienstes des Ministerrates, Berlin, December 
13, 1989, pp.1-2, BArch DC9/1052.
738“einzig als kommerzielles Unternehmen tätig, hat Geschäfte zu machen und abzuwickeln. Bedarfs- und inhaltliche 
Entscheidungen sind dort zu treffen, wo die politische Verantwortung liegt bzw. die Importaufträge erteilt werden.” 
Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
739See “Der Import von Presseerzeugnissen erfolgt ausschließlich durch den AHB Buchexport.” Position Paper, Position 
und Losungsvorschläge für den Import und den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und 
anderen Ländern des nichtsozialistischen Wirtschaftsgebietes in der DDR, attachment to letter, Hammer, Ministerium 
für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to Rudi Müller, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, 
December 13, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
740“Das Vertriebsmonopol der Deutschen Post wird aufrechterhalten. Jeglicher Vertrieb importierter Presseerzeugnisse 
erfolgt durch die Deutsche Post.” Position Paper, Position und Losungsvorschläge für den Import und den Vertrieb von 
Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen Ländern des nichtsozialistischen Wirtschaftsgebietes in der
DDR, attachment to letter, Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to Rudi Müller, Presse und 
Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 13, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
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Currently West German publishing houses offer their publications for partly lower special 
sales prices to enter the GDR market. It is to be expected that these reduced prices will 
remain for only a limited period of time. … The publishing house that provides such 
economically advantageous prices for the longest has the greatest competitive advantages 
and highest market opportunities in the GDR.741 
While this import option required less foreign currency for the GDR and covered all expenses (the EVP
would still have to be determined based on import expenses), the disadvantage was price inflation (as 
the price did not stand in relation to its production costs) and an eventual increase in prices. However, 
since the main aim of publishers currently was to acquired the greatest competitive advantage, they 
“want to offer their publications in the GDR partly even for free, i.e. via direct sales on streets and in 
public spaces, via Postal Distribution etc. … Moreover, also joint publications or supplements of East 
and West German publishers are being planned.”742 Here, prices would have to be determined 
individually by the MfK and the MPF. 
As to the option of importing West German print media for East German currency with all 
revenues remaining on special accounts (Devisenausländerkonten), the ministry objected to such plans 
and so did the MPF. Though such offers had been made by various West German publishers, and 
though Hammer admitted that this “would help solve existing supply problems at relatively short 
notice,” the resulting deflation of prices (Preisbilligung) (sales prices in Mark based on DM prices) 
made this option unfavorable.743 Further, because of the higher quality of West German publications, 
they soon “would dominate the market” in the GDR.744 The overall goal, however, was to reform and 
keep a domestic press. The Ministry of Prices concluded that “[s]ince not one but several of these 
741“Gegenwärtig bieten BRD-Verlagshäuser, um in den DDR-Markt einzusteigen, ihre Presseerzeugnisse, z.T. zu niedrigen
Sonderpreisen, an. Es ist davon auszugehen, daß diese Sonderpreise nur für einen begrenzten Zeitraum gelten. … Damit 
hat derjenige BRD-Verlag Konkurrenzvorteile und hohere Marktchancen, der am längsten für die DDR okonomisch 
günstige Sonderpreise gewährt.” Letter, Standpunkt zur Preisbildung für Presseerzeugnisse aus der BRD und WB, 
Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise to Presse und Informationsdienst, Berlin, December 8, 1989, p. 3, BArch 
DC9/1052.
742Full quote: “BRD-Verlage wollen ihre Presseerzeugnisse z.T. auch kostenlos in der DDR anbieten, z.B. direkte 
Verteilung auf Straßen und Plätzen, durch Postversand usw. … Darüber hinaus ist auch die Herausgabe gemeinsamer 
Presseerzeugnisse bzw. Beilagen von DDR- und BRD-Verlagen vorgesehen.” Letter, Standpunkt zur Preisbildung für 
Presseerzeugnisse aus der BRD und WB, Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise to Presse und Informationsdienst, Berlin, 
December 8, 1989, p. 4, BArch DC9/1052.
743“würde relativ kurzfristig anstehende Versorgungsprobleme losen helfen” Position Paper, Position und 
Losungsvorschläge für den Import und den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen 
Ländern des nichtsozialistischen Wirtschaftsgebietes in der DDR, attachment to letter, Hammer, Ministerium für Post- 
und Fernmeldewesen, to Rudi Müller, Presse und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 13, 
1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
744“marktbestimmend werden würden.” Position Paper, Position und Losungsvorschläge für den Import und den Vertrieb 
von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen Ländern des nichtsozialistischen Wirtschaftsgebietes in
der DDR, attachment to letter, Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to Rudi Müller, Presse und 
Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR, Berlin, December 13, 1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
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import options will take effect simultaneously,” administered retail prices “cannot be explained either 
by volume, layout or content but only by the varying import conditions and price formation. This 
would have to be communicated to the population of the GDR in time, for it will otherwise lead to a 
lack of understanding.”745 The ministry's statement outlined a situation that was soon to set in, when a 
complex administration of price fixing in a planned economy met early attempts of West German 
publishers to enter the market with free or low-cost publications.
And while the meeting of the ministries focused on potential media policies, two-thirds of its 
protocol was dedicated to the great amount of “offers of Western media cooperations.”746 The relevance
of these “different cooperation-, joint venture- and other special offers of Western media corporations 
to East German institutions,” cannot be overestimated, even if or precisely because they stood in 
conflict with proposed domestic measures, as they yet still “left the circle of attendees …. ʻstrongly 
impressed.ʼ”747 Some offers, in particular those of G+J and Bauer, made specific suggestions for the 
import and distribution of their own and West German publications more generally. The general idea of
both: publishers were to deliver directly to the East German Post and (possibly in coordination with the
Post) determine their own retail prices. The Post was to distribute publications within the GDR and 
receive forty-five percent of the revenues in East German Mark while the rest was to be paid onto an 
account at an East German credit institute.748 The person who presented this concept at the meeting was
Manfred Schuberth, head of the Center for Foreign Cultural Relations, and, as seen above, responsible 
for negotiating reforms of press distribution. In this capacity, he made clear during the meeting that he 
had been in contact with Bauer and G+J for some time.749 Just a week earlier,  Schuberth declared:
The talks with representatives and the management of Bauer publishers in Berlin and 
Hamburg confirmed my impression that any opening of the GDR for the Western press can 
and must also be connected to tangible, economically beneficial conditions [for the GDR]. 
745Full quote: “Da nicht eine dieser Importvarianten, sondern mehre parallel wirksam werden, führen die dargestellten 
Verfahrensweisen zu stark differenzierten EVP, die weder durch den Umfang, die Gestaltung oder den Inhalt zu erklären
sind, sondern nur durch die differenzierten Bezugsbedingungen bis hin zum Diktat des DDR-Preises. Das müßte zum 
gegebenen Zeitpunk der Bevolkerung der DDR mitgeteilt werden, weil es sonst zu Unverständnis führt.” Letter, 
Standpunk zur Preisbildung für Presseerzeugnisse aus der BRD und WB, Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise to Presse 
und Informationsdienst, Berlin, December 8, 1989, p. 4, BArch DC9/1052.
746“Angebote westlicher Medienkonzerne.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und 
Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 2-3, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
747“Zur Sprache kamen verschiedene Kooperations- Joint Venture- und Spezialangebote westlicher Medienkonzerne an 
DDR-Unternehmen, die den kreis der Angesprochenen .. 'stark beeindruckten.'” Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine 
Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, December 7, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
748Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
749Letter, Manfred Schubert, Zentrum für Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit beim Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, 
Presseamt der Regierung, November 30, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. 
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Bauer publishers – like other publishers – is willing to consent to this.750   
Now, at the meeting, he pushed this point. In favor of cooperating with West German major publishing 
houses, Schuberth emphasized that no press import and distribution would be possible without basic 
economic ground rules, and these needed to set advantages for the GDR.751 Thus, the competitive 
situation between Bauer and G+J needed to be exploited. Bauer, the participants of the meeting were 
told, “wants to kick it off with a free giveaway of 700.000 copies of a magazine,” while G+J “wants  – 
in competition with Bauer – to provide for extensive advanced investments,” and had also formed a 
“ʻGDR businessʼ project group.”752 Both publishers considered to build a national distribution joint 
venture with the East German Post, which would offer a simple solution to several material obstacles in
the distribution of press imports.753 To Schuberth, this kind of cooperation also held the potential for 
joint production of new publications, which would allow for increased imports and hard currency 
revenues (see Chapter 5).754 
 Other representatives at the meeting were more critical of such offers and the respective 
agreements made. “It becomes clear,” AHB Buchexport concluded, “that domestic publishers and 
authorities are rather helpless in the face of this full-on offensive [of West German publishers] by 
making uncoordinated commitments and arrangements without being able to rely on any legal 
principles.”755 The prime example for this was the idea “to make [additional] hard currency by placing 
Western advertisements in East German publications,” which caused serious excitement among the 
participants of the meeting. They were “almost besides themselves over the fantastic prospects to earn 
hard currency and over the different options offered by the 'big' [corporations].”756 And while ideas on 
750“In Gesprächen mit den Vertretern und der Führung des Bauer-Verlages in Berlin und Hamburg festigte sich mein 
Eindruck, daß die Öffnung der DDR für westliche Presseerzeugnisse jedweder Art auch an konkrete, okonomisch 
vorteilhafte Bedingungen geknüpft werden kann und muß. Der Bauer-Verlag ist – wie auch andere Konzerne – dazu 
bereit.” Letter, Manfred Schubert, Zentrum für Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit beim Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang 
Meyer, Presseamt der Regierung, November 30, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. 
751Letter, Manfred Schubert, Zentrum für Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit beim Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, 
Presseamt der Regierung, November 30, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. 
752Full quote: ““will als Einstieg erstmal 700 000 Expl. einer Zeitschrift verschenken … will – in Konkurrenz zu Bauer – 
umfangreiche Vorleistungen erbringen. Es wurde eine Projektgruppe 'DDR-Geschäft' gebildet.” Internal note, 
Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE AHB 
Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
753Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
754Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
755“Hierbei zeigt sich, daß inländische Verlage und Instanzen dieser Offensive relativ hilflos gegenüberstehen und 
unkoordinierte Zusagen geben, Abmachungen treffen, ohne auf rechtliche Grundlagen zurückgreifen zu konnen.” 
Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
756“durch Schaltung von westlichen Werbe-Inseraten in DDR-Z/Z Valuta zu machen … Man war formlich aus dem 
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maintaining centrally controlled imports merged with those of market-based revenue schemes, after the
meeting, it was the big publishers that continued the conversation with participants of the meeting. 
Representatives of Bauer (potentially also of other publishers) met up with some to talk in detail over 
their import and distribution concepts (see Chapter 5).757 
The outcome of the meeting: follow-up communication. To develop a proposal for the Council 
of Ministers, the individual positions of the different ministries were to be sent to the Information and 
Press Office by December 31, 1989. Too late, considering the increasingly fast-changing situation on 
the ground and developing market pressures. What remained was a long list of legal uncertainties and 
loopholes. Without a clear legislation on imports, with open questions regarding bank accounts (in East
German currency) and taxes for foreign companies, with no regulations for unsold Western 
publications in the GDR or the use of revenue made from these sales, West German publishers soon 
found individual solutions to the problems at hand. This happened in a general legal grey zone, 
undermining not least the sovereignty of the state in its foreign trade monopoly and/or internal reform 
processes.758 In short, while administrative matters in the GDR were complicated and went slow, 
individual market-driven solutions of various publishers outpaced any state concern over press matters. 
The answers to both initial questions – how could possible export demands be met, and where was the 
hard currency for imports going to come from – were the same. Both required additional resources and 
hard currency, and needed to be decided on a government level. 
Analysis
East German officials were well aware of the importance of making available West German 
print media to the East German population. They, thus, needed to respond to changing political 
imperatives and find ad-hoc solutions to offers made by West German publishers. These unprecedented
shifts came along with uncertainties on all levels of import, distribution and sale of a “Western press” 
that had previously been highly regulated. Open questions related to the pricing and the distribution of 
publications, the potential role of advertising, the legal basis for German-German cooperations, and the
financial resources to allow for any such reforms. While publishers in the FRG acted individually and 
approached the GDR government for ad-hoc solutions, in the GDR, these issues were closely 
Häuschen über die phantastischen Moglichkeiten, an Valuta zu kommen und was die 'Großen' alles bieten.” Internal 
note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE AHB 
Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
757Zusätzliche Hinweise zum Vermerk über Gespräch mit Bauer-Verlag, MPF, December 7, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 
(2/3).
758Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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interconnected for they were centrally controlled. 
And while the Modrow government was aware of the urgency of popular demand, it was also 
aware of the possible repercussion an influx of West German publications might have for the domestic 
press. While some pushed the idea that market competition needed to be used to the advantage of the 
GDR, and that West German publications might add to but not replace domestic products, others urged
that East German newspapers were in the midst of internal reform processes and had to change from 
within. The political imperative, however, was clear: the import of print media was not to be limited 
and/or impeded. And while existing structures, such as the exclusive role of AHB Buchexport in any 
import/export related issues, were to be maintained, early inquiries of West German interests groups 
and their lobbying efforts also influenced ideas on how to handle matters differently. 
How detailed concepts of West German publishers were, may be illustrated by Burda's concept 
“on what conditions can we distribute and sell our publications in the GDR?,” sent to Hammer at the 
MPF in early January. This two-page document contained a list of Burda publications issued for sale, 
as well as price suggestions in Mark, ideas on distribution channels and questions regarding the 
possibility of advertising.759 
Burda made clear: “In principle, we are interested in offering all of our publications in the GDR
… Regarding the trade margin, the aim should be sales prices similar to those in the FRG.”760 These  
points were highlighted by hand, presumably by Hammer, indicating their importance. Burda further 
suggested three sales channels: First, a direct subscription service for its products delivered from West 
Germany. For this, “we expect an on-time and seamless delivery of gift subscriptions from the FRG to 
GDR citizens.”761 Second, retail sale. Due to the lack of sufficient newspaper stands in the GDR, it 
759Document, Zu welchen Bedingungen konnen wir [Burda] unsere Titel in der DDR anbieten bzw. vertreiben, Attachment
to letter, Wolfgang Vogel, Rechtsanwalt, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, MFP, Berlin, January 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3).
760“Grundsätzlich haben wie ein Interesse, alle unsere Titel in der DDR anzubieten … Was die Handelsspanne angeht, so 
ist anzustreben, ähnliche Abgabepreise wie in der BRD zu erzielen.” Document, Zu welchen Bedingungen konnen wir 
[Burda] unsere Titel in der DDR anbieten bzw. vertreiben, p. 1, Attachment to letter, Wolfgang Vogel, Rechtsanwalt, to 
Hans-Jürgen Hammer, MFP, Berlin, January 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Note: This meant that Burda Inc. aimed 
at distributing its thirteen weekly magazines (i.e. Bunte, Bild+Funk, Freundin), as well as its monthly puzzle books, 
while Aenne Burda was interested in selling its four monthly magazine (i.e. Burda Moden, Verena) in addition to three 
other fashion magazines. Prices were to range from five GDR Mark for Bunte and Freundin to two GDR Mark for 
Freizeit Revue. The TV guide Bild+Funk was to cost three Mark. Burda suggested that at coming meetings, it needed to 
be clarified in what currency billing was to take place, and whether or not prices in GDR Mark had to be put onto the 
front of the publications.
761“Wir erwarten die termingerechte und lückenlose Zustellung der aus der Bundesrepublik gelieferten 
Geschenkabonnements an DDR-Bürger.” Document, Zu welchen Bedingungen konnen wir [Burda] unsere Titel in der 
DDR anbieten bzw. vertreiben, p. 2, Attachment to letter, Wolfgang Vogel, Rechtsanwalt, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, 
MFP, Berlin, January 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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needed street vendors to “guarantee a broader supply.”762 As to the third, distribution channels, Burda 
envisioned the “installing of a network of agencies.”763 Because current limitations lay mainly in the 
low capacity of Postal Distribution, Burda aimed at establishing its own infrastructure: “We aspire to 
establish a so-called agency network. Magazines will be supplied centrally from the FRG directly to 
individual cities and agencies ... They [magazines] will be distributed to the households (subscribers) 
via a carrier network. Bills will be collected by the agency.”764 Not surprisingly, this part was again 
highlighted by Hammer. These concrete and market-driven steps appealed to the MPF but also other 
ministries that aimed for expanding infrastructures that were static in their interdependencies.
Advertising serves as another example here: Centrally controlled and regulated in the GDR, 
West German companies approached newspapers individually for advertising capacities early on. Eager
for additional revenue, newspapers circumvented current regulations. This set in motion a chain of 
structural shifts, partly because policies needed to respond to matters at hand, but more so, because also
to policy makers these revenue schemes promised an easy-fix to problems that had defined press 
matters in the GDR for too long, namely the lack of financial resources. The assumption in all this, 
however, always was a reciprocal press exchange between both states.
AHB, on its part, asked “how far the willingness of the GDR for additional imports of 
newspapers and magazines can be connected to demands for such imports of publications of the GDR 
into the West (Grossisten, media corporations).”765 This question would be addressed only a few days 
later during the meeting of Modrow and Kohl in Dresden on December 19 (see Chapter 3). While a 
mutual press exchange between both German states was agreed upon during this meeting, the specifics 
to this question remained in the open. AHB suggested that West German media corporations, interested
in selling their publications in the GDR, could promote East German publications and, thereby, help 
762“zur Sicherstellung eines erweiterten Angebotes.” Document, Zu welchen Bedingungen konnen wir [Burda] unsere Titel
in der DDR anbieten bzw. vertreiben, p. 2, Attachment to letter, Wolfgang Vogel, Rechtsanwalt, to Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, MFP, Berlin, January 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
763“Installation eines Agenturnetzes.” Document, Zu welchen Bedingungen konnen wir [Burda] unsere Titel in der DDR 
anbieten bzw. vertreiben, p. 2, Attachment to letter, Wolfgang Vogel, Rechtsanwalt, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, MFP, 
Berlin, January 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
764“Wir streben die Errichtung eines sogenannten Agentursystems an. Die Belieferung mit den Zeitschriften erfolgt direkt 
aus der BRD zentral in einzelne Städte an dort zu gründende Agenturen. Sie werden über ein Trägernetz an die 
Haushalte (Abonnenten) verteilt. Das Inkasso erfolgt über die Agentur.” Document, Zu welchen Bedingungen konnen 
wir [Burda] unsere Titel in der DDR anbieten bzw. vertreiben, p. 2, Attachment to letter, Wolfgang Vogel, 
Rechtsanwalt, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, MFP, Berlin, January 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
765“inwiefern zusätzliche Abnahmebereitschaft der DDR-Seite für Z/Z mit der Forderung nach zusätzlicher 
Abnahmebereitschaft der westlichen Seite (Grossisten, Medienkonzerne) für lieferbare Verlagserzeugnisse der DDR 
verknüpft werden kann.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, 
Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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increase export numbers.766 This reasoning ignored issues of supply and demand on the saturated West 
German press market as well as the limited marketability of East German publications in the FRG, and 
no such “exchange” ever came to fruition. While there were a few sporadic, local and unstructured 
attempts of East German newspapers to attract a West German readership, they are worth mentioning 
only to illustrate the gap in systematic approach and in the conditions that would have allowed for an 
even remotely competitive chance. 
The Take-Over of West German Publications 
 “The VDZ and the publishers under its trusteeship bear the
responsibility to protect the continued existence of East German
publishers, particularly during the starting phase of market
economy principles. Unrestrained competition in a country that
does yet not have available any protective 
measures must trigger devastating consequences.”
Wolfgang Fürstner, Association of German Magazine Publishers
(VDZ), March 23, 1990767
By late January 1990, several West German publications were locally distributed in the GDR. 
Especially in the border regions, individual agreements were made between publishers and municipal 
institutions and/or politicians. This “semi-legal” and “experimental move” of publishers into the GDR 
and of local authorities in it established local practices and structures that, once in place, were hard to 
change. 768 For instance, by January 1990, the postal directors of the municipalities of Rostock and 
Schwerin and the publisher of Lübecker Nachrichten had agreed on the distribution of the paper for a 
financial compensation. In addition, Lübecker Nachrichten was planning on distributing 8.000 free 
daily copies to the Post Office in Schwerin.769 Custom authorities generally had little idea or guidelines 
on how to deal with the uncertain legal situation. When 1.500 copies of the Niedersächsiches Tageblatt
766Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
767“Die VDZ und die von ihm getragenen Verlage stehen in der Verantwortung, gerade am Anfang einer 
marktwirtschaftlichen Orientierung den Bestand der DDR Verlage zu schützen. Ungezügelter Wettbewerb in einem 
Land, das nicht nicht über schutzgebietende Rahmenbedingungen verfügt, muß vernichtende Wirkungen auslosen.” 
Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.54, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07924. 
768“halblegal … Testballon.” Die Bunte Republik holt die DDR heim, Heinrich Thee, taz (Hamburg), 3/30/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07949.
769Letter, Niehoff, Zollverwaltung der DDR, Hauptverwaltung, to Gemer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 
Berlin, January 26, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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(Lüneburg) were delivered to the East German border town of Boizenburg, the border customs office 
was informed that an agreement had been made between the mayor of Boizenburg and the publisher. 
From this day on, a daily delivery of 1.500 copies ready for free distribution arrived in Boizenburg.770 
While the Press and Information Office of the GDR had been informed, all that was left to do for 
customs was to declare that these publications, “under the circumstances invoked, are being checked 
for import without inspection.”771
At the Round Table (RT) meeting on February 12, MPF minister Wolf stated that such local 
imports into different border regions were generally being tolerated by East German officials as “one-
time deliveries, one-time sales offers,” even though there was no legislative framework in place.772 
Konrad Weiß, an artist and filmmaker who had been a central figure in the civic movement and was 
part of the RT working group on media, pointed to other cross-border activities  between West German 
publishers and East German officials.773 His particular example: Springer. Not only were, according to 
an agreement made between the MPF and the four major publishing houses, 100.000 copies of 
Springer's Bild to be imported into the GDR (see Chapter 5), but, a week earlier, Springer had also 
assembled the majority of its sales representatives 
to train them for their mission in the GDR. Truck loads of Bild and Welt, Hörzu and 
Funk Uhr are to be carried to [the East German towns of] Schwerin, Leipzig and 
Dresden. Meanwhile teams of canvassers are going from door to door to sell 
subscriptions for all sorts of publications. There is no legal footing for this.774 
On March 5, 1990, the major publishers started to directly supply about 3.300 sales points across the 
country (i.e. shops, supermarkets and private newsstands) with mainly their own publications (see 
Chapter 5).775 Aiming to close legislative gaps, on March 9, the Council of Ministers passed a 
resolution that allowed for the sale of print media from West Germany, West Berlin and other Western 
countries via Postal Distribution. It also introduced a registration requirement for West German 
770Letter, Niehoff, Zollverwaltung der DDR, Hauptverwaltung, to Gemer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 
Berlin, January 26, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
771“werden unter den geltend gemachten Umständen regungslos zur Einfuhr abgefertigt.” Letter, Niehoff, Zollverwaltung 
der DDR, Hauptverwaltung, to Gemer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 26, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
772“einmaligen Lieferungen, einmaligen Verkaufaktionen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, pp. 7-8, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
773Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
774“um sie für den Einsatz in der DDR zu schulen. Lastenweise sollen Bild und Welt, Hörzu und Funk Uhr nach Schwerin, 
Leipzig und Dresden gekarrt werden. Inzwischen gehen Werbekolonnen in der DDR von Tür zu Tür, um Abonnenten 
für alle moglichen Verlagsobjekte zu werben. Eine rechtliche Grundlage aber gibt es dafür nicht.” Protocol, Protokoll 
Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
775Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.52, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
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publications to keep track on the number of print media circulating in the GDR (see Chapter 5). 
According to a thirty-two-page document issued in April 1990, by April 9, there were twenty-three 
West German dailies and forty-two weeklies registered and sold in the GDR.776 Among them, major 
national dailies such as Bild and FAZ, but also local papers, such as Frankfurter Rundschau and 
Hamburger Abendblatt, as well as Turkish language papers, such as Tercüman and Türkiye. Springer 
topped the list with a registered total of thirteen publications. With the exception of three, all 
publications were distributed by Postal Distribution and/or the publishers' own distribution networks 
(Eigenvertrieb).777 
In addition, between March 12 and April 9, a total of 230 magazines from the Federal Republic 
were registered for distribution in the GDR. Axel Springer was the first to register its three publications
of a total of sixteen between March 12 to March 14, Jahreszeiten registered all of its fifteen 
publications on March 16 (a total of twenty-two registrations), while the big wave came on March 20, 
with a total of ninety registrations including those of all major publishers (G+J registered nineteen, 
Burda twelve, and Bauer twenty-one). On March 21 alone, there were a total of forty-eight 
registrations, and on March 22, twenty.778 
By the second quarter of 1990, West German publishers distributed about 1.5 million dailies, 
and 4.3 million (mostly weekly) general interest magazines.779 In particular the magazine sector, 
however, was defined by an East-West disparity. According to a study of the West German magazine 
Wirtschaftswoche, by the summer of 1990, only fifty-two domestic magazines with an overall 
circulation of 20.2 million copies were still being published. In comparison, a total of 529 West 
German publications with an overall circulation of 113.7 million copies were being distributed in the 
GDR.780 G+J alone sold ten of its publications by May 1990; among them, according to spokes person 
Christoph Keese, its flagship products, such as the news magazine Stern and the women's magazine 
Brigitte but also Prima and Sandra. About 60.000 copies per week were shipped across the border.781 
When confronted with allegations of “flooding” the GDR, G+J CEO Gerd Schulte-Hillen responded by
776Table, Registrierung der Zeitungen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) für den Vertrieb in der DDR, n.d., BArch 
DC9/1052.
777Table, Registrierung der Zeitungen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) für den Vertrieb in der DDR, n.d., BArch 
DC9/1052.
778Table, Registrierung von BRD-Zeitschriften für den Vertrieb in der DDR, n.d., BArch DC9/1052.
779Note: This referred exclusively to their own lines of publications. Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt 
der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050.
780Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050.
781Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp. 50-54, p. 53, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
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stating there was “no flooding of West German publications,” and he was joined by Burda managing 
director Horst Hilbertz.782 Publizistik und Kunst, on the other hand, pointed to un unrestrained 
competition that had set in on the East German market. Admitting the words of Wolfgang Fürstner 
against such competition (see above) to have been noble, they were nothing more but good intentions. 
In reality, they had soon been forgotten and by now had turned into their opposite.783 
Market Strategies 
The commercial success of West German publications in the GDR was remarkable. Andreas 
Ruppert, representative of G+J, stated, not without pride, that West German cut-price publications sold 
“like hot cakes.”784 Eva Kohlrusch, representative of Springer, explained that the cheaper a magazine 
was made, the better it sold in the GDR. The masses, yet an eager and uncritical readership, were easily
taken.785 Springer spokesperson Heiner Bremer, put it slightly different in claiming that inexpensive 
publications “possessing an innovatory value” had the biggest chances of success on the current East 
German market.786 This included tabloids and TV magazines, less so informative publications and 
costly magazines. Bremer suspected a sort of “reversed propaganda effect;” after years of official 
badmouthing of the tabloid press, East Germans now wanted to read them themselves.787 Thus, the plan
in May 1990, was to establish regional editions of Bild analogous to the East German regional (state) 
boundaries.788 
And while sales figures proved the representatives of G+J and Springer right, they omitted other
conditions that had come along with and/or enabled this success. Contributing factor, as had been lined 
out by all three representatives above, was competitive prices. Their consequences for publishers in the 
782“Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” 
medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990,private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. “Geschäftsführer Hilberz: Alleingang ist 
Übergangslosung. Burda beliefert 850 DDR-Händler,” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 13, 1990; also “Fünf-Punkte 
Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell,
No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.     
783“BRD-Presse überflutet den DDR-Zeitungsmarkt.” Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik 
und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
784“wie warme Semmeln.” Andreas Ruppert, representative of Gruner + Jahr at the discussion round titled “Media 
development and media research in the GDR” (“Medienentwicklung und Medienforschung in der DDR”) in Salzburg, 
Austria in May 1990.  Cited in ADN, Medienexperte: DDR-Medienmarkt ist aufgeteilt – Interesse an regionalen 
Zeitungen, press release, 5/29/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08159.
785Cited from Aschenputtel auf dem Ball. Journalistinnen aus Ost und West diskutieren über Umbruch der 
Medienlandschaft und ihre eigene Zukunft, die tageszeitung, Ulrike Helwerth, April 24, 1990, DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
786“von ihrer Machart her einen Neuigkeitswert besitzen.” Cited in Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, 
Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.53, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
787“umgekehrter Propagandaeffekt.” Cited in Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 
5/90, pp.50-54, p.54, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07924. 
788Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.54, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07924. 
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GDR were not denied by their Western counterparts. In early April 1990, Burda top-manager Gerd 
Bolls made clear, the grace period for East German magazines was over. Acknowledging that the 
competition of West German publishers put under threat the existence of many magazines in the East, 
Bolls agreed, “it was a shame” but “[e]ven if we wanted to … we could not hold back.”789 This mainly 
referred to price dumping strategies that were being applied by all major publishing houses on the East 
German market.  
The Price War 
“Astonished East German citizens may now watch, live 
and in color, the beginnings of a market economy in 
the GDR: the major and small publishing houses 
are fighting a fierce price war on a new market.”
Dpa press release, n.d [March 1990].790
When discussing the import of West German publications, East German interests groups 
generally aligned on the price-fixing demand based on a 1:3 ratio reflecting the currency exchange rate 
between Mark and Deutschmark (see above). It was to allow for a somewhat fair price competition and 
gave some protection to East German publishers. Accordingly, in early negotiations between the MPF 
and the four major publishers, the latter had agreed to this demand. On January 23, G+J CEO Schulte-
Hillen emphasized that all four publishers were to sell their products “for three times of the [original] 
price in M [Mark].”791 This happened in the context of negotiating the building of a new press 
distribution joint venture that was to start operating in early March (see Chapter 5). The fixed-price 
ratio was to be valid until a functioning market and a solid distribution system were established, and all
negotiations were based on this stipulation.792 
With joint venture negotiations falling through, the price deal also lasted for only about two 
weeks. “It went really fast in the newspaper sector,” Heiner Bremer stated, in particular in the border 
789“Schade sei das … Selbst wenn wir wollten … wir konnten uns gar nicht zurückhalten.” Cited in Wie die Fliege im 
Netz, Der Spiegel, 14/90, p. 135, p. 136.
790“Die staunenden DDR-Bürger dürfen jetzt als Zuschauer den Beginn der Marktwirtschaft in der DDR live und in Farbe 
verfolgen: Die großen und kleinen Verlagsunternehmen liefern sich auf dem neuen Markt einen heftigen Preiskrieg.” 
Press release, dpa, Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage liefern sich Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], 
BArch DC9/1052.
791“zum 3 fachen Preis in M.“ In Handwritten note Viehof, “Beratung mit BRD-Verlagen,“ January 23, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
792Handwritten note Niehof, “Beratung mit BRD-Verlagen,“ January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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regions where the competition between daily newspapers was particularly strong and prices soon 
deflated.793 The “initial spark for a rigorous price war,” was given when the publishers Burda and Gong
in cooperation with the East German printing facility Druckhaus Thüringen started to sell the new TV 
guide Super TV for 1.70 Mark (East), that is on a 1:1 ratio.794 Within weeks, the circulation of Super TV
was pushed from 400.000 to 1.5 million copies, the entire price scheme fell apart and set off a “price 
war” without precedent.795 On March 20, Bauer followed and sold its TV-guides Fernsehwoche, TV 
Hören und Sehen and Auf einen Blick for their DM retail prices in Mark. Soon after, Springer lowered 
its price for Hörzu from originally 6 to 2 Mark, Funk-Uhr (1.5 Mark) and Bildwoche (1.4 Mark).796 By 
May, “a total of seven West German TV guides, ranging in price from 1.40 to 2 Mark, compete[d] for 
the interest of East German citizens, all of them on a 1:1 price ratio.”797 Kunst und Publizistik predicted 
a trickle-down effect to a general decrease of prices, and the magazine was right.798 The highly 
competitive TV-guide market just set the precedent and was soon followed by a lowering of prices for 
the entire product ranges.
Gruner + Jahr soon sold its leading women's magazine Brigitte for its DM retail price in Mark, 
followed by the competing Für Sie of the medium-sized publisher Jahreszeiten. According to 
Jahreszeiten spokesperson Stefan Teschke, the publisher, in fact, had never bothered to sell some of its 
other publications for anything higher than a 1:1 ratio, such as the magazine Merian that stood in direct
competition with G+J's Geo.799 By May, all West German publications were sold based on a 1:1 price 
ratio, and the revenue was put onto GDR accounts.800 Dpa concluded: “The developments on the press 
market of the GDR can, thus, find their place in market economy textbooks: a price-fixing cartel 
793“Bei den Zeitungen ging es ganz schnell.” dpa, Pressemitteilung, Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage liefern sich 
Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], BArch DC9/1052.
794“Initialzündung für einen heftigen Preiskrieg.” Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und 
Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.54, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07924. Note: Other sources speak of 1,40 GDR 
Mark, see: Wie die Fliege im Netz, Der Spiegel, 14/90. 
795Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 7, BArch DC9/1050. Also Wie die Fliege im Netz, Der Spiegel, 14/90.
796Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 7, BArch DC9/1050.
797Full quote: “So wetteiferten nunmehr sieben westliche TV-Gazetten in der Preisklasse von 1,40 bis 2 Mark um die 
Gunst der DDR-Bürger, allesamt zum Kurs von 1:1.” Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik 
und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.54, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07924. 
798Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.54, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07924. 
799dpa, Pressemitteilung, Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage liefern sich Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], 
BArch DC9/1052.
800Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-
17, p. 7, BArch DC9/1050.
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collapsed because one [publisher] aimed for an advantage on the market.”801 All publishers, the taz 
pointed out, made use of “a legal vacuum offered by a weak state that was incapable of acting.”802 
This war through aggressive price strategies was exclusively fought between and among West 
German publishers aiming to secure market advantages. Little to no consideration was given to East 
German publishers or to the consequences these dumping price strategies would have for a developing 
and transitioning press. Effectively, a 1:1 sale meant the undercutting of prices or, as Müller put it, 
“undervalued prices” (Unterpreis) that covered neither production nor transfer costs, which led to a 
“distortion of competition” (Wettbewerbsverzerrung).803 This “uncontrolled pricing,” with publications 
being sold “for one-third of the West German retail price,” Wolfgang Fürstner urged, was disastrous 
for East German publishers and ruined newspapers in the GDR.804 Its reason was a competitive 
advantage over future readership shares. 
What followed was a blame game. Springer's Heiner Bremer underlined, “[a]t Springer we 
emphasize that [we] did not start this competition … We cannot but act in line with the market.”805 
Burda, on the other hand, accused Bauer and Springer of having started the price war at the expense of 
the GDR and its publishers.806 The major publishers jointly pointed at smaller publishers. “The 
deviation from the 1:3 principle,” they claimed later, “had been initiated by the those smaller publishers
that, after that the agreement of the four major publishers and Postal Distribution, aimed to play the 
guardian of press freedom and of the interests of East German newspapers.”807 Ralf Bachmann, in a 
response to such a joined statement, declared in March, that their blaming it on a few smaller and 
801“Die Entwicklung auf dem DDR-Pressemarkt kann so in die Lehrbücher der Marktwirtschaft Eingang finden: Ein 
Preiskartell ist zusammengebrochen, weil einer sich Vorteile am Markt verschaffen wollte.” dpa, Pressemitteilung, 
Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage liefern sich Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], BArch DC9/1052.
802“rechtsfreien Raum, den der handlungsunfähige Staat bot.” Die Bunte Republik holt die DDR heim, Heinrich Thee, taz 
(Hamburg), 3/30/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07949.
803Cited in Neue Vertriebsverordnung wirkt auch keine Wunder, Berliner Zeitung, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 
35a-b, DSC07780. Cited in Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, DDR-Presse: Schlacht verloren, 
Rückzugsgefechte eingeleitet, Thomas Kunze, press release, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07775.
804“Der Wildwuchs in der Preisgestaltung … insbesondere der Verkauf westdeutscher Presse im Währungsverhältnis 1:1, 
was etwas einem Drittel des westdeutschen Verkaufspreises entspricht.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine 
Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
805“Bei Springer legt man Wert auf die Feststellung, die Auseinandersetzung nicht begonnen zu haben … Wir konnen uns 
nicht anders als marktgerecht verhalten.” Cited in dpa, Pressemitteilung, Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage liefern
sich Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], BArch DC9/1052.
806dpa, Pressemitteilung, Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage liefern sich Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], 
BArch DC9/1052.
807“Die Abweichung vom 1:3-Prinzip sei von jenen kleinen Verlagen ausgegangen, die sich nach der Vereinbarung 
zwischen den vier Großverlagen und dem Postzeitungsvertrieb der DDR als Hüter der Pressefreiheit und der Interessen 
der DDR-Zeitungen aufgespielt hatten.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, 
p. 3, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
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medium-sized publishers did not make price dumping strategies any more acceptable.808 Springer's Die 
Welt concluded that any distortion (Mißstand) that might have resulted from the sale of West German 
publications in the GDR had “surely not been the intention of the major publishing houses.”809 
Likewise, G+J spokesperson Christoph Keese expressed regrets “that this development can put GDR 
publishers into danger,” while Jahreszeiten's Stefan Teschke, took a different stand; he underlined that 
East German publishers would “certainly not be saved by price-fixing agreements.”810 
Teschke was more concerned with the market strategies of the major publishers in relation to 
medium-sized West German publishers, and he demanded: “The major [publishers] must talk to us!”811 
Why? Entirely for reason of competition between medium-sized and major West German publishers in 
the GDR (see Chapter 5). Teschke's self-referencing demand, thus, stood exemplary not only for the 
little consideration that was given to the East German press but also for the market dynamics between 
different West German interests groups. Small and medium-sized publishers feared that the major 
houses would again expand their domineering market positions onto East Germany. This related to the 
sale of publications, to distribution as well as to joint venture cooperations.812 The undercutting of 
prices, thus, simply was a different battle in the same war. 
And while Springer spokesperson Heiner Bremer pointed out that “playing the altruist and 
staying with 1:3 would have surely resulted in charges of stupidity laid against us,” G+J CEO Gerd 
Schulte-Hillen redefined the matter.813 He reasoned that, in fact, the 1:1 sale “accommodates greatly the
needs of the citizens to to get … up-to-date and inexpensive information.”814 Wolfgang Fürstner, 
generally in line with the major publishers, took a different stand, not simply over price issues but over 
the fundamental question of how to handle the development of a new press market. Already in March 
1990, he had urged:
808Press release, Erklärung, Bachmann, n.d. [March 1990],p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
809“sicherlich ungewollt von den Großverlagen.” DDR schränkt Freiheit der Presse wieder ein, Dieter Dose, Die Welt, 
5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07778.
810“Wir bedauern, daß durch diese Entwicklung DDR-Verlage in Gefahr geraten konnen … werden mit Sicherheit nicht 
durch Preisabsprachen westdeutscher Verlage gerettet.” dpa, Pressemitteilung, Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage 
liefern sich Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], BArch DC9/1052.
811“Die Großen müssen endlich mit uns reden!” dpa, Pressemitteilung, Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage liefern sich
Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], BArch DC9/1052.
812dpa, Pressemitteilung, Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage liefern sich Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], 
BArch DC9/1052.
813“Den Altruisten zu spielen und bei 1:3 zu bleiben, hätte uns mit Sicherheit den Vorwurf der Dummheit eingetragen.” 
dpa, Pressemitteilung, Eckart Gienke, Bundesdeutsche Verlage liefern sich Preiskrieg in der DDR, n.d. [March 1990], 
BArch DC9/1052.
814“kommt den Bedürfnissen der Bürger, sich aktuell und preisgünstig … zu informieren, sehr entgegen.” “Fünf-Punkte 
Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell,
No. 12, March 19, 1990,private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
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With the greatest sympathy for the necessity to help the breakthrough of a free flow of 
information and opinions through the presence of the West German press in the GDR, it 
currently requires care and consideration for the newspaper and magazines publishers in 
the GDR who are in the midst of transitional change. Unrestrained competition 
inevitably drives East German publishers to the wall.815 
“No one is being driven to the wall” and no one aimed to do so, was the response of Roman Koster, PR
head of Bauer.816 Quite the contrary. The matter of fact was: newspapers in the GDR had been highly 
subsidized, that was over, and “[n]ow they need to try to cover their costs via sales and advertising 
revenue.”817 Realists in the GDR, “those who see the situation in realistic way,” knew that their own 
publications “can, in no way, compete with West German products.”818 This related to quality standards
in print, paper, advertising and distribution, “I do not even want to talk about the notorious lack of 
paper.”819 Considering these obstacles, Koster had every sympathy for the concerns East German 
officials but there was little to be done. 
East German Papers and Institutions on the Price War
“[A]fter decades of SED tutelage, there is now an obvious danger
of tutelage by long-established [West German] media
monopolies, as we can witness in the unrestrained sale of West
German newspapers and magazines in the GDR.”
Dr. Wolfgang Kleinwächter, member of the MKR,
April 19, 1990820
815“Bei allem Verständnis für die Notwendigkeit, dem freien Fluß von Informationen und Meinungen durch die Präsenz 
westdeutscher Presse in der DDR zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen, bedarf es in der gegenwärtigen Phase der Behutsamkeit
und Rücksichtnahme auf die in der Umstellung begriffenen Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlage der DDR. Ungehemmter 
Wettbewerb muß zwangsläufig dazu führen, daß die DDR Verlage an die Wand gedrückt werden.” “'Die Worte veralten 
im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 
11-14, p. 14, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
816“Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt.” “NDR-Interview mit Bauer-PR-Chef Roman Koster 'Niemand wird an die 
Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
817“Nun müssen sie versuchen durch Vertriebs- und Anzeigenerlose kostendeckend zu arbeiten.” “NDR-Interview mit 
Bauer-PR-Chef Roman Koster 'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private 
archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
818“jene, die ganz sachlich die Lage sehen … in keiner Weise mit dem Wettbewerb mit westdeutschen Produkten 
standhalten konnen.” “NDR-Interview mit Bauer-PR-Chef Roman Koster 'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” 
medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
819“Vom notorischen Papiermangel will ich gar nicht reden.” “NDR-Interview mit Bauer-PR-Chef Roman Koster 
'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
820“In der Tat droht offensichtlich nach der jahrzehntelangen Bevormundung durch den SED nun eine Bevormundung 
durch die alteingesessenen Medienmonopole, wie der ungeordnete Vertrieb westlicher Zeitungen und Zeitschriften in 
der DDR zeigt.” Mit beschränkten Vollmachten. Gespräch mit dem Mitglied des Medienkontrollrates Prof. 
Kleinwächter, BZ, 4/19/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07836. 
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East German interest groups reacted strongly against the price dumping strategies. The 
executive board of the Association of Journalists of the GDR (Verband der Journalisten der DDR) 
(VJD) spoke of a “neo-colonial appropriation of the East German media market by West German major
publishers,” which endangered “the just-won press freedom.”821 Also Neues Deutschland claimed that 
major publishers were making “use of the executive vacuum by colonizing the East German market 
with dumping prices;” the Berliner Allgemeine underlined that, while press freedom included the 
competition of all papers, including West German ones, “yet, statute and law, morality and decency … 
must not be thrown over board.”822 All of publishers asked for government interventions and regulation 
of sales. The taz, however, doubted that an “Alliance led government” would want to deal with the 
situation on the ground, and, thus, expected little resistance.823 Instead, it claimed that the strategy of 
Gong and Burda had simply been a “detour” or good enough excuse; now, exactly one week before 
subsidies for the East German publishers were ending, and newspapers had to raise their prices, “[c]ut-
throat competition seems to have turned into a campaign of destruction, which likely only few East 
German newspapers and magazines will be able to withstand.”824 Gottfried Müller, on the other hand, 
opposed such terms as a “campaign of destruction” (Vernichtungsfeldzug) that was supposedly being 
led by West German major publishing houses. Instead, he looked at it as a sugar-coated flood of 
publications that “keeps on welling and welling from the pots of the publishers,” or an “uncontrolled 
growth” (Wildwuchs).825 Regardless the term, the consequences for East German publishers remained 
the same and government interventions remained absent. Instead, the vice president of the Office of 
Competition Protection Reinhold Wutzke, admitting to “unfair competition” practices, concluded that 
in the end, it was up to the “profiling of East German publications” to succeed on the market.826 
821“neokolonialistische Aufteilung des DDR-Medienmarktes durch BRD-Großverlage … die gerade erst errungene 
Pressefreiheit.” ADN, Pressemitteilung, VJD protestiert gegen Aufteilung des DDR-Medienmarktes, March 22, 1990, 
BArch DC9/1052.
822Full quote: “nachdem Großverlage seit Wochen in einem exekutiven Vakuum der DDR-Markt teilweise mit 
Dumpingpreisen zu kolonisieren versuchen.” Gegen Wildwuchs, Michael Müller, Neues Deutschland, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07795. “Doch Recht und Gesetz, Moral und Anstand … dürfen dabei nicht über Bord 
gehen.” Die gleiche Chance?, Berliner Allgemeine, Bodo Rehboldt, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07754. 
823“Allianz-geführte Regierung.” Die Bunte Republik holt die DDR heim, Heinrich Thee, taz (Hamburg), 3/30/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07949.
824“Umweg … Aus dem Verdrängungswettbewerb scheint ein Vernichtungsfeldzug zu werden, dem wohl nur wenige der 
DDR-Zeitungen und -Zeitschriften widerstehen konnen.” Die Bunte Republik holt die DDR heim, Heinrich Thee, taz 
(Hamburg), 3/30/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07949.
825“süßem Brei … Es quillt und quillt aus den Verlegertopfen.” Cited in Minister Müller zur Pressekonzentration: Kein 
Vernichtungsfeldzug, eher süßer Brei aus Verlegertopfen, Susanne Anger, Kontrapunkt, 13/90, 6/25/90, pp.6-8, p.7, 
BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2). See Welcher Wildwuchs?, Gernot Facius, Die Welt, 3/5/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
826“Profilierung von bisherigen DDR-Presseerzeugnissen.” Cited in DDR-Presseerzeugnisse kartellrechtlich schützen! 
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The Impotence of Media Policy Institutions
The abundance of handwritten notes on such press releases and articles bear proof that the MPF,
the MfM as well as the MKR were well aware of the gravity of the situation.827 Low prices were 
threatening press diversity that “must be maintained,” MKR member Gerhard Bächer noted at the 
March 14 meeting of the MKR, and he added that “still no taxes or tariffs are being charged” for West 
German publications.828 There was, however, no uniform opinion on how to deal with these issues: 
Some MKR members argued for immediate interventions due to limited opportunities of East German 
papers to engage in fair competition and the subsequent threat to media diversity. Domestic 
publications needed to be saved from price dumping strategies and from “newspaper poachers” by 
means of favorable tax legislation, subsidies or the lowering of paper prices.829 “The other group 
opposed such dirigiste methods, since they are nothing more than a sublime kind of censorship.”830 
The next day, however, the MKR issued a statement to the Council of Ministers on “Equal 
Opportunities and Variety of Print Media” (see also Chapter 5).831 Underlining that price policy alone 
was not a sufficient means to keep check on “West German print media distributed in the GDR, 
potentially endangering equal opportunities, pluralism and the independence of East German 
newspapers,” it needed stable and equal distribution practices for all publications.832 Still, the best way 
to ensure equal chances on the current market, was “to explicitly set general, uniform price policies for 
all publications,” and the MKR urged for legislative measures.833 
Stellungnahme des Vizepräsidenten Dr. Reinhold Wutzke vom 4.5.1990, das blatt, 13/90, p.22, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
File 35c, DSC08044. 
827Note: Here, in particular press clippings in BArch DC9/1052, and IISH/ID-Archive MKR Box 35 (files a-f) and Box 36 
(files a-f).
828“muss aber gewährleistet werden … werden immer noch keine Steuern od. Zolle erhoben.” See notes, Gerhard Bächer, 
n.d. [March 14, 1990] Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
829“Zeitungswilderer.” Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 14.3.1990, Berlin March, 16, 1990,  
Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, 
File 1.
830“Die zweite Richtung verneinte die dirigistische Methoden der Einflussnahme, da diese nur eine sublimierte Form der 
Zensur darstellen.” Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 4.4.1990, Berlin, April 4, 1990, p. 1, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
831“Chancengleichheit und Vielfalt von Presseerzeugnissen.” Letter, Media Control Council to Council of Ministers 
(March 15, 1990), Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik Archives, International Institute of Social History, Folder 6, DSC07376.
832“Print-Medien aus der Bundesrpublik Deutschland in der DDR vertrieben werden und dadurch moglicherweise die 
Chancengleichheit, die Vielfalt und die Eigenständigkeit der in der DDR hergestellten Zeitungen beeinträchtigt werden 
kann.” Letter, Media Control Council to Council of Ministers (March 15, 1990), Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Archives, International Institute 
of Social History, Folder 6, DSC07376.
833“daß ausdrücklich eine generelle Preisgleichheit für alle vertriebenen Organe festgelegt wird.” Letter, Media Control 
Council to Council of Ministers (March 15, 1990), Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 
Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Archives, International Institute of Social History, Folder 6, 
DSC07376.
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The letter was received by the Council of Ministers and forward to the MPF, the central 
institution in negotiating matters of import, with a request to reply. The MPF did so on April 12, only 
to state that the issues brought up by the MKR went beyond its responsibility but “relate to media 
policies of the future government.”834 The MPF, not on friendly terms with either the MKR or the 
Round Table, while holding its own negotiations with the major publishing houses, underlined that: 
Constituting and enforcing prices for Western publications to guarantee equal chances of
the press in the competition with Western print media, requires negotiations in the 
context of the respective existing GDR-FRG government commissions [expert groups] 
and comprehensive legal regulations that, given the legal situation, the MPF minister 
cannot enforce.835
Current conditions, “we had to adapt to,” they had developed without the MPF's doing and, therefore, 
lay “beyond the scope of our responsibility.”836 What this meant specifically is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
What this meant for the MKR, with no executive or legislative powers of its own, was that it 
needed to continue lobbying for legislative measures on the government level. MKR member 
Kleinwächter pointed out that the MKR's goal was not to ban or repress West German publications. 
“On the contrary, all publications – but precisely not just those of major publishing houses – should 
have access to the market.”837 The MKR aimed for a sale and distribution system “in which market-
domineering companies do not have the a priori say-so, and that takes into account also the interests of 
the East German press.”838 This demanded for fair competition and “structural neutrality” in 
distribution, as was made clear during a meeting with Wolfgang Fürstner (VDZ) and the 
834Full quote: “die Medienpolitik der künftigen Regierung betreffen und über den Kompetenzbereich des Ministers für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen hinausgehen.” Letter, Minister MPF / gez. Niehof, Minister für Post- und Fernmeldewesen 
der DDR, to Staatssekretär Mobis, Sekretariat des Ministerrates, April 12, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
835“Die Bildung und vor allem die Durchsetzung von Preisen für westliche Presseerzeugnisse, die die Chancengleichheit 
der DDR_Presse [sic] im Konkurrenzkampf mit den westlichen Print-Medien gewährleisten sollen, erfordern 
Verhandlungen im Rahmen der dazu bestehenden gemeinsamen Regierungskommission DDR – BRD und übergreifende
rechtliche Regelungen, die der Minister für /PF/ bei der bestehenden Rechtslage nicht schaffen kann.” Letter, Minister 
MPF / gez. Niehof, Minister für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, to Martin Kramer, Vorsitzender des 
Medienkontrollrates Magdeburg der DDR, April 12, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
836Full quote: “bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt ohne unsere Mitwirkung und außerhalb unseres Verantwortungsbereiches 
tatsächlich entstandenen Zustand, dem wir uns anpassen mußten.” Letter, Minister MPF / gez. Niehof, Minister für Post-
und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, to Martin Kramer, Vorsitzender des Medienkontrollrates Magdeburg der DDR, April 12,
1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
837“Im Gegenteil, allen Erzeugnissen – aber eben nicht nur denen der Großverlage – soll der Zugang zum Markt gewährt 
werden.” Cited in Mit beschränkten Vollmachten. Gespräch mit dem Mitglied des Medienkontrollrates Prof. 
Kleinwächter, BZ, 4/19/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07836. Also in Ein 'basisdemokratisches Relikt der 
Wende' lost sich auf, Cornelia Bolesch, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9/19/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2).
838“in dem marktbeherrschende Unternehmen nicht von vornherein das Sagen haben und auch die Interessen der DDR-
Presse berücksichtig.” Mit beschränkten Vollmachten. Gespräch mit dem Mitglied des Medienkontrollrates Prof. 
Kleinwächter, BZ, 4/19/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07836. 
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representatives of the major publishing houses on April 4, 1990 (see Chapter 5).839 While the meeting 
focused on the publishersʼ efforts in building Grosso-enterprises in the GDR, the MKR made clear that 
current sales practices had caused “considerable irritations.”840 “Pressing concerns of the Media Control
Council here are based on a price policy that threatens the basis of existence of yet not competitive East
German publishers who, since early April, further need to do without state subsidies,” Fürstner pointed 
out after the meeting.841 The VDZ, thus, recommended that all West German publishers needed to keep 
and/or return to a 1:3 price ratio “where competition allows for it. With this plea, the West German 
magazine publishers underline their responsibility for the continued existence and development of East 
German publishers.”842 This “plea” might seem ironic, given that the same publishers that executed 
aggressive price strategies now “plead” to stop them. It serves as an example for the limits of self-
regulation to the promise of new markets. 
Only a few days later, and two days before the MPF responded to MKR's “Equality Statement” 
(see above), on April 10, the MKR came to the conclusion “that the fight for a 1:3 price ratio was in 
fact lost.”843 “And again, the Media Control Council is left to helplessly shrug its shoulders. Established
to protect the autonomy and equal opportunities of East German media, it is being overrun by 
concerted corporate efforts time and time again,” concluded the taz.844 This text passage, underlined by 
hand likely by MKR secretary Graf, only points to the impotence of the reformist media advisory 
board.
Similarly helpless was Media Minister Müller. At a press conference on May 10, 1990, he 
expressed his regrets “that we could not maintain a one to three sales price. But we have simply been 
overrun by the price policies of major West German publishers.”845 Müller continued, “[w]e cannot 
839“strukturelle Neutralität.” Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 4.4.1990, Berlin, April 4, 1990,
p. 1, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
840“erhebliche Irritationen.” Press release, Pressenotiz “Pressevertrieb in der DDR,” Verband Deutscher 
Zeitschriftenlerleger e.V., Bonn, April 5, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
841“Dahinter steht die akute Sorge des Medienkontrollrates, durch diese Preisgestaltung den ohnehin zur Zeit noch nicht 
wettbewerbsfähigen DDR-Verlagen, die zudem seit Anfang April auf staatliche Subventionen verzichten müssen, die 
Existenzgrundlage zu nehmen.” Press release, Pressenotiz “Pressevertrieb in der DDR,” Verband Deutscher 
Zeitschriftenlerleger e.V., Bonn, April 5, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
842“wo der Wettbewerb dieses zulässt. Die westdeutschen Zeitschriftenverlage unterstreichen mit diesem Appell ihre 
Verantwortung für eine Bestand- und Entwicklungschance der DDR-Verlage.” Press release, Pressenotiz “Pressevertrieb
in der DDR,” Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenlerleger e.V., Bonn, April 5, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
843“daß der Kampf um die Preisrelation 1:3 verloren sei.” Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 
4.4.1990, Berlin, April 4, 1990, p. 2, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
844“Dem Medienkontrollrat bleibt wieder nur ratloses Schulterzucken. Angetreten, die Eigenständigkeit und 
Chncengleichheit [sic] der DDR-Medien zu wahren, wird er Mal um Mal den von konzentrierten Aktionen der Konzerne
überrollt.” Die Bunte Republik holt die DDR heim, Heinrich Thee, taz (Hamburg), 3/30/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File
35a-b, DSC07949.
845Full quote: “Wir bedauern außerordentlich, daß wir den Verkauf zum Verhältnis eins zu drei nicht beibehalten konnten. 
172
make it undone now. It's no use, our publication must face up to competition.”846 And while likewise 
shrugging his shoulders repeatedly as a sign for his and the MfM's helplessness to deal with the 
situation, Müller confirmed that many smaller papers that had been founded with the democratic 
movement had already disappeared from the market.847 Berliner Zeitung commented that “[a]pparently 
also a minister cannot stand up to the elbow tactics used by the big four major publishers on the East 
German market.”848 Despite this impotence of East German institutions to face market pressures, they 
were not simply “victims” in this process. Instead, they were actors in their own right, and so were East
German publishers and papers.
Variety at Newsstands
The paper Bauern Echo, as well as other East German papers, argued that despite their basic 
disadvantages in competing with West German publications, they were willing to face up to 
competition.849 The latter was an integral part of a diverse media, and West German publications were 
part of a broader information range. Also Der Morgen drew a generally positive conclusion. What 
could currently be seen was a “most pleasant variety at the newsstands, compared to the dreariness 
offered almost just days ago, when there was not even a sufficient supply of the comparatively meager 
and mousey East German-prints.”850 Other journalists agreed and underlined the positive shifts from a 
“uniformly dull press” to the wide vibrant variety at newsstands.851 This variety manifested a plurality 
of opinion and viewpoints. 
Since March, the major publishers directly supplied sales points across the country with their 
Aber sind von der Preispolitik großer bundesdeutscher Presseverlage einfach überrollt worden.” DDR-Presse steht vor 
dem Zusammenbruch, 5/11/90, Das Volksblatt, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07776. 
846“Jetzt konnen wir nichts mehr zurückdrehen. Es hilft nichts, unsere Produkte müssen sich dem Wettbewerb stellen.” 
DDR-Presse steht vor dem Zusammenbruch, 5/11/90, Das Volksblatt, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07776. 
847Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, DDR-Presse: Schlacht verloren, Rückzugsgefechte eingeleitet, Thomas 
Kunze, press release, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07775; DDR-Presse steht vor dem 
Zusammenbruch, 5/11/90, Das Volksblatt, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07776. 
848“Offensichtlich kann auch ein Minister nicht gegen die Ellbogen an, die von den vier großen aus dem DDR-Markt 
agierenden bundesdeutschen Verlagen im Konkurrenzkampf eingesetzt werden.” Neue Vertriebsverordnung wirkt auch 
keine Wunder, Berliner Zeitung, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07780. 
849Pressefreiheit darf keine Einbahnstraße sein!, Uwe Creutzmann, Bauern Echo, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 
35a-b, DSC07754. Also Die gleiche Chance?, Berliner Allgemeine, Bodo Rehboldt, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
File 35a-b, DSC07754. 
850“Eine überaus erfreuliche Vielfalt an den Zeitungskiosken, verglichen mit der Tristesse, die sie beinahe vor Tagen noch 
boten, als nicht einmal die vergleichsweise mageren und mausgrauen DDR-Prints ausreichend angeboten werden 
konnten.” Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.52, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
851“gleichformig-triste Blätterwald.” Tausend bunte Blätter? Manfred Meier, Neue Zeit, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
File 35a-b, DSC07955. 
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publications.852 Accordingly, in East Berlin alone, the sales numbers of Berliner Morgenpost, 
Tagespiegel and BZ only amounted to 200.000 copies daily.853 The resulting variety at newsstands or 
the “blossoming of a thousand publications,” as one tabloid put it, now put high gloss next to East 
German publications that, in comparison, looked grey and mousey.854 Gottfried Müller soon observed, 
however, that East German publications were not put on display anymore.855 Why?
Part of the answer lay in practical necessity. The account of Hannelore von Zobelitz, a fifty year
old newspaper vendor, gave insights into daily life at an  East Berlin newsstand in May 1990.856 About 
forty papers were delivered for the day, 500 Berliner Zeitung, 300 BZ (Springer), 100 Neues 
Deutschland, 55 taz, 20 Berliner Morgenpost (Springer). During the last weeks, thirty West German 
and ten new East German publications had been added to her products on display. Of the East German 
dailies, however, “a great majority is being put directly onto the stack that – declared to be unsaleable –
is being send [back] to the main post office the next day.”857 “After all, I know what I can sell and how 
much of it,” and she needed more copies of the BZ.858 
The newsstand is way too small … how am I to advertise them all equally?! I can 
display the mastheads only. That is strange to customers and confusing … The ministry 
suggests placing the GDR to the left and the FRG to the right but that is impractical. I 
would have to jump back and forth all the time … I want to have the most popular 
papers at easy reach.859
This meant, all-too well known East German papers vanished in the back of the newsstand before being
put on display. The newspaper Bauern Echo argued that if there was no supply, there can also not be 
demand. Thus, with papers not being offered, their chances to sell went to zero.860 
852Marketing in ausgehungerten Märkten, Günter Herkel, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.52, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07920. 
853Viele Leser abgesprungen, Der Morgen, 5/29/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC07987. Also Das 
Millionengeschäft mit Gregor Gysi, Peter Marx, Die Zeit, 22, 5/25/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC07985.
854Tausend bunte Blätter? Manfred Meier, Neue Zeit, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07955. 
855Cited in Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, “DDR-Presse: Schlacht verloren, Rückzugsgefechte eingeleitet” 
Thomas Kunze, press release, November 5, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07775. Also “DDR-Presse 
steht vor dem Zusammenbruch,” Das Volksblatt, November 5, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07776. 
856Konkurrenz am U-Bahnhof, Wochenpost, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07801. 
857“landet ein großer Teil gleich auf dem Stapel, der am nächsten Tag – als unverkäuflich deklariert – ins Hauptpostamt 
zurückgeschickt wird.” Konkurrenz am U-Bahnhof, Wochenpost, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07801. 
858“Ich weiß schließlich, wieviel ich wovon verkaufen kann.” Konkurrenz am U-Bahnhof, Wochenpost, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07801. 
859“Der Kiosk ist viel zu klein … wie soll man da alles gleichberechtigt anpreisen?! Man muß sich darauf beschränken, die
Zeitungskopfe zu zeigen. Das ist für die Kunden ungewohnt und unübersichtlich. ...Vom Ministerium ist empfohlen, 
links die DDR und rechts die BRD zu plazieren, das läßt sich aber nicht einhalten. Da müßte ich immer hin und her 
springen … Ich will die gängigsten Zeitungen in meiner Nähe haben.” Konkurrenz am U-Bahnhof, Wochenpost, 
5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07801. 
860Pressefreiheit darf keine Einbahnstraße sein!, Uwe Creutzmann, Bauern Echo, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 
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Especially for East German magazines the overflow of West German high-gloss magazines at 
newsstands was disastrous. Like “grubby urchins,” the taz wrote, they were hidden among their classy 
and multicolored competitors.861 The women's magazine Für Dich, for instance, with an initially 
unchallenged circulation of about 900.000 to one million copies, fought for its survival since subsidies 
had ceased. Printed in the facility Berliner Druckerei on a machine that allowed for twelve colored 
pages per copy only, it needed an entire week to print its circulation of one million copies. The 
magazine journalist speculated that due to such outdated technology, advertising revenue from West 
German companies did not offer remedy, for it could simply not be done.862 With its seventy staff 
members (overstaffed compared to West German standards), its greyish layout and without 
advertisements, still costing 1,50 Mark (compared to Springer's Bild der Frau for 1 Mark), Für Dich's 
future looked gloomy.863 
Newsstand owner Hannelore von Zobelitz pointed at how the former shortage of papers and 
magazines had turned into an oversupply. “In the past, I was horrified of Wednesday mornings, when 
the [weeklies] FF Dabei and the Wochenpost were passed out, rather than sold. After thirty minutes or 
an hour, I had to say: all gone. The reactions of those who left with empty hands were accordingly 
[strong].”864 Now, 200 copies of the Wochenpost lay the back of her shop. They were likely go into 
recycling, while customers who asked for it on a Friday afternoon, could not believe it was still 
available. 
Von Zobelitz' account is insightful in that it suggests that marketability and the readers' 
preferences alone made for readers' choice and consequently her choice of display. This 
“marketability,” however, did not exist in and out of itself. First, it followed newly introduced Western 
standards of layout and display (i.e. showing headlines only) to attract the readers' attention. East 
German papers did not follow these standards nor did they possess the printing technology to outshine 
their competitors in color or layout. Second, as had been made clear by Springer representative Bremer 
earlier, the competition between “new” vs. “old” clearly went in favor of “new.” The scheme of 
35a-b, DSC07754.
861“die Schmuddelkinder.” Aschenputtel auf dem Ball. Journalistinnen aus Ost und West diskutieren über Umbruch der 
Medienlandschaft und ihre eigene Zukunft, die tageszeitung, Ulrike Helwerth, April 24, 1990, DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
862Schlechte Karten, journalist, 5/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, p.41, File 35a-b, DSC07768.
863Cited from Aschenputtel auf dem Ball. Journalistinnen aus Ost und West diskutieren über Umbruch der 
Medienlandschaft und ihre eigene Zukunft, die tageszeitung, Ulrike Helwerth, April 24, 1990, DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
864“Früher grauste mir immer vor dem Mittwochmorgen, als die FF Dabei und die Wochenpost doch eher verteilt als 
verkauft wurden. Nach einer halben bzw. einer Stunde musste ich sagen: alle. Die Reaktionen der leer Ausgegangenen 
waren dementsprechend.” Konkurrenz am U-Bahnhof, Wochenpost, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07801. 
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attracting new readers, however, and Bremer was keenly aware of this, only worked because of 
inexpensive or deflated prices. However attractive “new” was, sales number might likely have looked 
different, if prices had included the actual production and shipping costs. The “attractiveness” and/or 
marketability of West German publications must, therefore, be seen as part of a larger concerted effort 
to attract future readers and market shares at the price of short-term financial losses, and the long-term 
ruining of East German publishers.
The Many Obstacles of East German Papers
Price strategies alone were not the only reason why the East German press struggled. East 
German publications faced various obstacles simultaneously, which made their “equal” competition on 
a “free market” practically impossible. Wolfgang Fürstner (VDZ), himself point to them: While some 
were due to issues of material quality (i.e. paper, print, layout, and colors), others were due to lacking 
an economic basis (see Chapter 6) and uneven distribution infrastructures (see Chapter 5), as well as 
outdated editorial and printing technology, and a lack of marketing expertise and infrastructure. The 
latter were crucial with changing revenue schemes from subsidies to advertising.  “And the notorious 
paper shortage stifles from the outset the aim of market structures for East German publishers.”865 
Heavily subsidized in the past, within a short time span, papers needed to become economically self-
sufficient in a market defined by harsh competition. “This,” Fürstner claimed, “almost inevitably, leads 
to predatory competition on the territory of the GDR, which, in no time, is going to drive East German 
publishers into bankruptcy.”866 
Unmentioned by him: while having to compete on a “free market,” newspapers were not free to 
set their own or paper needs, often still faced restrictions on printing resources, and paper prices were 
highly problematic. While, for instance, 1.000 kilogram of printing paper for newspapers cost around 
1.100 DM in early May 1990, the price in the GDR was 2.900 Mark. This difference resulted from the 
official 1:3 currency exchange rate. Though not followed in the pricing of West German publications, it
865Full quote: “müssen sie [DDR Verlage] gegenwärtig versuchen, sich über Vertriebs- und Anzeigenerlose kostendeckend
zu finanzieren. Jedermann weiß dabei, daß die Qualitätsstandards der Drucktechnik, die Papierqualität, das 
Anleihengeschäft und die vorhandenen Vertriebswege in keiner Weise mit dem Wettbewerb westdeutscher Produkten 
standhalten konnen. Und der notorische Papiermangel läßt den Versuch marktwirtschaftlicher Strukturen von DDR-
Verlagen im Keim ersticken.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” 
Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
866“führt geradezu zwangsläufig zu einem Verdrängungswettbewerb auf dem Boden der DDR, der die DDR-Verlage in 
kürzester Frist in den Bankerott [sic] treiben wird.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum 
Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
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was still largely applicable for the acquisition of resources of East German publishers, and the same 
kind of price imbalance applied to other kinds of paper.867 On May 3, 1990, the Berlin Newspaper- and 
Magazine Association (Berliner Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlegerverband e.V.), thus, wrote to the 
Media Ministry and claimed that if the goal was to create conditions that would allow publishers as 
well as printers “to be competitive with regard to West German enterprises,” paper prices needed to be 
adapted and be cut by fifty percent before the monetary union on July 1, 1990.868 This price regulation 
did not take place.
Also unmentioned by Fürstner, and hinted at earlier, dumping price strategies were only part of 
an entire set of aggressive marketing strategies. Various articles and letters from East German readers 
in newspapers gave evidence for the “Wild West” marketing methods, unthinkable in established 
markets. The papers Die Märkische, Die Andere and, in particular, Bauern Echo took a lead in 
protesting against unfair sales and distribution practices. They published letters to the editor that gave 
evidence of how sales were being hampered by Postal Distribution in close coordination with the major
publishers (see Chapter 5). By mid-August 1990, the amount of letters written to the Consumer Center 
Berlin (Verbraucherzentrum Berlin e.V.) had reach such levels that it contacted the Media Ministry in 
search for advice. According to the center, unwanted or unasked for magazine subscriptions, the 
irregular delivery of publications, and aggressive sales strategies (i.e. no information of cancelation 
options) were of increasing concern.869 Subscriptions were being sold under false pretense, with filled 
out cancelation forms for East German publications, and they were being sold at door-to-door sales 
ventures that were largely nontransparent.
A respective inquiry of the Media Ministry at the Federal Association of the Advertising Book 
and Newspaper Trade (Bundesverband des werbenden Buch- und Zeitschriftenhandels e.V.) (WBZ), a 
central institution in managing these sales, relating to such business practices and questioning their 
legality was outright refused. The WBZ argued that the February 5 resolution only required publishers 
to register their commercial activities in the GDR. WBZ members, selling subscriptions had no 
influence over the content of a publication and, therefore, did not need to register its service providers. 
The WBZ, thus, did not see any need to take any measures for current practices and was not aware of 
867Letter, Berliner Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlegerverband e.V. und VE Unternehmensvereinigung Polygrafie to 
Ministerium für Medienpolitik der DDR, May 3, 1990, BArch DC9/1067.
868“wettbewerbsfähig gegenüber den bundesdeutschen Einrichtungen zu sein.” Letter, Berliner Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlegerverband e.V. und VE Unternehmensvereinigung Polygrafie to Ministerium für Medienpolitik der 
DDR, May 3, 1990, BArch DC9/1067.
869Letter, Beich, Verbraucherzentrum Berlin e.V., to Ministerium für Medienpolitik, August 17, 1990, BArch DC9/1070.  
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any unfair business practices.870 Instead, the WBZ made clear that specialized service providers from 
the Federal Republic being active in the GDR in the acquisition of subscription contracts was “nothing 
unusual” and was to continue.871 The matter was not investigated any further.
Analysis
Given these examples, the conclusion cannot be that the major obstacle of East German papers 
during the transition period was those of decreasing sales numbers or of a readership that did not care 
for its publications. While this was true for some papers, it was certainly not for others. A thorough 
study of the Economic Ministry of the GDR, likely from June 1990, showed exactly that: Listing 
twenty-eight regional papers, the nine national papers, as well as a selection of weeklies, the study 
documented that the papers that struggled the most were national dailies, here in particular, the former 
SED paper Neues Deutschland and the Junge Welt, each had dropped by 70 percent in subscription and
retail sale.872 It also showed, however, that many of the former SED regional papers had remained 
consistently strong in circulation and sale, and it documented how almost all East German papers were 
in some sort of cooperation with West German publishers. Individual stories differed. Circulation 
numbers of former bloc party papers, such as Der Morgen and Berliner Allgemeine (Nationalzeitung), 
for instance, had gone down from 67.300 to 51.5000, and from 59.800 to 27.400. Berliner Allgemeine 
eventually joined Der Morgen in July 1990, which led to a circulation rate of 48.800 copies.873 By then,
the paper had been taken over by Springer (see Chapter 6).874 
The situation was not much different for weeklies. Of a selected seven, five had lost an average 
of fifty percent of their subscription and/or retail sales, examples were the women's magazine Für Dich 
(from 932.400 to 489.300), Horizont (129.000 to 63.000), Wochenpost (123.200 to 67.420) and Freie 
Welt (345.200 to 165.700). The satire magazine Eulenspiegel, and in particular the TV guide FF dabei, 
however, had remained relatively even in circulation. FF-dabei (of the Berliner Verlag) had kept a 
circulation of 1.279.700 copies (from formerly 1.479.900), and Eulenspiegel a circulation of 354.300 
870Note: This argument was incorrect. Though reading circles needed no license, they did need to register at the Trade 
Office.
871“nichts ungewohnliches.” Letter, Werner Pientka, Bundesverband des werbenden Buch- und Zeitschriftenhandels e.V., 
to Grothe, Ministerium für Medienpolitik, September 3, 1990, BArch DC9/1070.
872Note: Junge Welt went from a total of 1.57600 in December 1989 to 445.300 in June 1990, and Neues Deutschland from
1.062200 to 324.300 copies a day. Circulation numbers of papers such as Bauernecho had dropped from 94.700 to 
53.900, and the union paper Tribüne from 420.900 to 300.300 copies. Table, Die überregionalen Tageszeitungen, n.d. 
[June 1990], BArch DE10/16.
873“Kein Licht am Ende des Tunnels” Horizont, July 27, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; 
Box 27-30, File 30. 
874Note: Springer had also taken over Deutsches Sportecho whose circulation numbers had dropped from 173.300 to 
133.000. Table, Die überregionalen Tageszeitungen, n.d. [June 1990], BArch DE10/16.
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compared to 472.000 in December 1989. Eulenspiegel was also the only magazine that was still 
independent from West German publishers, all others were in cooperation or had been “taken over” by 
Gruner+Jahr.875 Similarly, of the nine national newspapers, only four (Bauernecho, Junge Welt, Neues 
Deutschland and Tribüne) were listed as independent. Berliner Zeitung had only lost an average of 10 
percent (going from 455.500 to 414.600 copies in June 1990) but by July, increased its circulation 
again by 8.3 percent.876 By then, a joint venture deal had been made between the publisher, Robert 
Maxwell, and Gruner +Jahr (see Chapter 6).
It was in particular regional papers that had kept a large majority of their readership. Though all
papers had lost, at times, significant amounts between December 1989 and June 1990, the majority of 
them had lost only a total average of 10 percent in subscriptions and 12 percent in retail sale.877 Some 
of the major former SED regional papers, such as the Sächsische Zeitung (Dresden) or Mitteldeutsche 
Zeitung (Halle) lost only between 6 and 8 percent, but both still had circulation numbers of around 
540.000 copies a day. Other examples included Freie Presse (Chemnitz) that had gone from 664.500 in
December 1989 to 614.200 in June 1990, Lausitzer Rundschau (Cottbus) from 294.200 to 273.700, or 
Thüringer Allgemeine (Erfurt) from 407.700 to 381.500.878 Again, though individual stories differed, by
June 1990, all of the listed former SED regional dailies were in cooperation and/or had joint venture 
agreements with a West German publisher (see Chapter 6). In addition, by August 1990, West German 
publishing houses had founded more than forty new publications that by then, dpa concluded, replaced 
almost entirely dropped circulation numbers of East German publications.879 
These examples are telling. They show the close connection between sales and joint venture 
dynamics. They also question the often cited and all-too-obvious reason for the struggles of East 
German newspapers, which was the immediate disappearance of a readership and/or interest in papers. 
As shown earlier, in the GDR, newspaper readers generally held several subscriptions (see Chapter 3). 
With the increase in prices and a broader range of publications available, they often kept only one. In 
the case of former SED regional papers, still holding quasi-monopolies in their respective regions, 
875Table, Die überregionalen Tageszeitungen, n.d. [June 1990], BArch DE10/16.
876“Kein Licht am Ende des Tunnels” Horizont, July 27, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; 
Box 27-30, File 30. 
877Note: Based on a calculation that excluded the four publishers that had lost more then twenty-three percent in 
subscription  and retail sale.
878Note: Smaller papers  such as Brandenburger Neueste Nachrichten (Potsdam) went from 24.400 to 21.000, Nordeutsche
Zeitung (Schwerin) from 24.000 to 22.200 while Die Union (Dresden), in fact, increased its circulation from 68.100 to 
76.100 copies a day. Table, Die überregionalen Tageszeitungen, n.d. [June 1990], BArch DE10/16.
879Note: Circulation numbers of “old” GDR dailies had dropped by about 2.8 million copies between December 1989 and 
June 1990. Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 
1990, pp. 1-17, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050.
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readership “loyalty” was particularly high (see Chapter 6). In particular with regard to these regional 
papers but also relating to newly established papers, low subscription and retail sales alone do not 
provide a good enough frame to explain the struggles publishers experienced. Instead, they grounded in
a complex set of structural and economic shifts within which early pressures exercised by West 
German market interests interlocked with the impotence of a weak state, and aggressive market 
strategies took a lead role in the transitioning of the press in the GDR. It is a chicken-or-egg question 
whether high supplies of West German publications caused less demand or if it was the other way 
around. More importantly, high West German press supplies changed more than demand and supply: 
they introduced new market logic and criteria into a newly opened press landscape in transition. 
Conclusion – Sales and Prices
“There must be no fear that West German publications 
are to flood the [East German] market.”
G+J CEO Gerd Schulte-Hille, medien aktuell,
March 19, 1990880
On May 5, the same day Gottfried Müller met Helmut Kohl in Bonn to talk about establishing a 
free press in the GDR (see Chapter 3), the (West German) public broadcasting station Hessischer 
Rundfunk 2 dedicated a radio feature to the “significant transformation” of the media landscape of the 
GDR.881 Two different concepts of journalism were clashing: former party journalists 
(Kaderjournalisten) were facing the Western concepts of independent journalism. But while there was 
no lack of ideas on how to bring about reform from within, “[t]he desire of East Germany to assert 
itself in media policy is facing drastically different ambitions and strategies of a Western media 
expansion.”882 It sounded nice when West German publishing houses argued that the reason for their 
“eastward expansion” (Ostexpansion) was the East Germans' need for information. Such arguments, 
however, obscured other important motives: 
880“Eine Marktüberschwemmung durch Westprodukte ist nicht zu befürchten.” “Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-
Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 
1990,private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
881“einschneidenen Umbruch.” Transcript, Hessischer Rundfunk 2, 6.15pm/1, 5/5/90, Hermann Mein, Uwe Schulz, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07799. Also BArch DC 9/1003/1.
882“An Planspielen darüber, auf welche Weise die bisherigen Strukturen … neu zu ordnen wären, fehlt es nicht. 
Medienpolitischers Behauptungswille im Osten Deutschlands und medienstrategische Erweiterungsabsichten im Westen
stehen sich kraß gegenüber.” Transcript, Hessischer Rundfunk 2, 6.15pm/1, 5/5/90, Hermann Mein, Uwe Schulz, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07799. Also BArch DC 9/1003/1.
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Publishing houses, in their Maecenas-like conduct, connect – and who could blame them
in a market economy – very concrete economic interests with their involvement in the 
GDR. They aim at taking over new sales markets.883 
And since in the Federal Republic, money was not as much an issue for such ambitions as was its tight 
antitrust legislation, the newly opened East German market came just at the right time.884 The feature 
speculated that the day might come, when individual press sectors were to be largely dominated by 
West German publishers, and such “appropriation” would likely bring along the kinds of defects that 
media experts in the Federal Republic had criticized for years, such as local press monopolies (see 
Chapter 6).885 The feature brought to the point, what this chapter has outlined in more detail.
In early 1990, the East German press (still under the limitations of a planned economy) faced an
increasingly fierce competition and aggressive market strategies employed by (the major) West 
German publishing houses. Demanding equal opportunities for all publications, the Press and 
Information Office of the interim GDR government appealed to the BMI. According to the former, “the
division of the East German press market among the four West German major publishing houses, the 
direct supply of the retail sector, [and] predatory competition through price dumping [strategies],” 
endangered East German publishers.886 In particular the price war, exclusively fought between and 
among West German publishers who aimed at securing a future readership, set a deflated 1:1 price 
baseline that was impossible to meet if production and transportation costs needed to be met. Selling 
publications for one third of the original price to win a competitive advantage and set future claims, 
thus, required a strong, established market position and the respective financial resources. This pushed 
to the sidelines East German, as well as small and medium-sized West German publishers. And while 
the BMI saw the need for regulation early on, it lacked the jurisdiction and/or political will do take 
concrete measures (see Chapter 5 and 6).
East German publishers, on the other hand, fought for their survival. By April 1, subsidies 
ceased to exist. Since then, publishers needed to finance themselves by means of higher prices and 
883“Die sich so mäzenatisch gebärdenden Verlage verbinden – und wer konnte ihnen das in der Marktwirtschaft verdenken 
– mit dem DDR-Engagement handfeste wirtschaftliche Interessen. Ihnen geht es darum, neue Absatzmärkte zu erobern.”
Transcript, Hessischer Rundfunk 2, 6.15pm/1, 5/5/90, Hermann Mein, Uwe Schulz, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07799. Also BArch DC 9/1003/1.
884Transcript, Hessischer Rundfunk 2, 6.15pm/1, 5/5/90, Hermann Mein, Uwe Schulz, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07799. Also BArch DC 9/1003/1.
885“Vereinnahmung.” Transcript, Hessischer Rundfunk 2, 6.15pm/1, 5/5/90, Hermann Mein, Uwe Schulz, IISH/ID-Archive
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07799. Also BArch DC 9/1003/1.
886“Die Aufteilung des Pressemarktes der DDR unter den vier BRD-Großverlagen, Direktbelieferung des Einzelhandels, 
Verdrängungswettbewerb mit Dumping-Preisen.” Press release, Erklärung, Bachmann, n.d. [March 1990], p. 1, BArch 
DC9/1052.
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advertising. This required ad-hoc solutions for building individual marketing infrastructures, often 
possible only through West German investments and expertise, which opened the door for joint venture
activities. And though this chapter focused on import and sale for analytical reasons, it also showed the
connection between all three sectors (sale, distribution, and joint venture cooperations). This related, on
the one hand, to the reasoning of different interests groups, but more so, to the economic underpinnings
of daily pressures faced by East German newspapers. 
Part of the reason why West German publications were initially so successful in the GDR was 
their superiority in the quality of paper, color, print, layout and partly information. They had been 
unattainable for years and exceeded East German standards by far. The latter lagged behind in printing 
and editorial technology while simultaneously undergoing internal reform processes. East German print
media also, however, consistently improved in content, and papers such as Der Morgen, repeatedly 
received awards for their news coverage. G+J CEO Gerd Schulte-Hillen, thus, claimed “[s]ince East 
German newspapers improve on a daily basis, they have a good chance in competition.”887 How far this
was true will come out further in the following chapters. To the readership, who for decades had not 
had sufficient access to East, and no access to West German publications, the newly available product 
and format range (such as tabloids) opened up a welcome variety at news stand. It did not follow, 
however, that they rejected their “own” publications entirely. On the contrary, especially former SED 
regional papers remained strong in readership and circulation. 
Further, the overall success of West German publications cannot be explained by demand or 
their own assets alone. Contributing factors were also aggressive marketing and price dumping 
strategies, and a privatized distribution system (see Chapter 5). Wolfgang Fürstner from the VDZ 
concluded, who should be surprised that the government of the GDR, “interested in protecting its own 
publishers, is watching exceedingly critically the proliferation in distribution and the unregulated 
flooding of the GDR with a West German press.”888 As was shown above, though the government was 
critical, it was also “overrun” by market developments. Fürstner, on the other hand, repeatedly urged 
for self-regulation and failed to the promise of new markets. 
If, as has been criticized by the head of the BMI Schaible, East German publishers and other 
887“Da die DDR-Zeitungen von Tag zu Tag besser werden, haben sie eine gute Chance im Wettbewerb.” “Fünf-Punkte 
Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell,
No. 12, March 19, 1990,private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
888“im Interesse des Schutzes ihrer eigenen Verlage außerordentlich kritisch den vertrieblichen Wildwuchs und die 
ungesteuerte Überflutung der DDR mit westdeutscher Presse beobachtet.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine 
Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
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media institutions and interest groups blurred the lines between different sectors of a media economy 
(see Introduction), it was precisely because they did not experience these pressures as being separate. 
Low prices and distribution issues jointly fostered joint ventures negotiations, and all were being 
navigated largely by the same West German interests groups, namely the major publishers. And while 
it does not follow that they, indeed, were concerted, to East German institutions, it made little 
difference. As shown above, however, also the latter (the MKR, different ministries and/or East 
German publishers) had their own interests at stake, and, thus, diverging ideas on how to deal with old 
structures and new demands. Generally lagging behind developments of the market, media policy 
institutions fell into a state of irrelevance and changed little in the immediate situation of publishers. 
The latter found individual solutions for pressing issues, partly by subverting legislative restrictions and
generally in early cooperations and/or joint ventures with West German publishers. 
A look into the future reveals that in spite of initially high sales numbers, West German 
publications did not establish themselves on the East German market. In the long run, Dussel 
concludes, “West German publishers [were] unsuccessful in bringing their products to the East German
consumer.”889 To Dussel, the consequences for West German interests were clear: the buying of East 
German publishers by their Western counterparts via the Treuhandgesellschaft (see Chapter 6).890 
While this might have been so, this chapter has shown that this future “buy out” of papers started much 
earlier. Even if West German publications did not succeed in establishing themselves in the long run, 
the consequences of their short-lived marketing and price dumping endeavor were serious for East 
German publishers and for all domestic press reform initiatives. They severely limited reform attempts 
from within and created the ground work upon which early cooperation and joint-venture agreements 
were based. These consequences cannot be brushed aside by pointing to the next step without 
confronting the fact that early market fights had severely damaged the early transformation of the East 
German press.
889“Westdeutscher Verlage [waren] weitgehend erfolglos darin ihre Produkte an den ostdeutschen Mann und seine Frau zu 
bringen.” See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 245, 
Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
890See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 245, Corporate 
Archives of Axel Springer SE.
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CHAPTER 5: DISTRIBUTING THE PRESS
“Publishers operating on the territory of the GDR 
are bound to treat press-Grossisten of the GDR as 
equal enterprises, on equal terms.”
Amendment to the Resolution of Press Distribution in the GDR,
GDR Media Ministry, June 1990891
The quote above makes little sense to anyone who does not know its context, and even with 
such context, its meaning is hard to get. Press distribution in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
was handled by the German Post (not Grossisten), and the Grosso-system of the Federal Republic 
(FRG) was specifically designed to be a distribution system independent of publishers (see Chapter 4). 
Publishers in the Federal Republic (as well as in the GDR) were generally not involved in matters of 
distribution and could, thus, not regard Grossisten as their “equals.” If, as the quote suggests, 
publishers were engaged in distributing print media in the GDR, what publishers were they and why 
were they involved? And a less obvious question is: Why was this matter so important that it required, 
first, a resolution that was, second, added by an amendment? These questions will be answered in this 
chapter. It gives insights into one of the major battlefields in the fight over press freedom in the 
transitioning GDR: the struggle over press distribution infrastructures. 
It was not without reason that in April 1990, the newly founded Association of Newspaper and 
Magazine Publishers of the GDR (Verband der Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR, VZZD) 
urged the Media Control Council (Medienkontrollrat, MKR) that the greatest danger to the newly won 
press freedom in the GDR “stems, by no means, from the appearance of Western print media on the 
East German market.”892 “Existential threats of the press root exclusively in the lack of a functioning 
distribution.”893 The VZZD underlined, a free press was worth nothing, if it did not find its ways to the 
readers. 
For years, the outdated infrastructures of Postal Newspaper Distribution (Postzeitungsvertrieb, 
891“Die auf dem Gebiet der DDR tätigen Verlage sind verpflichtet die DDR-Pressegrossisten als gleichartige Unternehmen 
gleich zu behandeln.” Second draft, Zweite Verordnung über den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR vom 2. 
Mai 1990, 2. Entwurf, n.d. [June 7, 1990?], § 5, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050. 
892“rührt keineswegs aus dem Erscheinen westlicher Druckerzeugnisse auf dem DDR-Markt.” Open letter, Verband der 
Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR, April 22, 1990, Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
893“Existenziell bedroht wird die Presse einzig und allein vom Fehlen eines funktionierenden Vertriebs.” Open letter, 
Verband der Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR, April 22, 1990, Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
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PZV) had frustrated East German publishers and readers with its unreliable services.894 Postal 
Distribution managed the country-wide retail sale and delivered subscriptions, which made for up to 80
percent of the overall newspaper sales. Different from the West German Grosso-system, the Post 
bought the newspapers in advance, and sold them respectively, without the right to return unsold 
copies. It was a system based on high demand and short supply (see Chapter 3).895 With the political 
turn and the major political shifts also came new challenges for Postal Distribution. As early as 
November 1989, ideas on how to reorganize and/or break the monopoly of the Post in distribution 
circulated within governmental bodies, and among East and West German publishers. The resolution of
the People's Chamber from of February 5, 1990, lifted its monopoly and allowed for “publishers' own 
distribution/sales channels;” it also gave all natural and legal persons in the GDR “the right to publish 
newspapers, magazines and other publications.”896 Production and distribution were now free to 
everyone, which resulted in a tremendous increase in publications and made necessary an expansion of 
infrastructures and logistics to face upcoming tasks. 
Still, in July 1990, the minister of the Ministry of Postal and Telecommunication (Ministerium 
für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, MPF), Klaus Wolf, in a letter to Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière, 
outlined how “the substantial redeployments and shifts in the East German press system, the many new
publications, the consistent price changes with their vast consequences for subscription developments” 
had brought Postal Distribution “to the limits of its capacities.”897 Though the need for substantial 
reforms was widely shared, Postal Distribution's timeworn technology and organization remained in 
place. Why? Because the question how to attain needed reforms became one of the most contested 
question in the transformation of the East German print media. 
This chapter lays open this battle over distribution. It was a fight over territory and national 
sovereignty, political imperatives and economic interests and necessities. Similar to issues of import 
and sale, the reform of distribution was influenced by Western economic interests early on, not the least
because a deficient distribution posed a serious obstacle to the exploration of a new East German 
market. For West German publishers to distribute (and sell) their products, the GDR needed 
894Note: BArch DC9/1052 contains extensive documentation on the press distribution in the GDR.
895Protocol, Postal Minister Wolf, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 7, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
896“Eigenvertrieb durch den Herausgeber … Das Recht zur Herausgabe von Zeitungen, Zeitschriften und anderen 
Publikationen” cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” 
August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 5, BArch DC9/1050.
897“die gravierenden Umschichtungen und Veränderungen im Pressesystem der DDR, die vielen Neuerscheinungen, die 
durchgängigen Preisänderungen mit ihren enormen Auswirkungen auf die Abonnementsentwicklungen … bis an die 
Grenze seiner Leistungsfähigkeit.” Letter, Wolf, Staatssekretär, to Lothar de Maizière, Ministerpräsident, Berlin, July 
17, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC20/6848.
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functioning press distribution infrastructures with higher transshipment capacities. This could only be 
done in cooperation with institutions of the GDR (unlike the circumventing of domestic authority by 
individual West German publishers making use of “legal grey zones,” as happened in sales). For 
distribution, the challenges lay differently and, thus, asked for different strategies. Early lobbying by 
West German major publishing houses in (media) policies became the crucial component, without 
which any reform attempts in distribution cannot be made sense of. Lobbying set the basis not only for 
a close interaction between East and West German institutions but, more importantly, for inter- and 
intra capital struggles in the exploration of the new Eastern market. Here, “[t]he GDR,” as the publisher
Tagesspiegel claimed, became “the testing ground for a fundamental restructuring of press distribution 
in a future united Germany.”898 This chapter shows how far this was true, and if any such attempts were
successful. Generally, the justifying motive to build a free and democratic press infrastructure for 
citizens of the GDR was brought forth and mutually challenged by all interest groups. This fight 
eventually turned against the political imperatives of a free press. 
Early Lobbying of Major Publishers in Reforming Postal Distribution
As mentioned earlier, already on November 29, three weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
chief executive of Gruner + Jahr, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, contacted Hans Modrow with his own business 
proposition. Explaining that “in the course of increasing economic cooperation between both German 
states we [G+J] are interested in collaborations, joint-ventures or independent economic activities in 
the GDR,” in particular the founding of new publications.899 Attached to his letter was a concept 
entitled “Concept of universal import of Western press products into the GDR in the recognition of the 
commitment of Korb 3, the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna follow-up conference” (see Appendix 
A).900 
This concept was the founding document for all policy proposals, first, of the Ministry of 
898“Das Gebiet der DDR ist daher nach interner Interessenaufteilung das Versuchsfeld für eine grundlegende 
Umstrukturierung des Pressevertriebs im künftigen Gesamtdeutschland.” Attachment, Punktation zur aktuellen Berliner 
Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 1990, Letter, Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Gottfried Müller, June 25, 1990, 
Der Tagesspiegel, BArch DC9/1070.  
899“Im Zuge der zunehmenden wirtschaftlichen Kooperation beider deutscher Staaten interessieren wir uns für 
Kooperationen, Joint-ventures oder eigenständige wirtschaftliche Tätigkeiten in der DDR.” Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, 
Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
900Note: In the BArch files, this concept (though not attached and not mentioned in the letter) is the document written on 
the same kind of paper, directly following the letter of Schulte-Hillen to Modrow from November 29, 1989. Generally, 
all documents in the file BArch DC9/1052 are well sorted and in timely order, allowing for the conclusion that both 
documents were sent together. Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik mit in- und ausländischen Pressepordukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-
Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 1989?), BArch DC9/1052, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, 
Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
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Culture (Ministerium für Kultur, MfK), and, later, by the MPF discussed earlier (see Chapter 4). It 
carried the same name, contained a similar order of points and employed a similar language as did the 
policy documents. Its content, however, differed in the absence of political imperatives, but it brought 
to the fore the central role of G+J as the sole Western partner in the building of a new press distribution
system. Thus, while the initial policy proposal referred to the “building of a strong, market-oriented 
national press distribution system (NVP) as a joint-venture with a Western partner,” this concept 
focused entirely on G+J being the latter.901 According to G+J, the NPV was to “be founded as a joint 
venture between one or several partners in the German Democratic Republic and the Gruner + Jahr 
publishing house ...  each [holding] 50 percent of the shares.”902 Only “such universal distribution 
system with country-wide price fixing by the publishers as well as reasonable profit margins in the 
supply chain guarantee an optimal way of universal press supply regardless of political orientation.”903 
While subscription services were to remain with the Postal Distribution, the joint venture was to be in 
charge of retail sales and to use the distribution and retail facilities of the Post.904 The joint venture was 
also to handle to export of East German publications for hard currency. This centralist approach made 
G+J the sole Western institution on each and every level of press import, export and distribution in the 
GDR.
Particularly interesting, G+Jʼs pitch to sell its left-over copies, or Remissionsexemplare, to the 
GDR by underlining that “[w]ithin the scope of this package deal, Gruner + Jahr is willing to take into 
901“Gründung eines leistungsstarken am DDR-Markt orientierten nationalen Pressevertriebssystems (NPV) als 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmen mit einem westlichen Partner.” Policy draft, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, 
Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Korb. 3, 
der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
902Full quote: “Das NPV wird gegründet als Gemeinschaftsunternehmen eines oder mehrerer Partner in der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und dem Verlag Gruner+Jahr. Die Partnerunternehmen der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik und der Verlag Gruner + Jahr halten je 50 Prozent der Anteile an diesem Gemeinschaftsunternehmen.” 
Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Pressepordukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), p. 1, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
903“Ein solches einheitliches Vertriebssystem mit landeseinheitlicher Preisfestlegung und -bindung durch die Verleger 
sowie angemessener Handelsspannen für die Handelsstufen sichert in optimaler Weise eine umfassende Versorgung mit 
Presseproduktion unabhängig von ihrer politischen Ausrichtung.” Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der 
Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung 
von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 1989?), p. 3, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-
Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
904The direct quote of G+J: “Zur Sicherstellung der flächendeckenden Versorgung mit Presseprodukten nutzt das 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmen die bestehenden Vertriebseinrichtungen der Deutschen Post und die Verkaufsstellen der 
Handelsorganisationen sowie weitere Einrichtungen gegen eine angemessene Handelsspanne.” Concept, Konzept zur 
umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und ausländischen 
Pressepordukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 1989?), p. 1, 
attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, 
November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
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serious consideration making available [for an interim period of time] its products for a price of less 
than 50 percent.”905 Estimating that organization and transportation costs amounted to about 0.20 DM 
per copy, “Gruner + Jahr guarantees for this price, for a volume still to be negotiated, the supply of 
returned [unsold] copies of our publications.”906 Put differently, the GDR was to become a market for 
left-over publications from the Federal Republic. G+J also added possibilities of media production, 
such as the founding of a daily newspaper or a joint venture in the printing sector and the building of 
printing plants.907 The financial estimates, listed under the heading “Provision of needed hard currency 
for the financing of the comprehensive package and risk protection,” though less detailed, were the 
same in numbers, language and reasoning as in all policy drafts: It was suggested that the needed hard 
currency could be earned with a limited amount of advertising for Western companies on GDR public 
television.908 G+J was to take over the marketing of advertising airtime for a provision of 15 percent, 
and it would hold the exclusive marketing rights.909 These estimates and the broad involvement of the 
publishers in various fields would have made G+J the central Western partner in the Eastern German 
print sector.
On December 13, 1989, Modrowʼs personal assistant Karl Heinz Arnold responded to Schulte-
Hillen.910 Underlining that the “importance of your company and its integrity are well know also in the 
GDR,” Arnold made clear that “already from that point of view, your outlined intentions are more than 
905“ausländischen Endverbraucherpreises … Der Verlag Gruner+Jahr erklärt sich im Rahmen eines dieses Gesamtpaketes 
bereit, ernsthaft zu prüfen, seine Erzeugnisse für einen Preis von unter 50 Prozent zur Verfügung zu stellen.” Concept, 
Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), p. 2, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
906“Gruner + Jahr garantiert zu diesem Preis in zu verabredendem Umfang die Bereitstellung von Remissionsexemplaren 
der eigenen Produkte.” Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik mit in- und ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, 
n.d. (November 29, 1989?), p. 2, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, 
Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
907Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), pp. 3-4, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
908“Bereitstellung der erforderlichen Valuta zur Finanzierung des Gesamtpaketes und zur Risikoabsicherung.” Concept, 
Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), p. 4, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
909Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), p. 5, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
910Letter, Dr. Arnold to Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner und Jahr, December 13, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
188
interesting.”911 His focus was a different one, however. “[W]hat should primarily be considered are 
certain measures of cooperation with existing or ʻrevivableʼ East German media,” Arnold stated and 
gave specific examples.912 The women's magazine Für Dich was to soon come out with a new name 
and concept, and could, thus, fill a market gap also in the FRG; also the reissuing of the economic trade
journal Die Wirtschaft was deemed desirable. Joint-ventures, on the other hand, were “generally 
useful” if “the respective sales revenue [through the export to] the FRG made the import of additional 
paper … financially feasible.”913 For further negotiations, Arnold handed the issue over to Wolfgang 
Meyer, Head of the Press Office.
In-between the letter of Gerd Schulte-Hillen (November 29, 1989) and Arnold's response 
(December 13, 1989) lay about two weeks. During this time, G+Jʼs proposal had already circulated 
within different governmental bodies, and been modified and worked on by Manfred Schuberth at the 
Ministry of Culture (MfK) in charge of drafting the policy proposal for press imports (see Chapter 3). 
When Schuberth met with Germer on December 18, 1989, to talk over the final policy draft, Germer 
noted after the meeting that during the discussion it “became obvious that for weeks now, Schuberth 
has dealt with the proposal of G+J and wants to follow through with it come what may.”914 During the 
meeting, Schuberth presented what he thought were the benefits of the G+J package deal. To him, it 
ensured maximum benefits for the intake of hard and domestic currency, both served the overarching 
goal of financing objectives of the MfK, such as press imports.915 Schuberthʼs argument was close to 
what was laid out in the second policy draft that “the advantage of the project finance lies in the 
opportunity to import print media into the GDR without causing any costs to its balance of payment,” 
not least because “Gruner+Jahr guarantees the level of volume and revenue given above.”916 Though 
911“Bedeutung Ihres Unternehmens und seine Seriosität sind auch in der DDR wohlbekannt … schon aus dieser Sicht sind 
die von Ihnen dargelegten Absichten mehr als interessant.” Letter, Dr. Arnold to Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner und Jahr, 
December 13, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
912Full quote: “Soweit die gegenwärtige Situation zu übersehen ist, kommen am ehesten bestimmte Formen der 
Zusammenarbeit mit bestehenden oder 'wiederzuerweckenden' DDR-Medien in Betracht.” Letter, Dr. Arnold to Gerd 
Schulte-Hillen, Gruner und Jahr, December 13, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
913“Generell sinnvoll … durch entsprechende Verkaufseinnahmen in der BRD der zusätzliche Import von Papier … 
finanzierbar wäre.” Letter, Dr. Arnold to Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner und Jahr, December 13, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
914“war erkennbar, daß der Kollege Schuberth sich seit Wochen intensiv mit dem Vorschlag von G+J befaßt und ihn
unter allen Umständen durchsetzen will.” Internal Note, Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim 
Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, am 18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 
(2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung 
westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. [Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
915Internal Note, Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, 
am 18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den 
Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. 
[Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
916“Der Vorteil des Finanzierungsmodells besteht darin, daß Printmedien in der DDR eingeführt werden konnen ohne daß 
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this part of holding G+J accountable for promised profits was erased from the third version (and then 
would re-appear in the final proposal), it was the estimates, language and calculations initially 
introduced by G+J that remained the base-line for the initial and all following financial concepts on 
Western press import and the reform of distribution in the GDR. 
Heinrich Bauer 
Though G+J was the central publisher in these proposals, it was not the only publisher with 
such early ambitions. As discussed earlier (see Chapter 4), by December 7, 1989, several offers of West
German interest groups had been made to various institutions in the GDR, and they came up during an 
expert meeting on the import and export of press products at the Office for Press and Information 
Service in Berlin that same day. It were in particular the offers of the G+J and Heinrich Bauer 
publishing houses that were discussed most thoughtfully and regarded to be most attractive.917 
 In an internal note of the MPF on the expert meeting, both G+J and Bauer were described as 
“the two largest distribution companies in the FRG;” both had made “similar offers,” and it was, thus, 
“necessary to make use of this competitive situation during negotiations to bring about favorable 
conditions for the German Post.”918 Though, in fact, neither Bauer nor G+J were “distribution 
companies” but major publishers, the Post aimed at enhancing its own position by negotiating with 
both.
However, during the meeting on December 7, Bauer (not G+J) was introduced as the major 
West German partner in negotiation over a joint venture for which the Post would provide its facilities 
and Bauer the technology.919 It was, thus, Bauer representatives who, immediately after the expert 
meeting on December 7, held subsequent talks with East German officials on its business proposal.
The Bauer Concept
What spoke for Bauer: it had been faster than G+J and had had a detailed “Offer of the publishing 
house Bauer for press distribution for the territory of the GDR” ready by November 17, 1989, only 
Belastungen der Zahlungsbilanz der DDR entstehen … Gruner + Jahr garantiert, Umfang und Einnahmen in oben 
aufgeführter Hohe.” Policy draft II, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung 
westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d., p. 4, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052.
917Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, December 7, 1989, 
BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
918“die beiden großten Vertriebsorganisationen der BRD … ähnliche Angebote … Es ist notwendig, diese Konkurrenz in 
Verhandlungen auszunutzen, um für DP günstige Bedingungen zu erwirken.” Internal note, Zusätzliche Hinweise zum 
Vermerk über Gespräch mit Bauer-Verlag, December 7, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
919Internal note, Aktennotiz über eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE 
AHB Bbuchexport, Leipzig, December 8, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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eight days after the fall of the Berlin Wall.920 It is not clear whether this proposal was sent right away or
if it was sent after the meeting on December 7. Regardless the timing, Bauer CEO Gerd Bolls and 
management member Günther Schottler (and others) presented Bauer as a strong and leading company 
particularly engaged in distribution. With the independent distribution of our own 
publications, the national distribution for other publishers and our Grosso enterprise in 
the Hamburg region, the publishing house has a wide-ranging expertise on all levels [of 
distribution].921 
Similar to G+J, Bauer envisioned a joint venture with a partner in the GDR for distributing East 
German publications as well as “imported publications, especially from the FRG,” via three to five 
locations in its distribution network.922 The East German side was bring in property, facilities and 
personnel while Bauer was to contribute expertise, computer systems and operating supplies.923
Part of the proposal was an overview of the press market in the FRG. Bauer admitted, however, 
that “lacking detailed knowledge” with regard to the GDR, it could only offer an exemplary concept 
laying out “principles ideas for a newly built distribution system in the GDR.”924 It needed East 
German experts to elaborate the details; the same was true “for the selection and sale of West German 
publications ... Our perspective only considers mass publications and major special interest 
magazines,” a selection that could, however, be expanded without problems.925 Laying out the offer at 
the expert meeting, the Post argued, the Bauer deal entailed a way “out of the problematic situation in 
920Proposal, Angebot der Verlagsgruppe Bauer für einen Pressevertrieb auf dem Gebiet der DDR, November 17, 1989, 
BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to Letter, Heinrich Bauer Verlag to Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
921“besonders stark im Vertriebsgeschäft engagiert. Durch den eigenständigen Vertrieb der selbst verlegten Objekte, eine 
nationale Vertriebsunternehmung für Fremdverlage und ein eigenes Großhandelsunternehmen im Raum Hamburg 
verfügt der Verlag über ein umfassendes Know-how auf allen Ebenen.” Proposal, Angebot der Verlagsgruppe Bauer für 
einen Pressevertrieb auf dem Gebiet der DDR, November 17, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to Letter, 
Heinrich Bauer Verlag to Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 
(2/3).
922“importierter Titel, insbesondere aus der BRD.” Proposal, Angebot der Verlagsgruppe Bauer für einen Pressevertrieb 
auf dem Gebiet der DDR, November 17, 1989, pp. 1-2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to Letter, Heinrich Bauer 
Verlag to Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
923Proposal, Angebot der Verlagsgruppe Bauer für einen Pressevertrieb auf dem Gebiet der DDR, November 17, 1989, p. 
2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to Letter, Heinrich Bauer Verlag to Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
924“geringer Detailkenntnisse … grundlegende Ideen für ein neu zu schaffendes Vertriebssystem in der DDR.” Proposal, 
Angebot der Verlagsgruppe Bauer für einen Pressevertrieb auf dem Gebiet der DDR, November 17, 1989, p. 2, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to Letter, Heinrich Bauer Verlag to Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen,
December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
925Full quote: “für die Auswahl der anzubietenden Objekte aus der BRD, die im einzelnen abzustimmen wären. Unsere 
Betrachtungen schließen nur Massen- und große Spezialzeitschriften ein.” Proposal, Angebot der Verlagsgruppe Bauer 
für einen Pressevertrieb auf dem Gebiet der DDR, November 17, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to 
Letter, Heinrich Bauer Verlag to Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, December 8, 1989, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
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retail sale (demand for a 5-day week of delivery personnel, missing newsstand personnel), any 
additional domestic distribution would not be possible otherwise.”926 And while this offer was similar 
to G+J's, an advantage of Bauer was its prior business relations with the GDR: the publisher had, in 
cooperation with the Art and Antiques Ltd. (Kunst und Antiquitäten GmbH), for about a year 
distributed four of its publications to an East German readership via a subscription service (see Chapter
3). It now aimed at expanding this product range by ten publications.927 
Already during an earlier meeting on November 24, 1989, Bauer had discussed this expansion 
and other options for business activities and joint projects in the GDR. Present at the meeting were 
owner Heinz Bauer (and others) for Heinrich Bauer publishers, Manfred Schuberth, as well as 
representatives of Art and Antiques Ltd.928 The publisher believed that the expansion of the publication 
range would “open up further future perspectives for a close cooperation with your ministry [MfK], 
public authorities, institutions and companies in the GDR.”929 With Bauer being “Europeʼs biggest 
magazine publisher,” one idea for such cooperation was the distribution of up to 300.000 copies of the 
magazine Neue Mode (new fashion) for a retail price in East German currency distributed by Postal 
Distribution.930 While this was to be a trial for a joint publication project, the publisher underlined, 
Bauer was interested in “cooperation on the widest possible scale in the different sectors in publishing 
(editing, distribution and sales, marketing etc.),” and expressed interest in further in-depth negotiations 
to bring about specific results.931 
926“aus der Misere beim Z/Z-verkauf (Forderung nach 5-Tage-Woche für Zusteller, fehlendes Kiosk-Personal), 
herauszukommen, da ein zusätzlicher Inlandsvertrieb sonst nicht durchzuführen wäre.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über 
eine Beratung beim Amt für Presse- und Informationsdienst, Berlin, am 7.12.1989, VE AHB Buchexport, Leipzig, 
December 8, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
927Telex, Günther Schottler Geschäftsleitung, Heinrich Bauer Verlag, to Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle 
Auslandsarbeit, MfK, Hamburg, November 28, 1990, attachment to letter, Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle 
Auslandsarbeit beim Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, Presseamt der Regierung, November 30, 1989, BArch
DC9/1052. 
928Telex, Günther Schottler Geschäftsleitung, Heinrich Bauer Verlag, to Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle 
Auslandsarbeit, MfK, Hamburg, November 28, 1990, attachment to letter, Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle 
Auslandsarbeit beim Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, Presseamt der Regierung, November 30, 1989, BArch
DC9/1052. 
929“sich fuer die zukunft weitere perspektiven einer intensiven zusammenarbeit mit ihrem ministerium, behoerden, 
institutionen und firmen der ddr ergeben.” Telex, Günther Schottler Geschäftsleitung, Heinrich Bauer Verlag, to 
Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit, MfK,  Hamburg, November 28, 1990, attachment to letter, 
Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit beim Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, Presseamt
der Regierung, November 30, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
930“europas groesster zeitschriftenverlag.” Telex, Günther Schottler Geschäftsleitung, Heinrich Bauer Verlag, to Manfred 
Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit, MfK,  Hamburg, November 28, 1990, attachment to letter, Manfred 
Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit beim Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, Presseamt der 
Regierung, November 30, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
931“zusammenarbeit auf breitester ebene in den unterschiedlichen bereichen des verlagsgeschaeftes (redaktion, vertrieb, 
anzeigen etc.)” Telex, Günther Schottler Geschäftsleitung, Heinrich Bauer Verlag, to Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für 
Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit, MfK,  Hamburg, November 28, 1990, attachment to letter, Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für 
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About a week after this meeting, on November 30, Manfred Schuberth wrote a letter to 
Wolfgang Meyer, spokesman of the government and head of the Press Office, giving details on the 
Bauer deal. Schuberth pointed to the “complexity of the entire issue” having to negotiate political 
imperatives of media reform and the economic necessities coming along with it.932 Schuberth explained
that since he had been appointed director of the Center for Foreign Cultural Relations, “substantial 
efforts [have been made] to expand commercial work abroad,” which included business connections 
with “renown foreign publishing groups, such as Bauer publishers.”933 The overall goal was “to allow 
for political and economic interests in the field of international cultural relations – where sensible – … 
to be seized and consolidated purposefully” for the benefit of the GDR.934 
Schuberth's reasoning might be understood as a response to the way press matters were being 
discussed among East German institutions and ministries. While there was a general emphasis on the 
necessity of political decision-making and policy guidelines for a free and more diverse press, 
discussions on the economic necessities were left in the open; it was clear that no additional resources 
could be made available for any such endeavor. This is where West German publishers stepped in: on 
December 7, after the political talk over the imperatives of a free press was over, representatives of the 
executive board of Heinrich Bauer met with Hans-Jürgen Hammer (MPF) and Germer (Postal 
Distribution, PZV) to further discuss the economic side and the business proposal of Bauer.935 
The Follow-up Meeting with Bauer 
During this meeting, two representatives of Bauer (who were, in fact, representatives of the 
public relations agency Salaction936) made again an offer for the “building of a joint enterprise … for 
the press distribution in the GDR” for which the publisher would provide material assistance, 
technology and management expertise while the Post was to contribute its facilities, properties, and its 
Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit beim Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, Presseamt der Regierung, November 30, 
1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
932“Kompliziertheit dieser gesamten Problematik.” Letter, Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit beim
Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, Presseamt der Regierung, November 30, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
933“umfangreiche Anstrengungen zum Ausbau der kommerziellen Auslandsarbeit … renomierten Verlagsgruppen des 
Auslandes, darunter der Bauer-Verlag.” Letter, Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit beim 
Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, Presseamt der Regierung, November 30, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. 
934Full quote: “Damit sollen in den internationalen Kulturbeziehungen – da wo sinnvoll – politische und wirtschaftliche 
Interessen ... zielgerichtet aufgegriffen und miteinander verbunden werden.” Letter, Manfred Schuberth, Zentrum für 
Kulturelle Auslandsarbeit beim Ministerium für Kultur, to Wolfgang Meyer, Presseamt der Regierung, November 30, 
1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052. 
935Internal note, Hammer, Information über ein Gespräch mit Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer 
Verlages am 7. Dezember 1989, December 7, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3); also Internal note, Zusätzliche Hinweise 
zum Vermerk über Gespräch mit Bauer-Verlag, December 7, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
936Letter, Günther Schottler, Heinrich Bauer Verlag to Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, December 8, 
1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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personnel.937 The import of West German publications was to happen in East German currency, and 
Bauer offered a trade margin of forty percent of the administered retail price (EVP). The remaining 
sixty percent, going to Bauer, was to be paid into an account of a credit institute in the GDR.938 
According to an internal note of Hammer: “The publisher expects a prospective annual revenue of 
about 250 million Mark (the current press revenue of the PZV is about 750 million Mark) by exporting 
about 3.5 million copies of 72 publications on a weekly basis into the GDR.”939 
This offer was forwarded to the MPF with a request for further examination. Internally, 
however, suggestions were made to give approval to Bauer. Based on current costs, the given trade 
margin promised sufficient revenue, and it was estimated that “the East German market [was] ready for
the import in estimated scales.”940 The joint venture distributor was to do retail distribution only. To 
reach the estimated 3.5 million copies per week, distribution was to be increased in stages, by 
publication, and depending on the respective capacities. A condition for accepting the offer, however, 
was “that Postal Distribution remains an integral part of the postal and press sector, and that the 
monopoly of the German Post for press distribution is being maintained.”941 It further needed specific 
and concrete steps to bring this deal about: First, the inquiry of Bauer for importing of fashion 
magazine Neue Mode (with an estimated circulation of 300.000 copies starting in January 1990) needed
to be approved, preferably by December 12.942 And while AHB Buchexport was to be generally in 
charge of these imports, it needed principle decisions regarding the transfer of import and distribution 
rights to the German Post, and the opening of an account for Bauer (both by December 31, 1989). It 
also needed a clear directive for further negotiations with Bauer regarding the founding of a 
937 “Aufbau eines gemeinsamen Unternehmens … für den Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Internal note, Hammer, Information
über ein Gespräch mit Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer Verlages am 7. Dezember 1989, December
7, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
938Internal note, Hammer, Information über ein Gespräch mit Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer 
Verlages am 7. Dezember 1989, December 7, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
939“Der Verlag rechnet perspektivisch mit einem Export in die DDR von wochentlich ca. 3,5 Mio Exemplaren bei 72 
Titeln mit einem voraussichtlichen Jahresumsatz von ca. 250 Mio M (derzeitiger Presseumsatz der PZV ca. 750 Mio 
M).” Internal note, Hammer, Information über ein Gespräch mit Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer 
Verlages am 7. Dezember 1989, December 7, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
940“der Markt der DDR … für den Import in der geschätzten Großenordnung aufnahmefähig.” Internal note, Hammer, 
Information über ein Gespräch mit Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer Verlages am 7. Dezember 
1989, December 7, 1989, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
941“daß der PZV als integrierter Bestandteil des Post- und Zeitungswesen bestehen bleibt und das Vertriebsmonopol der 
Deutschen Post für alle Presseerzeugnisse erhalten bleibt.” Internal note, Hammer, Information über ein Gespräch mit 
Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer Verlages am 7. Dezember 1989, December 7, 1989, p. 2, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
942Internal note, Hammer, Information über ein Gespräch mit Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer 
Verlages am 7. Dezember 1989, December 7, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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distribution joint venture.943 
Hammer made these suggestions in the follow-up of the Bauer talks on December 7, 
encouraged by a letter sent by Günther Schottler from Bauer management. In it, Schottler invited East 
German representatives on a tour through the publishing houseʼs production and marketing/distribution
department to talk over details for a cooperation with the ministry.944 Attached was the business 
proposal from November 17, 1989.945 
Though it seemed the Bauer deal was to come about, the MPF backpedaled shortly after. After 
having consulted with the Ministry of Operation and Traffic, to which the MPF was subordinated, on 
December 11, Hammer noted that “no premature talks must be led!”946 For now, there should be no 
import of publications, but any such import first required common positions, which still needed to be 
worked out.947 Bauerʼs request to import Neue Mode was eventually rejected on December 12, with 
reference to the unclear legal condition.948 
In spite of Bauerʼs detailed effort, in the end, G+J had the more comprehensive concept and 
Schuberth pushing for it. Bauerʼs offer, based on import rather than on offering clear solutions 
regarding distribution, lost to G+Jʼs detailed financing scheme. Even Germer, who was not in favor of 
the G+J deal, stated that “in some points, it still is economically more feasible than the offer of 
Heinrich Bauer publishers.”949 G+J's estimates had put the baseline also for how other offers of West 
German publishers were being evaluated.
943Internal note, Hammer, Information über ein Gespräch mit Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer 
Verlages am 7. Dezember 1989, December 7, 1989, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
944Letter, Günther Schottler, Heinrich Bauer Verlag to Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, December 8, 
1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
945Proposal, Angebot der Verlagsgruppe Bauer für einen Pressevertrieb auf dem Gebiet der DDR, 17. November 1989, 
BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to Letter, Günther Schottler, Heinrich Bauer Verlag to Hammer, Ministerium für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen, December 8, 1989, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
946“keine voreiligen Verhandlungen anstreben!” Handwritten notes on internal note, Hammer, Information über ein 
Gespräch mit Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer Verlages am 7. Dezember 1989, December 7, 1989,
pp.1-2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
947“keine voreiligen Verhandlungen anstreben!” Handwritten notes on internal note, Hammer, Information über ein 
Gespräch mit Beauftragten der Geschäftsleitung des Heinrich Bauer Verlages am 7. Dezember 1989, December 7, 1989,
pp.1-2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
948Letter, Germer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to Schottler, Bauer Verlag, December 12, 1989, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
949“ist aber offensichtlich in einigen Punkten okonomisch günstiger als das Angebot vom Heinrich Bauer Verlag.”Internal 
Note, Dietrich Germer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Kultur, Kollegen Lorf, am 
18.12.1989, December 19, 1989, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), attachment to policy draft III, Vorlage für den 
Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d. 
[Dezember 1989], BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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Springer: The Late Comer
The same day the MPF rejected the third policy draft of the MfK (see Chapter 4), Peter Tamm, 
chair of the board of the Axel Springer publishers, wrote to then Prime Minister Hans Modrow.950 
Similar to Gerd Schulte-Hillen (G+J) three weeks earlier, Tamm explained that “the introduced 
reforms” in the GDR gave reason “to offer advice and support for the advancement of existing [East 
German] media as well as the establishment of new newspapers and magazines;” the goal was “to very 
soon come to a concrete collaboration.”951 
Attached was an eight-page document entitled “Cooperations in the Media Sector between 
Institutions of the German Democratic Republic and Companies in the Federal Republic of Germany,” 
which, according to Tamm, listed essential projects that should be given priority in any such efforts.952 
And though the title implied the involvement of various companies on the side of the FRG, it focused 
on Springer as the sole potential partner. Tamm explained, not only did Springer possess in-depth 
experience in all segments of national and international media markets and had decidedly helped build 
the West German press, but it also offered knowledge transfer “and the direct corporate commitment in
joint ventures and [other] projects.”953 Springer was willing to be the sole shareholder in any such joint 
ventures but, if necessary, was also willing to cooperate with other West German partners. Tamm 
closed by stating: “Needless to say, we respect the sovereignty of media in your country and, therefore, 
see our responsibilities mainly in a collaborative partnership in the spirit of the CSCE agreements,” 
before asking for the permission of opening an editorial office in East Berlin and for short notice talks 
“in order to soon generate specific results.”954 All of these points were included in the attached 
proposal. Similar to the proposal introduced by G+J, the concept of Springer brought to the fore an all-
encompassing approach, aiming for a quasi-monopoly position of Springer in media in the GDR. 
950Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
951“die eingeleiteten Reformen … für die Fortentwicklung der bestehenden Medien sowie die Gründung neuer Zeitungen 
und Zeitschriften Rat und Unterstützung anzubieten...sehr schnell zu einer konkreten Zusammenarbeit zu kommen.” 
Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
952Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans 
Modrow, December 20, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
953“als auch das direkte unternehmerische Engagement in gemeinsamen Projekten und Gesellschaften.” Letter, Peter 
Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
954“Selbstverständlich respektieren wir die Eigenständigkeit der Medien Ihres Landes und sehen unsere Aufgaben deshalb 
vor allem in partnerschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit im Geiste der KSZE-Vereinbarungen. … um moglichst schnell zu 
konkreten Ergebnissen zu kommen.” Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, 
p. 1-2, BArch DC9/1052.
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The Springer Proposal 
Underlining the political dimensions of media and current developments in the GDR to comply 
with international agreements (CSCE), the goal according to Springer was “to allow all political groups
[in the GDR] to access media.”955 For this and the challenges coming along with it, Axel Springer 
offered its partnership, for it was “qualified for such partnerships like no other West German 
publisher.”956 Underlining its various activities and expertise in the national and local press sector, in 
foreign print media markets, in the broadcasting sector, as well as in distribution, the proposal focused 
on the GDR only. Slightly different from G+J and Bauer, Springer claimed:
We believe the biggest problem currently lies with the provision of adequate financial 
resources and foreign currency for developing further existing activities, and for starting 
of new ones. This is why, for the time being, the priority must be to mainly promote those
projects that directly lead to a foreign currency intake for the German Democratic 
Republic.957 
This revenue could then be used for new investments, such as the import of press products. 
Springer put particular emphasis on the financial aspect and on the lack of material resources in 
the GDR. Thus, only “those kinds of projects should be supported that lead to an increase in efficiency 
and productivity in the media sector without requiring additional hard currency.”958 The proposal lined 
out several such projects, giving propositions on the broadcasting sector, print media, and press 
distribution. Springer acknowledged, however, that the development of any specifics “requires the 
setting of media policy priorities through the German Democratic Republic.”959 Similar to G+J, the 
955“allen politischen Gruppierungen Zugang zu Medien zu ermoglichen.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich 
zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
956Full quote: “eignet sich zu derartigen Partnerschaften wie kein anderer westdeutscher Verlag, weil er in allen Sparten 
und Märkten der Medienbranche tätig ist.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter 
Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
957“Nach unserer Einschätzung besteht in der augenblicklichen Konstellation das grosste Problem in der Bereitstellung 
ausreichender Finanzmittel und Valuten für den Ausbau bestehender und Aufbau neuer Aktivitäten. Deshalb muss es 
zunächst vorrangiges Ziel sein, jene Projekte zu fordern, die unmittelbar zu Deviseneinnahmen für die Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik führen.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, 
Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052. 
958“sollten alle jene Projekte  gefordert werden, die zu einer Steigerung der Effizienz und Produktivität im Medienbereich 
führen, ohne dass hierfür Devisen benotigt werden.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen 
Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052. 
959“setzt die Festlegung der medienpolitischen Prioritäten durch die Deutsche Demokratische Republik voraus.” Proposal, 
Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, 
December 20, 1989, p. 8, BArch DC9/1052. 
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basic assumption of Springer was that advertising served as the central source of financing. 
Respectively, a central concern of the proposal was the introduction of advertising and marketing 
services to all media related enterprises for the purpose of revenue intake. The proposed projects were 
to be financed, first, by the sale of advertising time, second, by the sale of advertising space in print 
media to West German clients, third, by the marketing of TV productions and, fourth, the sale of 
printing and other services.960 
Relating to broadcasting, it was suggested that by increasing the amount of advertising time on 
television and radio, air time could be marketed to Western advertising agencies. Depending on the 
development of the range of consumer goods and the purchasing power in the GDR, “under favorable 
conditions, sales revenue in the range of more than 200 million DM is possible.”961 Airtime marketing 
was to be organized by a joint venture between Springer and an East German partner or, alternatively, 
could be handled by the Axel Springer's marketing department for a standard commission of fifteen 
percent.962 Springer also envisioned a joint venture for the production of television shows for both 
German markets. Holding a majority share in CAPITOL, a company specialized in the acquisition and 
sale of film and TV series rights, Springer offered the companyʼs services for acquiring international 
television rights for the GDR and marketing its production internationally in return.963 
As for print media, Springer offered consulting assistance for developing East German 
newspapers and magazines in particular with regard to the introduction of electronic text and 
advertising booking systems. Springer was also willing to establish new local and national newspapers 
and magazines (i.e. TV guides, supplements, and trade journals) in joint venture with partners in the 
GDR. These projects were to be financed through the gradual expansion of advertising in print media. 
“For this, West German advertising clients can be solicited via the advertising sales network of Axel 
Springer.”964 In addition, Springer offered its support in modernizing printing technology and printing 
960Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans 
Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 8, BArch DC9/1052. 
961“Unter günstigen Voraussetzungen konnen die Umsätze eine Grossenordnung von mehr als 200 Millionen DM 
erreichen.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer 
Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
962Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans 
Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
963Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans 
Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
964“Dabei konnen westdeutsche Unternehmen für die Insertion über den Anzeigenverkaufsapparat des Axel Springer 
Verlages geworben werden.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
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plants (possibly through a joint venture), and was also willing to use its competency being “one of the 
largest purchasers of paper for improving the supply with raw materials to the extent possible.”965 To 
“achieve direct solutions for the German Democratic Republic in the short term,” the publisher was 
furthermore willing “to provide assistance in the technical production of publications in its own 
printing plants to the extent possible.”966 This was an immediate measure. In the long run, East German 
newspaper and magazines could be distributed and marketed in the Federal Republic on favorable 
terms via the Axel Springer sales network. In return, West German publications could be imported into 
the GDR via a joint-venture company. “For this, Axel Springer publishers is willing to offer its [unsold 
and returned] newspapers and magazines,” such as Journal für die Frau, Hobby, Tennis Magazine, 
Auto-Bild, and Sport-Bild on an interim basis.967 
For press distribution, Springer also suggested a joint venture. While partners could be the 
German Post and/or other suitable trade and distribution organizations, the “investment partner on West
German side can be Axel Springer publishers alone or in cooperation with other major publishers.”968 It
was made clear: “The distribution joint venture must guarantee the same market entry criteria to all 
legally permitted domestic and international newspapers and magazines … on the basis of a reasonable 
profit margin by means of universal price fixing.”969 Springer furthermore offered its training facilities 
and business premises for education and training programs for journalists and trainees, and it was 
willing to train aspiring East German journalists in its own editorial offices. It was also to make 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, 
Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 4, BArch DC9/1052. 
965“einer der großten Papiereinkäufer im Rahmen der gegebenen Moglichkeiten für eine Verbesserung der 
Versorgungslage mit Rohstoffen.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, 
Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 5, BArch DC9/1052. 
966“unmittelbar und kurzfristig für die Deutsche Demokratische Republik wirksame Losungen zu erzielen … z.B. Hilfe bei
der technischen Herstellung von Druckerzeugnissen im Rahmen verfügbarer Kapazitäten in seinen eigenen Druckereien 
zu leisten.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer 
Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 5, BArch DC9/1052. 
967“Der Axel Springer Verlag ist bereit, dafür seine Zeitungen und Zeitschriften anzubieten.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit 
im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 
1989, p. 5, BArch DC9/1052. 
968“Beteiligungspartner von westdeutscher Seite kann der Axel Springer Verlag allein oder auch zusammen mit anderen 
Großverlagen sein.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, 
Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 6, BArch DC9/1052. 
969“Das Vertriebs-Gemeinschaftsunternehmen hat für alle gesetzlich zulässigen in- und ausländischen Zeitungen und 
Zeitschriften den Marktzugang nach gleichen Kriterien zu garantieren. Dabei wird eine angemessene Handelsspanne bei 
landeseinheitlicher Preisbindung zugrunde gelegt.” Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, 
Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, December 20, 1989, p. 6, BArch DC9/1052. 
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available advisory teams and offer its expertise in computer and organizational systems. Other possible 
areas of cooperation included the book market (via Ullstein), medical journals (via the trade journal 
group Medical Tribune) and market research.970
Analysis
Both Gruner + Jahr and Bauer (and slightly later Springer) had business concepts ready for 
reforming East German media in general and the press in particular only days after the fall of the Berlin
Wall. In particular G+J offered the first holistic approach in offering a financing scheme that allowed 
for comprehensive reform efforts based on advertising revenue affecting all media in the GDR. Though
G+J was aggressive in its approach, the still pending approval of its board of director can be taken as 
evidence for how fast its business proposal must have been written. Also Bauer was very active in 
promoting itself as the West German partner in the endeavor of opening up the GDR market to Western
print media. And while all the publishers pushed for and were actively engaged in concrete talks on 
how to bring this about, it was in particular G+J that aimed for influence on a much broader level. G+J 
also made use of distinctly East German language (by using terms such as “ausländischer 
Endverbraucherpreis”) and by incorporating distinctly East German institutions (i.e. 
Außenhandelsgesellschaft) and, thereby, adapted to the GDR context, potentially generating a favorable
outcome. Its major stronghold: a reform of the entire press sector that seemingly did not require any 
additional investments. This initial business proposal became the base-line document for all policy 
initiatives of the MfK and MPF. 
It follows that the first and all subsequent drafts of the policy proposal (as outlaid in Chapter 4) 
must, on the one hand, be seen as written manifestations for the goals and priorities of the East German
government during the early transition period. The proclaimed goal of a “free media” in the GDR stood
for much broader policy aims of the coalition government a month after the fall of the Wall. On the 
other hand, however, the document also exemplifies the very early influence of Western lobbying in 
media policy related matters. The latter never developed in its own right. Instead, the substantial 
influence of the G+J concept lay in the quick and seamless adaption of an advertising-based free press 
model; this came along with a quasi-monopoly position of a West German private entity over large 
parts the media in the GDR. All policy drafts disregarded any political, economic and/or ideological 
implications the introduction of advertising-based media as the major source of revenue might have for 
970Proposal, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans 
Modrow, December 20, 1989, pp. 6-7, BArch DC9/1052. 
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the GDR (being a sovereign socialist country) in general, and its media (in a planned economy) in 
particular. Though the second policy draft stated that “a landmark decision for the import and 
distribution of Western press product in the GDR brings up completely new problems for many levels 
in our society,” the listed problems relate to distribution rather than to more profound consequences of 
introducing advertising and its market logic to a still socialist state.971 The particular strength of the G+J
proposal was that it fit right into the hybrid mindset of familiar socialist centralist media structures for 
political purposes disguising newly introduced monopolistic corporate strategies. 
Similar to the earlier proposal of G+J, Springer reasoned with a free press and CSCE 
agreements, had an all-inclusive and comprehensive approach to reforming the media in the GDR, and 
proposed its financing through advertising based revenue. Slightly different from other offers, Springer 
had a more holistic and detailed approach in that it included every level of production, distribution, and 
training in print, broadcast and film. Similar to the other publishers, Springer too framed its own efforts
(such as taking over printing orders from East German publishers, marketing advertising time or the 
marketing of East German print media in the FRG) as political imperatives not as economically 
beneficial. In this way, the potential exploitation of new market opportunities were presented as 
standing in the service of reform. 
Individual Talks with Major Publishers 
Springer sent its proposal the same day the MPF drafted its letter to reject the G+J-based third 
policy proposal of the MfK. In spite of this rejection, Gruner+Jahrʼs concept still circulated in different 
ministries, which eventually culminated in the fourth proposal (this time of the MPF) on January 4, also
this policy proposal fell through (see Chapter 4). In consequence, the Post, in its aim to maintain its 
control over distribution, took over negotiations entirely, aiming at exploiting the competitive situation 
between publishers to its own advantage. In the upcoming new round of negotiations, however, past 
concepts and ideas that had initially been introduced by G+J, were now being presented as “native.” 
Core concern: the building of a joint venture distribution company with the Post as the East German 
partner.  
Between January 5 and January 10, 1990, separate meetings were held between the MPF and 
the executive directors of Gruner + Jahr, Axel Springer, and Bauer over importing Western print media
and building a joint venture for their distribution. A meeting with major publisher Burda was scheduled
971“Mit einer Grundsatzentscheidung für den Import und Vertrieb westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR entstehen 
vollig neue Problemstellungen für viele Bereiche unserer Gesellschaft.” Policy draft II, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der 
DDR, Konzeption zur umfassenden Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in die DDR, n.d., p. 5, BArch DC9/1052.
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for January 11. Present at all of these meetings were Hans-Jürgen Hammer, deputy minister of the 
MPF, and Heinz Schunke, joined by the different representatives of the respective publishers. Internal 
notes of Hammer on the individual meetings show very similar proceedings: Hammer underlined that 
the exclusive press distribution rights lay with the German Post, and the publishers expressed their 
great interest in working with the Post in importing and distributing press from West Germany. Issues 
discussed during the meeting related in particular to the financing of imports and the need of material 
and technical assistance for any joint venture enterprise.972 What differed were the concrete ideas and 
strategies of the publishers with regard to the financing of Western press distribution. 
Bauer and Gruner +Jahr 
The first meeting took place on January 5, when Hammer and Schunke met with representatives
of Bauer, and G+J at the MPF in Berlin. The length of notes taken by Hammer suggest that Bauer 
disappointed, while G+J defended anew its strong position.
Present for Bauer were CEO Günther Schottler and members of the management who laid out 
Bauerʼs distribution concept but, as Hammer later noted, made no statements regarding the financial 
basis for a broader import. And though discussions regarding the financing problem were in-depth, the 
meeting ended “without Bauer publishers having given any concrete ideas for possible solutions.”973 
“On the part of the MPF, it was emphasized that it was not about general intentions but about concrete 
proposals on how, via other services of the GDR as part of a joint distributor, foreign currency can be 
generated by the German Post to import, in sufficient amounts, needed publications from the FRG and 
West Berlin.”974 Bauer left the meeting agreeing to continue working on a proposal and to inform the 
MPF as soon as possible about its progress. Schottler further gave the option of investing the revenue 
Bauer was to generate into “concrete measures for improving the infrastructure in the GDR.”975 He was
972See for example: Internal note, Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen des Vertriebes von 
Presseerzeugnissen der BRD und Berlin(West) mit dem Heinrich Bauer Verlag am 5.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 8, 
1990, DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). Note: The internal notes of all meetings can be found in 
DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
973“ohne daß konkrete Losungsmoglichkeiten vom Heinrich Bauer Verlag angegeben werden konnten.” Internal note, 
Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen des Vertriebes von Presseerzeugnissen der BRD und 
Berlin(West) mit dem Heinrich Bauer Verlag am 5.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 8, 1990, DM3/21121 (1/3).
974“Betont wurde dabei von seiten [sic] des MPF, daß es hierbei nicht um allgemeine Absichten sondern um konkrete 
Vorschläge gehe, wie durch andere Leistungen der DDR im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Vertriebsaufgabe Valutamittel 
durch die Deutsche Post eingenommen werden konnen, um die erforderlichen Presseerzeugnisse bedarfsdeckend aus der
BRD bzw. Berlin(West) zu importieren.” Internal note, Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen 
des Vertriebes von Presseerzeugnissen der BRD und Berlin(West) mit dem Heinrich Bauer Verlag am 5.1.1990 im 
MPF, Berlin, January 8, 1990, DM3/21121 (1/3).
975“für konkrete Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Infrastruktur der DDR bereitzustellen.” Internal note, Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen des Vertriebes von Presseerzeugnissen der BRD und Berlin(West) mit 
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going to inform the MPF about Bauerʼs final decision regarding this question. As far as the 
documentation shows, this question never came up again.
That same day, Hammer and Schunke were joined by Wolfgang Gerhardt from the Ministry of 
Economics to meet with G+J.976 Representatives for G+J were CEO Gerhard Schulte-Hillen, Rolf 
Wickmann (director of the magazine department), Hartmut Bühne (department manager), as well as 
Herr Schmidt-Holz (advertising department). In contrast to Bauer, G+J was ready to present its detailed
concept and financing plan. 
According to Hammer, there were three essential outcomes of the meeting: First, the import of 
press products was to be financed through advertising on television. Similar to its initial concept, G+J 
estimated “that for the first 12 months, TV advertising orders worth 60 mio. DM could be possible,” 
with further increases in the future (again, with a 15 percent commission for G+J).977 “Being 
specifically asked what guarantees could be given for the GDRʼs foreign currency intake, Mr. Schulte-
Hillen stated that considering all factors yet unknown for such advertising activity on East German 
television [FS-DDR], he expects a [guaranteed] revenue intake of 20 million DM for the first year.”978 
G+J agreed that the guaranteed net advertising revenue was to be renewed annually based on the 
commitment to not undercut the attained level of performance.979 Second, G+J accepted that the 
German Post was to hold the majority of 51 percent in the joint venture company. Furthermore, any 
decision on the product range of Western print media to be imported was to be made by the Post. Third,
G+J agreed to give immediate material assistance to support the needed additional handling and 
transport services of the Post and to ensure its material basis, especially in transportation capacities.980 
dem Heinrich Bauer Verlag am 5.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 8, 1990, DM3/21121 (1/3).
976Internal note, Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen der Bildung eines 
Pressevertriebsunternehmens des Deutschen Post mit dem Verlagshaus Gruner & Jahr am 5.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, 
January 8, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
977“daß in den ersten 12 Monaten mindestens für 60 Mill DM Werbeaufträge für das Fernsehen der DDR realisiert werden 
konnen.” Internal note, Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen der Bildung eines 
Pressevertriebsunternehmens des Deutschen Post mit dem Verlagshaus Gruner & Jahr am 5.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, 
January 8, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
978“Auf eine ausdrückliche Frage, welche Garantie für die Valuta-Einnahmen für die DDR gegeben werden konnen, teilte 
Herr Schulte-Hillen mit, daß er unter Beachtung aller bisher unbekannten Fakten einer solchen Werbetätigkeit im DDR-
Fernsehen eine Einnahme-Hohe von 20 Mio DM im ersten Jahr für sicher hält.” Internal note, Hans-Jürgen Hammer, 
Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen der Bildung eines Pressevertriebsunternehmens des Deutschen Post mit dem 
Verlagshaus Gruner & Jahr am 5.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 8, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
979The passage reads as follows: “Das garantierte Netto-Werbeaufkommen wird jährlich jeweils 3 Monate vor Ablauf des 
Jhres [sic] auf der Grundlage der Verpflichtung fortgeschrieben, das erreichte Leistungsniveau nicht zu unterbieten.” 
Internal note, Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen der Bildung eines 
Pressevertriebsunternehmens des Deutschen Post mit dem Verlagshaus Gruner & Jahr am 5.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, 
January 8, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
980Internal note, Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen der Bildung eines 
Pressevertriebsunternehmens des Deutschen Post mit dem Verlagshaus Gruner & Jahr am 5.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, 
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G+J was to present concrete proposals to the MPF on short notice, which it did three days later (see 
below).981 
When G+J was informed that also other West German publishers were interested in and had 
submitted their respective concepts for a joint venture, it was made clear that “[f]or reasons of 
efficiency, Mister Schulte-Hillen does not consider it to be useful to include other distributors or 
publishers on part of the FRG for establishing a distribution enterprise in the GDR.”982 Not only did 
G+J aim at being the sole joint-venture partner but also, in contrast to Bauer, Schulte-Hillen made it 
very clear that he had every intention of finalizing their agreements as soon as possible. The MPF on its
part clarified that any details referring to establishing and operating a joint venture could be drafted 
only after the government had given its approval. For further negotiations regarding the advertising 
question, Schulte-Hillen was promised direct talks with representatives of FS-DDR. G+J and the MPF 
were to meet again soon.
Gruner+Jahr's Renewed Proposition
Three days later, Schulte-Hillen, thanking Hammer for the “constructive meeting” and wanting 
to capture the “central points” of the conversation, renewed his wish to “soon come to final 
agreements.”983 While the overall results captured in the letter were similar to the notes taken by 
Hammer and to the concept sent on November 29, 1989, the letter did contain significant differences: it
gave more competencies to the joint venture, and added detailed stipulations regarding advertising 
(revenue) and the material assistance offered by G+J.984 And though Schulte-Hillen claimed that 
“details still need to be worked out over the responsibilities of G+J as a managing partner in the joint 
January 8, 1990, pp. 1-2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
981See letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandsvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des 
Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, January 8, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
982“Herr Schulte-Hillen hält es aus Effektivitätsgründen nicht für zweckmäßig, von [seiten] der BRD weitere Vertriebs- 
oder Verlagsunternehmen an einer zu bildenden Vertriebsgesellschaft in der DDR zu beteiligen.” Internal note, Hans-
Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über ein Gespräch zu Fragen der Bildung eines Pressevertriebsunternehmens des Deutschen 
Post mit dem Verlagshaus Gruner & Jahr am 5.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 8, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
983“konstruktive Gespräch … wesentlichen Punkte … bald zu endgültigen Vereinbarungen kommen.” Letter, Gerd 
Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandsvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post-
und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, January 8, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
984The core ideas remained the same: G+J was to hold 49 percent of the joint venture whose overall purpose was to import 
and distribute foreign publications in the GDR (Note: G+J expected the 51 percent share of the Post to be divided again 
between the Post and a possible co-partner such as the television of the GDR and/or Leipzig Kommissionsgroßhandel). 
And just like with its initial concept, the joint venture was to also manage the “distribution of national press products in 
the GDR as well as their export” (“Vertrieb nationaler Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR sowie deren Export”).Thus, the 
joint venture was to be taking charge of importing Western publications and of distributing GDR publications within the 
GDR. Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandsvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des
Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, January 8, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
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venture, there had been a basic agreement [during the talks] that G+J was to be in charge of retail sales 
and its further development” while the Post was to “bring to the joint venture its monopoly rights for 
press distribution.”985 The revenue scheme for the needed hard currency intake was slightly more 
ambitious now:
Year Ad-time per day in 
min per program
Gross revenue in 
DM per year 
G+J guarantees
(preliminary)
1990 30 60-70 million 20 million minimum
1991 60 90-100 million -
1992 90 120-150 million -
Table 1
G+J guaranteed a revenue of 20 million for that year but expected the amount to increase after 
negotiations with FS-DDR (for instance over the timing and placing of ads).986 “For the acquisition of 
additional advertising means, out-of-home advertising in the GDR is being delegated to the joint-
venture.”987 The sale of advertising spaces to Western companies was to be managed by the marketing 
department of G+J on a commission basis, and G+J was to “make every effort promoting the feeding of
television of the GDR into the cable networks of the Federal Republic.”988 Details still had to be 
negotiated, but G+J emphasized that it was to “submit a 3-year-plan and an investment plan for the 
joint venture as soon as possible.”989 
It return for its partnership rights, G+J was willing to provide the “basic transportation capacity”
(Transportgrundkapazität) of one hundred 1.5-toner trucks free of charge once the joint venture started 
operating. The same applied to the basic equipment for the administrative sector with office furniture 
and other supplies. G+J was further willing to “provide hard currency as long as it was needed for 
985“Über die Aufgaben von G+J als managing partner im Joint-venture muß im Detail noch Einigung erzielt werden. Dem 
Grund nach bestand aber Einigkeit, G+J insbesondere den Einzelverkauf und dessen weiteren Ausbau zu übertragen … 
die bei ihr liegenden Monopolrechte des Pressevertriebs … einbringen.” Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, 
Vorstandsvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen der DDR, January 8, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
986Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandsvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des 
Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, January 8, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
987“Zur Beschaffung zusätzlicher Werbemittel wird dem Joint-venture die Außenwerbung in der DDR übertragen.” Letter, 
Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandsvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, January 8, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
988“alle Anstrengungen unternehmen, die Einspeisung des DDR-Fernsehens in die Kabelnetze der Bundesrepublik zu 
befordern.” Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandsvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, 
Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, January 8, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
989“umgehend einen 3-Jahresplan und einen Investitionsplan für das Joint-venture vorlegen.” Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, 
Vorstandsvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen der DDR, January 8, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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purchasing office and business equipment.”990 In return, G+J expected the Post to provide the needed 
facilities and processing spaces. This financing and material assistance scheme was a continuation of 
former concepts and was to set the baseline for further negotiations with the MPF. The promised 
meeting with representatives of FS-DDR on the conditions of TV advertising took place on January 10,
when G+J met with the director of FS-DDR; in result of this meeting, G+J promised a new proposal by
January 25, 1990.991 
Springer and Burda
On January 9, Hammer and Schunke met with Springer CEO Peter Tamm.992 They were joined 
by Wolfgang Vogel, a lawyer, who later, in a letter to Hammer, described this meeting as having been 
“very pleasant.”993 Tamm underlined the interest of Springer to manage the distribution of West 
German publications in the GDR, if needed also in cooperation with another publisher, preferably 
Heinrich Bauer, via a joint venture that should expediently have a marketing office affiliated to it. The 
main issues discussed during the meeting were the financing of West German press imports, needed 
material and technical assistance, and the stipulation of a guaranteed sum for commencing business 
activities and press distribution. Hammer noted, “Mister Tamm explained that this [import] can be 
financed [entirely] by advertising in East German media,” and a follow-up meeting with the director of 
the FS-DDR had been set for the same day.994 Regarding questions of scale, “discussions ranged in the 
order of 250 to 500 publications per year,” while the Post was to select the respective Western 
publications to be distributed in the GDR.995 Tamm agreed to submit a detailed written proposal by 
January 12; it was to clarify questions regarding financing, and the material and technical assistance.
Wolfgang Vogel, in his follow-up letter to Hammer, also attached a document he had received 
from the Burda publishing house. According to Vogel, this document had “a provisional character of 
990“die Valutamittel bereitzustellen, soweit sie zur Beschaffung der Betriebs- und Geschäftsausstattung erforderlich sind.” 
Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandsvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des 
Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, January 8, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
991Letter, Minister Klaus Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to Staatssekretär Rauchfuß, Ministerrat der 
DDR, January 11, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
992Internal note, Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über eine Gespräch mit dem Axel Springer Verlag am 9.1.1990 im MPF, 
Berlin, January 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
993“sehr wohltuend.” Letter, Wolfgang Vogel, Rechtsanwalt, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, MPF, Berlin, January 9, 1990, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
994“Herrn Tamm erklärt, daß das über Werbetätigkeit in den Medien der DDR gesichert werden kann.” Internal note, Hans-
Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über eine Gespräch mit dem Axel Springer Verlag am 9.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 9, 
1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3)
995“wurde über eine Großenordnung von 250 bis 500 tausend Presseerzeugnisse pro Jahr diskutiert.” Internal note, Hans-
Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über eine Gespräch mit dem Axel Springer Verlag am 9.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 9, 
1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3)
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course [but] … It could be beneficial for the [Burda] talks.”996 Entitled “To What Conditions Can We 
Distribute and Sell Our Publications in the GDR,” this two page document contained a list of Burda 
publications issued for sale in the GDR, as well as price suggestions in Mark, ideas on distribution 
channels and questions regarding the possibility of advertising (see Chapter 4).997 Vogel, present also 
during the Burda meeting, was joined by Burda board member Günter Prinz, the managing directors 
Horst Hilbertz and Manfred Made, and Lothar Loewe, consultant for the Burda magazine Bunte. In 
spite of this relatively large number of representatives, no expanded detailed concept was presented. 
Instead, the publisher made clear that it intended to open an office in Berlin and to organize 
“promotion, and bus trips for Burda products throughout the GDR.”998 Different from former talks, 
Burda underlined its willingness to cooperate with other publishing houses in importing West German 
publications via a joint venture company.999 “Out of this discussion,” Hammer noted, “developed the 
idea of organizing the new distribution company, on the side of the FRG, with [all] four major 
publishing houses in cooperation with Postal Distribution of the German Post.”1000 Once this idea was 
on the table, Hilbertz informed Hammer that, in fact, “joint talks of the publishing houses over 
questions of distributing Western print media” had already been held, and that there “existed a 
corresponding distribution model.”1001
In the outcome of the talk, it was agreed that on part of the West German publishers Axel 
Springer, Gruner + Jahr, Heinrich Bauer and Burda a joint position will be coordinated, 
and that the result will be presented to the MPF within the next week.1002
996“natürlich rein vorbehaltenden Charakter haben … Es konnte die Gesprächsführung erleichtern.” Letter, Wolfgang 
Vogel, Rechtsanwalt, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, MPF, Berlin, January 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3).
997Document, Zu welchen Bedingungen konnen wir [Burda] unsere Titel in der DDR anbieten bzw. vertreiben, Attachment
to letter, Wolfgang Vogel, Rechtsanwalt, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, MPF, Berlin, January 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3).
998“Verkaufsfahrten für Burda Erzeugnisses und Omnibusreisen durch die DDR.” Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über 
eine Gespräch mit dem Burda Verlag am 11.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
999Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über eine Gespräch mit dem Burda Verlag am 11.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 12, 
1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1000“Aus der Diskussion entwickelte sich der Vorschlag, das zu bildende Vertriebsunternehmen von seiten der BRD von 4 
großen Verlagshäusern gemeinsam mit dem Postzeitungsvertrieb der Deutschen Post zu organisieren.” Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Vermerk über eine Gespräch mit dem Burda Verlag am 11.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 1, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1001“eine gemeinsame Beratung der Verlagshaeuser ueber Fragen des Vertriebs westlicher Presseerzeugnisse … ein 
vorhandenes analoges Vertriebsmodell.” Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Vermerk über eine Gespräch mit dem Burda Verlag am 
11.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1002“Im Ergebnis des Gespraechs wurde vereinbart, dass von seiten der BRD-Verlage Axel Springer, Gruner & Jahr, 
Heinrich Bauer und Burda hierzu eine gemeinsame Abstimmung vorgenommen und das Ergebnis im Verlaufe der 
naechsten Woche dem MPF mitgeteilt wird. Prof. Dr. Vogel wird hierbei koordinierend unterstuetzen.” Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Vermerk über eine Gespräch mit dem Burda Verlag am 11.1.1990 im MPF, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 2, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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From that moment on, all four major West German publishers stood in joint negotiations with the Post 
over the building of a new press distribution system in the GDR. 
In the meantime, by early January, daily irregularities in distribution had become common 
place, which caused an increasing amount of letters of complaint written by an unsatisfied East German
readership. Issues related mainly to publications not arriving, being delayed or not being available at 
all. One reader from the northern island of Rügen pointed out that while the last copy of her 
subscription-only-magazine from 1989 had not yet arrived, the same magazine was for retail sale in the
neighboring town. To her question, how that was possible, the response was that distribution of 
subscriptions was handled centrally in the southern region of Thuringia and little could be done. 
However, the magazine had been available for retail also in reader's home town since early December 
and was, therefore, available.1003 “I think it is about time,” the reader claimed, “that things are being 
thought over in Berlin and that the old 'socialist mindset' is being quickly left behind.”1004 With regard 
to publications not being available, the Post argued that the “increasing travel activities of the 
population” were responsible and that freight traffic (for print media) had experienced great difficulties 
between November and December.1005 The hope was that this was to change again soon.
Analysis
The separate talks between the MPF and the different major publishing houses had been aimed 
at enhancing the position of the Post by making use of the competitive situation between the publishers.
This concept was successful in that all publishers, in particular G+J and Springer, showed great 
ambitions to bring about their business plans (partly by reconfirming their initial proposals). In fact, by 
January 11, 1990, G+J and Springer were in high favor with the MPF. Klaus Wolf, minister of the 
MPF, weighing the different offers, stated that “while the publishing houses Gruner + Jahr and Axel 
Springer presented a financing model through the sale of advertising time on television … Heinrich 
Bauer Publisher could not advance any such proposal to date.”1006 The offers of G+J and Springer were 
similar in that both allocated 50 percent of advertising revenue to FS-DDR, the other 50 percent were 
1003Internal note, Aktenvermerk, Zur Eingabe des Bürgers R.F., Berlin, January 17, 1990, BArch DM3/21137.
1004“Nach meiner Meinung ist es hochste Zeit, daß man in Berlin sich Gedanken macht und die alte 'sozialistische Denkart'
ganz schnell abstreift.” Letter, Eingabe, reader to Klaus Wolf, Minister für Post und Fernmeldewesen, January 3, 1990, 
BArch DM3/21137.
1005“der verstärkten Reisetätigkeit der Bevolkerung.” Internal note, Aktenvermerk, Zur Eingabe des Bürgers R.F., Berlin, 
January 17, 1990, BArch DM3/21137.
1006“Während die Verlagshäuser Gruner&Jahr und Axel Springer über ein Finanzierungsmodell über den Verkauf von 
Werbezeiten für die Programme des DDR-Fernsehens verfügen, konnten vom Heinrich Bauer Verlag dazu bisher keine 
Vorschläge unterbreitet werden.” Letter, Minister Klaus Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to 
Staatssekretär Rauchfuß, Ministerrat der DDR, January 11, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
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to help finance the import of Western press. And while G+J had had a head start by having presented 
its initial proposal much earlier and now offered the most detailed financing plan and immediate 
material assistance, Springer had ensured the MPF of its serious intentions, submitting its more detailed
proposal within a few days.1007 
Springer kept its promise. One day after Wolfʼs estimate on all publishers, on January 12, 
Springer CEO Tamm contacted Wolf's deputy minister Hammer, thanking him for “the open and 
exceptionally constructive talk ... I feel we found a range of highly interesting and concrete entry points
for joint business activities, which found their way into our basic concepts.”1008 Underlining again that 
the driving goal was to generate foreign currency, press distribution and the sale of advertising on TV, 
broadcast radio and in print media were the most promising sources of revenue. “Already for the first 
year, we think 50 million DM of hard currency revenue is possible for the partner in the GDR. We are 
willing to guarantee the amount of 50 million DM. Depending on the general framework … this 
amount can increase significantly.”1009 The letter included a list of propositions “for the various areas of
cooperation,” which according to Tamm, could be discussed in detailed at a later meeting.1010 Attached 
was a twenty-five-page document laying out the possibilities for “Cooperation Between Institutions of 
the German Democratic Republic and Companies in the Federal Republic in the Media Sector” (see 
Appendix B).1011 The length and detail of the document owed much to the earlier concept sent on 
December 20 (see above).1012 Compared to this earlier proposal and its emphasis on advertising, 
1007Letter, Minister Klaus Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to Staatssekretär Rauchfuß, Ministerrat der 
DDR, January 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1008“das offene und ausserordentlich konstruktive Gespräch am letzten Dienstag...Nach meinem Empfinden haben wir eine
ganze Reihe hochinteressanter, konkreter Ansatzpunkte für gemeinsame unternehmerische Aktivitäten gefunden, die in 
unsere grundsätzlichen Überlegungen eingeflossen sind.” Letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer 
Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 
1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1009“Bereits im ersten Jahr halten wir mindestens 50 Mio DM Deviseneinnahmen für den Partner aus der DDR für 
realisierbar. Wir sind bereit sicherzustellen, daß ein Betrag in der Großenordnung von 50 Mio DM zur Verfügung steht. 
Ja nach der Gestaltung der Rahmenbedingungen ... kann sich dieser Betrag erheblich vergroßern.” Letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1010“für die verschiedenen Felder der Zusammenarbeit.” Letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags 
AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1011Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3); a copy in also available in BArch DC9/1052.
1012Letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, Dezember 20, 1989, BArch DC9/1052, also Concept, 
Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag to Hans Modrow, 20. 
Dezember 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
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television and the trade with films, the focus now shifted to press and press distribution. Similar in 
both: the far-reaching and all-inclusive take on a possible Springer involvement in every aspect of the 
media in the GDR, including press distribution, marketing, television and broadcasting, newspapers 
and magazines, printing, educational programs, and staff training. Sent in a separate letter but 
announced in this one, a complete list of all Springer newspapers and magazines to allow for a 
selection for distribution.
Thus, within days, G+J and Springer had submitted detailed renewed proposals on how to 
establish, finance and run a joint venture enterprise with the East German Post. Both proposals 
sketched a joint venture far beyond the initial concern of the MPF on how to import sufficient amounts 
of West German publications into the GDR and how to finance such enterprises. And while these 
individual deals were still in the making, the publishers had simultaneously started talks with one 
another. They, thus, had changed the situation by consolidating their interests, which changed the MPFʼs
approach immediately.
The same day Burda informed the MPF about the meeting of the four publishing houses, 
Hammer sent a telegram to G+J CEO Schulte-Hillen, informing him that
in result of further talks ... new aspects have come up that are worth considering. They 
relate to the possibility of including other publishers from the FRG and West Berlin in 
creating a joint distributor. I, thus, would like to ask you to contact the publishing houses 
Axel Springer, Heinrich Bauer and Burda.”1013 
That same day, Hammer was going to schedule a meeting with representatives of the MfK and other 
ministries, as well as the director of FS-DDR for the week of January 15, to discuss the different offers 
made by the publishers and to bring the results forward to the government.1014 By January 16, the “Big 
Four” had officially joined forces.
Joining Interests – the ʻBig Fourʼ 
The four major publishing houses had been in negotiation with each other before January 11, 
1990. That day, however, they had announced to present a proposal to the MPF within a week. It took 
five days. On January 16, Schulte-Hillen informed the MPF that G+J had come together with Springer, 
1013Full quote: “Im Ergebnis weiterer Gespräche zu den Fragen des Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und 
Berlin(West) in der DDR haben sich auch neue Aspekte ergeben, die überlegenswert sind. Sie betreffen eine 
Moglichkeit der Einbeziehung weiterer Verlagshäuser aus der BRD und Berlin(West) in die Bildung eines gemeinsamen
Vertriebsunternehmens. Ich bitte Sie, hierzu Kontakte mit den Verlagen Axel Springer, Heinrich Bauer und Burda 
aufzunehmen.” Telegram, Hans-Jürgen Hammer, MPF, to Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandvorsitzender Gruner + Jahr, 
Berlin, January 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1014Letter, Minister Klaus Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, to Staatssekretär Rauchfuß, Ministerrat der 
DDR, January 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
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Bauer and Burda in Hamburg on January 15 and 16, “to work out a joint proposal for the building of a 
distribution system in the GDR.”1015 The result was the five-page “Concept for the Universal Supply of 
the Population of the German Democratic Republic with Press Products.”1016 “I believe with this 
concept,” so Schulte-Hillen, “we have created a sound basis for cooperation and would be happy if this 
allowed us to contribute to the improvement of press supply in the GDR.”1017 Offering to join the next 
scheduled meeting between Springer and the MPF on January 23, Schulte-Hillen stressed, however, 
that it was advisable to meet earlier if distribution was to start in the sixth calendar week and proposed 
January 18 or 19, willing to clarify the date with the other publishers.1018 
Concept of Universal Supply1019
The “Concept for the Universal Supply of the Population of the German Democratic Republic with 
Press Products” was a first draft for a joint venture agreement between the East German Post and the 
four publishing houses for a joint press distribution enterprise (Vertriebsgesellschaft, VG) in the GDR, 
which was to begin operating in mid-February. 
The overall task of the VG was “the distribution of all domestic and international newspapers 
and magazines via all distribution channels and on all distribution levels with the exception of 
subscription-based sale that for the time being ... remains with the German Post.”1020 It was to be built 
“in consideration of the latest developments in the GDR;” its objective, thus, was to meet “the 
populationʼs demand for comprehensive and widespread access to print media.”1021 Here, the document 
1015“um einen gemeinsamen Vorschlag zum Aufbau eines Vertriebssystems in der DDR zu erarbeiten.” Letter, Gerd 
Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandvorsitzender Gruner+Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- 
und Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, January 16, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1016Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten,
Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3) Note: This document contains several spelling mistakes, which 
might be taken as an indication of the rush with which it was created. The mistakes are included in the German version 
only.
1017“Ich glaube, wir haben mit diesem Entwurf eine tragfähige Grundlage für eine Zsuammenarbeit [sic] geschaffen und 
würde mich freuen, wenn wir auf diese Weise zur Verbesserung des Anegbots [sic] an Presseprodukten in der DDR 
beitragen konnten.” Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandvorsitzender Gruner+Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, 
Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, January 16, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1018Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Vorstandvorsitzender Gruner+Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des 
Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, January 16, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1019Note: This document contains several spelling mistakes, which might be taken as an indication for the rush with which 
it was created. These mistakes are included in the German original text only. Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der 
Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3) 
1020Full quote: “Der Vertrieb sämtlicher in- und ausländsicher [sic] Presseprodukte über alle Vertriebswege und 
Vertriebsstufen mit Ausnahme des abonnementssgeschäfts [sic], das zunächst – wie bisher – von der Deutschen Post 
wahrgenommen wird.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3)
1021Full quote: “Im Zuge der Entwicklungen in der DDR muß dem Wunsch nach umfassender und flächendeckender 
Versorgung der Bevolkerung mit Presse Rechnung getragen werden.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der 
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used almost the exact language as the Springer proposal from January 12 (see Appendix B). Now, 
however, it was made clear that “on the initiative of the German Post,” the goal was to adjust the press 
distribution system of the GDR to “new demands” by creating a joint venture distribution enterprise 
between the German Post (50 percent), Springer (16 percent), Burda (5 percent), G+J (14 percent) and 
Bauer (15 percent).1022 In his letter to Hammer, Schulte-Hillen underlined “that the publishers would 
also welcome an interest share that exceeded 50 percent.”1023 The German Post was to bring in its retail 
network, its on-site infrastructures, necessary facilities and properties, as well as “the delivery rights for
all East German publishers and the exclusive distribution rights for print media in retail sale in the 
GDR.”1024 The publishers, on the other hand, brought in the “needed funds,” expertise and management
capacities, as well as technical and computer equipment, and transportation vehicles.1025 Business assets
brought in were to be evaluated according to joint negotiation guidelines. It was stated, however, that if
the Post was in need of capital to meet its share, the publishers were to make available “a shareholder 
loan in DM … at standard market conditions.”1026 The expected level of investment was 200 million 
DM, the goal was to start operations as soon as possible. 
Commencing operations, the joint venture distributor was given the monopoly rights over every
step in the press retail sector for domestic and international publications, and it was to be responsible 
for “the import of all publications not published in the GDR.”1027 With regard to East German 
publications, the concept was likewise all-inclusive: the VG was to handle their export, the distribution 
Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 1, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1022Note: According to the document, Burda had not yet given its final confirmation regarding its holdings but was 
expected to do so by January 17. Quote: “auf Anregung der Deutschen Post … Anforderungen” Konzept zur 
umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16.
Januar 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3) Note: Percentages of publishers' shares were changed on the document by 
hand-written additions as follows: Springer (fifteen percent), Burda (eight percent), G+J (thirteen percent) and Bauer 
(fourteen percent), and, thereby, resembled the distributions of shares introduced by Schulte-Hillen (G+J) at the meeting 
on January 23, 1990. 
1023“dass die Verlage eine über 50% hinausgehende Beteiligung ebenfalls begrüssen würden.” Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen,
Vorstandvorsitzender Gruner+Jahr AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, January 16, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1024“die Lieferrechte aller DDR-Verlage sowie das Alleinvertriebsrecht für Presseerzeugnisse im Einzelverkauf der DDR.”
Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, 
Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1025“Notwendige Finanzmittel.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1026“Gesellschafterdarlehen in DM ... zu marktüblichen Konditionen.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der 
Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 4, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1027“der Import aller nicht in der DDR verlegten Presseprodukte.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3). Note: Niehofʼs hand written notes on the document reveal that he was wondering what the term “all” referred to. 
“All” in this context could have meant full control of the VG over the trade with every non-GDR press product. 
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and sale of all publications whose publishers did not have their own sales department, and it was to 
quickly expand the network of retail locations in the GDR. It was further to be the main contact for 
distributors of national publications and in charge of all import and export transactions. Local offices 
were to be responsible for local logistics, and for regional retailers and distributors. As outlined in the 
agreement, the VG was to built upon infrastructures already in place and was envisioned as a centrally 
organized press distribution enterprise with its head office in charge of establishing and monitoring 
“the adherence of universal guidelines for the operation of the VG.”1028 
According to its working principles, the VG was to deliver “demand-oriented supplies” to 
retailers on a daily basis, generally guaranteeing “market access for all print media that do not violate 
the current laws of the GDR.”1029 It was to work according to the principle of distribution neutrality and
to maintain fixed prices of publishers with Remissionsrecht, that is a full return policy on all levels of 
trade. Returns were to be handled and deducted on a weekly basis, with publishers holding the right to 
determine circulation numbers and prices (Dispositionsrecht). The contract further stipulated for the 
VG to work according to “market principles” and to “not [be] subject to planned economy or 
comparable regulations on part of the GDR.”1030 The VG was, thus, to be a market-driven enterprise run
by for-profit media corporations in cooperation with the East German Post in a socialist economy based
on a closely intertwined not-for profit planned economy. 
Within this market-oriented enterprise, expansive authorities were given to “the shareholding 
publishers [that] are entrusted with the competency of establishing general guidelines for the design 
and operation of the VG.”1031 And though the working principles implied non-discriminatory practices 
towards other publishers, an added exception clause stated that “during the start-up phase of the VG, 
the adherence to some general rules can be restricted by the lack of resources.”1032 No specifics were 
given about the rules affected or the time period in question – with one exception, the limitation of 
1028“die Einhaltung einheitlicher Richtlinien zum Betrieb der Gesellschaft.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der 
Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 3, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1029“mit nachfragegerechten Mengen … Marktzugang für jedes Presseprodukt, das nicht gegen geltende DDR-Gesetze 
verstoßt.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit 
Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1030“marktwirtschaftlichen Grundsätzen … unterliegt keinen planwirtschaftlichen oder vergleichbaren Auflagen seitens 
der DDR.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit 
Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1031“Die Gesellschafter-Verlage erhalten die generelle Richtlinienkompetenz zur Gestaltung und zum Betrieb der VG.” 
Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, 
Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1032“In der Aufbauphase der VG kann die Einhaltung einiger Grundsätze wegen begrenzter Ressourcen eingeschränkt 
werden.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit 
Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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publications: It was made clear that “in order to not overload the developing press distribution in the 
GDR in its starting phase, for the time being, the number of publications from the FRG will be limited 
to about 70 to 100 for a period of six months.”1033 The agreement clarified that a committee appointed 
by the GDR was to “choose these publications according to comprehensible criteria, which should 
generally be defined based to marketability.”1034 This included publications such as Springerʼs Bild 
(100.000 copies), Spiegel (50.000 copies), G+Jʼs stern (65.000 copies), and Bauerʼs Bunte (50.000 
copies). Accordingly, during the starting phase, the maximum level of import was to be 5 percent of the
total sales in the FRG (during the last quarter of 1989) of selected publications, while “subsequently, 
quantities will be regulated in a demand-oriented manner.”1035 Just as the East German delegation had 
wanted, these publications were to be sold for East German currency, and “on the basis of a fixed ratio, 
the retail prices for publications from the FRG and West Berlin will universally be linked to the 
respective sales prices in DM. For the time being, they are fixed as being three times the retail price in 
DM.”1036 This meant, the retail price of Bild was 1.50 Mark, while Spiegel cost 13.50 Mark, and Stern 
11.40 Mark.1037 As shown earlier, this price fixing scheme soon fell apart (see Chapter 4), while the 
selection of publications was to become the key issue as negotiations continued.
1033“Um den im Ausbau befindlichen Pressevertrieb in der DDR in der Anfangsphase nicht zu überlasten, wird zunächst 
für die Dauer von sechs Monaten die importierte Titelzahl aus der BRD auf circa 70 bis 100 Titel beschränkt.” Konzept 
zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg,
16. Januar 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1034“wählt diese Titel nach nachvollziehbaren Kriterien aus, die sich grundsätzlich an der Verkäuflichkeit orientieren 
sollen.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit 
Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 5, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1035“Nachfolgend werden die Mengen nachfragegerecht reguliert.” Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 5, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3). 
1036“Die Endverkaufspreise für Presseerzeugnisse aus der BRD und Berlin-West werden in einer festen Relation 
einheitlich an die jeweils gültigen DM-Verkaufspreise gekoppelt. Sie betragen bis auf weiteres das 3-fache des DM-
Endverkaufspreises.”Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
mit Presseprodukten, Hamburg, 16. Januar 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1037See interview, “'Der Postminister übte Zensur aus' - Konrad Weiß von 'Demokratie Jetzt' und Mitglied der DDR 
Regierungskommission für ein neues Mediengesetz begründet den Beschluß gegen die 'big four',” Interview Ute Scheub 
(taz vom 10.2.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des 
Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 124-125, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR;
Box 31-38, File 33. 
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The East German Delegation
“Any selection of West German publications
  for import into the GDR is, in one way or the other, deliberate
… to import all is illusionary.”
Document, MfK, On the Supply of the GDR with Press from the
FRG, n.d.1038
With continuing negotiations being scheduled for January 23, by January 22, also the East 
German delegation (the MPF and the MfK) had worked out its respective positions. Written out in the 
“advisory material” for the negotiations the next day, the MPF listed its goals, means, and financial 
estimates.1039 It, thereby, adopted much of the previous business concepts of, and the outcomes of 
negotiations with G+J and Springer. Those now served as the foundation for what the GDR brought 
into the negotiations. 
Next to the Post and the West German publishers, the MPF envisioned a third party to be 
included to help expand the distribution and press system. A “sales agency for advertising services for 
western producers to institutions in the GDR” could, according to “estimates of the Western publishing 
houses,” during the first year, earn between 60 and 70 million DM via advertising on television; 
“Springer publisher guarantees a minimum revenue of 50 million DM.”1040 Taking up the idea initially 
introduced by G+J and Springer, 50 percent of the advertising revenue was to be spent for Western 
press imports. Drawing from the Springer proposal from January 12 (see Appendix B), “other 
possibilities for importing Western publications come from the export of East German newspapers and 
magazines (currently about 3.6 million VM [Valuta Mark or hard currency]) as well as the marketing 
of billboard advertising space (amount is not predictable at present).”1041 Export numbers were based on
1038“Jede Auswahl von BRD-Presse für die Belieferung der DDR ist in gewisser Weise willkürlich … sie alle zu 
importieren, ist illusorisch.” Document, Dokument, Zur Versorgung der DDR mit Presse aus der BRD, n.d., p. 1, BArch 
DM3/21121 (2/3). Note: Based on the use of language, the style and overall (finance) plan, this document very likely 
was a summary of plans recorded by the MfK. Personal communication, Email, Hans-Jürgen Niehof, June 12, 2017.
1039Beratungsmaterial, Grundsätze für den Import und den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin 
(West) in der DDR, n.d. [January 22, 1990 – handwritten note], BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Copy also available in BArch 
DC9/1052.
1040“Agentur zum Verkauf von Werbeleistungen westlicher Produzenten an Einrichtungen der DDR … Einschätzungen 
der westlichen Verlagshäuser … Der Springer Verlag garantiert einen Mindestumsatz von 50 Mill DM.” 
Beratungsmaterial, Grundsätze für den Import und den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) 
in der DDR, n.d. [January 22, 1990 – handwritten note], p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Copy also available in BArch 
DC9/1052.
1041“Weitere Moglichkeiten des Imports westlicher Presseerzeugnisse ergeben sich aus dem Export von DDR-Zeitungen 
und -Zeitschriften (z.Z. ca. 3,6 Mill VM) sowie den Verkauf von Werbeflächen aus Plakatwänden usw. (Betrag ist 
gegenwärtig nicht einzuschätzen).” Beratungsmaterial, Grundsätze für den Import und den Vertrieb von 
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the current trade with other socialist countries.
While these estimates clearly followed G+J and Springer, other points, indicating a more 
protective approach, in fact, only gave a different twist to the publishers' concepts. The East German 
delegation, for instance, wanted West German publications to be available for retail sale only. 
Subscriptions were to be possible only in exceptional circumstances. This point had been part of the 
initial concept of G+J and the policy proposals of the MfK, and it had been criticized by the MPF for 
its financial disadvantages for the Post (see Chapter 4). Now, it was turned into a protective measure 
for Postal Distribution. And while press imports required Valuta (hard currency), the sale of Western 
publications was to happen in East German currency “on the basis of the administered retail price valid 
in the FRG and (West) Berlin to a currency exchange rate (currently 1:3) determined by the state 
bank.”1042 Also in this point, the MPF and the concept of the Big Four stood in agreement.
Regarding the specifics of distributing West German publications, the MPF delegation favored 
two non-exclusive options and even added a third one. First, in alliance with the Big Four concept, it 
aimed for a joint venture with several Western publishers according to the laws of the GDR but with a 
handling of revenues according to the market principles of the joint venture. Connected to this joint 
venture, it aimed for the “best immediate material and technical assistance for securing additional 
turnover and transportation services in the GDR (especially transportation vehicles, office furniture and
other equipment) on favorable conditions.”1043 The delegation was, secondly, open to offers of West 
German publishers to distribute their publications in advance (before the joint venture started its 
operation) as long as they were sold for currency of the GDR and publishers deposited their revenue 
onto domestic accounts and/or helped develop domestic infrastructures or other projects in the public 
interest. Finally, for an interim time, it was also deemed possible for publishers, after having consulted 
over the conditions of distributing their products via the joint venture, to set their own distribution.1044 
Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) in der DDR, n.d. [January 22, 1990 – handwritten note], pp. 1-2, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Copy also available in BArch DC9/1052.
1042“der Basis des in der BRD und Berlin(West) geltenden EVP zu dem von der Staatsbank festgelegten Umrechnungssatz 
(z.Z. 1:3).” Note: the use of language here indicates difficulties in negotiating between the West and the East German 
economic context, for the administered retail price (EVP) was a fixed price concept in the planned GDR economy. 
Beratungsmaterial, Grundsätze für den Import und den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) 
in der DDR, n.d. [January 22, 1990 – handwritten note], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Copy also available in BArch 
DC9/1052.
1043“optimale sofortige materiell-technische Unterstützung für die Sicherung der zusätzlichen Umschlags- und 
Transportleistungen in der DDR (insbes. KfZ, Büromobel und andere Ausstattungen) mit vorteilhaften Konditionen.” 
Beratungsmaterial, Grundsätze für den Import und den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) 
in der DDR, n.d. [January 22, 1990 – handwritten note], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Copy also available in BArch 
DC9/1052.
1044Beratungsmaterial, Grundsätze für den Import und den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin 
(West) in der DDR, n.d. [January 22, 1990 – handwritten note], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Copy also available in 
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In sum, the MPF gave great leeway to all West German publishers. 
The biggest issue was the selection of publications. Here, a document drafted by the MfK, “On 
the Supply of the GDR with Press from the FRG,” gave an idea of how import was to be built and 
gradually expanded.1045 The basic assumption was that with three thousand (non-)periodical 
publications in the Federal Republic, full objectivity (meaning the inclusion of all publications) was 
possible only if hard currency “was available in unlimited amounts,” which, then, would allow for a 
non-discriminatory approach in the import and export of publications, and once Mark and DM were 
fully convertible according to set rates.1046 For now, the MfK envisioned an advisory board that was to 
select primary publications (Primär-Titel) and their circulation numbers; those publications were 
considered most important for import. The board was to ensure “a legally sound stipulation of 
regulations” for any such selection.1047 General principles were a “high percentage of dailies” and 
“more opinion-building publications” for import, the foreign (non-German) press was to be handled 
separately, there were to be no Sunday editions, and “initially only market-leaders” were to be 
imported.1048 The MfK reasoned that this exclusionary approach was necessary due to the limited 
amount of hard currency.1049 Once currency conditions changed, rules could be adapted. Though this 
document did not officially represent the position of the MPF, it did offer insights into the general 
problem of selection and the assumptions it was based on given the limited capacities of current 
distribution infrastructures. 
Analysis
The “Concept of Universal Supply” introduced by the Big Four publishers to the MPF on 
January 16, and the position of the MPF for upcoming talks, were closely aligned. Both envisioned a 
national distribution joint venture between the Post and the four major publishing houses. While the 
Post was to contribute its monopoly rights and centralized infrastructures, the publishers were to bring 
in “needed funds,” expertise and management capacities, as well as technical and computer equipment, 
BArch DC9/1052.
1045Note: Based on the use of language, the style and the overall (finance) plan, this document very likely was a summary 
of plans recorded by the MfK. Though presented here, it did not represent the position of the MPF. Personal 
communication, Email, Hans-Jürgen Niehof, June 12, 2017. Document, Dokument, Zur Versorgung der DDR mit Presse
aus der BRD, n.d., BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
1046“in unbegrenzter Hohe zur Verfügung stünden.” Document, Dokument, Zur Versorgung der DDR mit Presse aus der 
BRD, n.d., p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1047“für eine juristisch vertretbare Festschreibung der Regeln.” Document, Dokument, Zur Versorgung der DDR mit 
Presse aus der BRD, n.d., p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1048“hoher Tageszeitungsanteil … “mehr meinungsbildende Presse … anfänglich nur Marktführer.” Document, Dokument,
Zur Versorgung der DDR mit Presse aus der BRD, n.d., p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1049Document, Dokument, Zur Versorgung der DDR mit Presse aus der BRD, n.d., pp. 1-2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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and means of transportation. The publishers and the MPF agreed on a fixed price policy, selling West 
German publications at a 1:3 ratio (see Chapter 4), and both had borrowed from the earlier concepts of 
G+J and Springer, while the MPF had also adapted core points of the Big Four proposal. The latter 
went beyond earlier proposals in its comprehensive approach to press distribution.
Similar to earlier proposals, by introducing concepts such as Remissionsrecht, Dispositionsrecht 
and “demand-oriented supplies,” the Big Four concept also pushed for the introduction of West 
German market criteria and legal standards in the distribution of print media in the GDR. The concept, 
thus, took a sort of hybrid approach making use of socialist centralism with a for-profit baseline, or, put
differently, the concept presented a continuation of a monopoly already in place with an added private 
interest component. This also served the purpose of the MPF and its aim to maintain the strong position
of Postal Distribution. 
However, the Post was to only keep the more expensive and less profitable subscription-based 
distribution while the joint venture (with a 50+ percent share of the publishers) was given monopoly 
rights over every step in the retail sector for domestic and international publications. The corresponding
protective measure of the MPF to simply disallow for the import of West German publications on a 
subscription basis might be considered a minor drawback for the publishers, partly because some 
papers, such as Bild, were for street sale only. More important were the substantial competencies of the 
publishers to set the guidelines of the joint venture: its management (provided by the publishers) was to
hold the power and means to decide on all company policies; this related to the central headquarters as 
well as local offices but in essence to the entire (retail) press distribution in the GDR. 
The MPFʼs approach (in aiming to make Western publications available in the GDR with as 
little expenditure as possible while maintaining a strong position of Postal Distribution) not only gave 
great leeway to individual efforts of West German publishers, but it had fully incorporated an 
advertising-based revenue model as the remedy to all problems. It followed the all-inclusive approach 
of centrally administered and controlled advertising (in print, television, and on billboards) that had 
initially been introduced by G+J and Springer. The MPF also adopted the proposal of Springer to 
generate additional revenue through the export of East German newspapers and magazines. Its 
estimates, however, were based on current exports to other socialist countries, and, thereby, disregarded
differences in the quality of paper, printing and layout, as well as the over-saturated West German print
market with its high entry barriers. The idea of exporting East German publications to the West, 
therefore, seems short-sighted at best. 
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Overall, ideas of the MPF how to reform distribution were largely based on readily available 
concepts of Springer and G+J who had done an excellent job in convincing their negotiation partners 
on how things should be done. And though the MPF did set its own emphases (mainly in protecting its 
own interests), little thought was given to the long-term consequences of introducing an ad-based 
media economy into the GDR or to protective measures for a domestic press that would soon to have to
compete in a highly competitive market. The same was true for small and medium-sized West German 
publishers, as the position of the Big Four on the selection of publications indicated. While the 
publishersʼ concept officially gave control to an appointed East German committee to select West 
German publications for import, it preselected sales figures as the defining criteria. This pre-set 
narrowing of choice came along with a ready-made list of West German publications ready for import. 
With the marketability of publications as the key criterion for import (adopted by East German 
officials, and laid out by the MfK), the Big Four became the main beneficiaries. The publishers, on 
their part, justified this pre-selection and the maintaining of centralized structures with the urgent 
political situation and the high demand for (mainly West German) publications in the GDR. 
Several indicators in the publisherʼs concept from January 16 (i.e. Burdaʼs still missing final 
approval, and several spelling mistakes in the document) bear proof to the haste with which 
negotiations were being held, and concepts were being drafted and redrafted. Within days, market 
shares had to be secured for potential decades to come. It goes without saying that the concept provided
by the publishers, in particular with regard to selecting publications based on market-criteria and the 
monopolistic position of major publishing houses in matters of distribution, would have been deemed 
illegal if held to West German legal standards. Thus, while introducing market criteria and Western 
concepts of a free, privately owned press, the legal norms keeping them in check remained aside. 
Instead, they adapted centralized structures of a planned economy to a market rationale. 
The ʻBig Fourʼ Negotiations 
Negotiations between the four major West German publishers and different East German 
governmental bodies (the MfK and the GDR Press and Information Service under the lead of the MPF) 
resumed in Berlin on January 23.1050 Talks went well and fast. That same day, a tentative partnership 
agreement was signed by all parties. As stated in the agreement, it was largely based on the publishers' 
“Concept of Universal Supply” from January 16, 1990.1051
1050Handwritten note Niehof, “Beratung mit BRD-Verlagen,“ January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1051Übereinkunft zwischen Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, Ministerium für Kultur, und der Presse- 
und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR und Heinrich Bauer Verlag Hamburg, Burda GmbH Offenburg, Gruner 
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Tentative Partnership Agreement
During the talks, G+J CEO Schulte-Hillen took the lead on part of the publishers. He laid out 
the concept and introduced slightly changed numbers in the joint venture shares of the publishers: 
Springer was to now take over 15 percent, Burda, 8 percent, G+J, 13 percent, and Bauer was to hold a 
share of 14 percent. He explained that the publishers were to invest sixty million Mark in the first year, 
all publishers were to finance their investments with their own resources and sell their products on a 
1:3 ratio in East German currency. The Post was to bring in its share with the existing infrastructures 
and properties. According to Schulte-Hillen, at most 5 percent of the overall circulation in the Federal 
Republic and a total of one hundred publications at most were to be sold in the GDR.1052  
While the partnership agreement sketched these points (leaving out the specifics of investment 
shares), it referred to the upcoming February 5 resolution of the Peopleʼs Chamber on media freedom 
and the freedom of information (see Chapter 3) and underlined that “the contracting parties will 
commence with the development of a comprehensive distribution system complementary to the current 
system of the German Post ... and with the import and export of press matters.”1053 Any initiatives of the
contracting parties, thus, stood in the service of media freedom and the freedom of information. Based 
on the “Concept of Universal Supply,” a joint venture was to offer publishers from West Germany and 
other Western countries the distribution of their products in the GDR for East German currency. 
Publishers were then to dispose over “revenue in Mark according to the laws of the GDR.”1054 If 
procurable, distribution was to start in early February 1990. 
It was anticipated that the investing publishers, “for the moment, hold 50 percent of the shares. 
After legal prerequisites have been established, the participating publishers aim for a higher share. For 
+ Jahr AG Hamburg, und Axel Springer Verlag AG Hamburg/Berlin, Berlin, 23. Januar 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), 
also in BArch DC9/1052 and BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). Note: Also this document contains several spelling mistakes, 
which might be taken as another indication of the rush with which it was created. The mistakes are included in the 
German version only.
1052Handwritten note Niehof, “Beratung mit BRD-Verlagen,“ January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1053“werden die Vertragspartner mit dem Ausbau eines das bisherige System der Deutschen Post ergänzenden 
flächendeckenden Vertriebssystems in der DDR beginnen und dem Im- und Export von Presseerzeugnissen aufnehmen.”
Übereinkunft zwischen Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, Ministerium für Kultur, und der Presse- 
und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR und Heinrich Bauer Verlag Hamburg, Burda GmbH Offenburg, Gruner 
+ Jahr AG Hamburg, und Axel Springer Verlag AG Hamburg/Berlin, Berlin, January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1054“Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit 
Presseprodukten … Erlose in Mark der DDR im Rahmen der Gesetze der DDR.” Übereinkunft zwischen Ministerium 
für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, Ministerium für Kultur, und der Presse- und Informationsdienst der Regierung 
der DDR und Heinrich Bauer Verlag Hamburg, Burda GmbH Offenburg, Gruner + Jahr AG Hamburg, und Axel 
Springer Verlag AG Hamburg/Berlin, Berlin, January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
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this, they hold preferential rights.”1055 According to the notes of Hans-Jürgen Niehof, who had just 
taken over office at the MPF, the long-term target, according to Schulte-Hillen, was a 75 percent 
investment share in the joint venture.1056 In addition, the agreement further broadened future authorities 
of the publishers: 
The respective parties on part of the GDR, within their capabilities and as soon as legal 
prerequisites have been established, will help to transfer the marketing of advertising 
time of the future public service broadcaster to the participating publishers. 50 percent of
the remaining revenue [from the sale of advertising time], after the deduction of sales 
commission, will be allocated to the joint venture for securing press import.1057  
This point is remarkable for various reasons, and it is analyzed in more detail below. Remarkable also, 
the immediate investments of the publishers made in return: once contracts were signed with the 
ministry and passed by the Council of Ministers, the publishers were to “hand over 100 transportation 
vehicles (1.5-tonner) ... free of charge, to support an optimal press distribution. These are overhauled 
used vehicles.”1058 In short, one hundred overhauled vehicles and sixty million Mark (or twenty million 
DM respectively) in investments were offered for a quasi-monopoly in (retail) press (import, export, 
and) distribution, and a future marketing monopoly over East German public service media advertising.
It was agreed that no public statement was to be made at this point but that a joint press release was to 
be sent out once the Council of Ministers had made its decision. The representatives of the four 
publishers were going to meet again at the MPF on January 25.1059 
Things at the MPF were in flux, however. A a part of the restructuring processes in the Ministry
of Operation and Traffic, the MPF underwent a reform of its entire administrative body along with the 
1055“zunächst 50 % der Gesellschaftsanteile halten. Die beteiligten Verlage streben nach Achaffung [sic] der gesetzlichen 
Voraussetzung eine hohere Beteiligung an. Hierfür haben sie ein Vorerwerbsrecht.” Übereinkunft zwischen Ministerium
für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, Ministerium für Kultur, und der Presse- und Informationsdienst der Regierung 
der DDR und Heinrich Bauer Verlag Hamburg, Burda GmbH Offenburg, Gruner + Jahr AG Hamburg, und Axel 
Springer Verlag AG Hamburg/Berlin, Berlin, January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1056Handwritten note Niehof, “Beratung mit BRD-Verlagen,“ January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1057“Die Beteiligten auf Seiten der DDR werden im Rahemen [sic] ihrer Moglichkeiten dazu beitragen, den beteiligten 
Verlagen die Vermarktung der Werbezeiten des zukünftig offentlich rechtlichen Rundfunks und Fernsehens der DDR zu
übertragen, sobald die gesetzlichen Voraussetzungen dafür gegeben sind. 50% der nach Abzug der Verkaufsprovisionen 
verbleibenden Erlose werden dem Joint venture zur Absicherung des Imports von Presseerzeucgnissen [sic] zur 
Verfügung gestellt.” Übereinkunft zwischen Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, Ministerium für 
Kultur, und der Presse- und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR und Heinrich Bauer Verlag Hamburg, Burda 
GmbH Offenburg, Gruner + Jahr AG Hamburg, und Axel Springer Verlag AG Hamburg/Berlin, Berlin, January 23, 
1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1058“der DDR 100 Transportfahrzeuge (1,5-Tonner) unentgeltlich zur Unterstützung eines optimalen Pressevertriebs 
übergeben. Es handelt scih [sic] um überholte Gebrauchtfahrzeuge.” Übereinkunft zwischen Ministerium für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen der DDR, Ministerium für Kultur, und der Presse- und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR und 
Heinrich Bauer Verlag Hamburg, Burda GmbH Offenburg, Gruner + Jahr AG Hamburg, und Axel Springer Verlag AG 
Hamburg/Berlin, Berlin,January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1059Handwritten note Niehof, “Beratung mit BRD-Verlagen,“ January 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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replacement of personnel. Hans-Jürgen Hammer (minister deputy of the PZV) was replaced by Hans-
Jürgen Niehof on January 22, just a day before the talk with the publishers. Though the tentative 
partnership agreement was still signed by Hammer in representation of the MPF, Niehof now joined the
small circle of East German representatives in negotiation with the publishers aiming to promote the 
interests of Postal Distribution. Niehof in taking over office, however, was not given a single file 
and/or documentation of previous negotiations, and had, thus, no knowledge of any of the prior 
agreements or talks.1060 “In the negotiations with the four major publishers on January 23, 1990,” 
Niehof commented, “I solely participated as a silent witness who did not know the history.”1061 Given 
the central role of Hammer in previous negotiations, Niehof had a rather difficult start.
Other Interest Groups
The same day the partnership agreement was signed, on January 23, Gerd Kapp, general 
manager of Presse-Grosso, the registered Association of German Book, Newspaper and Magazine 
Grossisten (Verband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V.) in the Federal 
Republic, contacted the MPF. Kapp had learned from the news that West German newspapers and 
magazines were soon to be sold at East German newsstands. And while the association had already sent
an offer of cooperation in early December 1989, Kapp now renewed, he “would like to offer assistance 
to the GDR in the building of a distribution system.”1062 Kapp laid out that with few exceptions, press 
distribution in the Federal Republic was organized by medium-sized, regional and independent 
companies (Grossisten). Of a total of eighty-one such companies, seventy-four were organized in the 
Verband Presse-Grosso (see Chapter 4). Offering its cooperation, expertise and other support in the 
“building of own [medium-sized] structures,” Kapp underlined “it surely is also the goal of the GDR to 
build infrastructures” that allowed for the fast and area-wide distribution and availability of all print 
media.1063 For this, as well as “in all distribution matters, each member firm of our association holds 
great expertise,” and Kapp offered to soon meet in Berlin or any other place for a tour though such a 
company.1064 
1060Personal Communication, Hans-Jürgen Niehof, Email, June 1, 2017.
1061“Ich habe lediglich an den Verhandlungen mit den 4 Großverlagen am 23. Januar 1990 als stummer Zeuge 
teilgenommen, der die Vorgeschichte nicht kannte.” Personal Communication, Email Hans-Jürgen Niehof, June 1, 2017.
1062“dass wir der ddr gerne unterstuetzung beim aufbau eines vertriebssystems anbieten wuerden.” Telegram, Gerd Kapp, 
Geschäftsführer, Verband Presse-Grosso, to Dr. Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernwesen, January 23, 1990, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1063“beim aufbau eigener strukturen … es ist sicher auch das ziel der ddr, eine infrastruktur zu schaffen” Telegram, Gerd 
Kapp, Geschäftsführer, Verband Presse-Grosso, to Dr. Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernwesen, January 23, 
1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1064“in allen vertriebsfragen verfuegen die mitgliedsfirmen unseres verbandes ueber hohe kompetenz.” Telegram, Gerd 
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Initially sent to Hammer on January 23, the telegram was received by Niehof on January 25. 
With Kapp having sent another telex a few days earlier without response, he contacted the MPF again 
on January 24, this time with more urgency. Having learned from the press that another meeting was 
set between the MPF and the major publishers on January 25, Kapp renewed his address and 
emphasized the Presse-Grossoʼs intent “to let medium-sized retailers [Grossisten] develop … also in 
the GDR with the help and coordination of your ministry.”1065 For this, existing distribution capacities 
of the Post were to be the “basis for a restructuring [process] to a system similar to that of the Federal 
Republic,” and Kapp offered any needed support, such as sponsorship, expertise, technical equipment, 
the training of personnel or financial resources.1066 He emphasized that “with such important landmark 
decision over the future structures of press distribution,” the minister should consider different options, 
not the least because the press is a “highly sensitive matter” that demanded for the “utmost neutrality 
towards all publishers.”1067 To give his arguments more weight, Presse-Grosso sent several brochures 
outlining press distribution in the Federal Republic.1068 Underlining the central “socio-political role” of 
press distributors in a democratic society, these brochures introduced to the workings of Grossisten as 
“guarantor[s] of press freedom and diversity” as part of a “modern, well working distribution system 
that fulfills its distributing and socio-political role in the best ways possible.”1069 Presse-Grosso was 
now part of the game.
Another interest group called into action was the Federal Association of German Newspaper 
Publishers (Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, BDZV). The committee on distribution within 
Kapp, Geschäftsführer, Verband Presse-Grosso, to Dr. Hammer, Ministerium für Post- und Fernwesen, January 23, 
1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1065“auch in der ddr mit der hilfe und mit der koordination durch ihr ministerium mittelstaendische grosshandlungen …. 
enstehen zu lassen.” Telex, Gerd Kapp, Geschäftsführer, Verband Presse-Grosso, to Dr. Klaus Wolf, Ministerium für 
Post- und Fernwesen, January 24, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1066 “initiator fuer eine umstrukturierung auf ein mit der bundesrepublik vergleichbares system.” Telex, Gerd Kapp, 
Geschäftsführer, Verband Presse-Grosso, to Dr. Klaus Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und Fernwesen, January 24, 1990, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1067“bei einer so wichtigen und richtungsweisenden entscheidung ueber die kuenftige struktur des pressevertriebs …sehr 
sensiblen bereich …  hoechstmass an neutralitaet gegenueber allen verlagen.” Telex, Gerd Kapp, Geschäftsführer, 
Verband Presse-Grosso, to Dr. Klaus Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und Fernwesen, January 24, 1990, BArch DM3/21121
(1/3).
1068 Nowadays, they can be found in the files of the MPF (BArch DM3/21121 (1/3)), for instance: Brochure, Presse-
Grosso, Der Großhandel mit Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, Verband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-
Grossisten e.V., n.d., BArch DM3/21121 (1/3); Brochure, Presse-Grosso, Der Presse-Großhandel als Garant für 
Pressefreiheit und Pressevielfalt, Verband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V., n.d.., BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1069“gesellschaftspolitische Funktion …Garant für Pressefreiheit und Pressevielfalt … modernes, ausgezeichnet 
funktionierendes Vertriebssystem, das sowohl seine verteilende als auch seine gesellschaftspolitische Funktion optimal 
erfüllt.” Brochure, Presse-Grosso, Der Großhandel mit Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, Verband Deutscher Buch-, 
Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V., n.d.., pp. 3-4, backcover, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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the BDZV had constituted a “working group on distribution in the GDR” (Arbeitsgruppe DDR-
Vertrieb) likely on January 25, 1990. On that day, the group met in Frankfurt to work out its basic 
stance on the matter.1070 The group consisted of two representatives of the BDZV (Klaus Wagner and 
Alexander von Kuhn) and nine representatives of different newspapers and publishing houses, 
including Springer, Handelsblatt (Dusseldorf), Frankfurter Rundschau, and Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ) (Frankfurt), Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), and Morgenpost (Springer/Berlin). During 
the discussion, the newspapers made clear that their main interest in the East German (retail and 
subscription) market lay in a wide distribution. The question “who the distributor is, for now, plays a 
secondary role.”1071 The expectation, however, was that “whoever” built such a system, needed to allow
for all newspapers to be distributed “on equal terms without limitations,” and that subscription services 
should lie with the publishers.1072 In outcome, the working group generally favored the federal 
distribution (Grosso) system with its “division of power” between producers and medium-sized 
distributors; this system had proofed reliable in the Federal Republic and was, thus, “desirable also for 
the GDR.”1073 Other meetings of the BDZV steering committee followed on February 6, and internal 
talks were held to carve out guidelines and goals in press distribution in the GDR.1074 Based on these 
talks and the BDZVʼs general role as the main lobby group of (West German) publishers, the 
association was to become a central player in upcoming negotiations. 
East German newspapers and publishers were generally excluded from these talks and/or 
received little to no consideration in any of the presented concepts. East newspapers, on their side, used
their newly won freedom to report in detail in consistent issues they were experiencing with Postal 
Distribution (see Chapter 4). The main players remained to be the MPF and the Big Four publishers.
Consequently, the day of the BDZV meeting, on January 25, Heinz Schunke (MPF) had a 
1070The outcome of this meeting was later presented to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Protocol, Protokoll einer 
Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner,
Bonn, February 16, 1990, attached to internal letter, Pressevertrieb in die DDR – Gespräch im Bundesinnenministerium, 
Alexander von Kuk, BDZV, to Mitglieder des Erweiterten Präsidiums [u.a.], BDZV, February 16, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3), also in private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
1071“Wer der „Vertreiber“ ist, spielt dabei zunächst eine nachgeordnete Rolle.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im 
Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 
16, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1072“von wem auch immer … ohne Titelbeschränkung zu gleichen Bedingungen.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung 
im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, 
February 16, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1073“Machtverteilung … ist auch für die DDR wünschbar.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im 
Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 
16, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1074Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb 
in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
224
conversation with Hartmut Bühne, head of G+J distribution and member of the G+J executive board. 
As a follow-up, Bühne sent Schunke “a [two-page] list, one for newspapers and one for magazines, 
providing you with individual weights and publication days as well as the current retail prices in the 
FRG and future ones in the GDR.”1075 According to the MPF, “the publications included [on the list 
and] in the starting phase of Western press distribution were agreed upon with the [Big Four] 
publishers.”1076 Most prominent on the newspaper list was the tabloid Bild (Springer). With a set supply
of 70.000 copies daily, its retail price of 0.60 DM was to be 1.80 M in the GDR. Bild was followed 
were the publications of the above listed BDZV representatives.1077 On the magazine list, the weekly 
TV guides Funkzeit (Bauer) with 135.000 copies (1.60 DM) and Funkzeit (Springer) with 110.000 
copies (1.55 DM) topped the list of twenty-six magazines. Both were to cost around 4.70 Mark and 
were followed by the womenʼs tabloid magazine Bild der Frau (Springer) with 100.000 copies (0.90 
DM) for 2.70 Mark. The news magazine Spiegel, in comparison, was to distribute 5.000 copies (4.50 
DM) per week, for a price of 13.50 Mark each.1078 The resulting weekly tonnage of 570 tons, so Bühne 
hoped, corresponded to current capacities of Postal Distribution; a project group was working on ideas 
regarding these issues.1079 
New meetings were set for the following Tuesday and Wednesday (January 30 and 31, 1990), 
the plan was to visit the East German Newspaper Distribution Department (Zeitungsvertriebsamt, 
ZVA). Bühne suggested to also visit a Grosso-company in West Berlin (likely the subsidiary of G+J) 
while expressing interest in visiting also several post offices handling the transfer to retail locations and
subscribers.1080 He further suggested that these meetings should be joined by the logistic and 
1075“je eine Liste für Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, aus denen Sie die Einzelgewichte und Erscheinungstage sowie die 
derzeit aktuellen Verkaufspreise in der BRD und zukünftig in der DDR entnehmen konnen.” Letter, Brief, Hartmut 
Bühne, Gruner+Jahr, to Heinz Schunke, Ministerium für Post und Fernmeldewesen DDR, Berlin, January 25, 1990, 
BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1076“Die für den Beginn des Vertriebes vorgesehenen Titel der westlichen Presseerzeugnisse wurden mit den Verlagen 
abgestimmt.” Proposal, Vorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland
in der DDR, January 26, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052.
1077Namely, the nationally distributed FAZ (1.60 DM/4.80 Mark) and Süddeutsche Zeitung (1.30 DM/3.90 Mark) each 
with 20.000 copies, Frankfurter Rundschau (1.30 DM/3.90M) with 10.000 copies, and the business newspaper 
Handelsblatt (2.50 DM/7.50 M) with 5.000 copies daily. List attached to letter, Brief, Hartmut Bühne, Gruner+Jahr, to 
Heinz Schunke, Ministerium für Post und Fernmeldewesen DDR, Berlin, January 25, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1078List attached to letter, Brief, Hartmut Bühne, Gruner+Jahr, to Heinz Schunke, Ministerium für Post und 
Fernmeldewesen DDR, Berlin, January 25, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). Note: Sunday editions and regional papers 
in border regions were not included in the list. This was partly due to missing information regarding retail locations open
on Sundays. Note: Numbers change slightly in later communication. 
1079Letter, Brief, Hartmut Bühne, Gruner+Jahr, to Heinz Schunke, Ministerium für Post und Fernmeldewesen DDR, 
Berlin, January 25, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1080Letter, Brief, Hartmut Bühne, Gruner+Jahr, to Heinz Schunke, Ministerium für Post und Fernmeldewesen DDR, 
Berlin, January 25, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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distribution experts Raimung Günthert (Berliner Presse Vertriebs GmbH, subsidiary of G+J), Lothar 
Scheuer (Heinrich Bauer Vertriebs KG), and Hubert Kinzel (Buch und Presse-Großvertrieb Hamburg 
GmbH, a Grossist with the majority shareholder Springer).1081 Only three days after the tentative 
partnership agreement had been signed, concrete steps were taken by the MPF and by representatives 
of the Big Four to bring about fast results.
The Policy Proposal
 The same day Bühne sent the publication list to Schunke, on January 26, a policy proposal 
titled “Distribution of Press Matters from the FRG, (West) Berlin and Other Countries into the GDR” 
was finished to be submitted to the GDR Council of Ministers a few days later.1082 The document, a 
continuation of earlier proposals (see above and Chapter 4) grounded its purpose in “expanding the 
press range in the GDR,” and gave authority to the minister of the MPF to negotiate (through 
appointees) “with the West German publishers Gruner + Jahr, Heinrich Bauer, Burda and Axel 
Springer” to work out an agreement “through which to ensure the comprehensive distribution of 
[Western] press matters in the GDR … on favorable conditions.”1083 This referred to the building and 
gradual expansion of a joint venture distribution (limited liability) company between the Post and the 
respective publishers. While the initial joint share of the publishers was to not exceed 50 percent, the 
publishers were given the right “to increase their holdings in the course of building the enterprise.”1084 
The proposal established officially what had been in the making since early December: The building of 
a joint venture whose purpose was to import print media from, and export East German publications to 
West Germany and other western countries, and to handle the national distribution of East German 
publications (for retail sale). While generally all print media could be imported that did not violate 
1081Letter, Brief, Hartmut Bühne, Gruner+Jahr, to Heinz Schunke, Ministerium für Post und Fernmeldewesen DDR, 
Berlin, January 25, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1082Proposal, Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland 
in der DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3), also in BArch DC9/1050. Note: Signed by the 
government spokesman and head of the GDR Press and Information Office, as well as the minister of the MPF, the 
proposal had been coordinated with the minister of culture, of finances and prices, and the minister of foreign trade. It 
was suggested that also the general director of GDR television should be invited to the Council's discussion of the 
proposal.
1083“Erweiterung des Presseangebots in der DDR … mit den BRD-Verlagen Gruner&Jahr, Heinrich Bauer, Burda und 
Axel Springer …  mit der der umfassende Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem 
übrigen westlichen Ausland in die DDR zu günsitgen Konditionen gewährleistet wird.” Proposal, Ministerratsvorlage, 
Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland in der DDR, Berlin, January 26, 
1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1084Full quote: “Die Verlage konnen im Zuge des Ausbaues [sic] des Unternehmens ihre Beteiligung erhohen.” Proposal, 
Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland in der 
DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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principles of the GDR constitution, the exact registration procedures were to be established by the 
media law still to be developed. Western publications were to be sold “for Mark of the GDR on a 1:3 
price ratio based on the DM retail price.”1085 Revenue (of the joint venture as well as of the publishers) 
were to be invested mainly into the expansion of distribution infrastructures according to East German 
legislation. All revenue was taxable, and its international transfer illegal. 
Press imports and distribution were to start in early March with a list of selected publications 
according to set circulation numbers. Both the number of publications and their circulations were to be 
increased gradually; during the first year, this number would total 140 million copies. The annual 
revenue with this initial scope was an estimated 700 million Mark. Of any potential additional revenue 
through the “placing of product advertisement on television of the GDR,” 50 percent was to go to the 
Post “for importing Western press.”1086 
Attached to the proposal, a list of “those Western publications intended for startup distribution,”
which had been “coordinated with the publishers.”1087 Listed in this three-page “overview of 
newspapers and magazines scheduled for distribution” were seven national and a number of regional 
dailies; the latter amounted to a total of 100.000 imported copies per day.1088 Listed under national 
papers were Springerʼs Bild (50.000 copies) and Die Welt (10.000) as well as the FAZ and Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (each 20.000 copies), Handelsblatt and die tageszeitung (each 5.000 copies). The overall 
import of daily papers amounted to 230.000 copies.1089 The document further listed twenty-six 
weeklies, toped by the TV-guides Fernsehwoche, Auf einen Blick and TV Hören und Sehen (each 
135.000 copies), as well as Bildwoche, Funkuhr and Hörzu (each 111.000 copies); the total lay at about
1.15 million copies per week. Of the thirty-two bi-weekly and monthly magazines, the womenʼs 
magazines Brigitte (50.000) and Freundin (40.000) or the earlier mentioned Burda Moden (55.000) 
topped the list of an overall import of 385.000 copies per month. This included also small scale 
1085Full quote: “Der Vertrieb der Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR ist gegen Mark der DDR in einem Preisverhältnis von 1:3,
bezogen auf den Ladenpreis in DM, vorzunehmen.” Proposal, Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus 
der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland in der DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1086“Aufnahme der Produkten-Werbung durch das Fernsehen der DDR … für den Import westlicher Presseprodukte.” 
Proposal, Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland in
der DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1087“Die für den Beginn der Vertriebes vorgesehenen Titel der westlichen Presseerzeugnisse … wurden mit den Verlagen 
abgestimmt.” Proposal, Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem 
übrigen Ausland in der DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, p. 3,  BArch DC9/1050.
1088List, “Übersicht der zum Vertrieb vorgesehen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften,” attached to the proposal, 
Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland in der 
DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, BArch DC9/1050, also in private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
1089List, “Übersicht der zum Vertrieb vorgesehen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften,” p. 1, attached to the proposal, 
Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland in der 
DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
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publications such as the fishing magazine Blinker (5.000 copies).1090 Later, the trade magazine kress 
report reported that 70 percent of the listed publications were those of the four major publishers, 
including G+Jʼs Blinker.1091
The day the proposal was finished, on January 26, Niehof sent two copies of the document to 
the secretary of the Council of Ministers for the councilʼs next meeting on February 1, “with the 
request for further initiation.”1092 In-between the proposal and the next meeting of the Council of 
Ministers lay five days, during which representatives of the MPF and the publishersʼ distribution 
experts were to visit each others facilities and further negotiate concrete details of a joint distribution.
Analysis
The policy proposal from January 26 came with an explanatory statement whose two political 
reference points were, first, the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna, and, second, the meeting between 
Kohl and Modrow on December 19, that had been followed by the resolution of the Council of 
Ministers on January 4, 1990 (see Chapters 3 and 4). Its reason and purpose lay in making available a 
Western press to an East German readership and to, thus, establish free media in the GDR. It presented 
the willingness of the respective publishers “to sell their products for currency of the GDR and, thus, 
without the [need of] spending hard currency on part of the GDR,” as a gain for the GDR, not as 
economically beneficial to the publishers.1093 The point pushed was that any revenue (also that of 
advertising) was to remain in the GDR, and that its majority was to be invested in the development of 
distribution infrastructures; it was emphasized that “with the proposed way of financing, a 
comprehensive output volume can be achieved.”1094 The line of reasoning focused on political 
1090List, “Übersicht der zum Vertrieb vorgesehen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften,” pp. 2-3, attached to the proposal, 
Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland in der 
DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1091Alles ohne Gewähr, kress report, no. 3, February 1, 1990, p. 3, attachment III to letter, Thomas Ganske, 
Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34. Note: These numbers differed 
from those circulating among different political bodies. See interview, “'Der Postminister übte Zensur aus' - Konrad 
Weiß von 'Demokratie Jetzt' und Mitglied der DDR Regierungskommission für ein neues Mediengesetz begründet den 
Beschluß gegen die 'big four',” Interview Ute Scheub (taz vom 10.2.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der 
Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 124-125, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
1092“mit der Bitte um entsprechende Veranlassung.” Letter, Hans-Jürgen Niehof, Ministerium für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, to Manfred Sauer, Stellvertreter des Leiters des Sekretariats des Ministerrates der DDR, Berlin, 
January 26, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1093“ihre Presseerzeugnisse gegen Mark der DDR und damit ohne Einsatz von Devisen durch die DDR zu vertreiben.” 
Proposal, Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland in
der DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
1094“Mit der vorgeschlagenen Finanzierungsform kann ein umfangreiches Leistungsvolumen realisiert werden.” Proposal, 
Ministerratsvorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und dem übrigen Ausland in der 
DDR, Berlin, January 26, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3).
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imperatives in an economically weak state, and on notions of a free press that was “free” only in the 
pre-selection of publications according to the interests of a few: the pre-set criteria of marketability 
according to which publications were selected for import and distribution played into the hands of the 
major publishers holding a 70 percent market share in the Federal Republic. Exceptions (e.g. Blinker) 
were made for publications of the major publishers. The latter, in defending these exceptions, claimed 
that “the often cited Blinker, as an example for imbalance, was on the list at the exclusive request of the
East German side” where fishing was apparently a pretty big deal.1095 Regardless of such points of 
reasoning, what remains important is the competitive advantage on side of the major publishers in 
setting the ground rules for press imports into the GDR.
The interest of the MPF lay mainly in keeping part of its former monopoly position. With the 
looming media resolution of the Peopleʼs Chamber on February 5, 1990, the MPF was well aware that 
its monopoly right was soon to be lifted. With no alternatives at hand, the MPF was willing to pay the 
price of sharing these rights and to take over the less profitable subscription-based distribution to 
maintain some of its former power. It pushed for the proposal to become a set policy before February 5,
1990.
And though the reasoning of the MPF, the Big Four and the proposal itself complied with the 
political objective to satisfy a populationʼs demand for a free press, negotiations had generally been 
held in a private, non-transparent setting. The “Concept of Universal Supply,” upon which the final 
policy proposal was based, had come into being in the G+J headquarters in Hamburg. It had been 
drafted by for-profit entities that held their own stakes in the exploration of the East German market. 
Other interests groups, such as Presse-Grosso, medium and small-sized West German publishers, and 
East German publishers or media institutions were left out of these negotiations and their respective 
follow-up concepts. Considering the general turmoil and greater shifts on every level of society in the 
GDR, the fast-paced negotiations between the MPF and the Big Four had been held off public record. 
Neither other ministries, nor the MPF representative Niehof himself knew of the history of the deal.  
1095“Der als Beispiel für Unausgewogenheit oft zitierte 'Blinker' ist auf ausschließlichen Wunsch der DDR-Seite in der 
Liste enthalten gewesen.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” 
Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 13, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
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The Information Campaign of Jahreszeiten Publisher
“How come the big [publishers] get to decide what works for the
GDR and what does not?”
“Alles ohne Gewähr,” kress report, February 1, 19901096
Jahreszeiten, a medium-sized publisher located in Hamburg, initially learned of the “offer of 
West German publishers to organize retail sale” in the GDR from a press release, and already on 
January 22, had written to MPF Minister Wolf of its “great worry … that one or two major West 
German publishing houses cannot resist the temptation to present to you proposals for the GDR that 
contradict an equality for all [West German print media].”1097 The letter was received by Niehof on 
January 30, too late, considering the pace of negotiations and the set meeting of the Council of 
Ministers for February 1.1098 What followed was an intense communication and eventually a full-blown 
information campaign by Jahreszeiten, which made questions of import and distribution, and the 
envisioned “deluxe-Grosso-model,” the bone of contention in the joint venture negotiations.1099 It 
culminated in Jahreszeiten CEO Thomas Ganske approaching the Round Table (RT) with an appeal on 
February 3, 1990, in which he and six other medium-sized publishers protested against the “secret 
negotiations” between the Post and the four major publishers.1100 Along with the appeal, the RT was 
sent an extensive documentation of the matter in form of sixteen newspaper clippings, press releases 
and internal letters in chronological order.1101 Jahreszeiten and other West German publishers were 
appealing a distributions system in the making that disregarded their interests.
1096“Wie kommen die Großen dazu, zu bestimmen, was in der DDR geht und was nicht?” Alles ohne Gewähr, kress 
report, no.3, February 1, 1990, p. 3, attachment III to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, 
Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34 (see below).
1097“großer Sorge … Angebot westdeutscher Verlage zur Organisation des Einzelverkaufs … daß ein bis zwei 
Großverlage der BRD der Versuchung nicht widerstehen konnen, Ihnen für die DDR Vorschläge zu unterbreiten, die 
einer Chancengleichheit widersprechen.” Letter, Gephard Sondermann, Leitung Jahreszeitenverlag Vertrieb, to Klaus 
Wolf, Generaldirektor Miniterium für Post- und Fernwesen, Presse-Vertriebssystem für BRD-Produkte in der DDR, 
January 22, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1098Note: This estimate is based on the the hand written note and signature on it, dating January 30, 1990. 
1099“Luxus-Grosso-Modell.” Stern und Geo für Suhl und Gera. Vier westdeutsche Verlage wollen ein Vertriebssystem in 
der DDR aufbauen, Andreas Kühner, Horizont, January 26, 1990, attachment V to letter, Thomas Ganske, 
Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1100“Geheimverhandlungen.” Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 
1990, BArch DA3/34; also in BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). The letter was signed by representatives of EHAPA-Verlag, 
Gong-Verlag, Verlagsgruppe Handelsblatt, Jürg-Marquard-Gruppe, Sebaldus-Verlag, Spiegel-Verlag.
1101Note: This sub-chapter is mainly based on this documentation (it can be found in BArch DM3/21121 (1/3)) as well as 
other material found in BArch DA3/34 and the private archive of Hans-Jürgen Niehof.
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The Initial Contact 
On January 22, 1990, Thomas Ganske wrote to Wolf that proposals made by major publishers 
potentially went against the principles of fair competition and expressed “the very big request” to talk 
over a “system of press distribution for products from the FRG in the GDR,” to give the alternative 
view of medium-sized publishers that included an “offer for securing the interests of the GDR.”1102 Not 
having received any reply, another letter followed on January 31, 1990. In it, Ganske now referred to 
the detailed plans for a joint venture between the MPF and the Big Four, of which he had learned 
recently and which had left him “very concerned.”1103 “It is our opinion that a neutral distribution 
system is the basis for democratic development in the GDR. It [such system] is, after all, the only way 
to allow the citizens of your country to truly decide for themselves what newspapers and magazines 
they want to read.”1104 Ending with an invitation for personal talks in Berlin, the letter entailed an open 
appeal entitled “The Post of the GDR plays press distribution into the hands of West German major 
publishers and, thereby, endangers press freedom.”1105 Signed by nine medium-sized publishers, such as
Gong, Spiegel and Handelsblatt, the appeal had been released to the press the day before, and was 
picked up by several newspapers.1106 It argued that the major publishing houses were expanding their 
market domination into East Germany by taking control over press distribution, a deal that had come 
about in “secret negotiations” with the East German Post: 
With this [system], free distribution for all medium-sized publishers and their publications
is being blatantly impeded and the new freedom of opinion in the GDR, so important for 
further developments, is limited at its outset.1107 
1102“in großer Sorge …  die sehr große Bitte … Presse-Vetriebssystem für BRD-Produkte in der DDR … Angebot zur 
Sicherung der DDR-Interessen.”Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag, to Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, January 22, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1103“erheblich beunruhigt.” Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag to Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, January 31, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1104“Ein neutrales Vertriebssystem ist nach unserer Auffassung als Grundlage einer demokratischen Entwicklung in der 
DDR erforderlich. Nur so konnen letztlich die Bürger ihres Landes wirklich selbst entscheiden, welche Zeitungen und 
Zeitschriften sie lesen wollen.” Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag to Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, January 31, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1105Note: The meeting was to be held by Ganskeʼs personal representative Karl-Udo Wrede and publishing manager of the
magazine Vital, Claus B. Schmidt. Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag to Wolf, Ministerium für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, January 31, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1106Press release, Jahreszeitenverlag et al., Die Post der DDR spielt westdeutschen Grossverlagen Pressevertriebssystem in
die Hände und gefährdet damit die Pressefreiheit, Hamburg, January 31, 1990, BArch DA3/34. For coverage see for 
instance: Pressevertriebssystem nut mit Großverlagen? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 1, 1990. Also Muster 
ohne Wert: Streit um das DDR-Presse-Grosso, Mittelständische Pressehäuser opponieren gegen die vier Großverlage / 
Bonner Arbeitsgruppe plädiert für offenes Vertriebsnetz, Horizont, February 1, 1990.
1107“Geheimverhandlungen … Damit wird der freie Vertrieb aller mittelständischen Verlage und ihrer Objekte eklatant 
behindert und die neue, für die weitere Entwicklung so notwendige Meinungsvielfalt in der DDR schon im Ansatz 
eingeschränkt.” Press release, Jahreszeitenverlag et al., Die Post der DDR spielt westdeutschen Grossverlagen 
Pressevertriebssystem in die Hände und gefährdet damit die Pressefreiheit, Hamburg, January 31, 1990, BArch DA3/34. 
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Another press release followed in which the Jahreszeiten underlined that it “cannot be that four 
publishing houses decide what newspapers and magazines from the Federal Republic can  – initially – 
be sold in the GDR.”1108 Jahreszeiten complained that while the proposal had been submitted by Wolf 
to the Council of Ministers and was up for resolution, both parties, the Post and the publishers, refused 
to provide any information as to its content. Approaching “all parties participating in the democratic 
process in the GDR,” Jahreszeiten et al. asked to defer the decision, to make the proposal public and to 
check for alternative solutions.1109 The goal needed to be a system “that guarantees free [market] entry 
for all, that is neutral and that works solely according to the rules of the market.”1110 Jahreszeiten 
threatened to contact the Round Table and other publishers in the Federal Republic if needed.
While the MPF did not respond to the letter or the appeal immediately, the Big Four did. Tamm,
in a letter to Ganske, made clear that “denunciations and the reckless jeopardizing of the intensive 
efforts to fully open the GDR for press freedom” were “no reference for commonalities” between the 
publishers.1111 The Big Four jointly rejected the “absurd accusations” as “willful misinterpretation” and 
underlined that the planned joint venture was based on “proven principles, such as free access/entry for 
all, neutrality and marketability.”1112 Referring to the urgency of the situation, the generally bad supply 
of press matters in the GDR and the need for a country-wide distribution of Western print media before
upcoming elections, any action and/or “massive influence” of the Round Table that potentially 
endangered the worked-out model would be “irresponsible” and “imprudent;” such action only 
hampered “the universal supply of citizens of the GDR with publications from the Federal Republic” 
and their “right to free information.”1113 This press release had been sent for approval to the MPF the 
Published in i.e. Muster ohne Wert: Streit um das DDR-Presse-Grosso, Mittelständische Pressehäuser opponieren gegen 
die vier Großverlage / Bonner Arbeitsgruppe plädiert für offenes Vertriebsnetz, Horizont, February 1, 1990.
1108“nicht angehen, daß vier Verlagshäuser darüber bestimmen, welche Zeitungen und Zeitschriften aus der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der DDR – zunächst – vertrieben werden dürfen.” Press release, Jahreszeitenverlag, 
Gemeinsamer Weg westdeutscher Verlage im Interesse der Pressefreiheit und Meinungsvielfalt in der DDR moglich?, 
Hamburg, February 1, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1109“alle am demokratischen Prozeß in der DDR Beteiligten.” Press release, Jahreszeitenverlag et al., Die Post der DDR 
spielt westdeutschen Grossverlagen Pressevertriebssystem in die Hände und gefährdet damit die Pressefreiheit, 
Hamburg, January 31, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1110“das den freien Zugang für alle gewährleistet, neutral ist und nur nach den Gesetzen des Marktes arbeitet.” Press 
release, Jahreszeitenverlag, Gemeinsamer Weg westdeutscher Verlage im Interesse der Pressefreiheit und 
Meinungsvielfalt in der DDR moglich?, Hamburg, February 1, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1111“Denunziationen und leichtfertige Gefährdung der intensiven Bemühungen für eine volle Öffnung zur Pressefreiheit in 
der DDR … sind keine Empfehlung für Gemeinsamkeiten.” Cited in Wie im Dschungel. Bundesdeutsche Verlage 
streiten, wer die West-Blätter in die DDR bringen darf, Der Spiegel, 7/90, pp. 110-111.
1112“absurden Unterstellungen … gezielte Fehlinterpretation … bewährten Prinzipien, wie freier Zugang für alle, 
Neutralität und Verkäuflichkeit.” Press release, Erklärung der vier Großverlage, February 1, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1113“massive Einflussnahme … verantwortungslos … die umfassende Versorgung der DDR-Büger mit dem der 
Bundesrepublik … und das Recht der DDR-Büger auf freie Information.” Press release, Erklärung der vier Großverlage,
February 1, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
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day before its release. Immediately responding, the MPF sent a request to the publishers to modify the 
text by adding that a functional distribution was the prerequisite not only for the import of Western 
print media but also for “the development of a diverse and self-reliant [East German] press.”1114 This 
sentence was not included in the final release. 
Instead, Christoph Keese, spokesperson of G+J underlined: “The planned joint venture is 
neither an instrument to secure market shares nor a monopoly – access for publications of other [West 
German] publishers is, of course, guaranteed at all time.”1115 The publishers furthermore underlined that
the Post had approached them for assistance, which now made necessary considerable financial 
resources all of them were willing to provide.1116 
Council of Ministers and the Round Table 
The press release of the Big Four came out on February 1, the same day the Council of 
Ministers decided, without much debate, to not pass the proposal of the MPF. Instead, the council 
passed it on to the RT for closer examination, which Jahreszeiten claimed as a success. Due to its 
protests, according to the publisher, negotiations on distribution issues in the GDR were again open. 
Now, also the Big Four were in favor of a neutral, market-based system, and Jahreszeiten asked if “a 
common path for West German publishers [was] possible in the interest of press freedom and the 
freedom of opinion in the GDR.”1117 To avoid any further delays, the publisher was to invite the major 
publishing houses, the other medium-sized publishers that had joined the appeal as well as Grossisten 
to talks in Hamburg at short notice.1118 East German interest groups were not on the list, and West 
German major publishers did not answer any of the invitations.
Further, in spite of Jahreszeiten's claims, the state of negotiations was, as underlined by 
kressreport, completely open; by February 1, “no sort of official response [regarding the reopening of 
negotiations on press distribution] has been given by the GDR.”1119 The Round Table was to meet on 
1114“das entstehen einer vielfaeltigen und eigenstaendigen presselandschaft.” Telex, Hammer and Schunke, MPF, January 
31, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (2/3). 
1115“Die geplante Vertriebsgesellschaft ist wieder ein Instrument, um Marktanteile zu ergattern, noch ein Monopol – der 
Zugang für Zeitschriften anderer Verlage ist natürlich jederzeit gewährleistet.” Muster ohne Wert: Streit um das DDR-
Presse-Grosso, Mittelständische Pressehäuser opponieren gegen die vier Großverlage / Bonner Arbeitsgruppe plädiert 
für offenes Vertriebsnetz, Horizont, February 1, 1990, attachment IV to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al.
an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1116Press release, Erklärung der vier Großverlage, February 1, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1117Press release, Gemeinsamer Weg westdeutscher Verlage im Interesse der Pressefreiheit und Meinungsvielfalt in der 
DDR moglich?, Jahreszeitenverlag, Hamburg, February 2, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1118Press release, Jahreszeitenverlag, Gemeinsamer Weg westdeutscher Verlage im Interesse der Pressefreiheit und 
Meinungsvielfalt in der DDR moglich?, Hamburg, February 2, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1119“Irgendwelche offiziellen Mitteilungen aus der DDR lagen aber nicht vor.” Alles ohne Gewähr, kress report, no.3, 
February 1, 1990, p. 3, attachment III to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, 
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February 12, and the goal of Jahreszeiten was to have a concept ready before then. With success, 
already on February 3, a proposal was handed over to the RT, in which the “medium-sized publishers 
[made] suggestions for a neutral distribution system in the GDR.”1120 Not having received any sign of 
cooperation from the major publishers, the concept was part of a larger appeal of six medium-sized 
publishers. Both were handed to the RT in addition to the aforementioned extensive documentation of 
the “secret negotiations.” The concept of the medium-sized publishers on the “Preconditions of a 
Neutral Press Distribution System in the GDR” had been elaborated during a meeting “in which the 
invited major publishing houses did not want to participate.”1121 In spite of this refusal, the concept 
made clear that any reformed system needed to be built in cooperation with the major publishers to 
soon allow for the distribution of West German publications.1122 This, however, required the 
elimination of any “pre-censorship by pre-selecting publications” that were to be sold in the GDR.1123 
The concept laid out that only a “market neutral” system based on the federal model would allow for 
press freedom also in the GDR.1124 It was a system that had proven itself in the Federal Republic by 
allowing for press diversity, competitive equality and a press density hardly matched internationally. 
Core demands for the GDR, thus, were: Equal opportunities for all publishers and publications based 
on the absence of censorship in any shape or form. Instead, the customer alone was to decide. For this, 
it needed an increase in retail sales. Referring to the post-WWII period, the publishers underlined that 
“this [federal] system has also been built out of an hour zero,” and the experiences from this building 
phase were still available.1125 “The regulation of press distribution in the FRG shall, therefore, be 
February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1120Presse release, Jahreszeitenverlag, Mittelständische Verlage erarbeiten Vorschläge für ein neutrales 
Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, attached documentation to letter, Thomas Ganske, 
Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1121“an dem die eingeladenen Großverlage nicht teilnehmen wollten.” Press release, Jahreszeitenverlag, Mittelständische 
Verlage erarbeiten Vorschläge für ein neutrales Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, 
attachment I to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch 
DA3/34.
1122Press release, Jahreszeitenverlag, Mittelständische Verlage erarbeiten Vorschläge für ein neutrales 
Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, attachment I to letter, Thomas Ganske, 
Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1123Full quote: “Vorzensure durch Vorab-Auswahl der zu vertreibenden Presseerzeugnisse.” Press release, 
Jahreszeitenverlag, Mittelständische Verlage erarbeiten Vorschläge für ein neutrales Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, 
Hamburg, February 3, 1990, attachment I to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, 
Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1124“wettbewerbsneutralen Pressegroßhandel.” Concept, Voraussetzungen für ein neutrales Pressevertriebssystem in der 
DDR,  Jahreszeitenverlag, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, attachment II to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al.
an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1125“dieses System auch aus einer Stunde Null heraus aufgebaut wurde.” Concept, Voraussetzungen für ein neutrales 
Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, Jahreszeitenverlag, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, attachment II to letter, Thomas 
Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
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adapted [by the GDR] as far as this is sensible and doable as well as accepted by the GDR.”1126 Thus, 
ideally, distribution in the GDR would be based on medium-sized Grossisten who could, if needed, be 
advised and supported by Grossisten from the FRG.1127 
The publishersʼ concept was supported by Presse-Grosso. Only a day earlier, Presse-Grosso had
contacted Gerhard Sondermann from Jahreszeiten with its own plea to all West German publishers to 
push for an East German distribution system according to federal standards. It underlined that only 
such a system (transfer) would serve all publishers.1128 This made necessary the immediate support, 
“without any further preconditions,” for knowledge transfer, financial assistance and the eventual 
withdrawal of publishers from distribution once a “functioning press distribution had proven itself” in 
the GDR.1129 “Publishers and [Presse-]Grosso should [therefore] immediately work on their joint plans 
to give the citizens of the GDR access to free Western information without any further delays.”1130 
Based on the statements made by politicians in both German states, on the fast approaching economic 
unity and the unification of both states, Presse-Grosso expected a subsequent change of economic 
conditions and policies that made obsolete some of the basic positions that had been laid out throughout
the last weeks. “This means, we all find considerably better conditions today to immediately implement
the economic means for the distribution of a free press in the GDR.”1131 And while Presse-Grosso 
pointed to a system transfer, Jahreszeiten underlined that change was possible only in cooperation with 
the major publishing houses, which required further talks with East German institutions. This “can 
1126“Die Regel des Pressevertriebs in der BRD sollen daher übernommen werden, soweit dies sinnvoll und machbar ist 
sowie von der DDR akzeptiert wird.” Concept, Voraussetzungen für ein neutrales Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, 
Jahreszeitenverlag, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, attachment II to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an 
Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1127Concept, Voraussetzungen für ein neutrales Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR,  Jahreszeitenverlag, Hamburg, 
February 3, 1990, attachment II to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, 
February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1128Stern und Geo für Suhl und Gera. Vier westdeutsche Verlage wollen ein Vertriebssystem in der DDR aufbauen, 
Andreas Kühner, Horizont, January 26, 1990, attachment V to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an 
Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1129“ohne weitere Vorbedingungen … Funktionsfähigkeit für den Pressevertrieb unter Beweis gestellt ist.” Telex, Dr. 
Eberhard Nolte to Gerhard Sondermann, Jahreszeiten Verlag, Erklärung des Verbandes Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V. (Presse-Grosso) zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR, February 2, 1990, attachment II to letter, 
Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1130“Verlage und Grosso sollten sofort ihre gemeinsamen Pläne angehen um ohne weiteren Verzogerungen den Bürgern 
der DDR Zugang zu freien Informationen aus dem Westen zu verschaffen.” Telex, Dr. Eberhard Nolte to Gerhard 
Sondermann, Jahreszeiten Verlag, Erklärung des Verbandes Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten 
e.V. (Presse-Grosso) zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR, February 2, 1990, attachment II to letter, Thomas Ganske, 
Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1131“Damit haben wie alle zusammen heute westenlich günstigere Vorraussetzungen, die wirtschaftlichen Ziele für den 
Vertieb einer freien Presse in der DDR praktisch und sofort umzusetzen.” Telex, Dr. Eberhard Nolte to Gerhard 
Sondermann, Jahreszeiten Verlag, Erklärung des Verbandes Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten 
e.V. (Presse-Grosso) zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR, February 2, 1990, attachment II to letter, Thomas Ganske, 
Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
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happen in continuation of pre-existing talks – with the participation of representatives assigned by the 
other [medium-sized] publishers.”1132 Jahreszeiten, thus, sent an additional invitation to the major 
publishing houses and several invitations to the RT for further talks in Berlin, Hamburg or any place 
desirable to prove “the functionality of the federal distribution system.”1133 
Two days later, on February 5, the Peopleʼs Chamber passed the resolution on the Freedom of 
Information and, thereby, not only set a first milestone on media freedom and the freedom of opinion in
the GDR (see Chapter 3) but also broke the monopoly of Postal Distribution. With the Council of 
Ministers having passed the policy proposal to the Round Table just days before, it had made 
impossible the Postʼs aim to maintain its influence. And though the MPF no longer had the exclusive 
rights over distribution, the Post was now legally required to buy and distribute all domestic 
publications with a circulation higher than 500 copies (see Chapter 3).1134 
The Take of the MPF
Time was pressing, but partly due to internal reform processes, partly due to the sheer amount 
of inquiries and the unwillingness to lay open its own dealings, the MPF responded slowly. By 
February 5, Thomas Ganske from Jahreszeiten had still not received any official reply to his letter from
January 31. Now, he and his colleague Claus-Burkhart Schmidt traveled to Berlin. Sending a last 
minute telex, they asked again for a meeting with the MPF to talk over distribution issues. Finally with 
success.1135 That same day, a meeting between Jahreszeiten and MPF representatives took place at the 
ministry during which Jahreszeiten laid out its position on the matter based on the documentation 
provided to the RT, including its own concept on distribution.1136 According to internal notes of the 
MPF, the talks allowed for an exchange of positions and essential concerns. The position of the MPF, 
however, was clear; it was summarized in the document “Argument for Building a Press Distribution 
Company.”1137 Outlining the proposal submitted by the MPF and the Big Four, the MPFʼs line of 
1132“kann in Fortführung der bereits gelaufenen Verhandlungen geschehen  – unter Beteiligung von Vertretern, die von 
den übrigen Verlagen bestimmt werden.” Concept, Voraussetzungen für ein neutrales Pressevertriebssystem in der 
DDR,  Jahreszeitenverlag, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, attachment II to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al.
an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1133“die Funktionsfähigkeit des bundesrepublikanischen Vertriebssystems.” Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. 
al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1134Alles ohne Gewähr, kress report, no.3, February 1, 1990, p. 2, attachment III to letter, Thomas Ganske, 
Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1135Note: this estimate is based on a handwritten note on the telex. Telex, Claus-Burkhardt Schmidt, Verlagsleitung Vital, 
Jahreszeitenverlag, to Klaus Wolf, Generaldirektor Ministerium für Post- und Fernwesen, February 5, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1136Internal Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, n.d. [February 11, 1990], 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1137Internal Note, Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, Minister, February 5, 1990, BArch 
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argument was as follows: It had been approached by the publishers in January 1990 with first concrete 
concepts regarding the financing of press imports in the GDR. Not only were the publishersʼ offers 
economically beneficial but their operating efficiency was a stronghold in guaranteeing a country-wide 
distribution and its gradual expansion, and this was “fully and completely in the interests of the 
population.”1138 The major publishers were willing to carry the economic risks, and their expansive 
business relations to other publishers in the Federal Republic ensured “that a broad product range of 
press matter can be offered for sale.”1139 Thus, “following a careful examination of the offers made,” 
the MPF in joint effort with other institutions of the GDR had entered official negotiations with the 
publishers, and not, as it had been circulated in press releases, “secret negotiations.”1140 It was the 
MPFʼs belief that “the intended distribution system allows for a free access of all other publishers 
according to agreed terms and, thereby, guarantees equal rights for all,” and it was going to insist on 
this point in upcoming negotiations.1141 
Days after the meeting, likely on February 11, this initial document, arguing for the building of 
a joint venture, was amended by a four-page “Addition to the Argument.”1142 Written in preparation for 
the upcoming RT meeting on February 12,1143 the MPFʼs position had slightly shifted; the meeting with
Jahreszeiten had shown that smaller publishers were not primarily interested in equity investments in 
the joint venture. Instead, they aimed for “a joint representation of the remaining publishers in shaping 
and concluding the shareholding agreement.”1144 Their interests, thus, needed to be taken into 
consideration. This more inclusive tone towards the interests of smaller publishers had not been the 
result of the meeting alone, however. It was also due to the pervasive information campaign of 
Jahreszeiten.
On February 6, a day after the meeting with the publisher, Niehof from the MPF received the 
DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1138“voll und ganz im Interesse der Bevolkerung.” Internal Note, Argumentation zur Bildung einer 
Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, Minister, February 5, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1139“daß ein breites Sortiment von Presseerzeugnissen zum Vertrieb angeboten werden kann.” Internal Note, 
Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, Minister, February 5, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1140“nach sehr sorgfältiger Prüfung der vorliegenden Angebote.” Internal Note, Argumentation zur Bildung einer 
Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, Minister, February 5, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1141“Das angestrebte Vertriebssystem läßt den freien Zugang für alle anderen Verlage zu den vereinbarten Konditionen zu 
und sichert damit Chancengleichheit für alle Verlage.” Internal Note, Argumentation zur Bildung einer 
Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, Minister, February 5, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1142Internal Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, n.d. [February 11, 1990], 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1143Personal communication, Email, Jürgen Niehof, September 12, 2017.
1144“eine gemeinsame Interessenvertretung der übrigen Verlage beim Abschluss und der Ausgestaltung des 
Gesellschaftervertrages.” Internal Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, 
n.d. [February 11, 1990], pp. 1-2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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same “documentation of the controversy regarding press distribution in the GDR” from Jahreszeiten as 
had earlier the Round Table.1145 Along with this information package came a particularly persistent 
approach of Gerhard Sondermann who repeatedly contacted Niehof for further meetings and/or 
information. Thus, “Wadenbeißer” Sondermann and Schmidt stood in constant communication with 
Niehof and the MPF.1146 With success. The same day the MPF received the information package, it, in 
turn, contacted the Big Four and brought forward the proposition of Jahreszeiten et al. for a joint 
interest group to participate in further negotiations. The major publishers, generally in favor of the 
proposal, suggested Wolfgang Fürstner, elected chair of the Association of German Magazine 
Publishers (Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., VDZ), the umbrella organization of German 
magazine publishers, to represent all publishers' interests.1147 This proposition was quickly followed by 
a board meeting of the VDZ magazine division (Fachgruppe Publikumszeitschriften) in Hamburg on 
February 7, and resulted in an immediate dpa press release from the Big Four, announcing that the 
publishers were given the green light to resume negotiations with the MPF (see below).1148 
Analysis
The policy proposal of the MPF and the Big Four had been close to becoming a done deal. But, 
as was outlined by East German delegates at the upcoming German-German media talks on February 8,
“on part of some Western publishers, such as Spiegel and Jahreszeiten, there have been protests against
this agreement, which went as far as a joint plea to the Round Table because these publishers feared for
their equal opportunities.”1149 The key issue: the selection of publications deemed fit for exploring the 
Eastern market. Fearing the loss of a potential future readership to the Big Four and the Eastern 
expansion of their market domination, small and medium-sized publishers went into opposition and 
started what the MPF called a media campaign of “a non-material interest group” under the leadership 
1145Note: The documentation contained sixteen documents (i.e. press clippings, press releases, letters) ordered 
chronologically, from between January 26 until February 3, 1990, regarding the battle over press distribution in the 
GDR. Documentation, Dokumentation zur Kontroverse um den Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Jahreszeiten Verlag, 
February 3, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1146Note: “Wadenbeißer” is a derogatory term for an insignificant but aggressive person. Personal Communication, 
Interview, Hans-Jürgen Niehof, March 20, 2017.
1147Internal Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, n.d. [February 11, 1990], p.
2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1148 “Grünes Licht … für den Aufbau eines Pressevertriebssystems in der DDR.” dpa press release, cited in Letter, 
Christian G. Christiansen, Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR, to 
Merk und Hübner, Bundesministerium des Inneren, Berlin, April 18, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1149“Seitens einiger westlicher Verlage wie des Spiegel-Verlages und des Jahreszeitenverlages gab es Proteste gegen diese 
Vereinbarung, die bis zu einem gemeinsamen Appell an den Runden Tisch gingen, weil die Verlage um ihre 
Chancengleichheit fürchteten.” Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. 
Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
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of Jahreszeiten.1150 The considerations of the publishers, however, were anything but non-material. In a 
fierce information battle, Jahreszeiten promoted primarily its own interests on the East German market 
and, thereby, followed familiar patterns. While all sides – the major publishing houses, the medium-
sized ones, Presse-Grosso as well as the MPF – argued for the East German citizensʼ rights for a free 
press, their primary concerns lay in maintaining control over established structures or gaining control 
over new markets. None included or mentioned the interests of East German papers or publishers, not 
to speak of media workers or unions. Thus, the general self-interest of all West German publishers 
outweighed any concern for press freedom in the GDR. The potential repercussions of practices in the 
GDR for established infrastructures in the Federal Republic were another driving concern particularly 
of Presse-Grosso and smaller publishers. While partly thanks to the Jahreszeiten campaign, 
negotiations had become public, talks were continued in nontransparent semi-private environments.  
German-German Policy Talks
With the upcoming German-German expert meeting on press and media (see Chapter 3) and the
Round Table debate, discussions over distribution in the GDR shifted to a more transparent level. 
Simultaneously, the two opposing groups of West German publishers continued their lobbying efforts 
aiming to influence these debates in their favor. As will become clear, it was partly due to these 
initiatives that none of the policy debates were able to emancipate themselves from the influence, if not
dominance, of Western centric assumptions of how a “free” press in close relation to distribution was 
to look like in the GDR. 
ʻGerman-German Media Talksʼ
Expert meetings between East and West German representatives on a wide range of socio-
economic and political issues had been agreed upon between Modrow and Kohl on December 19, 
1989. The first expert meeting on media, the “German-German media talks,” had been scheduled for 
February 8, 1990 (see Chapter 3). Initially on the agenda: the technical and financial framework for the 
exchange of print media between both states. The eventual focus of the talks, however, lay on 
“improving the mutual newspaper and magazine distribution, in particular the building of an 
independent press distribution system” in the GDR as well as the “cooperation between press 
enterprises of both states.”1151 
1150“einer ideellen Interessengruppe.” Internal Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer 
Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, n.d. [February 11, 1990], p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1151“die Verbesserung des wechselseitigen Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenvertriebs, insbesondere der Aufbau eines 
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The East German delegation was headed by Ralf Bachmann, deputy spokesperson of the 
government and representative of the Press and Information Office. Recently promoted to this position,
he had joined the negotiations over distribution without having had much prior knowledge of the 
case.1152 He was, however, highly in favor of the deal. At his side stood representatives of DDR-FS, 
Radio, the Foreign Ministry, the MfK (Manfred Schuberth), and the MPF. The meeting was joined by 
Jorg Reimann who worked at the Permanent Representation of the GDR in Bonn and had been the 
“communication node” between Bonn and Berlin.1153 Schuberth was the only participant who had taken
part in any of the previous talks.
In preparing for the meeting, the delegation outlined its perspective on the deal with the Big 
Four.1154 Being in favor of it, the general point to be pushed during the meeting was that while 
negotiations had initially started with the goal to improve Postal Distribution, the “particular value of 
the agreement” with the Big Four to establish a joint venture was “that it comes into effect fast and 
requires no hard currency spending for the GDR” while “simultaneously guaranteeing the export of all 
East German publications to Western countries.”1155 The initial import and distribution volume lay at 
about seventy publications of different West German publishers, “with a share of not more than 5 
percent of the overall circulation of the respective publications,” and this was for retail sale only.1156 
The delegation was convinced that on that same day, “green light will be given” for the joint venture 
project with the Big Four.1157 
However, when the seven East German representatives sat down at 10 am on a Thursday 
morning in the BMI in Bonn, they faced an “expert group” of twenty-four West German delegates. Part
unabhängigen Pressevertriebssystems in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik … Kooperation von 
Presseunternehmen aus beiden Staaten.” Joint press release, Gemeinsame Erklärung, Hans Neusel, Delegation der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, und Ralf Bachmann, Delegation der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Bonn, 
February 8, 1990, BArch DC9/1052. Also Bulletin, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Gemeinsame 
Erklärung über medienpolitische Zusammenarbeit mit der DDR, Nr. 24/S. 189, Bonn, February 13, 1990, BArch 
DC9/1050.
1152Deducted from personal communication, interview, Ralf Bachmann, August 20, 2014.
1153List of Attendees, Der Bundesminister des Inneren (SM 10-344690-6/1), Teilnehmerliste Bundesregierung/DDR, 
Besprechung am 8. Februar 1990, deutsche-deutsche Mediengespräche, February 8, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
1154Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p.
2, BArch DC9/1052. Note: The concept is a six-page document, likely written by Ralf Bachmann.
1155Full quote: “Der besondere Wert der Vereinbarung besteht, daß sie schnell wirksam wird und keine Valutakosten für 
die DDR verursacht … Mit dem beabsichtigten Vertriebsunternehmen soll gleichzeitig der Export aller in der DDR 
erscheinenden Presseerzeugnisse ins westliche Ausland gesichert werden.” Concept, Konzeption für die 
Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
1156“mit einem Anteil von nicht mehr als 5 % der Gesamtauflage des betreffenden Titels.” Concept, Konzeption für die 
Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
1157“erfolgt nun der Startschuß durch den Ministerrat der DDR” Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. 
Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
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of this delegation were State Secretary Hans Neusel (heading the talks), the director of the BMI Erich 
Schaible and his colleagues Hans-Günther Merk and Dietrich Hübner, Rüdiger Kass (the representative
of the chancellor), and Dr. Jürg Ter-Nedden from the Ministry of the Economy, as well as several other
ministries, and one representative from each Land (see also Chapter 3).
The position of the BMI was somewhat clear. Earlier, it had formed a “Working Group on 
media in the GDR” (DDR Medien Arbeitsgruppe), and this group “prefer[ed] a distribution model 
based on medium-sized businesses” that were independent from publishers.1158 This preference, as the 
trade journal Horizont reported, related closely to the increasingly prominent goal of German unity. 
The BMI, therefore, overall aimed for distribution structures similar to those in the Federal 
Republic.1159 If, however, a joint venture was to be built in the GDR, the BMI working group made 
clear that “the regulations of the distribution company must guarantee an open model.”1160 This meant, 
also publications with small circulation numbers and a consequently more expensive distribution 
needed to be included. The system further had to benefit building the press in the GDR. Horizont 
concluded that the group around Jahreszeiten seemed to have “good allies” in the upcoming talks.1161 
The view of the East German delegation, presented by Bachman, differed: Had smaller 
publishers not protested the most pressing issue, namely distribution, it would have been solved by 
now, and a broad range of West German publications could have been made available already and 
before the elections. 
Now, after their ʻplea for helpʼ to the Round Table, we are facing an entire row of 
opponents of the project, a part senses monopolization activities, another part fears for 
the competitiveness of our own publishers [see below]. But also opponents of the free 
exchange of print media altogether are hiding behind such arguments.1162 
1158“präferiert ein verlagsunabhängiges und mittelständisches Vertriebsmodell.” Muster ohne Wert: Streit um das DDR-
Presse-Grosso, Mittelständische Pressehäuser opponieren gegen die vier Großverlage / Bonner Arbeitsgruppe plädiert 
für offenes Vertriebsnetz, Horizont, February 1, 1990, attachment IV to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al.
an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1159“Gute Verbündete.” Muster ohne Wert: Streit um das DDR-Presse-Grosso, Mittelständische Pressehäuser opponieren 
gegen die vier Großverlage / Bonner Arbeitsgruppe plädiert für offenes Vertriebsnetz, Horizont, February 1, 1990, 
attachment IV to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch 
DA3/34.
1160“In der Satzung der Vertriebsgesellschaft muß ein offenes Modell festgeschrieben werden.” Muster ohne Wert: Streit 
um das DDR-Presse-Grosso, Mittelständische Pressehäuser opponieren gegen die vier Großverlage / Bonner 
Arbeitsgruppe plädiert für offenes Vertriebsnetz, Horizont, February 1, 1990, attachment IV to letter, Thomas Ganske, 
Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1161“Gute Verbündete.” Muster ohne Wert: Streit um das DDR-Presse-Grosso, Mittelständische Pressehäuser opponieren 
gegen die vier Großverlage / Bonner Arbeitsgruppe plädiert für offenes Vertriebsnetz, Horizont, February 1, 1990, 
attachment IV to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch 
DA3/34.
1162“Nun, nach deren ʻHilfsappellʼ an den Runden Tisch, sehen wir uns einer Front von Gegnern des Projekts gegenüber, 
von denen ein Teil Monopolisierungsversuche wittert, ein anderer Teil um die Konkurrenzfähigkeit unserer eigenen 
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In consequence of the appeal, precious time was being wasted in further elaborating the agreement. It 
needed counter-information that “explicitly underline[d] that no publisher is being discriminated 
against by the distribution company. From the outset, also publications of smaller publishers are being 
included.”1163 Acknowledging, however, that smaller and financially weaker West German publishers 
might encounter problems when selling their publications in the GDR (for a 1:3 ratio with revenues 
remaining in the GDR), Bachmann asked the federal government to assess “how it can offer support for
such publishers.”1164 What mattered most was to get distribution going, and the hope was to soon reach 
the final level of distribution capacities, which meant “only those publications will not be distributed 
that attract a too small amount of readersʼ interest,” whose distribution was not wanted by the publisher
or whose content did not adhere to the constitution of the GDR.1165 Bachmann expressed his deep 
appreciation for the efforts of the major publishers in bringing about a solution for distribution and 
underlined that, now, the help of the federal government was needed to quickly develop further the 
agreement with the Big Four. 
Schaible (BMI), instead of giving the position of the BMI on the matter, first gave his insights 
into the position of the publishers. He underlined: 
that there was a great disappointment on the management floors of the major publishing 
houses, in particular Springer, that, in spite of the ʻgenerous offer to guarantee a supply 
of Western print media to the GDR before the elections and to invest considerable 
resources for it,ʼ they had become the talk of town. There was no intention [on side of 
the publishers] to continue with the project but instead [they] were now considering 
ʻdirect distribution [and sale].ʼ1166 
Verlage fürchtet. Aber auch Gegner des freien Zeitungsaustausches überhaupt verstecken sich hinter solchen 
Argumenten.” Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit 
im Bereich Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052. 
1163Full quote: “Es ist deshalb notwendig, ausdrücklich zu bemerken, daß kein Verlag durch das Vertriebsunternehmen 
benachteiligt wird. Von Anfang an werden auch Erzeugnisse kleinerer Verlage mit berücksichtigt. Das Ziel ist, daß bei 
Erreichen der Endstufe der Kapazität nur solche Presseerzeugnisse nicht geliefert werden, an denen ein zu geringes 
Leserinteresse besteht, deren Verbreitung durch den Verleger nicht gewünscht wird oder deren Inhalt nicht mit der 
Verfassung der DDR im Einklang steht.” Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, 
(Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
1164“inwieweit sie solchen Verlagen Unterstützung geben kann.” Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. 
Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 4, BArch DC9/1052. 
1165See full quote above (fn 1162). Concept, Konzeption für die Expertengespräche am 8. Februar 1990 in Bonn, (Gen. 
Müller), n.d. (February 8, 1990), p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. Note: While the BMI argued all, also small, publications 
needed to be distributed, Bachmann's point likely related to the fact that the Post was required to buy and then distribute 
all publications with a circulation higher than 500 copies, a system that was unfeasible with a great amount of newly 
emerging publications. 
1166Full quote: “Ministerialdirektor Schaible informierte darüber, daß in den Direktionsetagen der Großverlage, besonders 
bei Springer, große Enttäuschung herrschte, daß man trotz des ʻgroßzügigen Angebots, eine Versorgung der DDR mit 
westlichen Zeitungen noch vor den Wahlen zu gewährleisten und dafür große Mittel einzusetzenʼ, so ins Gerede 
gekommen sei. Man wolle das Projekt jetzt nicht weiter verfolgen und denke über einen ʻDirektvertriebʼ nach.” Internal 
note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Presse, 
242
State Secretary Neusel proposed to aim for an understanding between the two groups of publishers. The
goal needed to be a joint offer “based on the existing one of the major publishers [that] includes, at 
least symbolically, the other [publishers].”1167 In the follow-up to the meeting, Bachmann noted that he 
was in complete support of this position. Later, he underlined this particular point. While it had been 
the promise of the BMI “to seek for a joint offer of all [emphasis added] West German publishers for 
distributing their publications in the GDR;” by March 30, no such proposal had yet been made.1168 
Still, on February 8, talks went well, and after the official meeting with West German 
politicians, the East German delegation met with leading representatives of the Association of German 
Magazine Publishers (VDZ), for instance its deputy chief executive and general director of the VDZ 
magazine division Wolfgang Fürstner. Fürstner informed the delegation, to their surprise, “that [in fact]
just a day earlier, a sort of reconciliation talk between the publishers had taken place ... and they now 
wanted to give it another try.”1169 The GDR delegation was handed a press release, distributed by the 
VDZ on February 8, confirming the statement (see below).1170 Both policy delegations, on their part, 
issued a joint statement on the expert meeting, announcing further media talks to find fast solutions to 
current problems.1171
The Run-Up to the Round Table Debate 
Looming in the back of the expert meeting and the “reconciliation talks” of the publishers stood
the Round Table decision scheduled for February 12, 1990. In its run-up phase, all involved parties 
took extra means to reach out to the MPF and the Round Table to provide both with what they thought 
was necessary information. 
Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, pp. 2-3, BArch DC9/1052. 
1167“der auf dem bisherigen der Großverlage basiert, aber die anderen wenigstens symbolisch einbezieht.” Internal note, 
Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Presse, Funk und
Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052. 
1168Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich 
Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052; “gemeinsamen Vorschlag aller Verlage 
der BRD für den Vertrieb ihrer Erzeugnisse in der DDR zu bemühen.” Letter, Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und 
Informationsdienst der DDR, to Dietrich Hübner, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin, March 30, 1990, p. 2, BArch 
DC9/1052.
1169“daß am Vortag eine Art Versohnungsgespräch der Verlage stattgefunden hatte (siehe beiliegende Pressenotiz) und 
man nun einen neuen Anlauf versuchen will.” Internal note, Ralf Bachmann, Kurzinformation über Expertengespräche 
DDR-BRD zur Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Presse, Funk und Fernsehen, Berlin, February 10, 1990, p. 3, BArch 
DC9/1052. 
1170Press release, Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch DC9/1052. 
Note: This press release was attached to the internal note of Ralf Bachmann that makes explicit reference to a press 
release.
1171Joint press release, Gemeinsame Erklärung, Hans Neusel, Delegation der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, und Ralf 
Bachmann, Delegation der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch DC9/1052.
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On February 10, Gerhard Sondermann from Jahreszeiten called Hans-Jürgen Niehof from the 
MPF to again lobby for his cause. During the phone conversation Niehof explained, he had been 
informed by the major publishing houses about the reached agreement between the publishers. Now, 
“the interests of the signing [medium-sized] publishers are being included” and were “represented by 
Mr. Fürstner from the VDZ,” a statement that had been confirmed by a VDZ press release.1172 Niehof, 
assuming that VDZ members were informed and stood in agreement, was surprised when Jahreszeiten 
strongly rejected this claim. Instead, Jahreszeiten, driven by the concern that based on Niehofʼs 
assessment, MPF minister Wolf was to report to the Round Table, again, offered extensive 
documentation to support its own point. Due to the urgency of the matter, the documentation was even 
sent to Niehofʼs home address.1173 
The Publishersʼ Meeting and a Press Release
What had happened? Three days before this phone conversation, on February 7, the board 
members of the VDZ magazine division (Fachgruppe Publikumszeitschriften) had met at short notice. 
Board members belonged to major and medium-sized publishers. The official agenda was to discuss 
the current state of negotiations with the East German government on possible exports of West German
print media. The overall goal of the meeting, however, was to calm the situation and to “reestablish a 
basis of trust among the publishers.”1174 In a short statement, immediately following the meeting, the 
VDZ made clear that in spite of differences in opinion among board members, a general agreement had
been reached “that the notion, the four major publishing houses had endangered the introduction of 
press freedom in the GDR is wrong.”1175 This unintended impression obviously rooted in the fact that 
the Post had only been in negotiation with the four major publishers.1176 
The next day, on February 8 (the day of the German-German media talks), a more elaborate 
statement on the meeting followed, and it now gave considerable space to the major publishersʼ point 
1172“die Interessen der Mit-Unterzeichnerverlage einbezogen werden, Herr Fürstner vom VDZ diese vertreten werde.” 
Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag, to Hans-Jürgen Niehof, Stellvertreter des Ministers und Generaldirektors für
Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, February 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1173Note: On February 11, Jahreszeiten sent again detailed documentation of the entire media battle as well as internal 
communication and joint proposals to Niehof (private address) and minister Klaus Wolf. Letter, Thomas Ganske, 
Jahreszeitenverlag, to Hans-Jürgen Niehof, Stellvertreter des Ministers und Generaldirektors für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, February 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1174“die Vertrauensbasis zwischen den Verlagen wiederherzustellen.” Press Release, VDZ, February 7, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1175“daß der Eindruck unztreffend ist, die vier Großverlage hätten durch ihre Verhandlungen die Einführung der 
Pressefreiheit in der DDR gefährdet.” Press Release, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., February 7, 1990, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1176Press Release, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., February 7, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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of view.1177 It first clarified that the German Post had approached them (the four publishers) in mid-
January with the request “to develop a model for the distribution of West German print media in the 
GDR under the leadership of Gruner+Jahr.”1178 The publishers had responded to the request at short 
notice. “The German Post explicitly and with reference to policy needs expressed the strong wish to 
keep negotiations confidential;” the publishers had accepted this request, “even though they knew [this 
might cause] frictions in their relationship with other publishers in the Federal Republic.”1179 The term 
“secret negotiations,” however, implied wrong intentions and was “inaccurately qualified.”1180 Though 
the GDR was interested in a broad flow of information and opinions via press imports, current 
distribution infrastructures did not allow for the import of any noteworthy numbers. The publishers 
had, thus, agreed to the building of a joint-venture with the Post for a “country-wide distribution 
system” that met “proven constituencies of the Federal Republic” in the understanding “that the 
preconditions … set by the Post (limitations on the number of publications and daily tonnage)” were 
restrictions of only temporary nature.1181 The publishers further underlined that they had objected to the 
publication list that had initially been issued by the Post “since it had been limited to the ... respective 
market leaders without any regard for market neutrality.”1182 The current publication list, on the other 
hand, issued only for the initial starting period, “does not give any indication that this imperative [of 
market neutrality]… has not been taken into account” under consideration of the need to limit 
publications and tonnages.1183 The opposite was true; the publishers aimed for a “neutral distribution” 
open to every publication on the market, and all their investments had been based on this principle.1184 
1177Press release, Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1178“unter der Leitung des Verlages Gruner+Jahr ein Modell für den Vertrieb westdeutscher Presse in der DDR zu 
entwickeln.” Press release, Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1179“Die Deutsche Post hat ausdrücklich und unter Hinweis auf vertriebspolitische Erfordernisse den dringenden Wunsch 
geäußert, diese Gespräche vertraulich zu halten … obwohl sie wußten, daß im Verhältnis zu anderen Verlagen in der 
Bundesrepublik dadurch Friktionen nicht auszuschließen waren.” Press release, Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher 
Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1180“unzutreffend qualifiziert.” Press release, Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, February 8, 
1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1181“flächendeckendes Vertriebssystem … in der Bundesrepublik bewährten Essentials [sic] … daß die von der Deutschen 
Post  … gegebenen Vorbedingungen (Beschränkung der Titelzahl und der täglichen Tonnage).” Press release, 
Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in 
BArch DC9/1052.
1182“weil diese sich auf die Lieferung der jeweiligen Marktführer beschränkte und in keiner Weise an dem Gedanken der 
Wettbewerbsneutralität orientiert war.” Press release, Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, 
February 8, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1183“läßt keinen Hinweis erkennen, daß diesem Gebot … nicht Rechnung getragen worden wäre.” Press release, 
Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in 
BArch DC9/1052.
1184Full quote: “wettbewerbsneutrales und für jeden verkäuflichen Titel offenes Vertriebssystem.” Press release, 
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The press release concluded that despite the interest of some VDZ board members to base distribution 
in the GDR on the Grossisten model, the VDZ board, in acknowledging the results of prior 
negotiations, had asked the four publishers to continue their talks with the GDR. From now on, 
however, negotiations were to be joined by Wolfgang Fürstner, which was to ensure the inclusion of all
publishers.1185 
In his phone conversation with Sondermann, Niehof referred to this press release. On the 
following day, Jahreszeiten CEO Ganske issued a detailed letter in which he strongly opposed the  
press release and provided what he thought was the necessary documentation to proof his point. 
Claiming that “[t]he [VDZ] board has not agreed on a continuation of talks” but that the press release 
spoke exclusively the language of the big four publishing houses, Ganske underlined: “The board only 
agreed to Mr. Fürstnerʼs participation in the talks under the condition that he represents the interests of 
all publishers.”1186 His claims could be confirmed by the board members Artope, Küber, and Theobald; 
all of whom represented medium-sized publishers, while all other board members were representatives 
of, or had affiliations with the major publishing houses.1187 It had been those three who had contacted 
Wolfgang Fürstner on February 9, to complain about the one-sided initiative. Emphasizing that this had
not been a collective statement based on the decision of all board members, the three underlined that 
the impression the board had asked the major publishers to continue talks with the Post was simply 
“untrue.”1188 
Hence, the group around Jahreszeiten made clear to the MPF that “in spite of having been 
elected by majority vote, it does not accept Mr. Fürstner as its representative,” but “it holds the 
conviction that because of given capital and market shares, he represents the interests of the major 
publishing houses.”1189 According to Ganske, the four publishers had not yet responded to repeated 
Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in 
BArch DC9/1052.
1185Press release, Pressenotiz, Verein Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e.V., Bonn, February 8, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3), also in BArch DC9/1052.
1186“Der Vorstand hat nicht eine Fortsetzung der Verhandlungen beschlossen. Der Vorstand hat einer Teilnahme von 
Hernn Fürstner an den Verhandlungen nur unter der Bedingung/Annahme zugestimmt, daß er die Interessen aller 
Verlage vertritt.” Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag, to Hans-Jürgen Niehof, Stellvertreter des Ministers und 
Generaldirektors für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, February 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1187Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag, to Hans-Jürgen Niehof, Stellvertreter des Ministers und Generaldirektors 
für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, February 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1188“unrichtig.” Letter, Artope, Küber and Theobald to Fürstner, VDZ, February 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), also in 
private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. See als Wie im Dschungel. Bundesdeutsche Verlage streiten, wer die West-Blätter 
in die DDR bringen darf, Der Spiegel, 7/90, pp. 110-111. 
1189Full quote: “Herr Fürstner trotz mehrheitlicher Wahl nicht als ihr Interessenvertreter akzeptiert, da er nach ihrer 
Auffassung auf Grund der gegebenen Kapital und Marktanteile die Interessen der Großverlage repräsentiere.” Internal 
Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, n.d. [February 11, 1990], p. 2, BArch
246
inquires for joint talks nor were they going to follow the invitation of the Ministry of the Interior in 
Bonn the following week. Not knowing if Mr. Fürstner truly represented the interests of all VDZ 
publishers further hampered the continuation of the talks.1190 “We will continue in our efforts for 
[finding] a common basis of dialogue in the FRG because the press supply for your fellow citizens 
must not suffer from the lack of voice and the disagreement between the publishers in the FRG.”1191 At 
the same time, Ganske repeatedly spoke of a compromise that had been formulated by his interest 
group, which could be implemented immediately and which would guarantee equality for all 
publishers.1192 
The same day Ganske sent his letter to the MPF, on February 11, Germer wrote up the earlier 
mentioned “Addition to the Argument” in preparation for the Round Table meeting with the MPF 
minister the next day.1193 Not only did he now include the position of smaller publishers and gave a 
more nuanced position of the MPF, he made clear that it was not the MPFʼs “task to judge the 
mechanisms of the FRGʼs market economy and domestic democracy.”1194 The MPF did, however, hold 
the responsibility towards the citizens of the GDR to allow for their fast and unimpeded access to 
information. This not only made necessary the immediate building of a distribution enterprise, giving 
access to all interested publishers on equal terms, but also for a solid legal framework. The latter 
concerned mainly the fixed prices for Western press imports to avoid speculative trading and allow 
equal chances on the market.1195 To find commonalities in the representation of interests of different 
publishers from the Federal Republic, the MPF thought it best to have Neusel (BMI) create a 
consortium.1196 
As outlined below, MPF minister Wolf did not follow this “additional” line of argument at the 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1190Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag, to Hans-Jürgen Niehof, Stellvertreter des Ministers und Generaldirektors 
für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, February 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1191“Wir werden uns weiterhin um eine gemeinsame Gesprächsbasis in der BRD bemühen, denn die Presseversorgung 
Ihrer Mitbürger darf nicht unter der Sprachlosigkeit und Uneinigkeit der Verlage in der BRD leiden.” Letter, Thomas 
Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag, to Hans-Jürgen Niehof, Stellvertreter des Ministers und Generaldirektors für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, February 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1192Letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag, to Hans-Jürgen Niehof, Stellvertreter des Ministers und Generaldirektors 
für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Hamburg, February 11, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1193Internal Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, n.d. [February 11, 1990], 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Personal communication, Email, Jürgen Niehof, September 12, 2017.
1194“Kompetenz und Aufgabe, über die Wirkungsmechanismen der Marktwirtschaft und der innerstaatlichen Demokratie 
in der BDR zu urteilen.” Internal Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, n.d.
[February 11, 1990], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1195Internal Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, n.d.  [February 11, 1990], 
p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1196Internal Note, Ergänzung zur Argumentation zur Bildung einer Pressevertriebsgesellschaft, n.d.  [February 11, 1990], 
p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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RT meeting. Instead, he remained with the initial joint venture proposal, which later caused his 
colleagues to hold him accountable for the negative outcome and the consequent “fall of the press 
monopoly of the Post.”1197  
Media Moguls and a Free Press: The Round Table Debate
“Of course, it does not surprise us that media moguls from the
Federal Republic are aiming to use all means to conquer 
the market in their own ways, no one must be 
astonished by that; astonishing, at most, is the fact 
that the [MPF] is playing along with it.”
 Manfred Klein, Round Table meeting, February 12, 19901198
The agreement between the major publishing houses, the MPF and other governmental bodies was laid 
before the RT on February 12.1199 While Bachmann was present, Wolf was being questioned. What 
followed was a fierce debate on issues of media freedom, media sovereignty, and monopolization 
strategies of West German interest groups. These debates gave valuable insight into the resistance and 
strong stand of East German reform and civic groups to tendencies of market monopolization or 
political interference by West German publishers.
Several members of the Round Table expressed their concerns regarding these issues, including 
Manfred Klein, newly elected radio director of the GDR, and Konrad Weiß, a central figure in the civic
movement and part of the RT working group on media, who took the lead. According to Weiß, the 
working group was in possession of a protocol from January 23, which contained a “preliminary 
agreement” between the MPF and the Big Four on the “division of the [East German] newspaper and 
magazine market … among the market domineering major publishing houses, and the upholding of the 
monopoly of the Post.”1200 Weiß, laying out the entire document to the RT, included a detailed 
description of the joint venture agreement, and the proportional shares of the Post and each publisher.
He made clear, the building of a country-wide distribution system complementary to Postal 
1197“Fall des Pressemonopols der Post.” Personal communication, Email, Jürgen Niehof, September 12, 2017.
1198“Es überrascht uns natürlich nicht, daß Medienriesen aus der Bundesrepublik hier versuchen, alle Moglichkeiten zu 
nutzen, den Markt, und zwar auf ihre Weise, zu erobern, das kann niemanden verwundern, verwundern kann hochstens, 
daß das zuständige Ministerium der DDR hier mitspielt.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 8, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1199Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1200“Vorvereinbarung … “Aufteilung des Zeitungen- und Zeitschriftenmarktes ... an die marktbeherschenden Großverlage 
und die Beibehaltung des Monopols durch die Post der DDR.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 
2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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Distribution, “simply put” meant the Post was to give up parts of its distribution rights to the four major
publishers.1201 This was a “billion [DM] business” while all the German Post was to receive was “100, I
underline 100 … refurbished used vehicles.”1202 The additional transfer of the exclusive marketing 
rights of advertising time to the publishers was “especially outrageous.”1203 This was an “affair beyond 
belief,” and Weiß pointed to the resolution on media freedom that, by the time the negotiations were 
being held, had already been issued by the Round Table. “They must have know that we have 
unambiguously opposed advertising on the air.”1204 And though some modification had been made, the 
agreement had come about in spite of the ministryʼs knowledge of a legislative procedure and an 
upcoming resolution. It was in particular the selection of publications, “that citizens of the GDR are 
henceforth allowed to read,” which contradicted any notion of a guaranteed media freedom.1205 
Referring to a Spiegel article, Weiß stated, that the great majority of publications came from the major 
publishers themselves; small publications would, thus, have “zero chance, while it is actually those 
small publications that we want to get into our country.”1206 
Wolf, in return, pointed out that any selection “certainly always is very subjective” and needed 
to be viewed from different angles.1207 The restriction to sixty or seventy, maximum one-hundred 
publications, was meant only for the initial phase “in order to cope at all,” and one had to consider “the 
broader the range of publications, the smaller the individual circulation numbers of individual 
publications.”1208 None of these numbers, however, had been finalized, but they were “only ideas we 
have proposed” that needed to be discussed further.1209 Wolf underlined, he would “never make any 
decision without the approval of the Media Control Council.”1210 Many considerations and opinions 
needed to be included, and the MKR needed to further discuss the selection of publications, no 
1201“im Klartext.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1202“Milliardengeschäft … 100, ich betone 100 … überholte Gebrauchtfahrzeuge.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, 
February 12, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1203“besonders emporend.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1204“unglaublichen Vorgang … Sie haben wissen müssen, daß wir eindeutig dagegen ausgesprochen haben [sic], daß es 
Werbezeiten gibt.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1205“die die DDR-Bürger künftig lesen dürfen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 3, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1206“überhaupt keine Chance, aber diese kleinen Zeitungen sind doch eigentlich die, die wir hier ins Land reinhaben 
wollen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1207Full quote: “ist sicher immer eine sehr subjektive Auswahl.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 7,
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1208“um sie überhaupt bewältigen zu konnen … je mehr Titel, umso geringer die einzelne Auflagenhohe des einzelnen 
Erzeugnisses.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 7, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1209“lediglich Vorstellungen, die wir hier unterbreitet haben.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 7, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1210“nie eine Entscheidung treffen, die ohne eine Zustimmung des Medienkontrollrates dort erfolgt.” Protocol, Protokoll 
Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 12, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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questions about that.1211 The document was a not a done deal but a “declaration of intent” 
(Absichtserklärung) that was neither finalized nor complete. 
Defending the MPF, Wolf further explained “that the four major publishers came into the GDR 
already in November and December, each with detailed, elaborated ideas on the building of a 
distribution enterprise implemented and run by the respective publisher.”1212 In particular Bauer and 
Burda had had plans regarding the distribution of their own products, while Springer had presented a 
broader concept. The ministry had, thus, aimed at bringing together the four publishing houses, but it 
had never denied any rights to other publishers to distribute their own products in the GDR, if they had 
the necessary means to do so. The agreement had further been made under the condition that approval 
was given by the Council of Ministers and by the respective supervisory bodies of the publishers. 
“Based on the offers of these companies, and yes, that is right, these companies” the idea was to create 
a system separate from that of Postal Distribution “to be able to cope with the product range of these 
companies in consecutive stages,” and the joint venture with the Post holding a fifty percent share was 
part of that system.1213 However, neither did the Post insist on a 50 percent share nor did it exclude any 
other publishers. The main goal was to meet current demands, and with many daily newspapers and 
magazines being sold out at newsstands within a few hours, the envisioned system for retail sale (not 
for subscription services!) would help to do so. Doing both subscription and retail “is unmanageable, 
we don't have the capacities,” already the transshipment processes would require more personnel than 
currently available.1214 The joint venture was the way out of this dilemma, and all needed personnel, 
except for management positions, was to be recruited from within the GDR. 
“I cannot help the impression that you have not been telling the whole truth here,” was Weißʼs 
response.1215 Several sources, including the major publishing houses, Jahreszeiten, as well as Presse-
Grosso, had provided him with information on “how one could build a distribution network in the 
GDR,” also alternative ones, and “it would have been your duty to evaluate, check and inform yourself 
1211Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 12, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1212“daß diese 4 großen Verlage jeder für sich schon im November und Dezember mit exakt ausgearbeiteten Vorstellungen
zum Aufbau einer jeweils durch sie durchzuführenden Vertriebsorganisation in der DDR gekommen sind.” Protocol, 
Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 5, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1213“Auf der Basis dieser Angebote dieser Firmen und das ist richtig, dieser Firmen … um das Angebot dieser Firmen in 
mehren Etappen bewältigen zu konnen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 6, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3).
1214“[d]as ist nicht zu bewältigen, dazu haben wir die Kräfte nicht.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, 
p. 6, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1215“Ich kann mich des Eindrucks nicht erwehren, daß sie hier nicht die volle Wahrheit gesagt haben.” Protocol, Protokoll 
Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 9, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
250
and to then choose the best option.”1216 Pointing again to the February 5 resolution, Weiß emphasized, 
not only did it set the legislative frame for all actions of the MPF, but its guaranteed freedom of 
expression included the freedom of all citizens to freely obtain information according to their own 
choice. It, thus, made any list defining what newspapers citizens could read a “waste of paper;” the 
time when the Post was in control over newspapers needed to be over.1217 
Wolf, in turn, claimed he had not known of any alternative concepts and insisted on the political
imperatives of negotiating with the Big Four; negotiations had come about due the meeting between 
Kohl and Modrow on December 19, 1989, and the urgent need for concrete means to meet the press 
exchange between both states. The agreement was not about keeping the postal monopoly, for any such
monopoly position became “completely unfeasible” with the opening of the GDR to all publications 
from the Federal Republic.1218 His ministry did not want the hasty and unchecked import of 
publications, on the one hand, but it also needed time and several conditions still needed to be met 
before the import of a broader range of publications could be initiated.1219 “What we have been told 
here by Mister Weiß,” Klein interrupted, “we should have actually been told by the minister.”1220 What 
kind of situation were they facing, Klein asked, if not even the minister shared needed information. 
Expressing his “outrage,” Klein demanded to add to the agenda a “call for resignation of this 
minister.”1221 
Weiß, in return, pointed to the bigger picture. The main concern should not be whether major or
medium-sized publishers from the Federal Republic were dividing the market among each other but 
“that enterprises of the GDR, medium-sized companies, were given the chance to build this market 
here.”1222 The RT, thus, needed “to give a chance to medium-sized companies … also to publishers to 
build their own distribution networks here.”1223 Lietz from the civic group New Forum agreed. Stating 
that anyone willing to establish his own business in publishing and/or retail, was currently facing a 
1216“wie man ein Vertriebsnetz in der DDR aufbauen konnte … es wäre Ihre Pflicht gewesen, das abzuwägen, das zu 
prüfen und sich sachkundig zu machen und dann den besten Weg auszusuchen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, 
February 12, 1990, p. 9, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1217“Makulatur.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, pp. 9-9a, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1218“überhaupt nicht machbar.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 11, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1219Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 11, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1220Full quote: “[D]aß das was Herr Weiß hier mitgeteilt hat, eigentlich das hätte sein müssen, was wir vom Hernn 
Minister hätten horen müssen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 8, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1221“Emporung … Rücktrittsforderung diesen Minister betreffend.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, 
p. 8, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1222“daß Unternehmer aus der DDR, mittelständische Betriebe eine Chance bekommen, daß sie diesen Markt hier 
aufbauen konnen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 9a, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1223Full quote: “Wir müssen mittelständischen Unternehmern … auch den Verlagen die Chance geben, hier ein eigenes 
Vertriebsnetz aufzubauen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 9a, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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“lawless situation” and a “new monopolization of distribution,” which left little chance for new 
initiatives.1224 The “situation of new, small-scale enterprises without rights and, thus, without 
protection” needed a legislative frame “to have a genuine chance to build the market here from 
within.”1225 Weiß pointed out that hundreds and thousands of small business owners needed to be given 
the chance to sell print media at newsstands and in book stores, and this related also to underlying 
infrastructures that must not be monopolized by vested West German market interests. “I believe this is
the right way. Then it [distribution] stays here and creates jobs in the GDR.”1226 Wolf responded that 
the distribution system developed with the Big Four did not exclude any of these options and did not 
hinder small business owners from opening shops and newsstands. The development of local 
infrastructures, however, was not in the authority of the Post, but it needed to develop locally and 
according to local resources and needs. This could be done with the involvement of West German 
publishers, regardless their size.1227 
In spite of Wolfʼs appeal, the Round Table vetoed the proposal. In an interview, Weiß found 
clear words for this decision: not only had negotiations been “illegal” but the major publishers had been
trying to get the distribution rights “on disgraceful and ridiculous terms. The fools of the old parties 
have agreed to sell off market rights for one hundred used trucks, to put it short.”1228 Most “scandalous”
was the selection of publications (seventy in the beginning) done by the publishers and the Post; “[t]his 
means, the postal minister took it up on himself to select what publications are to enter the GDR. He 
has, thus, executed an unconstitutional censorship.”1229 
1224“rechtlose Situation … neuen Monopolisierung des Vertriebswesen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 
1990, p. 10, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1225“rechtslosen und damit auch schutzlosen Zustand neuer Kleinbetriebe … damit auch eine echte Chance besteht, hier 
den Markt von innen heraus aufzubauen.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 10, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1226“Ich denke, das ist der richtige Weg. Dann bleibt es hier in der DDR und schafft Arbeitsplätze.” Protocol, Protokoll 
Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 9a, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1227Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 11, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1228“rechtswidrig … zu unwürdigen und lächerlichen Bedingungen. Die Tolpel der alten Parteien haben sich darauf 
eingelassen, für hundert gebrauchte LKWs die Marktrechte zu verscheuern, sage ich jetzt mal verkürzt.” Interview, 
“'Der Postminister übte Zensur aus' - Konrad Weiß von 'Demokratie Jetzt' und Mitglied der DDR 
Regierungskommission für ein neues Mediengesetz begründet den Beschluß gegen die 'big four',” Interview Ute Scheub 
(taz vom 10.2.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des 
Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 124-125, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR;
Box 31-38, File 33. 
1229“Skandalose … Das heißt, der Postminister hat sich angemaßt auszuwählen, welche Titel in die DDR reinkommen 
sollen. Er hat also verfassungswidrig Zensur ausgeübt.” Interview, “'Der Postminister übte Zensur aus' - Konrad Weiß 
von 'Demokratie Jetzt' und Mitglied der DDR Regierungskommission für ein neues Mediengesetz begründet den 
Beschluß gegen die 'big four',” Interview Ute Scheub (taz vom 10.2.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der 
Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 124-125, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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As had been formulated in the February 5 resolution, this matter (as all media related issues) 
was now to be handled by the Media Control Council (MKR), which was to have its constitutive 
meeting the following day. From now on, it was up to the MKR to decide over concepts for press 
distribution in the GDR.1230 
Responses to the Veto
The Jahreszeiten response to the veto followed promptly. On February 13, Sondermann, in his 
aim “to clarify the situation” and “for the sake of urgency,” asked Niehof to meet on February 14.1231 
The publisher now presented its own “Solutions on Press Distributions in the GDR.”1232 Based on the 
premise that “only a system of local Grossisten (handling all publishers and retailers) guarantees equal 
chances in the distribution of all, especially smaller publications,” the postal minister was asked to 
immediately stop all activities that did not serve this goal.1233 Instead, it was up to the MKR, consenting
to this maxim, to give out territorial licenses (Gebietslizenzen) to citizens and/or firms (but not 
publishers) in a tendering process. For the purpose of supporting Grossisten financially, technically and
with expertise, a joint venture partner needed to be established immediately in the Federal Republic. 
This made necessary an objective reassessment of the role and purpose of the Post in retail sale. 
Jahreszeiten envisioned a short-term solution for daily newspapers (before elections), with the Post 
distributing national West German publications within the GDR for a respective compensation and, if 
needed, with technical support.1234 
Jahreszeiten, by sending this proposal, read into the veto what suited its own interests and 
ignored the RTʼs insistence on a sovereign solution to domestic problems. Deaf to the RTʼs outrage 
about the dominance of West German interests in domestic affairs, Jahreszeiten continued its campaign
that served its own needs. To give some acknowledgment to East German publications, however, the 
publisher lastly did ask the Federal Republic to provide paper and financial resources to allow for their 
distribution in the FRG.1235 Who was meant by “Federal Republic” was not specified. As will be shown
1230Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1231“zur Klärung der Lage … der Dringlichkeit halber.” Telex, Gerhard Sondermann, Jahreszeiten Verlag, to Hans-Jürgen 
Niehof, Mintisterium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, February 13, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1232Communication, Losung zum Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, Jahreszeitenverlag an PZV, Ministerium für Post und
Fernmeldewesen, February 13, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1233“[n]ur ein System von Gebietsgrossisten (Betreuung aller Verlage und Verkausfsstellen) sichert den chancengleichen 
Vertrieb aller, vor allem der kleinen Presseobjekte.” Communication, Losung zum Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, 
Jahreszeitenverlag an PZV, Ministerium für Post und Fernmeldewesen, February 13, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1234Communication, Losung zum Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, Jahreszeitenverlag an PZV, Ministerium für Post und
Fernmeldewesen, February 13, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1235Communication, Losung zum Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR, Jahreszeitenverlag an PZV, Ministerium für Post und
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shortly, the BMI was reluctant to provide any such support. 
The MPF was anything but satisfied with the veto. It drafted several statements underlining that 
a perfectly fine distribution concept open to all publishers on equal terms “had been discarded by the 
Round Table. Demanded now, not the least due to pressures of medium-sized publishers and Presse-
Grosso, was a commercially organized system” without any say of a state institution.1236 A joint venture
between the Post and the major publishing houses, on the other hand, would have kept distribution, at 
least partly, under state control. Now, however, the matter lay in the hands of the MKR, and was not 
anymore the responsibility of the MPF. Any future issues were framed accordingly; they were the 
consequence of the Round Table veto (see below). All that was left to do for the MPF at this point, was
to give orders “to stop negotiations,” which according to Germer was done “immediately after the 
Round Table meeting.”1237 
Two days later, however, Germer noted that the Big Four too were in motion. There were “clear
indications that the West German publishing houses Gruner+Jahr, Springer, Bauer and Burda … at 
short notice, intend to start independent distribution of their pubications in the GDR. Activities are 
clearly being directed at … entering the postal sales network.”1238 This meant, Germer continued, that 
the publishers were likely to start distributing their products before any meeting with the Council of 
Ministers and/or the MKR.1239 A few days later, after the constitutive MKR meeting, Germer wrote to 
its director Martin Kramer to share his concerns. Germer warned Kramer, that “immediately after the 
[RT] decision, the respective publishers, making use of the new legal situation … and the existing 
political situation, have started with high intensity to prepare the distribution of their own products in 
the GDR.”1240 It was to be expected that publications that until now had been for sale only in individual 
Fernmeldewesen, February 13, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 1/3.
1236“Dieses Vertriebskonzept wurde jedoch vom Runden Tisch verworfen. Gefordert wurde, nicht zuletzt auf Drängen 
mittelständischer BRD-Verlage und des BRD-Grossistenverbandes, ein privatwirtschaftlich organisiertes 
Vertriebssystem.” Press release draft (not sent), ADN-Mitteilung, Stellungnahme des MPF, Entwurf (nicht abgesandt), 
n.d., BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1237Full quote: “die Verhandlungen über die Gründung eines Joint venture mit den BRD-Verlagen Gruner+Jahr, Bauer, 
Springer und Burda zu unterbrechen … unmittelbar nach der Beratung am Runden Tisch am 12. Februar 1990.” Letter, 
Germer, MPF, to Martin Kramer, MKR, February 19, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1238“deutlichen Anzeichen dafür, daß die BRD-Verlagshäuser Gruner+Jahr, Springer, Bauer und Burda … beabsichtigen, 
kurzfristig mit einem eigenständigen Vertrieb ihrer Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zu beginnen. Die Aktivitäten sind 
offensichtlich darauf gerichtet …. in das Verkaufsstellennetz des PZV einzudringen.” Internal memo, Aktenvermerk, 
Germer, Berlin, February 14, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1239Internal memo, Aktenvermerk, Germer, Berlin, February 14, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1240“die genannten Verlage unmittelbar nach dieser Entscheidung begonnen haben, unter Ausnutzung der neuen 
Rechtslage ... und der bestehenden politischen Situation, mit hoher Intensität den Vertrieb der in ihren Verlagen 
erscheinenden Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR vorzubereiten.” Letter, Germer, MPF, to Martin Kramer, MKR, February 
19, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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and dispersed locations “will shortly be available in large quantities on the press market of the 
GDR.”1241 “I do not hold any legal or practical authorities to have any influence on this process.”1242 It 
was partly because of the RT that this new situation had emerged, and he was not able to do anything 
about it.
Frustrated not only with the lost monopoly position of Postal Distribution but more so with his 
vetoed attempts to maintain influence in distribution by cooperating with the Big Four, Germer laid out
to Kramer the paradox that made for the daily press experience of East German citizens: Currently, 
Western print media were being offered in a variety of retail locations of different ownership. But 
while Postal Distribution made 75 percent of the total retail sales in the GDR, it was not allowed to 
participate in distributing Western print media. An unsatisfactory circumstance, not the least because 
the Post also supplied the rural population.1243 This “absurd situation” caused a “complete lack of 
understanding and foreseeable protests” among the East German readership.1244 And these 
contradictions, he warned Kramer, were to increase in the weeks to come; they needed clear guidelines 
from the MKR. Germer, therefore, asked Niehof to be present at the following meeting of the MKR, on
February 21, during which the issue was to be discussed in detail.1245 
But while Germer reasoned with the East German readership to push for a participation of the 
Post in the distribution of West German print media, internally, he underlined the need for clarity to 
“allow for the protection of the economic interests of the Post.”1246 Both needed to be discussed at the 
upcoming MKR meeting. In last consequence, Germer saw the only real chance in stopping the 
activities of the publishers in customs authority prohibiting and impeding the import of Western 
publications. “Current practice and the political situation, however, raise doubts as to whether such a 
solution to the problem can even be brought into the discussion.”1247 And he was right, as the RT debate
had shown.
1241“Es muß damit gerechnet werden, daß diese Titel, die bisher nur punktuell in der DDR angeboten werden, in Kürze mit
großen Auflagen auf dem DDR-Pressemarkt erscheinen werden.” Letter, Germer, MPF, to Martin Kramer, MKR, 
February 19, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1242“Ich verfüge über keine rechtlichen und praktischen Mittel, um auf diese Entwicklung Einfluß zu nehmen.” Letter, 
Germer, MPF, to Martin Kramer, MKR, February 19, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1243Internal memo, Aktenvermerk, Germer, Berlin, February 14, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3); Letter, Germer, 
MPF, to Martin Kramer, MKR, February 19, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1244 “absurde Situation … volliges Unverständnis und vorhersehbare Proteste.” Internal memo, Aktenvermerk, Germer, 
Berlin, February 14, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1245Letter, Germer, MPF, to Martin Kramer, MKR, February 19, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1246“die okonomischen Interessen des Deutschen Post wahren zu konnen.” Internal memo, Aktenvermerk, Germer, Berlin, 
February 14, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1247“Die gegenwärtige Praxis und die politische Situation lassen aber Zweifel aufkommen, ob eine solche Losung des 
Problems überhaupt in die Diskussion gebracht werden kann.” Internal memo, Aktenvermerk, Germer, Berlin, February 
14, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
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Analysis
While the Round Table debate had been heated, none of the respective parties argued 
completely on their own grounds. MPF minister Wolf had been in negotiations with, and had been 
provided information by the four major publishing houses. Likewise, in the run-up to the meeting, the 
media working group of the RT had been provided with information from Jahreszeiten, backed by 
Presse-Grosso. Thus, when Weiß accused Wolf of not having told the whole truth, it was based on 
information sent to him by opposing parties in the Federal Republic. Weiß rightfully and convincingly 
argued for a sovereign East German media, against domination by any West German interest groups, 
and for a plurality of opinion and information. This is where the RT emancipated itself from the West 
German blueprint; all possible ways of how to implement such, however, were based on concepts 
crucially informed by West German publishers. Some of the argumentation, thus, reads like copy-and-
paste references to the information given by these institutions rather than those of sovereign political 
bodies.
A similar picture presented itself at the German-German media talks. With twenty-four West 
German delegates facing a delegation of seven, the ratio of representatives exemplified the more 
general power relations during these talks. While the rhetoric of the West German delegation 
underlined the need for a free press and a plurality of opinion in the GDR, concrete measures on how to
bring this about remained absent. Instead, the argumentation of Schaible (giving insights into the 
disappointment of the major publishing houses about the failed deal) gave an indication of the close 
relationship between the BMI and the major publishers. This relationship shifted slightly with 
increasing tensions but did not change fundamentally in its ties. And in spite of a rhetoric of support, by 
March 30, no joint proposal between the FRG and the GDR had been made for the continuation of 
German-German media talks. Ralf Bachmann, initially in high hopes for cooperation with the BMI, 
pointed to the ministry's disinterest; initially also in favor of the deal with the major publishers, 
Bachmann soon became critical of both and turned against the attempts of the Big Four “to conquer the
market the GDR through the backdoor of distribution.”1248 He became one of the most outspoken 
opponents of their market strategy.
The Jahreszeiten campaign was successful on various levels. It mobilized resistance in the GDR
and instrumentalized it for its own purpose. Arguing for a “free press,” the publisher ignored the 
criticism of the RT against any West German domination in the GDR only to lobby for a system that 
1248Personal communication, interview, Ralf Bachmann, August 20, 2014.
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suited its own interests best. In almost none of the Jahreszeiten material, was any reference made to the 
interests of East German institutions (i.e. publishers, newly founded newspapers, civic groups or to 
current legal contracts), nor, to any of the distribution issues faced by East German publishers on a 
daily basis. If such references were made, they were of a general sense while specific concerns and 
arguments referred to the interests of medium-sized publishers in the FRG.1249 Thus, when demanding 
that the “blatant obstruction of a free distribution for all medium-sized publishers and their 
publications” needed to be stopped, Jahreszeiten meant exclusively West German publications.1250 The 
initiative of the publishers was, thus, wholly concerned with, and based on concerns of West German 
interests over future market shares. 
Jahreszeiten was further successful in steering controversy within the VDZ. While the purpose 
of the VDZ had been to observe the negotiations between the MPF and the Big Four to  ensure that a 
satisfying solution over issues of distribution could be found for all organized VDZ members, 
Jahreszeiten made public what the VDZ would have preferred to keep quiet.1251 It laid open internal 
power structures that heavily favored the market-domineering publishers in the Federal Republic. 
Jahreszeiten did so, not because it fundamentally questioned well-known structures but because it 
served best current purposes and future interests. Even though the last minute interference of 
Jahreszeiten in a time span of a few days suggests that the publisher had learned of the joint venture 
deal just days before, there is plenty of evidence that its RT appeal was, in fact, just the last straw. It 
was not Jahreszeiten's first choice of negotiation but only its climax.1252 All opposing parties had 
contacted the major publishing houses before: the medium-sized publishers had continuously aimed for
joint talks, Presse-Grosso had offered its help in building distribution in late January.1253 Without 
response.
Throughout this time, communication between the MPF and the Big Four had continued. 
1249This estimate is based on the documentation that can be found in BArch DM3/21121 (1/3), in BArch DA3/34 and the 
private archive of Hans-Jürgen Niehof.
1250Full quote: “Damit wird der freie Vertrieb aller mittelständischen Verlage und ihrer Objekte eklatant behindert.” Press 
release, Jahreszeitenverlag et al., Die Post der DDR spielt westdeutschen Grossverlagen Pressevertriebssystem in die 
Hände und gefährdet damit die Pressefreiheit, Hamburg, January 31, 1990, BArch DA3/34. Published in i.e. Muster 
ohne Wert: Streit um das DDR-Presse-Grosso, Mittelständische Pressehäuser opponieren gegen die vier Großverlage / 
Bonner Arbeitsgruppe plädiert für offenes Vertriebsnetz, Horizont, February 1, 1990.
1251Letter, Artope, Küber and Theobald to Fürstner, VDZ, February 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1252See for instance: Stern und Geo für Suhl und Gera. Vier westdeutsche Verlage wollen ein Vertriebssystem in der DDR 
aufbauen, Andreas Kühner, Horizont, January 26, 1990, attachment V to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. 
al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
1253Stern und Geo für Suhl und Gera. Vier westdeutsche Verlage wollen ein Vertriebssystem in der DDR aufbauen, 
Andreas Kühner, Horizont, January 26, 1990, attachment V to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an 
Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch DA3/34.
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Springer had sent its representatives to negotiate with Postal Distribution again on February 6, and it 
had been decided that if no decision was made during the constitutive MKR meeting in mid-February, 
other options would be taken into consideration.1254 With the RT veto and the MKR, overwhelmed with
media-related issues, shifting the issue of press distribution to its second meeting on February 21, these 
“other options” became feasible. As Germer laid out in his appeal to the MKR, the publishers were 
now taking distribution into their own hands. 
Germer likely argued with such urgency to give greater emphasis and justification to a renewed 
strong position of Post Distribution that had been denied by the RT. With a complete stop of imports 
not being feasible, Germer employed two main strategies to deal with the new situation: First, he 
shifted the responsibility for the current situation on the Round Table. With the joint venture plans 
having fallen through, the MPF and/or Postal Distribution were left with little authority in relation to 
the dealings of the Big Four.1255 The Post would have been the only weight against the combined 
economic power of the major publishers but this had been obstructed by the RT. 
Second, and closely related, while Germer pointed to the threat to the press landscape from a 
potential Big Four distribution, he also maintained open communication channels with the major 
publishers. In the same letter that informed the publishers of the necessity to interrupt negotiations, 
Germer underlined the continuing interest of the Post to distribute their publications in the GDR. This, 
however, was possible only, he added by hand, “after the necessary domestic clarification” and 
required further decisions of the MKR.1256 
The latter, at its constitutive meeting on February 13, decided to discuss press distribution on 
February 21. In-between lay about one week, not much from a policy perspective, but an eternity in a 
rapidly transitioning media economy. In the press sector, open gaps were filled, if not in open 
cooperation with, then in tacit acceptance by the federal government. Especially the BMI did little to 
nothing to counteract the marketization of the East German press landscape by West German 
publishers. On the contrary, the BMI explicitly supported the interests of the major West German 
institutions, specifically those of the publishers, and gave a helping hand in securing their interests.
1254Handwritten note Niehof, “Gespräch Herr [Wu/Wo ?]ckmann / Herr Leilich (Springer),” February 6, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1255“Ich verfüge über keine rechtlichen und praktischen Mittel, um auf diese Entwicklung Einfluß zu nehmen.” Letter, 
Germer, MPF, to Martin Kramer, MKR, February 19, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1256“nach der notwendigen innerstaatlichen Klärung,” (added by hand). Letter (draft), Schreiben (Entwurf), Germer to 
Verlage, Vorschlag für ein FS an die vier BRD-Verlagshäuser, 12. Februar 1990 (?), BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
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The Federal Ministry of the Interior
“Due to the due independence of matters of the press from the
state, the federal government has refrained from making any
statements regarding the different distribution models that have
been put forward for the press sector [in the GDR].”
 Minister of the Interior, Wolgang Schäuble, March 2, 19901257
In spite of the above given statement of Wolfgang Schäuble on the neutrality of the federal 
government in matters of press distribution in the GDR, the Ministry of the Interior (BMI) was not a 
neutral agent without an agenda of its own. Schäuble hinted at this agenda by stating that “for 
regulatory reasons,” the new distribution system in the GDR had to be built “on a broadest possible 
basis” and could not contradict current federal practices.1258 The “regulatory reasons,” thus, related to 
possible negative consequences distribution issues in the GDR might have for the FRG. The BMI, 
therefore, had two major concerns: First, as had been discussed during German-German media talks, it 
supported the free distribution of West German print media in the GDR. Second, any distribution 
infrastructure built in the GDR needed to be compatible with common practice in the Federal Republic;
it needed to be ensured “that nothing may be built that later cannot be dismantled.”1259 The BMI added 
that also East German concerns regarding domestic publications needed to be taken into consideration. 
The problem, according to BMI director Erich Schaible, was that the German-German media talks had 
not brought a cohesive concept, and the veto of the Round Table had blocked all former 
negotiations.1260 Now the ministry needed to act.
Initially, February 19 had been the day when Postal Distribution was to meet with the Big Four 
to finalize the joint venture agreement.1261 That same day, however, a hearing was arranged by the BMI 
with West German publishers and Grossisten. During the meeting, all parties proposed their own ideas 
1257“Wegen der gebotenen Staatsferne in Pressefragen hat sich die Bundesregierung einer Aussage zu den verschiedenen 
Vertriebsmodellen, die im Bereich der Presse aufgestellt wurden, enthalten.” Press release, Der Bundesminister des 
Inneren teilt mit, Pressedienst des Bundesministeriums des Inneren, Bonn, March 2, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050.
1258“[a]us ordnungspolitischen Gründen … eine moglichst breite Grundlage.” Press release, Der Bundesminister des 
Inneren teilt mit, Pressedienst des Bundesministeriums des Inneren, Bonn, March 2, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050.
1259“daß nichts aufgebaut werde, was später nicht mehr abbaubar sei.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im 
Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 
16, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1260Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb 
in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, pp. 2-3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1261Letter (draft), Schreiben (Entwurf), Germer to Verlage, Vorschlag für ein FS an die vier BRD-Verlagshäuser, 12. 
Februar 1990 (?), BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
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on how to build a distribution system in the GDR.1262 They eventually drafted the “Principles on 
Preserving Press Diversity in Building a Press Distribution System in the GDR” that was then sent to 
Bachmann, and later released to the press.1263 According to Bernd Klammer, the BMI handed over these
“Principles” to the GDR in early March. More revealing, however, is the fact that the East German 
delegation that had been part of the German-German media talks, in fact, only learnt of this meeting by 
a letter sent to Bachmann a week later; it informed him that the federal government and the Länder had
come to an agreement regarding press distribution in the GDR.1264 All had been arranged, and all that 
was left to do for Bachmann was to join the next talks in early March. 
According to soon to be Media Minister Gottfried Müller, the BMI held these hearings and 
drafted the document “by pushing boundaries to the greatest extent possible.”1265 There are, however, 
also strong points to argue the opposite: In the “Principles,” all parties agreed that press distribution 
was an essential part of press freedom and publishers needed to be able to decide self-responsibly on 
their distribution channels. Since distribution infrastructures, largely based on independent Grossisten, 
had proved themselves a viable and effective system in the Federal Republic, these experiences should 
also lead the way in building distribution in the GDR. Any such system was, first, to promote the 
development of an independent, diverse press through “the market-neutral distribution of newspapers, 
periodicals and the like and to guarantee the market entry of every competitor.”1266 Secondly, such 
system needed to be built in coherence with federal competition law to, thirdly, avoid “damaging 
changes in the distribution system” in the Federal Republic.1267 Based on these principles, the federal 
government aimed at continuing the media talks with the GDR in Bonn in early March.1268 Little 
consideration was given to critical voices, such as the point of the MPF that the envisioned system still 
1262Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1263“Grundsätze zur Erhaltung der Pressevielfalt beim Aufbau eines Pressevertriebssystems in der DDR.” Communication 
SM 10-344690-6/2a, Der Bundesminister des Inneren, BArch DC9/1050.
1264Note: The document informing Bachmann (via Reimann in Bonn) was initialed February 28, 1990, indicating that at 
least part of the ministry learned of it about a week after the meeting. Communication SM 10-344690-6/2a, Der 
Bundesminister des Inneren, BArch DC9/1050. For Klammer see: Klammer, Bernd. Pressevertrieb in Ostdeutschland, 
Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Interessen beim Aufbau eines Pressegroßhandelssystems nach der Oktoberwende 
1989, Dortmunder Beiträge zur Zeitungsforschung, Band 56, München: Saur, 1998, p. 109 f.
1265“seinen Spielraum bis zum Rand ausnutzend.” Personal communication, email, Gottfried Müllerʼ comments on 
minister diary (April-May 1990), May 5, 1990, sent to author in January 30, 2017.
1266“den wettbewerbsneutralen Absatz von Presseerzeugnissen und den Marktzugang für jeden Wettbewerber 
sicherstellen.” Press release, Der Bundesminister des Inneren teilt mit, Pressedienst des Bundesministeriums des 
Inneren, Bonn, March 2, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050.
1267“schädigenden Veränderungen des Vertriebssystems.” Press release, Der Bundesminister des Inneren teilt mit, 
Pressedienst des Bundesministeriums des Inneren, Bonn, March 2, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050.
1268Press release, Der Bundesminister des Inneren teilt mit, Pressedienst des Bundesministeriums des Inneren, Bonn, 
March 2, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
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entailed majority shares of West German companies.1269 
The Run-Up: The BDZV at the BMI
Leading up to the talks at the BMI on February 19, the ministry had invited several interest 
groups (the VDZ, the BDZV and Presse-Grosso) for individual talks. Each party was to give its 
respective ideas on the building of press distribution in the GDR while the BMI underlined its mere 
“facilitating role.”1270 It so happened that on February 14, the BDZV working group “distribution in the 
GDR” and several federal ministries met at the BMI under the leadership of BMI director Schaible. 
The head of the working group, Klaus Wagner, was joined by nine different publishers and 
newspapers, including Springer, Handelsblatt, Frankfurter Rundschau, FAZ and Morgenpost.1271 The 
hope of the BMI: the BDZV was to help build the distribution system in the GDR. 
The BDZV, on its part and following its overall stance of its January 25 meeting (see above), 
aimed at combining the interests of the competing parties. Yes, distribution in the GDR needed to be 
transformed “by including the interests of East German publishers” according to the federal model “in 
all its manifestations,” but it should not be forgotten that Grosso-distribution in the Federal Republic 
had initially been started by major publishing houses.1272 And while the systemʼs stronghold was a 
division of power (Machtverteilung) between financially strong producers and medium-sized 
distributors, it was flexible enough to also allow for the participation of high-performance Grossisten 
affiliated with publishers (Verlagsgrossisten). According to the BDZV, current positions “against the 
exclusivity of the four major publishers in distribution activities in the GDR were not directed against 
the publishers themselves but against any sort of monopoly position, to whomever this position was 
given.”1273 Correspondingly, considerable time of the meeting was given to Springer representative 
1269Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1270“moderierenden Tätigkeit.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn 
zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1271Note: On part of the ministries, there were representatives of the Ministry of the Interior (director Erich Schaible, and 
Dietrich Hübner), several representatives of the Ministry of Economy (i.e. councilor Dr. Monika Schmitt-Vockenhausen,
and undersecretary Dr. Jürg Ter-Nedden), and the Ministry for Posts and Telecommunication. Protocol, Protokoll einer 
Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner,
Bonn, February 16, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1272“unter Einschluss der Interessen der DDR-Verlage … in all seinen Erscheinungsformen.” Protocol, Protokoll einer 
Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner,
Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1273“gegen die Exclusivität [sic] gerichteten Vertriebsaktivitäten der vier Großverlage in der DDR richteten sich nicht 
gegen diese Verlage, sondern gegen jedwede Monopolstellung, wem auch immer diese eingeräumt würde.” Protocol, 
Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR,
Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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Leilich to present the Big Four model to the BMI. Leilich underlined that the publishers had aimed at 
making use of the potential that existed in the GDR with regard to management, logistics, adequate 
facilities, and personnel. Their envisioned system was neutral and open to all publications. The four 
publishers had been very aware of the responsibility they carried, “contrary to the ideas of the East 
German Post and the Ministry of Culture, both of which had supported a limitation of publications.”1274 
Leilich made clear that supplying the population of the GDR with West German publications needed to
happen fast. It needed high capital expenditures in form of liquid funds, tangible assets and the delivery
of goods, and “this could only be achieved by flexible and unconventional means.”1275 
With Leilich having given the aims and details of the Big Four concept, the rest of the meeting 
focused on the question if and how existing resources in the Federal Republic could be combined to 
build a Grosso system in the GDR compatible with that of the FRG, and how this could be financed 
and organized. “With the view of the financial dimensions, there was agreement that it depended on the
desired level of perfection [of the system].”1276 The most sensible solution would be a cooperation 
between the BDZV, VDZ and Presse-Grosso, all of whom were to act as “development agencies with a
ʻtrust functionʼ” for a start-up phase, and it was agreed that all three were to create a joint temporary 
working group with an advisory role for East German institutions and/or publishers.1277 
The plan was set: It made press distribution in the GDR exclusively a matter of West German 
interests, first, because the overarching goal of all interested parties was the unlimited import and 
distribution of West German print media. Second, because the BMI's main goal was to avoid any 
potential negative repercussions of newly created structures in the GDR for well established 
infrastructures in the Federal Republic. And though it was a deal made among West German interests, 
the federal government still had to pitch its goals to the East German government. The three points that 
needed to be pushed were, first, that the postal monopoly needed to be lifted in practice, second, Postal 
Distribution was to be an “additional provider for subscription service” only, and, third, a Grosso-
1274“im Gegensatz zu den Vorstellungen von DDR-Post- und Kulturministerium, die eine Titelbeschränkung befürwortet 
hätten.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema 
Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1275“Dies konne nur durch flexible und unkonventionelle Handlungsweise geleistet werden.” Protocol, Protokoll einer 
Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner,
Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1276“Hinsichtlich der finanziellen Großenordnung bestand Übereinstimmung darin, daß diese abhängig sei von der 
angestrebten Perfektion.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn 
zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1277“'in Treuhandfunktion' als Entwicklungshelfer.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am
14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 3, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
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system based on medium-sized companies needed to be built, possibly in combination with companies 
affiliated with publishers.1278 Considering that antitrust legislation was soon to become applicable also 
in the GDR, distribution could simply not lie with one authority, and these antitrust concerns needed to 
pointed out and kept in mind at all future talks.1279 
Regarding the current legal situation, however, matters were different. It was agreed that the 
legal grey zones within which West German publishers were currently distributing their products in the
GDR (with respect to tariffs, taxes or prices etc.) were likely to continue until the elections on March 
18, 1990. Since the respective East German institutions did not have any cohesive concept and were 
likely not able to present such a concept in an “appropriate and timely” manner but expected the 
Federal Republic to work it out, it was made clear that “until the elections, individual initiatives of 
publishers appear currently to be the only solution for the distribution [and sale] of West German 
publications and are being explicitly endorsed [emphasis added].”1280 Put differently, the BMI gave its 
approval for the uncoordinated and market-driven run of publishers onto a transitioning press 
landscape. Its reasoning lay in the failure of East German institutions to elaborate a coherent 
distribution concept. It, thereby, left out early lobbying initiatives of West German interest groups that 
had made any such independent attempts impossible from the outset. It further ignored potential early 
market pressures put onto a newly developing East German press in consequence of such unregulated 
efforts (see Chapter 4). The BMIʼs insistence that West German publications needed to be available for
the East German elections likely rooted more in the strong involvement of federal parties in the 
election, than in an interest in the democratic process within the GDR (see Chapter 3). The BMI's 
declaration that it was to have coherent distribution concept to present to the MKR by the election 
remained declarations of intent, and no such concept was ever presented.
When BDZV representatives discussed the outcomes of the meeting, they agreed that the 
association should take the lead in bringing together the VDZ and Presse-Grosso, and that it should 
soon contact the MKR. One of its biggest worries: that Presse-Grosso was to expand or newly establish
distribution areas of its own members in the GDR. Presse-Grosso needed to be kept from any such 
initiatives while previous efforts of publishers needed to be supported. The role of all involved West 
1278Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb 
in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1279Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb 
in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1280“sach- und zeitgerecht … Bis zur Wahl erscheinen Eigeninitiativen der Verlage als zur Zeit einziger Losungsansatz für 
den Vertrieb bundesdeutscher Presse und werden ausdrücklich gutgeheißen.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im 
Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 
16, 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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German parties, however, was to provide “development aid” and “knowledge transfer for establishing a
Grosso-system.”1281
The Media Control Council Meeting
Two days after the hearing at the BMI, the MPF informed the MKR about the proposals that 
had been made to the BMI.1282 It was February 21, the first proper meeting of the MKR, and the council
faced the major task of having to deal with the distribution issue. The MKR, now the sole institutional 
body that, according to the RT, was to decide on the import of West German print media and the 
involvement of the Post in their distribution, faced several challenges simultaneously.  First, its 
members were overwhelmed with the sheer amount of media-related issues (i.e. practices of import, 
cooperations between publishers, the break of the former party monopoly over the press and 
broadcasting etc.). Second, it held an advisory role only. It, thus, did not possess any executive or 
legislative rights, neither for matters of press distribution nor for any issues regarding the selection of 
Western print media eligible for distribution in the GDR. It was, therefore, not in the position of 
making any decisions of legal consequence, and its standing among East and West German interests 
groups was shaky from its offset (see Chapter 3).
On February 21, it held hearings with the Post. For the latter, this meant an opportunity to again 
lay out the “reasons and goals of the Ministry of Postal and Telecommunication of the GDR for 
negotiating with four West German major publishing houses over establishing a press distribution 
enterprise (joint venture).”1283 Represented by Niehof (MPF), and Weber and Germer (Postal 
Distribution), the proposed goal of the Post was to correct any “misinterpretations” that had come up at 
the Round Table meeting on February 12.1284 
For the Post, the meeting went well. Niehof described the discussions as “fact-based” while the 
reactions of several council members showed that the “presented positions of the Ministry of Postal and
Telecommunications were comprehensible and convincing.”1285 The major point pushed by the MPF 
1281Full quote: “Die Rolle des Pressegrosso sollte - genau wie die Rolle von BDZV und VDZ – der Entwicklungshilfe, 
dem Knowhow-Transfer zur Etablierung eines mittelständischen Grossovertriebssystems durch DDR-Unternehmen 
dienen.” Protocol, Protokoll einer Besprechung im Bundesinnenministerium am 14.2.1990 in Bonn zum Thema 
Pressevertrieb in der DDR, Klaus Wagner, Bonn, February 16, 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1282Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1283“Gründe und Ziele der Verhandlungen des MPF mit 4 BRD-Großverlagen zur Bildung einer 
Pressevertriebsgesellschaft (Joint venture).” Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 
21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1284“Fehlinterpretation.” Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des 
Vertriebes westlicher Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1285“sachlich … dargelegten Positionen des MPF verständlich und überzeugend waren.” Report, Niehof, Bericht über die 
264
was that the current “situation of uncontrolled press [imports and] distribution” exercised by West 
German publishers was concerning. Making use of an existing legal vacuum, these practices resulted in
a completely contradictory situation in the print media supply in the GDR.1286 The Post, again, argued 
for maintaining its strong position as a necessity to counter West German private market interests. It 
presented its own capacities of guaranteeing a universal supply of East German publications and a 
limited but expandable range of Western print media as a viable alternative to these Western privately 
driven initiatives.1287 
The MKR, on its part, shared the Postʼs concerns “that West German publishers and Grossisten 
are developing models for controlling the media market of the GDR, which have neither been 
coordinated with the GDR nor do they correspond to national interests and possibilities.”1288 The 
council, finding its tasks in implementing constitutional principles and the media resolution of the 
People's Chamber from February 5, aimed at “preventing any attempts to monopolize press 
distribution” and at securing fair market conditions.1289 According to Niehof, the MKR recognized the 
Post to have the greatest potential and currently the best prerequisites for guaranteeing a universal 
distribution of print media in the GDR. It, thus, granted the Post “the right for immediate distribution of
Western print media.”1290 Recognizing that the market was not yet ready for all West German 
publications, and that technical and economic limitations of Postal Distribution “made necessary a 
selection of the broad range of western print media,” the MKR wanted to “neither decide on 
publication lists nor officially sanction any selection made by the German Post.”1291 It was agreed, 
Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 
1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1286“entstandene Situation des unkontrollierten Pressevertriebes [durch Westberliner und BRD-Verlage in dem 
gegenwärtig bestehenden rechtsfreien Raum].” Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 
21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1287Note: The Post argued that it had, therefore, been actively involved building a legal foundation for press distribution 
after its monopoly positions had been discontinued with the Resolution on February 5. Report, Niehof, Bericht über die 
Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 
1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1288“daß von Verlagen und Grossisten der BRD Modelle zur Beherrschung des DDR-Medienmarktes ausgearbeitet 
werden, die weder mit der DDR abgestimmt sind noch unseren nationalen Interessen und Moglichkeiten entsprechen.” 
Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher 
Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1289Full quote: “Versuche zu Monopolisierung des Pressevertriebes zu verhindern, marktwirtschaftliche Bedingungen für 
den Pressevertrieb zu sichern.” Cited in report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990
zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1290“das Recht zum sofortigen Vertrieb westlicher Presseerzeugnisse.” Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des 
Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 3, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1291“die eine Auswahl aus der Gesamtheit der westlichen Presseerzeugnisse bedingen … weder Titellisten vorgeben noch 
eine Titelauswahl durch die Deutsche Post offiziell sanktionieren.” Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des 
Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des Vertriebes westlicher Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 3, 
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however, that the MPF was to submit, first, a list that contained all West German newspapers and 
magazines initially scheduled for distribution with the Big Four, and that, second, contained the offers 
the ministry had received from publishers.1292 During the meeting with the MKR and in later 
communication, the Post repeatedly underlined that any such publication list was based on “ideas for 
the initial stage, ... which were greatly influenced by the existing capabilities of the present distribution 
system.”1293 By expanding the technical possibilities, any of these restrictions would be gradually 
decreased while the final goal was to guarantee access to all West German publications. The Post did 
admit, however, that the list of offers by West German publishers was “strongly defined by 
contingencies”1294 
Shortly after the MKR meeting, on February 25, the newly created Association for Supporting 
an Independent Press Distribution in the GDR (Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen Vertriebs 
von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR) submitted a request to the Round Table for amending the 
February 5 resolution. In particular Art. 10, obligating the Post to distribute all domestic publications 
with a circulation higher than 500 copies, needed to be changed; not for the sake of the Post but 
because it needed a statute that “press wholesale for the retail sector is to be organized independent 
from publishers and via the exclusive local distribution of Grossisten.”1295 Though the postal monopoly 
had effectively stopped on February 14, the association feared that the “lifted distribution monopoly of 
the Post is being replaced by a factual distribution monopoly of West German major publishers.”1296 
The association, thereby, argued similar to Presse-Grosso with whom it kept close relations.
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1292Letter (draft), Niehof, Min P, to Martin Kramer, Medienkontrollrat, (28. Februar 1990), March 5, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3); also Report, Niehof, Bericht über die Beratung des Medienkontrollrates am 21.2.1990 zu Fragen des 
Vertriebes westlicher Presseerzeugnisse, February 26, 1990, p. 3, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1293“Vorstellungen für die Startphase … die wesentlich von den bestehenden Moglichkeiten des vorhandenen 
Vertriebssystems beeinflußt waren.” Letter (draft), Niehof, Min P, to Martin Kramer, Medienkontrollrat (28. Februar 
1990), March 5, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1294“stark von Zufälligkeiten geprägt.” Letter (draft), Niehof, Min P, to Martin Kramer, Medienkontrollrat (28. Februar 
1990), March 5, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1295“Der Großhandel für den Vertrieb im Einzelhandel ist verlagsunabhängig und gebietsweise über alleinausliefernde 
Pressegrossisten zu organisieren.” Petition, Antrag auf Ergänzung des Beschlusses der Volkskammer über die 
Gewährleistung der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit vom 5. Februar 1990, Vorstand Verein zur Forderung 
eines unabhängigen Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR, to Vertreter des Runder Tisches, 14. Sitzung, 
February 26, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1296“aufgehobene Vertriebsmonopol der Deutschen Post durch ein faktischen Vertriebsmonopol westdeutscher 
Großverlage ersetzt wird.” Petition, Antrag auf Ergänzung des Beschlusses der Volkskammer über die Gewährleistung 
der Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit vom 5. Februar 1990, Vorstand Verein zur Forderung eines 
unabhängigen Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR, to Vertreter des Runder Tisches, 14. Sitzung, February 26, 
1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
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Analysis
How great was the weight of the newly created Media Control Council compared to the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior? Both held hearings, the BMI with the major lobbying groups of competing 
West German interests, the MKR with the East German Post. What was being explicitly supported by 
the BMI, namely the individual “grey zone” initiatives of West German publishers to sell their 
publications in the GDR, was being refuted by the MKR. Any such uncontrolled import and 
distribution schemes designed by Western publishers, according to the MKR, served them more than it 
served the GDR. The MKR, thus, took a clear and critical stance towards Western pressures and their 
consequences for the democratic process in the GDR. 
The BMI took a much more pragmatic approach. Arguing for its own neutrality in press 
matters, it still held a coordinating function, first, in bringing together and giving space to the major 
West (rather than East) German lobbying and interest groups, second, in fostering legal grey zone 
initiatives, and, third, in setting clear regulatory premises. The BMI pushed the point that nothing that 
was being built in the GDR must endanger established infrastructures in the Federal Republic. This set 
the guidelines, less so for a free press in the GDR but for interests in the FRG. With these three points 
combined, the BMI supported and pushed the idea that a “free press” was to come to the GDR via press
imports, and gave little to no consideration to reform processes from within. Though East German 
publishers were given some thought, the immediate measures focused on imports, not the least because 
of the upcoming elections. The BMI, thus, stood side by side with West German publishers; their 
interests met in the aim to sell West German print media and information to an East German 
readership, and to do so fast. The driving motive of the BMI was the upcoming elections, for the 
publishers it was an unexplored market; both were not mutually exclusive. The line of argument of all 
was that of a free press and freedom of opinion in the GDR. 
The MKR emancipated itself from this rhetoric in that it shifted the focus on long-term goals of 
the GDR and the building of a domestic free press. It took the side of the Post partly because Postal 
Distribution presented the only viable alternative to Western interests that aimed to fill a vacuum left 
by a lifted postal monopoly. It did so also because the Post had been in contact with representatives of 
the MKR for some time, and had, thus, had its chance to lay out its position in more detail. The MKR, 
given the impossible task by the Round Table to decide on press distribution in the GDR, aimed at 
finding its own stance in a debate that had, from its offset, been heavily influenced by Western 
interests. It also tried to act in a fast-changing situation that would soon outpace any regulatory means.
267
The Big Four vs. the MPF 
“'[R]evolutionary times call for unusual measures,' if one aims to
support the goals of the revolution.”
Gerd Schulte-Hillen, March 19901297
With the initial joint venture plans having fallen trough, and the MKR having given the Post the
permission to distribute West German print media in the GDR, the Big Four changed strategies. Only 
one day after the MKR hearing, the Big Four announced their new distribution concept in a press 
release: Based on the media resolution from February 5, they had drafted a model based on the West 
German Grosso-system, which consisted of fifteen Grossisten acting as “neutral agents in retail” and 
that were owned in equal shares by East German partners and West German publishers (not simply by 
major publishers). These Grossisten were to distribute East and West German print media 
independently from the Postal Service.1298 By March 2, the publishers had developed a model that 
broke down the details: 32 percent of the shares were held by the major publishers, four medium-sized 
publishers were to hold 2 percent each, three regional publishers 1 percent each, and a consortium of 
other small publishers a 2 percent share. East German publishers together were to hold 25 percent, as 
was a managing partner of the GDR.1299 
Despite the proclaimed similarity to the West German Grosso-model, the concept differed in 
that it made publishers an integral part of distribution (an exception in the Federal Republic, see 
Chapter 4). This, initially, found little approval of either the BMI or the Federal Cartel Office. Both 
criticized the lacking of production and sales.1300 The Cartel Officeʼs concern with a majority share of 
publishers in Grossisten lay in their missing market neutrality. During a meeting with the major 
publishers on March 14, it, therefore, demanded further measures to guarantee such neutrality.1301 In the
1297“faire Berücksichtigung der Tatsache, dass 'revolutionäre Zeiten ungewohnliche Vorgehensweisen' erfordern, will man 
das Ziel der Revolution befordern.” “Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine 
Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1298“neutrale Mittler im Einzelhandel.” Cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – 
Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 5, BArch DC9/1050.
1299Concept, Pressevertrieb, [Medienkontrollrat, n.d.], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30,
File 30.   
1300Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 5, BArch DC9/1050. See also “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der 
DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1301Attachment, Punktation zur aktuellen Berliner Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 1990, Letter, Lothar C. Poll, 
Tagesspiegel, to Gottfried Müller, June 25, 1990, Der Tagesspiegel, BArch DC9/1070; also Deutsche Presse Agentur, 
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run-up to this decision, Schulte-Hillen had addressed the Cartel Office and had urged for the office's 
“fair acknowledgment of the fact that 'revolutionary times call for unusual measures,' if one aims to 
support the goals of the revolution.”1302 The office needed to take this into consideration. Similarly, at an
event in Leipzig, Schulte-Hillen pointed out that the publishers' efforts served the purpose of a free 
press; freedom of information was useless for citizens of the GDR “if they have no access to Western 
print media.”1303 With this being the baseline argument, the publishers added that “[i]n consideration of 
East German publishers and the currently effective exchange rate, a price ratio of one to three is being 
applied to West German publications during the starting phase.”1304 And based on this estimate, the Big 
Four started distribution.
Dividing the Cake
 “You divide a cake – but not regions inhabited by people.”
Roman Koster, PR head of Bauer, March 19, 19901305
Roman Koster, PR head of Bauer, strongly rejected claims of what became commonly known 
as “the press coup” of the Big Four. The term referred to the publishers having divided distribution in 
the GDR among themselves, partly by having made use of the general turmoil only weeks before the 
elections. And while the term used for this division might have differed, the fact remained the same. 
Representative of G+J, Andreas Ruppert, made clear that all was set among the publishing houses: 
Springer was to supply the south, Bauer the north, and Gruner + Jahr the Eastern part of the GDR.1306 
This meant, Bauer took over the northern region of the GDR, G+J the metropolitan area of Berlin and 
Frankfurt/O, Burda the Suhl region in Thuringia, and Springer took over the rest of the south. The 
“Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 5, BArch 
DC9/1050.
1302“faire Berücksichtigung der Tatsache, dass 'revolutionäre Zeiten ungewohnliche Vorgehensweisen' erfordern, will man 
das Ziel der Revolution befordern.” “Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine 
Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1303“wenn sie die West-Presse nicht verfügbar haben.” Cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der 
DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 6, BArch DC9/1050.
1304“Mit Rücksicht auf die DDR-Verlage und den derzeit geltenden Umrechnungskurs werde in der Anfangphase ein 
Preisverhältnis von eins zu drei für westdeutsche Publikationen zugrunde gelegt.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 
“Großverlage arbeiten an neuem Vertriebskonzept für DDR,” February 22, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). 
1305“Man teilt einen Kuchen auf – aber keine Gebiete, in denen Menschen wohnen.” “NDR-Interview mit Bauer-PR-Chef 
Roman Koster 'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-
Jürgen Niehof.   
1306Note: cited in Salzburger Nachrichten. ADN, Medienexperte: DDR-Medienmarkt ist aufgeteilt – Interesse an 
regionalen Zeitungen, press release, 5/29/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35d, DSC08159.
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publishers' distribution (Verlagsauslieferung) started on March 5 with about seventy-three publications;
this included some publications of West German medium-sized publishers but mainly publications of 
the “Gang of Four,” a term Koster hoped was meant as a joke.1307 
The fact that the four publishers primarily focused on specific regions was “not a market 
sharing but the division of labor,” Schulte-Hillen emphasized.1308 “The major publishers have not 
secured regional monopolies and will – like everyone else – operate universally.”1309 During the starting
phase in early March, Bauer alone delivered more than 300.000 magazines per week into the GDR, and
Springer sold 200.000 to 300.000 copies of its tabloid Bild in the south.1310 While Springer had rented a 
storehouse in the border-region around Hof, Burda claimed proudly to be the first West German 
publisher to start distribution from within the GDR. Having opened its own office in Erfurt (Thuringia),
publications were being centrally delivered to the office and then distributed to about 850 retail 
locations around Thuringia. With operations having started on March 8, by mid-March, Burda had 
distributed twenty-four magazines of West German publishers (325.000 copies) and 80.000 copies of 
Bild.1311 
In their choice of sales points, the publishers were not too picky: Bild was available (soon for 
0.60 Mark) at the “bakery, the shoe shop and at the florist, between toys and fashion accessories.”1312 It 
was “those retail locations,” Wolfgang Fürstner (VDZ) underlined, “that had been won by the 
publishers for retail sale. The network of locations is consistently being expanded.”1313 Fürstner 
defended the regional division by publishers in underlining that even though
“Grosso-regions were each owned by one publisher” there was a “second [separate] Grosso-enterprise, 
also owned by publishers, working in that same region.”1314 A Grosso-region was further managed by 
1307“Vierer-Bande.” “Man teilt einen Kuchen auf – aber keine Gebiete, in denen Menschen wohnen.” “NDR-Interview mit
Bauer-PR-Chef Roman Koster 'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990,private 
archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1308“nicht eine Marktaufteilung, sondern eine Arbeitsteilung.” “Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden 
Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990,private archive 
Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1309“Die Großverlage haben sich keine Gebietsmonopole zugesichert und werden ihrerseits – wie jeder andere auch – 
überall operieren.” “Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung 
durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1310See journalist, 7/90.
1311“Geschäftsführer Hilberz: Alleingang ist Übergangslosung. Burda beliefert 850 DDR-Händler,” medien aktuell, No. 
12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1312“beim Bäcker, im Schuhgeschäft und Blumenladen, zwischen Spielzeug und Modeaccessoires.” In journalist, 7/90.
1313“solche Verkaufsstellen die von den Verlagen für den Presseeinzelhandel gewonnen werden konnten. Das Netz der 
Verkaufsstellen wird fortlaufend ausgebaut.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in
der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 11, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne
Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1314Full quote: “Grosso-Gebiete, die im Eigentum eines Verlages stehen. Es besteht dann aber auf dem gleichen Gebiet 
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several publishers (holding 75 percent) and an independent managing shareholder (25 percent), which 
jointly guaranteed diversity. “All Grosso-companies, regardless their types of ownership, follow the 
principles of fair competition and free market access.”1315 G+J CEO Gerd Schulte-Hillen added that 
also Grossisten in the FRG that were run by major publishers had never misused their own position or 
given priority to their own publications.1316 
The publishing houses further emphasized, they were already distributing also publications that 
were not their own, and the goal was to give all products a chance on the market in due time.1317 
According to Springer manager Gerd Leilich, this had been the plan all along. The current publishers' 
distribution systems was a “start-up assistance for the GDR;” eventually, distribution capacities also for
East German products were to be turned into a “proper” Grosso-distribution, and negotiations on that 
continued.1318 Burda managing director, Horst Hilbertz, called it a “transitional solution … because all 
other effort had failed,” but all four publishers were will searching for a solution according to their 
developed model.1319 Bauer's Roman Koster clarified, the four publishers “want a distribution system 
that is fair and open for every publication of all West German publishers, which later, of course, should
offer its services also to publishers of the GDR.”1320 “[I]t is not our intention,” Koster underlined “to 
make use of the frailties [of East German publishers]. On the contrary, a new [distribution] model is on 
the table that protects in particular the publishers of the GDR.”1321 Regardless of their reasoning, dpa, in
eine zweite ebenfalls verlagseigene Grossofirma [mit jeweiliger Objekttrennung].” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine 
Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, pp. 12-13, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29. Also 
1315“Alle diese Grosso-Firmen folgen unabhängig von ihren jeweiligen Eigentumsformen den Prinzipien der 
Wettbewerbsneutralität und des uneingeschränkten Marktzutritts.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation 
zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 13, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1316“Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',”
medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990,private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1317In Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, 
pp. 1-17, p. 6, BArch DC9/1050. See also “Geschäftsführer Hilberz: Alleingang ist Übergangslosung. Burda beliefert 
850 DDR-Händler,” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 13, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1318“Anlaufhilfe für die DDR … ordentlichen.” Cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – 
Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 6, BArch DC9/1050.
1319“Übergangslosung … weil alle anderen Bemühungen gescheitert waren.” “Geschäftsführer Hilberz: Alleingang ist 
Übergangslosung. Burda beliefert 850 DDR-Händler,” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-
Jürgen Niehof.   
1320“mochten ein wettbewerbsneutralen und für jeden verkäuflichen Titel offenes Vertriebssystem für alle West-Verlage 
schaffen, das später selbstverständlich auch den DDR-Verlage seine Leistungen anbieten sollte.” “NDR-Interview mit 
Bauer-PR-Chef Roman Koster 'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990,private 
archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1321“uns geht es nicht darum, die Schwächen [der DDR Verlage] auszunutzen. Im Gegenteil, es liegt ein neues 
[Vertriebs-]Modell auf dem Tisch, das die DDR Verlage besonders schützt.” “NDR-Interview mit Bauer-PR-Chef 
Roman Koster 'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-
Jürgen Niehof.   
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retrospect, viewed the coup of the Big Four as a reaction to a growing “domestic competition,” and it 
criticized the “dull protests” of the interim East German government that did little to counter the Big 
Four scheme.1322  
Protests, however, were anything but “dull.” Instead, they were immediate, outspoken, fierce, 
and, at times, desperate. The Association for Supporting an Independent Press Distribution in the GDR 
and the union IG Druck referred to the Big Four strategy as a “disingenuous act” that endangered the 
newly won press freedom through “the market power of a new monopoly.”1323 Civic groups such as 
Bündnis '90 and its spokesman Konrad Weiß, who had so resolutely argued against West German 
interests in distribution at the RT meeting, stood in blatant opposition to the dealings of the Big Four: 
“What we witness here is Wild West mentality in the press sector.”1324 Weiß stood in line with the 
Media Control Council, and media unions in East and West Germany who strongly protested against 
any such separate, privately-run distribution system set up by the publishers exclusively for West 
German publications. 
The Association of Newspaper and Magazine Publishers of the GDR (VZZD) published an 
open letter to Modrow in which it underlined the lack of equal opportunities for the press of the 
GDR.1325 East publishers and newspapers still depended on a rather unreliable and still outdated Postal 
Distribution that limited them compared to the exclusive system set up for West German publications. 
When on March 12, the Leipziger Volkszeitung (LVZ) approached the East German Council of 
Ministers to complain that no declarations or protests of the government had stopped unfair 
developments, such as those in distribution, the council agreed.1326 
The de facto monopolization of distribution of print media by certain West German 
publishers clearly leads to a strong distortion of competition and would be deemed 
illegal under the antitrust laws of the FRG. Affected publishers in the GDR have the 
option to immediately draw attention to what they think are prevailing issues by means 
of their own newspapers and to soon ask the new government to go against such unfair 
1322“einheimische Konkurrenz … matter Protest.” Note: Dpa also understood that not having been democratically elected, 
the government considered it impossible to deny its population access to Western print products. Deutsche Presse 
Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 6, BArch 
DC9/1050.
1323“handstreichartigen Vorgehen … der Marktmacht eines neuen Monopols.” Cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, 
“Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 6, BArch 
DC9/1050.
1324“Was wir hier erleben, ist Presse-Wildwest.” Schlechte Karten, journalist, 5/90, p. 40, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 
35a-b, DSC07767.
1325Open letter, BZ, March 1, 1990, p. 2. See also “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb
in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1326Telegram, Offener Brief, Leipziger Volkszeitung to Ministerrat der DDR, Leipzig, March 12, 1990, BArch DC9/1051. 
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competition practices.1327 
With the Big Four distribution having started just days before the election, the government had little 
say and no means to counteract an infrastructure that had been built without any legal approval. By 
mid-March, the MKR aimed at including the Office of Competition Protection to deal with such 
monopoly building endeavors, while at the Ministry of Finances and Prices, the basic idea was to adopt
an interim legislation to prevent competitive constraints.1328 
The Post in Competition
“The lifting of the postal monopoly in distribution does not mean
 that the German Post, with its area-wide distribution [and sales]
infrastructure, does not participate in press distribution anymore.
Not least in the interest of publishers of the GDR will the Post
maintain its range of services for press distribution on a
contractual basis.”
Draft of a press release, MPF, March, 19901329
The Post now found itself in direct competition to a one-handedly built distribution system that 
exclusively delivered Western press imports without any legal basis or bi-lateral agreement.
The MPF, with regard to current distribution practices of the publishers, however, repeatedly 
underlined that it did not hold any responsibility in the matter:
The Minister for Postal and Telecommunication is neither legally entitled not is he 
practically capable of taking any influence on the ways in which the private-sector 
distribution outside of Postal Distribution is being organized, if and to what extent 
publishers and Grossisten of the FRG are allowed shareholdings in distributing 
companies, and how the interests of East German publishers can be protected in this 
process. This is the job of the Media Control Council.1330 
1327“Der de facto monopolisierte Vertrieb von Printmedien bestimmter BRD-Verlage führt eindeutig zu einer starken 
Wettbewerbsverzerrung und wäre nach dem Kartellgesetz der BRD unzulässig. Die betroffenen Verlage der DDR haben
den Moglichkeit, sofort durch ihre Zeitungen auf die ihrer Meinung nach vorhandenen Mißstände deutlich aufmerksam 
zu machen und alsbald die neue Regierung aufzufordern, gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb vorzugehen.” Telex, Dr. Arnold,
Sekretariats des Ministerrates, to Leipziger Volkszeitung, n.d. (after March 12, 1990), BArch DC9/1051. 
1328Notes, Gerhard Bächer, n.d. [March 14, 1990] Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File
30. 
1329“Die Beseitigung des Pressevertriebsmonopols bedeutet aber nicht, daß sich die Deutsche Post mit ihrem 
flächendeckenden Vertriebsapparat nicht mehr am Pressevertrieb beteiligt. Nicht zuletzt im Interesse der DDR-Verlage 
wird die Deutsche Post ihr bisheriges Leistungsangebot für den Pressevertrieb auf vertraglicher Grundlage 
aufrechterhalten.” Press release draft (not sent), ADN-Mitteilung, Stellungnahme des MPF, Entwurf (nicht abgesandt), 
n.d. [early March], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1330“Der Minister für Post- und Fernmeldewesen ist weder rechtlich befugt noch praktisch in der Lage, darauf Einfluß zu 
nehmen, wie das privatwirtschaftlich aufzubauende Vertriebssystem außerhalb des Postzeitungsvertriebs in seiner 
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The reason for the current situation clearly lay with the initial veto of the RT. It had demanded a 
“commercially organized distribution system,” and this is what came out of it.1331 Any problems East 
German newspapers were experiencing with regard to distribution were, thus, also the consequence of 
the RT's rejection of a joint-venture model that would have allowed the Post to have its share and say. 
Now, all the Post could do was to aim at improving its services in distribution and to modernize its 
processes but this would take time to come to completion.1332 
The problems publishers experienced with Postal Distribution, however, grew, and so did their 
open complaints (see Chapter 4). Part of the problem, as the VZZD pointed out, was the “secrecy of the
postal minister” that had seeded distrust among publishers.1333 They did not trust Postal Distribution 
due to problems caused by its infrastructure and its nontransparent activities. In early March, the MPF, 
therefore, made clear that “a discrimination against East German print media in distribution will not be 
tolerated … Fact is, only the purchasing decisions of citizens in the end decides on the existence of 
individual publications.”1334 After all, so the MPF, distribution did not disadvantage the press of the 
GDR as much as did outdated technology in editorial offices and printing plants.1335 In this way, by 
pointing to other serious issues East German print media struggled with, the MPF aimed to get itself 
out of public attention while continuing negotiations behind closed doors.
The Post Policy Proposal and the MKR
The Postʼs driving fear had been its degradation to a state of irrelevance in matters of 
distribution. With the lifting of its monopoly rights and being left with the distribution of East German 
papers, the Post started another attempt to stay in business. In early March, it was clear to the MPF that 
“of course, the German Post will also participate in the distribution of western print media.”1336 Plans 
Gesamtheit organisiert wird, ob und welchem Umfang BRD-Verlage und BRD-Grossisten die Beteiligung an 
Vertriebsunternehmen [oder die Eigengründung solcher Unternehmen in der DDR, handschriftlich hinzugefügt; Notiz 
von Autor] gestattet wird und wie die Interessen der DDR-Verlage in diesem Prozeß gewahrt werden. Hier ist der 
Medienkontrollrat gefordert.” Press release draft (not sent), ADN-Mitteilung, Stellungnahme des MPF, Entwurf (nicht 
abgesandt), n.d. [early March], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1331“ein privatwirtschaftlich organisiertes Vertriebssystem.” Press release draft (not sent), ADN-Mitteilung, Stellungnahme
des MPF, Entwurf (nicht abgesandt), n.d. [early March], p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1332Press release draft (not sent), ADN-Mitteilung, Stellungnahme des MPF, Entwurf (nicht abgesandt), n.d. [early March],
p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1333“Geheimniskrämerei des Postministers.” Open letter, BZ, March 1, 1990, p. 2.
1334“Eine Benachteiligung der DDR-Presse beim Vertrieb wird dabei durch das Ministerium für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen nicht zugelassen. Tatsache ist, daß allein der Bürger mit seiner Kaufentscheidung letztlich über die 
Existenz der einzelnen Presseerzeugnisse entscheidet.” Press release draft (not sent), ADN-Mitteilung, Stellungnahme 
des MPF, Entwurf (nicht abgesandt), n.d. [early March], p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1335Press release draft (not sent), ADN-Mitteilung, Stellungnahme des MPF, Entwurf (nicht abgesandt), n.d. [early March],
p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1336“Selbst verständlich wird sich die Deutsche Post auch am Vertrieb westlicher Presseerzeugnisse beteiligen.” Press 
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for this had crystallized on February 23, only two days after Niehof's MKR hearing, when a proposal 
started to circulate in different ministries. Within days, it was revised repeatedly, notes were added and 
deleted until a draft of the proposal, dated March 2, was sent to the Council of Ministers on March 5, 
the same day the Big Four started their distribution. The title of the proposal: “Principles for the 
Distribution of Newspapers and Magazines from the FRG and West Berlin via the German Post.”1337 
And though the document referred to the February 5 resolution of the People's Chamber as its founding
document, earlier drafts indicate that this proposal, in fact, was based on those initially worked out with
the Big Four in late January.1338 It was not until March 9, however, that it was fully completed, and it 
eventually circulated widely by March 15 (see below).
In the process of developing these different drafts, by March 2, at least eight East German 
institutions and ministries were involved, a considerable number that indicates again how 
interconnected issues of import and distribution of West German print media were (see Chapter 4).1339 
The March 2 draft gave authorization to the postal minister to negotiate with West German publishers 
over the supply of print media from West Germany, West Berlin and other Western countries to the 
“best possible conditions.”1340 The Post was to start distributing a selected range of Western print media
for retail and subscription, which was to be increased gradually.1341 A crucial point, and decidedly 
release draft (not sent), ADN-Mitteilung, Stellungnahme des MPF, Entwurf (nicht abgesandt), n.d. [early March], p. 2, 
BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1337Proposal, Vorlage, Grundsätzen für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen 
westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post', 2. März 1990, Minister Wolf, MPF an Staatssekretär Mobis, Sekretariat 
des Ministerrates, March 5, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1338Note: There are great differences between the different drafts. The earlier proposal from January 26 reasoned with the 
meeting of Kohl and Modrow on December 19, 1989 and the subsequent resolution of the Council of Ministers on 
January 4, 1990, as well as the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna. The line of argument and concepts outlined were 
very similar to the propositions initially made by the Big Four in the “Concept for the Universal Supply of the 
Population of the German Democratic Republic with Press Products.” Thus, while in the initial draft from January 26, 
the publishers in question were identified as Gruner+Jahr, Heinrich Bauer, Burda and Axel Springer, in later drafts no 
such explicit selection was made. Proposal, Vorlage, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und 
dem übrigen Ausland in der DDR, January 26, 1990, BArch DC9/1052.
1339Proposal, Vorlage, Grundsätzen für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen 
westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post', 2. März 1990, Minister Wolf, MPF to Staatssekretär Mobis, Sekretariat 
des Ministerrates, March 5, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1340“zu den bestmoglichen Konditionen.” Proposal, Vorlage, Grundsätzen für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der 
BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post', 2. März 1990, Minister Wolf, MPF an 
Staatssekretär Mobis, Sekretariat des Ministerrates, March 5, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1341Attachment, Anlage, Grundsätzen für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen 
westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post', 2. März 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3). Note: This point, deeply 
rooted in the socialist practice with high demands and low supplies. It now caused some controversy among ministries 
and was to be erased on behalf of Wolf (in agreement with the Spokesman of the Government and Head of the Press 
Office, and the Minister for Foreign Trade); it remained in the final version of the document. Letter, Minister Wolf, 
MPF, to Staatssekretär Mobis, Sekretariat des Ministerrates, March 6, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3); Attachement, 
Anlage, Grundsätzen für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen 
Ländern durch die Deutsche Post', 2. März 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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different from any of the prior Big Four concepts, the Post was to buy all publications from the West 
German publishers in currency of the GDR. It was to then sell these products at uniform prices.1342 All 
prices (transfer and sale) were to be in Mark only, sales prices were to be determined “by Postal 
Distribution according to the current pricing level (price level of April 1, 1990) … in consideration of 
supply and demand.”1343 The price was to amount to a maximum of three times the original retail price 
in DM.1344 In proposing this, the Post followed familiar patterns: It was to buy and sell the respective 
publications, and it was to do it in domestic currency. This meant that the Post was to carry all of the 
commercial risks while the publishers carried none. It also meant, however, that the Post did not need 
foreign currency to import Western publications. To the Post, the proposal was a practical solution in a 
situation of political and economic hardship and uncertainty.
The MPF submitted its final proposal of its own “Principles” to the Council of Ministers on 
March 6.1345 Not only had the Post, so its argument, “the material and technical, and the human 
resources (transportation and delivery systems, sales network) at its disposal” but by making Western 
print media available to citizens of the GDR, it “ensured the freedom of opinion, information and 
media.”1346 The Post was to start distributing Western publications for subscription and retail “with a 
limited product range and circulation numbers” in March 1990.1347 Both were to be gradually increased 
1342Attachement, Anlage, Grundsätzen für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen 
westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post', 2. März 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1343“durch den Postzeitungvertrieb in Hohe des in der DDR geltenden Preisniveaus (Preisstand 1.4.1990) … unter 
Berücksichtigung von Angebot und Nachfrage.” Meeting documents, Sitzungsmaterial V350/90, Grundsätze für den 
Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post, 
Berlin, March 7, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC 9/1051. 
1344Note: Settlements were to be paid to accounts of GDR banks, and taxes paid according to the “Principles for the Sale 
of Western Goods and Services in the GDR for GDR currency” as had been approved by the Council of Ministers. 
Meeting documents, Sitzungsmaterial V350/90, Grundsätze für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, 
Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post, Berlin, March 7, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC 9/1051. 
See also See notes, Gerhard Bächer, n.d. [March 14, 1990] Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box
27-30, File 30. 
1345Note: In agreement with the Spokesman of the Government, the Director of the GDR Press and Information Office, the
Minister of Foreign Trade, and the Ministry of Finances and Prices the proposal was sent to members of the Council of 
Ministers, the chairs of the district councils as well as the major of Berlin. Meeting documents, Sitzungsmaterial 
V350/90, Grundsätze für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen 
Ländern durch die Deutsche Post, Berlin, March 7, 1990, BArch DC 9/1051. 
1346Full quote: “Die Deutsche Post verfügt auf Grund ihrer Stellung im Pressevertriebssystem der DDR über die materiell-
technische und personelle Basis (Beforderungssystem, Zustellapparat, Verkaufsstellennetz), die es ihr ermoglicht, sich 
flächendeckend auch am Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen Ländern 
zu beteiligen. … damit im Sinne des Beschlusses der Volkskammer vom 5. Februar 1990 über die Gewährleistung der 
Meinungs-, Informations- und Medienfreiheit wirksam zu werden.” Meeting documents, Sitzungsmaterial V350/90, 
Grundsätze für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen Ländern durch 
die Deutsche Post, Berlin, March 7, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC 9/1051. 
1347“mit einem eingeschränkten Sortiment und begrenzten Auflagen.” Meeting documents, Sitzungsmaterial V350/90, 
Grundsätze für den Verkauf von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen Ländern durch 
die Deutsche Post, Berlin, March 7, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC 9/1051. 
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depending on the supply of the publishers and the “capacity of the market.”1348 
The MKR discussed the proposals submitted by the Post (and by the publishers) at its meetings 
on March 7 and March 14. It was generally in favor of the Post's initiative, and the meeting on March 
14 focused on the potential remedies provided by the Post's proposal on price dumping strategies of 
West German publishers in the GDR.1349 On March 7, the MKR was joined by four representatives of 
the Federal Cartel Office as well as by Niehof.1350 This meeting focused on press distribution in general 
and the petition that had been made by the Association for Supporting an Independent Press 
Distribution in the GDR to the Round Table on February 25 (see above), in particular. Both tasks had 
fallen onto the MKR. And though the association had been the initiator in proposing an amendment to 
the February 5 resolution to enshrine a Grossisten-model in it, it had not been invited to the MKR 
meeting. This lack of communication had caused its chair great “dismay” but due a lucky coincidence, 
the association had been given notice the day before, and its representative Christian Christiansen 
participated in the meeting.1351 
Much space, however, was given to the distribution model of the Big Four as had been 
developed by March 2 (see above). According to the Cartel Office, an improvement in this model was 
that the publishers had given up on the idea of a holding company; this would have resulted in one 
representative for all shareholding publishers holding 50 percent of the voting rights. Further, the 
shares of the Big Four had been lowered to “only” 32 percent.1352 What remained problematic was the 
selection of publications, the exclusion of East German publishers, and the fact that joint-ventures 
between publishers would jeopardize the set division of shares, which could lead again to a dominance 
of the Big Four.1353 Gerhard Bächer noted that according to the Cartel Office, also a 25 percent 
investment share on the side of the GDR was “illusionary;” this would require an investment of 
between 10 to 15 million Mark, which could hardly be raised by East German enterprises.1354 Other 
1348“Aufnahmefähigkeit der Marktes.” Meeting documents, Sitzungsmaterial V350/90, Grundsätze für den Verkauf von 
Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post, Berlin, March
7, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC 9/1051. 
1349Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 14.3.1990, Berlin March, 16, 1990, Medienkontrollrat der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
1350Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 7.3.1990, Berlin March, 12, 1990, Medienkontrollrat der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
1351“Befremden.” Letter, Pressevertrieb DDR, A. Senft, Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen Vertriebs von 
Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR, to Martin Kramer, Medienkontrollrat, March 6, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / 
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1352Concept, Pressevertrieb, [Medienkontrollrat, n.d.], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30,
File 30.   
1353Concept, Pressevertrieb, [Medienkontrollrat, n.d.], Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30,
File 30.   
1354“ist Illusion.” Notes, Gerhard Bächer, March 7, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-
277
open questions related to unpaid taxes by West German publishers, the potential lay-off of about 6.000 
employees of the Postal Distribution and the question whether or not distributors in the GDR were 
being forced to also distribute the Campaign Paper of the Alliance printed by Springer.1355 
In result of the meeting on March 7, the MKR underlined the great importance of fixed prices 
and of the 1:3 sales price ratio for West German publications. That same day, it passed its own 
“Principles for a Press Distribution System.”1356 In it, the MKR, similar to later declarations (see 
Introduction), addressed several issues simultaneously. It urged the government to reorganize press 
distribution to equally “address the rights and duties of publishers, Grossisten, Postal Distribution and 
of the retail sector.”1357 It put a focus on East German newspapers and publishers, and addressed their 
problems in distribution, and stipulated that while the distribution of periodical and non-periodical print
media had to be guaranteed, distribution structures “should not allow for any market dominating 
enterprises.”1358 The MKR favored a system consisting of Postal Distribution in combination with a 
network of regional Grossisten, and it supported the Postʼs plan to consult with Grossisten for such a 
setup. What “must be formalized” in the statutes of all, Grossisten as well as the Post, was “an open 
and neutral distribution system, independent of publishers”1359 The MKR underlined that:
In principle, no publication must be kept from entering the market by means of temporal 
and material market barriers. This includes the interests of the press of the GDR, which 
need to be taken into full consideration. Grossist, Postal Distribution and the retail sector 
must offer all publications; the decision lies with the customer alone.1360 
Until these principles were put into law and a statuary provision was adopted, the MKR expected them 
to be the guiding principles for distribution.1361 
30, File 30.   
1355Notes, Gerhard Bächer, March 7, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30.   
1356Resolution, Grundsätze zum Pressevertriebssystem, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, March 7, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3), also in BArch DC9/1051, and Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-
Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1. For a draft of the proposal draft, Entwurf, Erklärung zum 
Pressevertriebssystem, see Berlin, March 7, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, 
File 30. 
1357“die Rechte und Pflichte der Verlage, der Grossisten, des Postzeitungsvertriebes und des Einzelhandels umfassen.” 
Resolution, Grundsätze zum Pressevertriebssystem, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, March 7, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1358“sollte keine marktbeherrschenden Unternehmen zulassen.” Resolution, Grundsätze zum Pressevertriebssystem, 
Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, March 7, 1990, BArch DC9/1051.
1359“ist ein offenes, wettbewerbsneutrales, verlagsunabhägiges Vertiebssystem festzuschreiben.” Resolution, Grundsätze 
zum Pressevertriebssystem, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, March 7, 1990, BArch DC9/1051.
1360“Im Grundsatz darf kein Titel durch zeitlich und sachliche Marktbarrieren im Marktzutritt behindert werden. Das 
schließt ein, daß die Interessen der DDR-Presse voll berücksichtigt werden. Grossist, Postzeitungsvertrieb und 
Einzelhandel sind verpflichtet, jeden Titel anzubieten; die Entscheidung trifft allein der Käufer.” Resolution, Grundsätze
zum Pressevertriebssystem, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, March 7, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1361Resolution, Grundsätze zum Pressevertriebssystem, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, March 7, 1990, BArch 
DC9/1051.
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The MKR's overarching goal was to create some sort of order in the press landscape. This, the 
council pointed out, could only be done if print media that were distributed in the GDR were registered 
with the Press- and Information Service.1362 This registration requirement was introduced only days 
later, when on March 9, the Council of Ministers passed the resolution on the “Principles for the Sale of
Press Products from the FRG, Berlin (West) and other Western Countries via the German Post” as had 
been submitted by the MPF.1363 One point in the proposal had been changed however. The Press- and 
Information Office had requested to be added, as the MR had suggested, as the institution for 
registering print media, and to include the sentence that “[o]nly publications registered with the Press 
and Information Service of the government of the GDR can be distributed [in the GDR].”1364 Wolfgang 
Meyer from the Press and Information Service underlined that by doing so, the MKRʼs “wording ... in 
the document [Principles for a Press Distribution System] is accounted for also by the government.”1365 
The point would, thus, receive greater authority. 
As it was, the Post was to start distributing West German publications in March 1990 for 
subscription and retail with a limited product range and circulation. With the MPF minister now being 
authorized to “conclude contracts with publishers over the supply of publications on the best possible 
conditions,” immediately following the Council of Minister's decision, Germer wrote a letter to the 
major publishers.1366 Stating that he expected the publishers to still be interested in distributing their 
products via Postal Distribution, he suggested March 12 for a meeting to talk things over.1367 On that 
same day, Niehof wrote to the VDZ. Confirming media reports of the Postʼs efforts to distribute West 
German print media “based on unambiguous legal provisions,” the Post wanted “to start the 
1362Resolution, Grundsätze zum Pressevertriebssystem, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, Berlin, March 7, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1363Resolution, Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Beschluß über Grundsätze für den Verkauf von 
Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post, Beschluß 
18/I. 11/90, March 9, 1990, BArch DC9/1052.
1364“Nur vom Presse- und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR registrierte Presseerzeugnisse sind vertriebsfähig.” 
Request to add to Umlaufvorlage V 350/90, p.2 (3) in letter, Wolfgang Meyer, Regierungssprecher und Leiter des 
Presse- und Informationsdienstes der Regierung der DDR, to Manfred Sauer, Stellvertreter des Leiters des Sekretariats 
des Ministerrates, Berlin, March 9, 1990, BArch DC 9/1051.
1365“unter Punkt 4 dieses Dokuments getroffene Festlegung auch durch die Regierung getragen [wird].” Request to add to 
Umlaufvorlage V 350/90, p.2 (3) in letter, Wolfgang Meyer, Regierungssprecher und Leiter des Presse- und 
Informationsdienstes der Regierung der DDR, to Manfred Sauer, Stellvertreter des Leiters des Sekretariats des 
Ministerrates, Berlin, March 9, 1990, BArch DC 9/1051.
1366“Verlagen zu den bestmoglichen Konditionen Verträge über die Lieferung von Presseerzeugnissen ... abschliessen zu 
lassen.” Resolution, Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Beschluß über Grundsätze für den Verkauf 
von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD, Berlin (West) und anderen westlichen Ländern durch die Deutsche Post, Beschluß
18/I. 11/90, March 9, 1990, BArch DC9/1052.
1367Letter, Germer, Direktor PZV, to Hartmut Bühne, G+J, Springer, Bauer, und Burda, March 9, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
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comprehensive and nation-wide distribution of Western print media at the earliest possible time.”1368 
Any distribution was to be based on the MKR's “Principles for Press Distribution” and on the decision 
of the Council of Ministers. Niehof urged the VDZ “to exceed their influence to the effect that no 
formal constraints may obstruct an imminent start of distribution.”1369 According to a template letter 
that was to be sent to several West German publishers, distribution was to start on March 12. All 
transactions were to happen in Mark, revenue was non-transferable and had to remain in the GDR but 
could be used either for business transactions or for investments.1370 According to an attached list, about
sixty-five magazine publishers had offered to supply about 132 publications for distribution.1371 Shortly 
after, Bächer noted that “since March 13, the registration of Western newspapers and magazines is 
running full speed” (see Chapter 4), and that the council decided to again urge the new government for 
equal competition and a “grace period” for publishers of the GDR.1372
For the Sake of Freedom: the VDZ and the Big Four 
“What we want for the citizens of the GDR is freedom of
information, now and not successively. The sociopolitical
responsibility of large companies …. finds its real media policy
expression in the current proceedings 
[of building a publishers' Grosso-system].”
Gerd Schullte-Hillen, March 19, 19901373
On March 21, three days after the elections in the GDR and one day before a meeting with 
Germer from Postal Distribution, Wolfgang Fürstner of the VDZ, tired of rumors and half-truths, took a
1368“auf der Grundlage eindeutiger rechtlicher Regelungen …. zum frühstmoglichen Zeitpunkt mit dem umfassenden und 
flächendeckenden Vertrieb westlicher Presseerzeugnisse beginnen.” Letter, Niehof, Min P, to G. Lindau, Verband 
Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger, Fachgruppe Fachzeitschriften, March 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1369“dahingehend Einfluß zu nehmen, damit einer baldigen Vertriebsaufnahme keine formalen Hemmnisse 
entgegenstehen.” Letter, Niehof, Min P, to G. Lindau, Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger, Fachgruppe 
Fachzeitschriften, March 9, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1370Template Letter, Musterbrief, Schreiben PZV an Verlage, n.d., BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1371List, Vorliegende Angebote von Verlagen aus der BRD und Berlin (West) für den Vertrieb in der DDR ohne Tages- 
und Wochenzeitungen sowie andere Massenpublikationen, pp.1-9 n.d., Attachment, Template Letter, Musterbrief, 
Schreiben PZV an Verlage, n.d., BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1372“Seit 13.3. läuft die Registrierung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse auf Hochtouren … Schonfrist.” Notes, Gerhard Bächer,
n.d. [March 14, 1990] Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1373“Wir wollen für die Bürger der DDR Informationsfreiheit sofort und nicht auf Raten. Die gesellschaftspolitische 
Verpflichtung der Großunternehmen … findet in dem jetzigen Vorgehen [des Baus eines verlagsabhängigen 
Grossosystems] ihre reale medienpolitische Ausprägung.” “Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden 
Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive 
Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
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stand. “Everything that is currently being said regarding the distribution of newspapers and magazines 
in the GDR,” he claimed, “is either incomplete, biased, or it lags behind current developments.”1374 
Comments and articles in the press, all too often gave proof of “underlying group interests or 
insufficient sources of information.”1375 He, therefore, aimed to “document the developments of the last
weeks” and circulated his account widely in the media journal textintern.1376
Prior to its publication, Fürstner had sent his text, together with statements of Bauer, Burda and 
G+J, to the board members of the VDZ magazine division.1377 Indicating the text's alignment with the 
views of the major publishers, rather than with those publishers opposing their plans, the text was 
largely a copy-and-paste version of the argument of the major publishers, which had been published in 
the heavily embattled VDZ press release on February 8 (see above).1378 Fürstner was in such close 
alignment with the major publishers that Roman Koster, PR head of Bauer, when being asked if the 
new distribution model (soon to be presented to the Cartel Office) came from the major publishers, he 
responded that it did not; it was “a model of the Association of German Magazine Publishers [VDZ], 
which is also being supported by the major publishing houses.”1379 This, however, was not the case, and
the model was the publishers'.
To Fürstner, the building of a distribution system in the GDR stood in the service of the 
agreement between Kohl and Modrow from December 19, 1989. This had been the initial impetus and 
remained to be the main reason for the involvement of the VDZ and the West German publishers in the
GDR; for weeks now, it had been the “special political interest in the Federal Republic.”1380 The role of 
the VDZ was, thus, to ensure “that the continued existence and development of publishers in the GDR 
1374Alles, was zur Zeit zum Thema DDR-Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenvertrieb gesagt wird, ist entweder unvollständig, 
tendenzios oder es trifft nicht die aktuelle Diskussion.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum 
Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 11, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1375“die dahinterstehenden Gruppeninteressen oder die unzureichenden Informationsquellen.” “'Die Worte veralten im 
Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-
14, p. 11, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1376“die Entwicklung der vergangenen Wochen zu dokumentieren.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation 
zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 11, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1377Letter and attachment, Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Herren des Vorstandes Fachgruppe Publikumszeitschriften, VDZ, 
Bonn, March 19, 1990, received by Jürgen Niehof on April 24, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1378“'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, 
March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1379“ein Modell des Verbandes Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger, das auch von den Großverlage getragen wird.” “NDR-
Interview mit Bauer-PR-Chef Roman Koster 'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 
1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1380“besondere politische Interesse in der Bundesrepublik.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum 
Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 11, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
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is being safeguarded via an adequate distribution system.”1381 Likewise, magazine publishers had 
initially (in early February) not distributed their publications in the GDR, not because of their 
inability or missing legal prerequisites. Their hesitation was rather carried by the 
concern that the individual direct supply of West German publishers might lead to a 
solidification of distribution structures in the GDR, leading to an uncontrolled growth 
that only leads bigger publishers to end up with a market opportunity.1382 
Any distribution efforts  of the major publishing houses, according to Fürstner, had really only started 
in early March, when Springer, Bauer, Burda and G+J started, “according to plan, with the distribution 
of West German print media [about 75 newspaper and magazines] in the GDR.”1383 This had been done 
in agreement with the VDZ and the Federal Cartel Office and was compatible with West German 
practices. 
 While the publishers were “making an effort to distribute, next to their own products, as many 
publications of other publishers as possible,” these efforts were being limited by “logistic deficits,” 
such as transportation and storage capacities, personnel and retail locations.1384 The initiative of the 
publishers was, therefore, not an “invasion,” as had been titled in the press.1385 Instead, after the 
government and publishers of the GDR had complained about an “uncontrolled growth” in distribution 
and sale, the goal now was to find a compromise, “an interim solution … for press distribution,” on the 
one hand, to fulfill the political goal of press exchange between both German states, on the other.1386 
1381“daß die Verlage der DDR auf dem Weg über ein adäquates Vertriebssystem eine Bestand- und Entwicklungschance 
behalten.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR 
extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, 
File 29.
1382“Unvermogen oder an fehlenden gesetzlichen Voraussetzungen. Ihre Zurückhaltung was vielmehr von dem Gedanken 
getragen, daß individuelle Verlagsauslieferungen westdeutscher Verlage zu einer Verfestigung von Vertriebsstrukturen 
in der DDR führen konnten, die zu einem vertrieblichen Wildwuchs führen, bei dem am Ende nur die großeren Verlage 
eine Marktchance haben.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” 
Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 11, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1383“planmäßig mit die Auslieferung westdeutscher Presseprodukte [ca. 75 Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftentitel] in der DDR.” 
“'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, 
March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 11, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1384“bemühen sich darum, neben ihren eigenen Produkten so viele Titel anderer Verlage wie moglich mitzunehmen … 
logistischen Defiziten.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” 
Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 11, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1385“Einmarsch der Großverlage in der DDR.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in 
der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 11, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne
Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1386“einer Übergangslosung … des Pressevertriebs.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum 
Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 12, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
282
This reasoning later circulated widely in the West German press.1387 And so did the point (pushed 
already in the press release on February 8) that the initial inquiry had come from the German Post: in 
mid-January it had asked the four publishers to develop a press distribution system in the GDR; the 
publishers “at short notice accommodated the request” and informed the VDZ magazine division of 
their actions.1388 With the MPF having asked to keep negotiations private, Bauer's Koster stated that it 
had been a mistake to keep them under the radar, but “when confidentiality is being agreed upon, we 
stick to it.”1389 
Fürstner made clear that as long as principles of fair competition and the free market access for 
all publications were guaranteed, “ownership structures of newly built Grosso-enterprises in the GDR 
are not relevant for the VDZ.”1390 Instead, by supporting the Big Four model, the VDZ supported “the 
first steps in building an orderly and high-performance press distribution system in the GDR. They 
[these steps] are being carried by the political responsibility to protect the continued existence of East 
German publishers, particularly during the starting phase of market economy principles.”1391 Fürstner 
pushed this point in various interviews and articles; it did not, however, become more true only because
it was repeated more often (see Chapter 4). 
Most importantly, Fürstner made clear that any system built in the GDR needed to be 
compatible with the federal system, partly for reasons of press diversity, partly with regard to the 
upcoming German unification. Given that the West German market was defined by four major 
publishers (with a 70 percent market share) and several medium- und small sized publishers, it 
followed that a “distribution system without the four major publishers could not guarantee … a 
universal supply that was economically sensible.”1392 The latest developments had shown, however, 
1387“Das Grosso-Modell soll nur für den Übergang gelten,” Handelsblatt, March 27, 1990,Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / 
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1388Full quote: “sind diesem Wunsch kurzfristig nachgekomme.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation 
zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 13, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1389“wenn Vertraulichkeit vereinbart wird, dann halten wir uns auch daran.” “NDR-Interview mit Bauer-PR-Chef Roman 
Koster 'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990,private archive Hans-Jürgen 
Niehof.   
1390“Für den VDZ sind die Eigentümerstrukturen neu zu bildender Grosso-Firmen in der DDR nicht relevant.” “'Die Worte
veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 
1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1391“die ersten Schritte zum Aufbau eines geordneten und leistungsfähigen Pressevertriebssystems in der DDR. Sie werden
getragen von der ordnungspolitischen Verantwortung, gerade am Beginn einer marktwirtschaftlichen Orientierung, den 
Bestand der DDR-Verlage zu schützen.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der 
DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1392“[e]in Vertriebssystem ohne die vier Grossverlage konnte eine wirtschaftlich sinnvolle und flächendeckende 
Versorgung … nicht gewährleisten.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der 
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that any system based exclusively on the four publishers was not feasible either. Instead, it needed a 
solution that included also small and medium-sized publishers; the alternative to that was that major 
publishers distributed solely their own publications “with the consequence that medium-sized 
publishers cannot reach a country-wise market presence.”1393 The solution, therefore, was cooperation. 
All of this, of course, also needed the general support of the government and publishers of the GDR. 
Though, according to Fürstner's reasoning, smaller West German publishers had, in fact, no 
alternative but to comply with the Big Four system to not fall into a market irrelevance, he interpreted 
all concerns of different interest groups as unfortunate side-effects to efforts that stood in the service of 
a free press. Similar to G+J CEO Gerd Schulte-Hillen who claimed that the “initiative of the major 
publishers [has been] completely misunderstood and misinterpreted by: the Round Table, federal 
government / Ministry of the Interior, Cartel Office;” in short, by all.1394 According to Schulte-Hillen, 
complaints over a still domineering influence of the PDS (former SED) over media in the GDR had 
made it necessary to improve the voters' access to information. This had required fast action and not 
“extensive thinking” or “negotiating the political and legal protection of press distribution.”1395 The 
publishers had chosen to act and to face the consequences of a legally uncertain and transitional 
solution. “No one wanted to instal a monopoly or oligopoly,” but every publisher or distributor from 
the Federal Republic could become active in the GDR, regardless the actions of individual major 
publishing houses.1396 Not only did Schulte-Hillen make the press market of the GDR a playground for 
West German interests, which seemed to hold no regulations and/or interest groups of its own, but his 
account clearly contradicted the months of negotiations that had preceded his statement. 
Just one week later, on March 28, Fürstner, joined by Gruner + Jahr board member Rolf 
Wickmann, spoke to the MKR to lobby for the publishers' press distribution.1397 In a document 
DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 12, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1393“mit der Folge, dass mittelständische Verlage keine flächendeckende Marktpräsenz schaffen konnten.” “'Die Worte 
veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 
1990, pp. 11-14, p. 12, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1394“Initiative der Großverlage [wurde] gründlich mißverstanden und mißinterpretiert. Und zwar durch: Runden Tisch; 
Bundesregierung/Innenministerium; Kartellamt.” “Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-
Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-
Jürgen Niehof.   
1395“langes Überlegen … Ausverhandeln sowie politisches und rechtliches Absichern des Vertriebs von Presseprodukten.”
“Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” 
medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1396“Niemand wollte ein Oligopol oder ein Monopol installieren.” “Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-
Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch West-Presse',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 
1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1397Protocol, Ergebebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 28.3.1990, Berlin April, 2, 1990, p. 1,  
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addressed to the MKR likely for this meeting, Fürstner pushed for the joint interests of the VDZ and 
the major publishers. He made clear, first, that the particularities of the Grosso-system (i.e. regional 
monopolies) needed to be permissible also in cross-border transfers, second, that it was the belief of the
publishers that the exclusive contracts with Grosso-enterprises did not fall under Art. 85 of EC 
(European Community) regulations, which regulated cross-border markets, and, third, that parallel 
imports of Western publications were undesirable.1398 Adding to Fürstner's demands, Wickmann gave 
insights into current and future developments during the meeting. While the MKR held that the current 
situation “resembled more early capitalist Wild-West practices” than equal market competition, 
Wickmann argued that not distribution but design, content and prices made for such competition.1399 
Largely following the official VDZ account in summarizing previous events, he stated that since 
distribution had stated on March 5, 65 to 70 percent of the publications distributed were those of the 
major publishers (who produced about 200 out of a total of about 3.000 publications in the FRG). With 
the Cartel Office having asked for revisions of former concepts, the current plan envisioned the 
building of fifteen Grossisten in the GDR with a fifty-fifty share between East and West German 
shareholders, and the concept was to soon be presented to the Federal Cartel Office (see below).1400 
There, thus, was no intention on side of the publishers to stop distribution. And while Fürstner's points 
gave exclusive import and distribution rights to future Grossisten of the publishers, Wickmann pointed 
to slightly changed ownership shares that would preempt any monopoly position of the latter. Both 
argued in complete disregard for any ground rules that had been set by the MKR. 
For the Sake of Democracy: The MKR's Appeal to the BMI
The same day Fürstner had published his take on distribution, on March 21, the MKR had 
issued an (earlier mentioned, see Chapter 3) press release, in which it insisted that any monopoly 
position of domestic and foreign publishers, or any majority shares of West German publishers in East 
German publishing enterprises, printing facilities or newspapers were illegal. With regard to 
distribution, it underlined: 
Next to the Postal Service, also Grossisten independent of publishers are permitted to 
Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, 
File 1.
1398Document, “Grundsätze des Deutschen Pressevertriebssystems,” Wolfgang Fürstner, Bonn March 28, 1990, Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1399“gleicht mehr den frühkapitalistischen Wild-West Praktiken.” See notes, Gerhard Bächer, n.d. [March 14, 1990] 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1400See notes, Gerhard Bächer, n.d. [March 14, 1990] Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, 
File 30. 
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distribute foreign (press) publications on the territory of the GDR. Foreign publications 
need to be offered based on a 1:3 ratio to avoid price dumping and unfair competition. 
… Direct sales of foreign publishers on the territory of the GDR are not permitted.1401 
In demanding the latter, the MKR had again explicitly rejected the BMI's earlier mentioned preference 
for such individual initiatives of publishers (see above).
By March 30, the distribution of the Big Four had taken increasing momentum, and so had the 
complaints posed against it. The “massive criticism in numerous newspapers, suggestions of the Media 
Control Council, resolutions of the German Journalists Association, of unions and staff in the GDR as 
well as our own [the government's] concerns,” Ralf Bachmann wrote to the BMI, had remained without
result. He, thus, had decided to seek help from the ministry in making an appeal against the distribution
practices of the Big Four.1402 Writing to Dietrich Hübner at the BMI, Bachmann urged that “since the 
beginning of March, the publishing houses Springer, Gruner+Jahr, Bauer and Burda, without any 
consultation with us or the Media Control Council, have proceeded to divide the press market among 
themselves.”1403 Underlining that “in contradiction also to current federal law” and in circumventing 
any official institutions, “they are performing a country-wide direct supply of tens of thousands of 
small retails locations in all parts of the GDR. For some days now, this initiative is being intensified by 
means of a cut-throat, price dumping competition between the [major] publishers.”1404 In doing so, they 
were knowingly jeopardizing the existence and means of publishers in the GDR, going also against the 
interests of medium-sized West German publishers and ignoring the objections of the Federal Cartel 
Office.1405 “We, therefore, ask you [the BMI] to assert your influence, to make the major publishers 
1401“Neben der Deutschen Post ist verlagsunabhängigen Grossisten gestattet, ausländische Publikationen (Presse) auf dem 
Territorium der DDR zu vertreiben. Ausländische Presseerzeugnisse werden im Verhältnis 1:3 zu DM angeboten um 
Dumping und unlauteren Wettbewerb zu vermeiden. ... Der Eigenvertrieb von ausländischen Verlagen ist auf dem 
Gebiet der DDR nicht statthaft.” Press release, Presseerklärung, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, March 21, 1990, p. 2, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1402“Massive Kritik in zahlreichen Zeitungen, Hinweise des Medienkontrollrates, Resolutionen des Journalistenverbandes, 
von Gewerkschaften und Belegschaften in der DDR und unsere eigene Besorgnis.” Letter, Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und 
Informationsdienst der DDR, to Dietrich Hübner, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin, March 30, 1990, p. 1, BArch 
DC9/1052.
1403“Seit Anfang März sind die Verlage Springer, Gruner+Jahr, Bauer und Burda ohne Konsultation mit uns und dem 
Medienkontrollrat der DDR dazu übergegangen, den Zeitschriftenmarkt unter sich aufzuteilen.” Letter, Ralf Bachmann, 
Presse- und Informationsdienst der DDR, to Dietrich Hübner, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin, March 30, 1990, p.
1, BArch DC9/1052.
1404Full quote: “Im Widerspruch auch zu gültigen Gesetzen der Bundesrepublik nehmen sie unter Umgehung des 
Zeitschriftengroßhandels eine flächendeckende Direktbelieferung Zehntausender Einzelhandelsverkaufsstellen in allen 
Teilen der DDR vor. Seit einigen Tagen wird diese Aktion durch einen Verdrängungswettbewerb der Verlage 
untereinander mit Dumpingpreisen verschärft.” Letter, Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdienst der DDR, to 
Dietrich Hübner, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin, March 30, 1990, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
1405Letter, Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdienst der DDR, to Dietrich Hübner, Bundesministerium des Innern, 
Berlin, March 30, 1990, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
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stop their activities and to return to normal business practices.”1406 After all, the BMI had agreed to help
work on a joint solution at the expert meeting in Bonn on February 8. Though, in spite of several 
inquiries, no such proposal had yet been made; but now, the BMI needed to act on behalf of all 
involved interests.1407 And Bachmann's plea was carried by a long list of protesters: different ministries 
of the GDR, the Media Control Council, the Industrial Union Print and Media, the Association of 
Journalist of the GDR, the developing publishers' association, and the Association for Supporting an 
Independent Press Distribution in the GDR. Their opposition had remained unheard, as had been 
different appeals of various publishers and critical commentaries in newspapers.  
It did not take long for a reply, not from the ministry but from the Big Four who had been 
informed by the BMI. Burda, Bauer, Springer and Gruner + Jahr, in a joint statement, claimed the Press
and Information Service of the GDR had “accused [the federal government] did not make an effort in 
working out a proposal for a Grosso-distribution in the GDR” and had further asked the BMI to stop 
the distribution of West German newspapers and magazines, which went against any notion of a free 
press.1408 Bachmann was baffled by this blatantly wrong interpretation of his letter and the interests 
behind it.1409 The declaration of the publishers had “little relevance” to the matter at hand and “was 
without any substance.”1410 On the contrary, in the letter to the BMI the GDR had emphasized its 
willingness “to put into place all prerequisites guaranteeing a full freedom of information,” this, 
however, was “inextricably linked to principally guaranteeing equal opportunity.”1411 Not only the did 
major publishers leave unmentioned the fact that they were knowingly endangering the means of East 
German publishers, but their statement gave the impression there was no newspaper distribution 
(Zeitungsgroßhandel) in the GDR, “even though, just weeks ago, they aimed at creating a joint venture 
with Postal Distribution also for the sale of their own products in the GDR.”1412 While the failure of the 
1406“Wir ersuchen Sie deshalb, Einfluß darauf zu nehmen, daß die Großverlage ihre Aktionen einstellen und zu einem 
normalen Geschäftsgebaren zurückkehren.” Letter, Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdienst der DDR, to 
Dietrich Hübner, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin, March 30, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
1407Letter, Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdienst der DDR, to Dietrich Hübner, Bundesministerium des Innern, 
Berlin, March 30, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
1408“[der Bundesregierung den] Vorwurf gemacht, sie bemühe sich nicht um einen Vorschlag für ein Grosso-
Vertriebssystem in der DDR.” Cited in press release, Erklärung, Bachmann, n.d. [early April], p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
1409Personal communication, interview, Ralf Bachmann, August 20, 2014.
1410“wenig sachdienlich … entbehre jeder Grundlage.” Press release, Erklärung, Bachmann, n.d. [early April], p. 1, BArch 
DC9/1052.
1411“alle Voraussetzungen für eine volle Informationsfreiheit zu garantieren … untrennbar mit der Gewährleistung des 
Prinzips der Chancengleichheit verbunden.” Press release, Erklärung, Bachmann, n.d. [early April], p. 1, BArch 
DC9/1052. See also letter, Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdienst der DDR, to Dietrich Hübner, 
Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin, March 30, 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
1412Full quote: obwohl sie noch vor wenigen Wochen mit dem Postzeitungsvertrieb der DDR ein Joint venture auch zum 
Vertrieb ihrer Printmedien in der DDR eingehen wollten, dessen Scheitern von keiner der beteiligten Seiten gewünscht 
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deal had not been desired by any of the involved parties, negotiations regarding press distribution still 
needed to be led primarily by institutions of the GDR. The current situation did not ask for statements 
and counter-statements but for negotiation and concrete “steps towards [reaching] equal opportunities 
on the media market.”1413 
And while the Big Four had responded immediately, it took the BMI over a week. On April 9, 
Hübner responded to Bachmannʼs plea “to assert influence over publishers, residing in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, to comply with existing regulations in the GDR in the distribution of their 
products.”1414 And Hübner left no doubt that little such help could or should be expected from the BMI. 
The federal government had “no effective legal means” regarding press distribution and/or sales prices 
of West German publishers in the GDR. It made clear that question “if publishers from the Federal 
Republic of Germany are circumventing legal regulations in the GDR does not fall within the 
assessment and competence of the Federal Republic of Germany. A breach of federal law does not 
apply.”1415 And yes, during the German-German media talks on February 8, the federal government had
declared “that it was in favor of developing press diversity” in the GDR, and “keeping the largest 
number possible of independent and economically productive press enterprises in the GDR” was part of
this goal.1416 Unfortunately, this question had not been addressed in an expert meeting since, but the 
minister of the interior in cooperation with various federal institutions had sedulously been “working 
on drafting a media policy proposal that was acceptable and conformed to competition law.”1417 And 
this had been done in close cooperation with the major publishing houses and the Cartel Office. 
On April 4, representatives of Burda, Bauer, Springer and Gruner+Jahr had presented their 
worden war.” Press release, Erklärung, Bachmann, n.d. [early April], p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
1413“Schritte zur Chancengleichheit für alle auf dem Medienmarkt DDR.” Press release, Erklärung, Bachmann, n.d. [early 
April], p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
1414“In Ihrem Schreiben ersuchen Sie den Bundesminister des Inneren, Einfluß darauf zu nehmen, daß sich die in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland ansässigen Verlage beim Vertrieb ihrer Erzeugnisse an die geltenden Bestimmungen in der
DDR halten.” Letter, Hübner, Bundesinnenminsterium, to Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdiesnt der 
Regierung der DDR, Der Bundesminister des Inneren (SM 10-344690-6/1a), April 9, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
1415“keinerlei rechtliche Handhabe … Inwieweit Verlage aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland geltende Bestimmungen in 
der DDR umgehen sollten, fällt nicht in die Beurteilung und Zuständigkeit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ein 
Verstoß gegenüber der Rechtslage in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland liegt nicht vor.” Letter, Hübner, 
Bundesinnenminsterium, to Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdiesnt der Regierung der DDR, Der 
Bundesminister des Inneren (SM 10-344690-6/1a), April 9, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
1416“daß ihr an dem Ausbau der Pressevielfalt gelegen sei … die Erhaltung einer moglichst großen Zahl eigenständiger 
und wirtschaftlich leistungsfähiger Presseunternehmen in der DDR.” Letter, Hübner, Bundesinnenminsterium, to Ralf 
Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdiesnt der Regierung der DDR, Der Bundesminister des Inneren (SM 10-344690-
6/1a), April 9, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
1417“an dem Zustandekommen eines medienpolitisch akzeptablen und wettbewerbskonformen Vorschlages gearbeitet.” 
Letter, Hübner, Bundesinnenminsterium, to Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdiesnt der Regierung der DDR, 
Der Bundesminister des Inneren (SM 10-344690-6/1a), April 9, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
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ideas of a “tamed Grosso-model” to the Federal Cartel Office; it was, according to Hübner, a 
“participation model that [was] tolerable from the Federal Cartel Office's point of view.”1418 What 
Schulte-Hillen called the “50-25-25” model reorganized direct distribution by building fifteen 
Grossisten in the GDR.1419 25 percent of each company would be held by a “citizen of the GDR” as a 
managing partner, twenty-five percent held by East German publishers, and fifty percent by diverse 
West German publishers (with a 25 percent limit for the Big Four). The latter “need to bring in 
construction and investment assets of about 200 million DM.”1420 In short, only 25 percent of the shares
of Grossisten were to be owned by major publishing houses, the rest was managed by a consortium of 
several smaller publishers, the other 50 percent by East German shareholders.1421 The idea, pushed by 
the major publishers during the hearing and later, was that this system strengthened all small and 
medium-sized West German publishers and gave them the “possibility to participate” in distribution, 
while the fifty-fifty split between West and East German interests “safeguards institutionally 
competitive neutrality and free market access for all [publications].”1422 With success. 
Even though the Cartel Office still considered the federal model of Grossisten completely 
independent of publishers to be “the better solution,” the office considered the new concept to be 
acceptable.1423 “If it should not come to such [an independent system] in the GDR, the introduced 
model [of the major publishers] would also be tolerable.”1424 Its focus lay on the 25-percent-division of 
1418“Beteiligungsmodell, das aus Sicht der Bundeskartellamtes tolerabel ist.” Letter, Hübner, Bundesinnenminsterium, to 
Ralf Bachmann, Presse- und Informationsdiesnt der Regierung der DDR, Der Bundesminister des Inneren (SM 10-
344690-6/1a), April 9, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
1419“50:25:25.” “Fünf-Punkte Erklärung des G+J-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Schulte-Hille. 'Keine Überschwemmung durch 
West-Presse',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 1990,private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1420“DDR-Bürger … die eine Aufbau- und Investitionsleistung von ca. DM 200 Mio. einbringen müssen.” “'Die Worte 
veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 
1990, pp. 11-14, p. 13, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29. See also “NDR-
Interview mit Bauer-PR-Chef Roman Koster 'Niemand wird an die Wand gedrückt',” medien aktuell, No. 12, March 19, 
1990,private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.   
1421Letter and attached table, Wolfgang Fürstner, Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenlerleger e.V, to Mitgliedsverlage der 
Fachgruppe Publikumszeitschriften, Bonn, April 6, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
1422“Moglichkeit der Teilnahme … die Wettbewerbsneutralität und den freien Marktzutritt für alle Zeitschriften [und 
Zeitungen] institutionell abzusichern.” “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der 
DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 13, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne 
Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1423“die bessere Losung.” Cited in Letter, Christian G. Christiansen, Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen Vertriebs 
von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR, to Merk und Hübner, Bundesministerium des Inneren, Berlin, April 18, 1990, 
BArch DC9/1050; Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” 
August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 7, BArch DC9/1050. For a VDZ version, see also “'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine 
Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29.
1424“Wenn es aber in der DDR dazu nicht kommen sollte, wäre auch das vorgestellte Modell tolerabel.” Cited in Letter, 
Christian G. Christiansen, Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR, to 
Merk und Hübner, Bundesministerium des Inneren, Berlin, April 18, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
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shares among investment partners.1425 With regard to a possible future jurisdiction of the office (in 
some years to come), however, it made clear that for this model to remain acceptable, it two 
preconditions needed to be met: First, that there were no independent Grossisten, and second, that no 
consolidated system of Grossisten owned by publishers was to be established.1426 
Regardless of this more than cautious reasoning of the Cartel Office, the decision was 
immediately hailed by the VDZ as a “green light … for building a press distribution system in the 
GDR,” according to the same principles that distinguish press distribution in the FRG.1427 
Fürstner, informing other publishers of the joint success of the VDZ and Springer, Bauer, Burda and 
G+J, emphasized that the current model took into consideration the kind of concerns “that have defined
the discussions among publishers for the last few weeks.”1428 Based on the current agreement, further 
talks were planned, now involving the federal government and the respective institutions of the GDR. 
In these upcoming talks, the Cartel Office's consent consistently served as a means to counter any 
doubts and criticism of the publishers' dealings, such as those of the Media Ministry (MfM).1429 Presso 
Grosso, on its part, was “very disappointed” that the office, generally critical of the publishers' plans, 
had now considered them to be  “tolerable.”1430 
The Post and the Big Four 
In the meantime, negotiations between Postal Distribution and the major publishers had 
resumed (with the letters written by Germer and Niehof after the Council of Ministersʼ decision on 
March 9). On March 22, Germer met with Bühne (G+J) and Leilich (Springer) to come to fast and 
mutually beneficial agreements.1431 Again, with success. During the meeting, it was agreed that the 
1425Cartel Office Report 1989/90, Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes über seine Tätigkeit in den Jahren 1989/90, 
Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, Bundeskartellamt, Drucksache 12/847, June 26, 1991, p. 106.
1426Letter, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Hamburg und Berlin, und andere; Zusammenwirken beim Pressegrossovertrieb; 
Pruefung nach § 37 a Abs. 1 I.V.m. § 1 GWB, Bundeskartellamt to Axel Springer, August 16, 1990, private archive 
Hans-Jürgen Niehof.  
1427“Grünes Licht für den Aufbau eines Pressevertriebssystems in der DDR.” Press release, Pressenotiz “Pressevertrieb in 
der DDR,” Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenlerleger e.V., Bonn, April 4, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. Also
cited in Letter, Christian G. Christiansen, Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen in
der DDR, to Merk und Hübner, Bundesministerium des Inneren, Berlin, April 18, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1428“die die Diskussion der Verlage untereinander in den letzten Wochen bestimmt hat.” Letter, Wolfgang Fürstner, 
Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenlerleger e.V, to Mitgliedsverlage der Fachgruppe Publikumszeitschriften, Bonn, April 6,
1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
1429Telegram, Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Gottfried Müller, Medien Ministerium, May 25, 1990, BArch DC9/1051.
1430“sehr enttäuscht … tolerabel.” Letter, Gerd Kapp, Presse-Grosso, to Gottfried Müller, Ministerium für Medien und 
Presse, Koln, April 29, 1990, p. 3,  Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-
Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
1431Telex, Dietrich Germer, PZV, to Herrn Bühne, Verlag Gruner + Jahr AG, and Herrn Leilich, Axel Springer Verlag AG,
March 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3)
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publishers were to conclude contracts with the regional head offices (Bezirksdirektionen) of the Post to 
supply them with their products for retail sale (Einzelverkaufslieferungen). The publishers were to 
“grant the regional head offices a West German-level retail margin in addition to a tentative fixed-rate 
remuneration for services of the German Post that exceed regular retail, which, until a final agreement 
is reached, amounts to 5 percent of the retail price.”1432 The nature and scope of these additional 
services were to be negotiated individually between the publishers and the regional head offices, 
“taking into consideration the specific local conditions.”1433 Eventually, these individual agreements 
were to set the basis for a comprehensive list of centrally negotiated remuneration rates for common 
additional services that were, in turn, to set the frame for future regional negotiations on services and 
their actual performance. Once a final agreement was reached on the remuneration of regional head 
offices, however, they were to be paid retroactively from the day distribution started.1434 This deal was 
to be put into practice as soon as possible, and Germer asked Bühne and Leilich for their final 
confirmation so that the regional head offices could be notified immediately; he received their final 
confirmation separately three days later.1435 
Before having sent their confirmation, Bühne and Leilich had contacted Bauer and Burda to 
inform both about the meeting. Bühne confirmed that also Bauer was on board, and according to 
Leilich, also Burda “in principle accepts the proposal.”1436 Representatives of Springer were, thus, soon 
to contact the postal head offices in the southern towns of Dresden, Gera, Halle, Karl-Marx-Stadt and 
Leipzig to negotiate necessary details, and Burda was to do the same in Erfurt and Suhl (Thuringia) to 
negotiate and close local deals for retail distribution. “At any rate, we will deliver our publications 
exclusively,” Bühne added, for matters of regulation and control.1437 A few days later, Lothar Scheuer 
from Bauer also contacted Germer. Referring to the confirmation given by Bühne on behalf of Bauer, 
Scheuer wanted to leave no doubt about Bauer's intention. “We again want to reaffirm… this 
1432“gewähren den Bezirksdirektionen die BRD-Einzelhandelsspanne zuzüglich einer vorläufigen pauschalen Vergütung 
für Leistungen der Deutschen Post, die über die Leistungen des Einzelhandels hinausgehen, die bis zu ihrer endgültigen 
Vereinbarung 5% vom Verkaufspreis beträgt.” Telex, Dietrich Germer, PZV, to Herrn Bühne, Verlag Gruner + Jahr AG,
and Herrn Leilich, Axel Springer Verlag AG, March 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3)
1433“unter Berücksichtigung der konkreten Bedingungen vor Ort.” Telex, Dietrich Germer, PZV, to Herrn Bühne, Verlag 
Gruner + Jahr AG, and Herrn Leilich, Axel Springer Verlag AG, March 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3)
1434Telex, Dietrich Germer, PZV, to Herrn Bühne, Verlag Gruner + Jahr AG, and Herrn Leilich, Axel Springer Verlag AG,
March 23, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3)
1435Telegram, Herrn Leilich, Axel Springer Verlag AG, to Dietrich Germer, PZV, March 26., 1990, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3); Telegram, Herrn Hartmut Bühne, Verlag Gruner + Jahr AG, to Herrn Germer, PZV, March 26, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1436“dem vorschlag im grundsatz zustimmt.” Telegram, Herrn Leilich, Axel Springer Verlag AG, to Dietrich Germer, 
PZV, March 26., 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1437“wir werden jedenfalls unsere titel exklusiv liefern.” Telegram, Herrn Hartmut Bühne, Verlag Gruner + Jahr AG, to 
Dietrich Germer, PZV, March 26, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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confirmation in its full factual content. You can assume that we will proceed on this premise in future 
negotiations with individual regional head offices of the Post.”1438 While differences remained in detail,
all four major publishers were on board for making separate deals with regional postal head offices for 
delivering their publications for retail sale.
Only two days after Bühne and Leilich gave their final okay, an internal directive of Postal 
Distribution, entitled “Distribution of Print Media from the FRG and West Berlin,” was sent to all 
regional head offices.1439 This directive, as Germer pointed out, was an addition to the “Principles for 
the Distribution of Newspapers and Magazines from the FRG and West Berlin via the German Post” 
that had been passed by the Council of Ministers, and had been sent to the respective department heads 
on March 15. The new directive, Germer explained in a letter, specified the general set-up of profit 
margins in negotiating over individual supply contracts. While the document contained the exact points
as had been agreed upon by the Post and the four publishers, it did not entail what had been suggested 
by Bühne, that is exclusive delivery rights for publishers or more freedom for publishers to negotiate 
with individual offices. Instead, it was stated that if an offer was made by a Grossist independent of 
publishers, the contract depended on his ability to prove his delivery capacities and to start in a timely 
manner.1440 In spite of this addition, the deal with the Post enabled the major publishers to now sell their
publications also via Postal Distribution, which expanded their reach in particular in rural areas. To the 
Post, it meant its share in the business of distributing Western print media. Not officially announcing 
their deal, their timing was excellent.
Just one day before the directive was sent out to the postal head offices, the German-German 
expert group on competition had its first meeting (see Chapter 3). It expressed “serious concerns” about
the planned mergers in the press distribution sector and underlined, it was crucial “that publishing and 
distribution should not rest in one pair of hands.”1441 The group referred to the attempts of the major 
publishers to buy out Grossisten that aimed at establishing themselves independent from the publishers.
The attempt to build a network of independent Grossisten was in the making, and market 
1438“wir moechten diese zustimmung … noch einmal voll inhaltlich bestaetigen. sie koennen davon ausgehen, dass wie 
[sic] kuenftig bei unseren kontakten mit den jeweiligen bezirksdirektionen der post der ddr von dieser regelung ausgehen
werden.” Telex, Lothar Scheuer, Heinrich Bauer Vertriebs KG, to Dietrich Germer, PZV, April 3, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3)
1439Internal Directive, Dietrich Germer, PZV, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin (West), FS an alle 
BDP, March 28, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1440Internal Directive, Dietrich Germer, PZV, Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen aus der BRD und Berlin (West), FS an alle 
BDP, March 28, 1990, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1441“ernsthafte Bedenken … daß Verlagswesen und Vertrieb nicht in einer Hand liegen.” Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der 
1. Beratung der deutsch-deutschen Arbeitsgruppe Wettbewerb am 27.3.1990, Ministerium der Finanzen und Preise, Abt.
Grundsätze des Preis- und Wettbewerbsrechts, Berlin April 4, 1990, p. 3, BArch DE10/67. 
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monopolizations needed to be avoided. The expert group, thus, proposed, “to make use of the option, 
open to the state ownership,” to choose partners carefully “when selling [enterprises], or with attempted
joint ventures, to prevent the emergence of anti-competitive structures.”1442 Planned joint ventures and 
cooperations in press distribution should “develop in a possibly competitive manner,” which made 
necessary a “focused course of action of competition authorities on both sides;” they needed to deal 
with current competitive issues and develop alternative concepts.1443 The overall goal needed to be a 
broad range of distributors.
Analysis
Soon to be Media Minister Gottfried Müller later referred to the Federal Cartel Office as the 
“spearhead in the engagement of Bonn for a regulative clean solution in distribution.”1444 In charge of 
concrete measures to limit possible monopolies of publishers, the office, Müller claimed, was always 
welcomed at the MfM. Müller's account indicates the impotence of domestic institutions in the search 
for any legal means to set regulatory limits to the dealings of the major publishers in the GDR. After 
all, the Cartel Office was not per se concerned with matters of a free press but with its economic 
underpinnings. This left out various aspects of a transitioning press in a country over which it had no 
jurisdiction. Still, with its focus on economic concentration processes, the office became the core 
federal institution in setting some guidelines with regard to a distribution system that had single-
handedly been built by market domineering West German publishers, not the least because no other 
federal ministry was willing to provide more than lip service. The BMI, in spite of its repeated 
emphasis on the importance of a free, diverse press in the GDR, committed to little more than that, lip 
service. It claimed to have no jurisdiction in any press matters and/or individual actions of publishers 
while simultaneously encouraging the latter to enter the GDR and distribute their products. With regard
to press distribution it made clear that because publishers were not breaking federal law, the ministry 
was in no position to make any adjustments or encourage the publishers to act differently. Instead, the 
BMI repeatedly invited the major publishers to present their adjusted concepts for distribution and 
1442Full quote: “die Moglichkeit auszunutzen, die der Staat als Eigentümer hat, um beim Verkauf bzw. beabsichtigten 
Unternehmenszusammschlüssen das Entstehen wettbewerbsbeeinträchtigender Strukturen zu verhindern” Protocol, 
Ergebnisprotokoll der 1. Beratung der deutsch-deutschen Arbeitsgruppe Wettbewerb am 27.3.1990, Ministerium der 
Finanzen und Preise, Abt. Grundsätze des Preis- und Wettbewerbsrechts, Berlin April 4, 1990, p. 3, BArch DE10/67. 
1443“sich in moglichst wettbewerbskonformer Weise entwickeln … konzentrietes Vorgehen der Wettbewerbsinstanzen 
beider Seiten.” Press release, Pressemitteilung, n.d. [March 28, 1990], BArch DE10/67. 
1444“Speerspitze im Bonner Engagement für eine ordnungspolitisch saubere Vertriebslosung in der DDR.” Gottfried 
Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), May 5, 1990, sent to author in January 
30, 2017.
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work out a solution with them. This duality of reasoning, pointing to the lack of jurisdiction while 
being deeply engaged in dealing with (and encouraging) a factual one-German market, defined the 
BMI's role during the transition.
The Cartel Office being the sole institution able to hold some sort of leeway against the Big 
Four distribution speaks to the sheer market power of the major publishers. Little stood in their way, 
and none of the various complaints of different institutions of the GDR received considerable notice. 
The Federal Cartel Office was appeased with a “tolerable” solution, partly because the BMI had put 
significant effort into bringing this deal about. This, however, did not change the fundamental issue, 
which was that the Big Four had divided East German distribution among themselves and had built 
their exclusive distribution network without any legal foundation and/or consent of the government of a
still sovereign country. To the BMI, this “solution” allowed for the import of West German print media
before the elections heavily influenced by West German political interests (see Chapter 3). The BMI's 
close ties with the top-management circles of the Big Four and the lobbying groups BDZV and VDZ 
would reappear when the ministry, in its role as a regulatory body, would facilitate their interests in 
matters of ownership (see Chapter 6). 
In the meantime, East German institutions aimed for their own last straw by shifting authority 
back to the Post giving it the right the distribute Western print media in the GDR. The sheer speed of 
this policy initiative was mind-blowing. The Post was determined to not let go of this business and as 
soon as it was in the position of negotiating with West German publishers again, it reinitiated contact 
with the Big Four. It managed to create its own deal with the very publishers it stood in competition 
with. The overall weight of Postal Distribution should not be overestimated, however. By April 12, its 
share in distributing West German print media in the GDR lay between five and ten percent.1445 What 
mattered though was, again, the non-transparency of the deal with the major publishers. The new 
“Principles” sent to its employees remained under the radar of the general public, as well as any of the 
East German newspapers and/or publishers. This seeded again distrust among publishers, not the least 
because also the Post soon was affected by the dumping price scheme of the publishers.
When in mid-March, the MKR made an inquiry to the Council of Ministers about the dealings 
of the MPF in matters of distribution, the MPF, responding a month later, emphasized only that it held 
no intention of taking advantages with regard to other distributors, for instance by any sort of price 
1445Letter, Minister MPF / gez. Niehof, Minister für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, to Martin Kramer, Vorsitzender 
des Medienkontrollrates Magdeburg der DDR, April 12, 1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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formation.1446 While the uniform sale and pricing of print media were important and should not be 
questioned, the Post underlined that it now saw itself exposed to market forces. With price dumping 
strategies of West German publishers at full speed and major publishers having lowered their prices 
way below the initial 1:3 ratio, the MPF minister made clear that these prices have been “fixed without 
our doing and outside of our responsibility,” which had “brought about an as-is situation we had to 
adjust to.”1447 
Meanwhile, the initiative to build a Grosso-system independent of publishers grew, but slowly, 
largely due to the unwillingness of the major publishers to cooperate. The Association for Supporting 
an Independent Press Distribution in the GDR, working in close cooperation with Presse-Grosso, 
regularly contacted East and West German ministries in search for support. Their main concern in 
building an independent distribution: to keep in check the obstructive strategies of the Big Four, 
without much success (see below). Instead, the Big Four continued to lobby for their own distribution 
concept. On April 4, the same day the VDZ hailed the “green light” given by the Federal Cartel Office 
for the “50-25-25” model, Fürstner, Leilich (Springer), Scheuer (Bauer) and Hiberts (Burda) spoke at 
the MKR. While the publishers had been invited at short notice only five days earlier, they were ready 
to present their new model: fifteen Grosso-enterprises were to guarantee “structural neutrality” and 
could start operation within the next two to three weeks.1448 It would, in fact, take until late June/July 
and the Act against Restraints of Competition (see Chapter 3) for the publishers to implement this 
model. Publishers of the GDR, on the other hand, remained dependent on Postal Distribution, which 
was to soon to face charges of preferential treatment of West German print media. 
The Media Ministry between Different Interests
Before Media Minister Gottfried Müller took over office on April 17, 1990, he studied media 
policy papers. Müller was not aware where these documents came from and what their history was. He 
later guessed, they might have been the work of West German consultants who had been put by his 
1446“Chancengleichheit und Vielfalt von Presseerzeugnissen.” Letter, Minister MPF / gez. Niehof, Minister für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen der DDR, to Martin Kramer, Vorsitzender des Medienkontrollrates Magdeburg der DDR, April 12, 
1990, p. 2, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1447“fixiert den bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt ohne unsere Mitwirkung und außerhalb unseres Verantwortungsbereiches ... 
tatsächlich entstandenen Zustand, dem wir uns anpassen mußten.” Letter, Minister MPF / gez. Niehof, Minister für Post-
und Fernmeldewesen der DDR, to Martin Kramer, Vorsitzender des Medienkontrollrates Magdeburg der DDR, April 12,
1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1448“strukturelle Neutralität.” Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 4.4.1990, Berlin, April 4, 
1990, p. 1, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30; also in Medienkontrollrat der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
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side.1449 His estimate, however, was clear (see Introduction), and so was his “solution for press 
distribution” issues, which 
should not be found in the cooperation between the government of the GDR and West 
German major publishing houses but, contrary to the Modrow government – not fearing 
the confrontation with the cartel – in the establishment of a press Grosso-system 
independent of publishers.1450 
The day after Müller took office, he received a copy of a letter written by Christian G. Christiansen, 
representative of the Association for Supporting an Independent Press Distribution in the GDR, written 
to Hübner of the BMI. Christiansen had contacted Hübner in response to his earlier communication 
with Ralf Bachmann (see above) and wrote that Hübner's reply “has disappointed me very much 
personally.”1451 Referring to a meeting that had taken place in Dusseldorf between the BMI, the 
association and the publisher of das blatt on March 28, the East German side had “gratefully accepted 
your encouragement to resolutely continue walking the path for a GDR Grosso[-system] that was 
independent of publishers and that allowed for fair competition, in spite of the rude tactics of the four 
West German publishers.”1452 Now, however, there was no mentioning  any such alternative. 
Underlining that the Cartel Office was by no means in favor of the current model, even though the 
VDZ would like to have it this way, Christiansen pointed to continuing attempts of the major 
publishers to buy out independent Grossisten. The tactic was simple, instead of supplying them with 
their publications, the publishers offered them service contracts. With such attempts being made, 
Christiansen argued, there was no intention on the side of publishers to supply Grossisten or to support 
the building of such independent system. Concluding that he now had little hope of receiving any 
support from the BMI, he hoped for the upcoming media law (see Chapter 3) and for regulatory 
provisions of the government of the GDR until then.1453 
1449Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), April 15, 1990, sent to 
author in January 30, 2017.
1450“Die Losung des Pressevertriebs sollte nicht in Zusammenarbeit von DDR-Regierung und westdeutschen 
Großverlagen erfolgen, sondern im Gegensatz zur Modrow-Regierung - die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Kartell nicht 
scheuend - durch Etablierung eines verlagsunabhängigen Pressegrosso-Systems.” Gottfried Müller, personal 
communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), April 15, 1990, sent to author on February 3, 2017.
1451“hat mich personlich sehr enttäuscht.”  Letter, Christian G. Christiansen, Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen 
Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR, to Merk und Hübner, Bundesministerium des Inneren, Berlin, April 18, 
1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1452“nahmen dankbar Ihre Ermunterung entgegen, den Weg für ein verlagsunabhängiges wettbewerbsneutrales Grosso in 
der DDR entschlossen weiterzugehen trotz rüden Vorgehensweisen der vier westdeutschen Verlage.” Letter, Christian 
G. Christiansen, Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR, to Merk und 
Hübner, Bundesministerium des Inneren, Berlin, April 18, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1453Note: As had happened in the area of Leipzig in April 11, when Leilich (from Springer and, according to the 
publishers's division, responsible for the area), refused the Grossist (Petry) any supply but offered a service contract 
instead. Letter, Christian G. Christiansen, Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen in
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That same day, the MKR had a meeting to develop “a positive strategy for the print media 
sector”1454 Participants were Werner Felgentrebe, head of the newly established Association of 
Newspaper Publishers in Thuringia (Verband der Thüringischen Zeitungsverleger) (see also Chapter 6),
representatives of the Association of Newspaper Publishers of Brandenburg (Verein der 
Zeitungsverleger des Landes Brandenburg) and of the Berlin Association of Newspaper and Magazine 
Publishers, as well as Gerd Holzel and Peter Pankau from the publisher Berliner Verlag. Discussing the
“increasingly [degenerating] situation” in the distribution situation of domestic publications, the MKR 
suggested two strategies: first, Media Minister “Dr. Müller … must be told very clearly that legal 
regulations, including a no-discrimination rule, for newspaper and magazine distribution independent 
of publishers must be established as quickly as possible.”1455 Second, it was to approach Müller and the 
MPF to present the increasing problems of East German publishers in distribution.
The day after the meeting, it was Gerd Kapp from Presse-Grosso who contacted Müller to make
his case. In an extensive four-page letter, Kapp outlined the Grossisten-system in the Federal Republic 
and underlined that such system, favored by all relevant institutions and political parties, would be 
favorable also for the GDR. He feared, however, “that mainly large corporations [would] gain a 
foothold in the GDR.”1456 And while the major publishers presented their distribution system in the 
GDR to be a legitimate model, compatible with federal structures just different in ownership, it 
effectively meant that publishers held majority shares on the distribution level.1457 Neither did such a 
system comply with ideas of a free press, nor with that of an independent distribution. Only a neutral 
system of distribution open to all lay in the interests of small and medium-sized West German 
publishers but especially of publishers of the GDR who needed to be able to distribute their 
publications without interference. This could be guaranteed only by keeping publishers out of 
distribution, in spite of claims of the major publishers “only they were able to build a press distribution 
der DDR, to Merk und Hübner, Bundesministerium des Inneren, Berlin, April 18, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1454“einer positiven Stategie im Printmedienbereich.” Protocol, Ergebebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 
18.4.1990, Berlin April, 24, 1990,  Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-
Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
1455“zugespitzte Situation … “Dr. Müller ... ist klar darauf zu orientieren, daß schnellstens rechtliche Regelungen für einen
verlagsunabhängigen Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenvertrieb unter Einschluß es Diskriminierungsverbots fixiert werden 
müssen.” Protocol, Ergebebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 18.4.1990, Berlin April, 24, 1990, p. 1,  
Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, 
File 1.
1456“daß in der DDR primär die Großkonzerne Fuß fassen.” Letter, Gerd Kapp, Presse-Grosso, to Gottfried Müller, 
Ministerium für Medien und Presse, Koln, April 29, 1990, p. 2,  Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
1457Letter, Gerd Kapp, Presse-Grosso, to Gottfried Müller, Ministerium für Medien und Presse, Koln, April 29, 1990, p. 3, 
Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, 
File 1.
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in the GDR because of their capital resources.”1458 The fact of the matter was, Kapp argued similar to 
Christiansen a day earlier, they were undermining the building of an independent system by boycotting 
supplies of their publications to independent Grossisten already at work. With those publications 
generating the majority of revenue, however, they were fundamental to make any Grosso-enterprise 
financially feasible (see Chapter 4). Though the association could not become active in the GDR 
directly, it urged the minister to use his powers in joint effort with other ministries to ensure a fair 
supply and distribution.
Currently, there are talks over the introduction of an anti-trust law. An Office of 
Competition Protection has been founded. Now, there is a chance to make legally 
binding also the Principles [for a Press Distribution System] of the Media Control 
Council of the GDR … Maybe even an ad hoc transitional provision, applicable for the 
press sector, can be established until a final statutory provision comes into place.1459 
Not only did Presso Grosso offer its material and technical support to citizens of the GDR willing to 
work as Grossisten, but it also saw the possibility “to finance a press distribution system in the GDR 
[on its own].”1460 It asked the minister for follow-up talks to discuss the details and come to fast results.
 Already a week before Kapp sent off his letter, a meeting had taken place in the Media 
Ministry; similar to Kapp's suggestion of a transitional provision order, it focused on the idea of an 
emergency distribution order (Notvertriebsordnung). After the meeting, however, Müller noted in his 
diary: “impressive how powerless one is. You have to start with the small ones [enterprises etc.], those 
you can get. The big ones, however, are simply out of reach.”1461 Müller, only two days after having 
taken over office, backpedaled from his initially daring tone. He faced the impossibility of taking 
regulative measures on a system that had already been built by financially strong publishing houses 
over whom he had no jurisdiction. With its own few financial resources, Müller noted in retrospect, the 
1458“nur sie seien aufgrund ihrer vorhandenen Kapitalkraft in der Lage, den Pressevertrieb in der DDR aufzubauen.” 
Letter, Gerd Kapp, Presse-Grosso, to Gottfried Müller, Ministerium für Medien und Presse, Koln, April 29, 1990, p. 3,  
Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, 
File 1.
1459“In der DDR wird zur Stunde über die Einführung eines Kartellgesetzes beraten. Ein Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz 
wurde gegründet. Jetzt besteht die Chance, die vom DDR-Medienkontrollrat formulierten Grundsätze auch rechtlich zu 
verankern … Vielleicht läßt sich sogar ein ad hoc anwendbares Übergangsrecht für den Pressebereich schaffen bis zur 
endgültigen gesetzlichen Fixierung.” Letter, Gerd Kapp, Presse-Grosso, to Gottfried Müller, Ministerium für Medien 
und Presse, Koln, April 29, 1990, Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
1460“ein DDR-Pressevertriebssystem allein zu finanzieren.” Letter, Gerd Kapp, Presse-Grosso, to Gottfried Müller, 
Ministerium für Medien und Presse, Koln, April 29, 1990, p. 3, Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
1461“Beeindruckend, wie machtlos man ist. Man muß bei den Kleinen anfangen. Die sind erreichbar, an die Großen kommt
man nicht heran.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), April 19, 1990, sent to author on January 12, 
2017.
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ministry “could ... not take political action, for instance, by supporting the development of small, 
independent Grossisten by means of material support.”1462 When a resolution on press distribution 
(Pressevertriebsordnung) did come out, it likewise was captured in the limbo of political imperatives, 
economic interests and a weak state (see below).
In the meantime, the MPF had aimed to adjust Postal Distribution to new demands and market 
structures. While the MKR, in its meeting on April 18, had brought up the question how the Post could 
reform distribution in ways “that do not damage the domestic press” and had suggested handing over 
subscription lists (still in the possession of the Post) to publishers or giving pre-emptive rights to 
Grossisten to buy postal kiosks, MPF plans took different paths.1463 In its “Theses on the Development 
of Postal Distribution,” the MPF suggested substantial reforms and made clear that subscription and 
retail sale were now legally, practically and structurally separate matters. Subscriptions were now a 
matter of service (Dienstleistung) rather than of trade (Handelsleistung) for publishers. This meant 
more flexibility for the needs and demands of publishers, and a more stringent and timely delivery to 
the subscribers. Retail sale, on the other hand, was soon to be organized by fifteen to twenty postal 
Grosso-enterprises via the Press Distribution Office (ZVA). Facilities for distribution were to be those 
of the Post, and sales were to happen exclusively in postal retail locations (kiosks etc.) whose opening 
times needed to be extended significantly.1464 These reform efforts required total funds of about 45 
million DM (around 13 million for establishing postal Grosso-enterprises, and 32 million for 
modernizing the sales locations of the Post).1465 Now, the Post also joined the circle of interest groups 
that aimed for their own Grosso-network while simultaneously lagging behind future visions of 
improved services.
Protests of East German Papers
Meanwhile, various East German publishers and newspapers expressed their fierce criticism 
regarding the practices of West German major publishers and the shortcomings of Postal Distribution. 
1462“konnte daher nicht politisch gestaltend tätig werden, indem es etwa das Entstehen von kleineren unabhängigen 
Grossofirmen materiell forderte.” Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 
1990), sent to author on January 30, 2017.
1463“dass nicht die eigene Presse geschädigt wird.” Protocol, Ergebebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 
18.4.1990, Berlin April, 24, 1990, p. 2,  Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-
Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
1464Document, “Thesen zur Entwicklung des Postzeitungsvetriebs,” Ministerium für Post- und Telekommunikation, 
Berlin, April 27, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
1465Document, “Thesen zur Entwicklung des Postzeitungsvetriebs,” Finanzbedarf zur Sicherung der Entwicklung des 
Postzeitungsvertriebs, Ministerium für Post- und Telekommunikation, Berlin, April 27, 1990, private archive Hans-
Jürgen Niehof. 
299
They, thereby, put into practice what the MKR in its meeting on a “positive strategy for the print media
sector” on April 18, had called for. Addressing “all those present representatives of publishers [of the 
GDR],” the MKR had urged “to generate aggressive pressure regarding this issue [of distribution] by 
means of their own publications;” and they did.1466 
The Association of Newspaper and Magazine Publishers of the GDR (VZZD) circulated an 
emergency appeal to publishers across the GDR and Europe. It stressed that the “blatant failures of 
Postal Distribution, the incapability of the management, and the disinterest” of the MPF had 
maneuvered publishers of the GDR into a “dangerous crisis.”1467 Parallel efforts of the major publishers
to build their own distribution network, “with careless methods and little regard for existing laws,” 
their refusal to supply local Grossisten as part of a “brutal local predatory competition,” not only 
seriously endangered papers but were proof for a colonization of the GDR.1468   Not able to rely on 
Postal Distribution and/or private distributors, publishers of the GDR needed to build their own, 
independent and open to all distribution network. This, according to the association, was the only way 
to keep papers in the GDR alive; an emergency fund needed to be created, a trust agency was to be in 
charge, first steps had already been taken.1469 Also the VZZD now aimed for its own version of a 
Grosso-system in response to two systems in place that both failed to provide services benefiting its 
publishers.
With the Big Four system being for West German print media only, East German newspapers 
still relied on Postal Distribution. In spite of high fees (at times more than 50 percent of the 
newspaperʼs sales price), several newspapers and magazines reported delayed or canceled deliveries to 
newsstands and/or subscribers, or the delivery of papers with cancelation forms attached to them. 
Newspapers published complaints of subscribers, urged postal workers and readers to report issues, and
took a stand on their own grounds:
1466Full quote: “appelliert der MKR an die anwesenden Verlagsvertreter, in ihren Periodika diesbezüglich Offensivdruck 
zu entfalten.” Protocol, Ergebebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 18.4.1990, Berlin April, 24, 1990, p. 2, 
Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, 
File 1.
1467“eklatante Versagen des Postzeitungsvertriebs, die Unfähigkeit der Leitung, und das Desinteresse … bedrohliche 
Krise.” Open letter, Verband der Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR, April 22, 1990, Medienkontrollrat der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
1468“mit hemdsärmeligen Methoden und unter weitgehender Mißachtung geltender Gesetze … brutalen 
Verdrängungswettbewerb vor Ort.” Open letter, Verband der Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR, April 22, 
1990, Medienkontrollrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
Box 1-4, File 1.
1469Open letter, Verband der Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR, April 22, 1990, Medienkontrollrat der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ID-Archiv-Sammlungen, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, Box 1-4, File 1.
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The Andere Zeitung, for instance, received “outraged letters to the editor” on a daily basis.1470  
Reports of delayed deliveries (at newsstands by three to four days), which for any newspaper meant “a 
deadly [kind of] 'currency,'” the paper claimed that the effects of the new postal distribution system 
could be felt at a “breathtaking” speed; for readers and makers likewise, they had reached an 
unbearable level.1471 Since its market entry in late January, the paper had experienced consistent 
problems with distribution. What had started as occasional “irregularities,” soon became the norm and 
was now threatening the paperʼs existence. It asked why the news stand next door seemed to have no 
problem at all offering the (West German) dailies FAZ or SZ while Die Andere had to make several 
detours to make it to retail locations. The paper concluded “this connection is neither coincidental nor 
inevitable, but it is a clear result of the entry of the Post into the market economy: new contracts 
without adequate capacities.”1472 
The Bauern Echo took the lead role in reporting deliveries that were not even opened at postal 
kiosks only to leave more space for West German publications, or of subscribers receiving “fabricated 
cancelation forms by postal employees to unsubscribe – as happened to readers of our paper.”1473 This 
practice, the paper protested, was “damaging for business,” particularly for smaller publications that 
had been founded “after the revolutionary Fall of 89.”1474 Bauern Echo readers, on their part, objected 
to unfair practices of the Post. Entire villages had been removed from subscription lists and could not 
receive the paper. Bauern Echo turned to the MKR, hoping it would step in to end this practice of the 
Post unilaterally canceling subscriptions.1475 The Bauern Echo had on its side also Media Minister 
Müller who emphasized that whoever exercised this current “practice of cancelation” was indictable, 
only that it was not clear who was responsible for it.1476  
The newly founded culture and political magazine Sondeur, the Berliner Allgemeine wrote, was 
1470“emporte Leserbriefe.” Das Mass ist Voll! Zum „Vertrieb“ unserer Zeitung durch die Deutsche Post, Die Andere 
Zeitung, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07731.
1471“todliche „Aktualität“ ...atemberaubend.” Das Mass ist Voll! Zum „Vertrieb“ unserer Zeitung durch die Deutsche Post,
Die Andere Zeitung, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07731.
1472 „Dieser Zusammenhang ist weder zufällig noch unvermeidlich, sondern ein offenbares Resultat des Post-Einstiegs in 
die Marktwirtschaft: neue Verträge ohne entsprechende Kapazitäten.” Das Mass ist Voll! Zum „Vertrieb“ unserer 
Zeitung durch die Deutsche Post, Die Andere Zeitung, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07731.
1473“von Postzustellern fingierte Abbestellscheine – so auch geschehen bei Lesern unserer Zeitung,” Endlich Ordnung bei 
dem Presse-Wildwuchs, Vera Krause, Bauern Echo, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07779. 
1474“geschäftsschädigend … nach dem Revolutionsherbst '89.” Endlich Ordnung bei dem Presse-Wildwuchs, Vera Krause,
Bauern Echo, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07779. 
1475BE-Leser weiter von der Post bevormundet?, Bauern Echo, No. 112, 5/15/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07735. Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, DDR-Presse: Schlacht verloren, Rückzugsgefechte eingeleitet, 
Thomas Kunze, press release, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07775.
1476“Abbestellungspraxis.” Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, DDR-Presse: Schlacht verloren, Rückzugsgefechte 
eingeleitet, Thomas Kunze, press release, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07775.
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another example of the “much, and deservedly so criticized [postal] monopoly distributor for [press] 
products of the GDR.”1477 In spite of the magazineʼs excellent quality and publishing diligence, Postal 
Distribution posed a serious threat to its success. The magazine was not available in and around 
Dresden, “elsewhere it is usually placed hidden behind your usual high-gloss [West German] 
publications.”1478 The Märkische Volksstimme even titled an article “Post versus media of the GDR” to 
emphasize whom East German publishers were really fighting against.1479 The Volksstimme and other 
papers reported that the Post, without warning, did not deliver agreed upon amounts of copies or that 
publications were not available at newsstands.1480 The paperʼs chief editor protested against these 
“dirigistic interventions of the Post” and in a radio interview stated, it could be assumed that with the 
cutback of publications, space was being created to expand the lucrative sale of West German print 
media.1481 Others speculated, however, that the reason for the Post canceling or lowering the 
distribution of publications lay in the fact that it still did not have any legal right to return unsold copies
(Remissionsrecht). The Post, thus, carried the entire sales risk.1482 Others suspected that Postal 
Distribution was simply not able to handle increased transshipments, which forced several local 
newspapers to build their own distribution networks.1483 
Readers, on the other hand, had their own take on what was happening to their papers. As one 
pastor, who had experienced problems with her subscriptions to the church weekly Die Kirche and to 
Neues Deutschland, argued that “certain East German media are being obstructed in their 
distribution.”1484 Sharing the concern of other readers, she suspected, “there apparently is a system 
behind these impediments,” only to conclude, “I will fight back against all attempts to limit press 
freedom by new means and for new reasons.”1485 The paper Die Kirche eventually stood in extensive 
1477“von vielen Seiten und zu Recht gescholtene Monopol-Vertriebsgesellschaft für DDR-Erzeugnisse.” Konkurrenz für 
'Weltbühne,' Gerd Dehnel, Berliner Allgemeine, 5/9/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07821.
1478“anderswo liegt er üblicherweise versteckt hinter den einschlägigen Hochglanz-Blättern.” Konkurrenz für 'Weltbühne,' 
Gerd Dehnel, Berliner Allgemeine, 5/9/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07821.
1479Post kontra DDR-Medien, Märkische Volksstimme, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07742. 
1480Post kontra DDR-Medien, Märkische Volksstimme, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07742. 
1481“dieses dirigistische Vorgehen der DDR-Post.” Post kontra DDR-Medien, Märkische Volksstimme, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07742. 
1482Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, DDR-Presse: Schlacht verloren, Rückzugsgefechte eingeleitet, Thomas 
Kunze, press release, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07775.
1483In dpa, Neuorganisation der DDR-Verlage bringt viele Arbeitsplätze, Dietmer von Ladiges, press release, 6/20/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 35e, DSC08190. 
1484Full quote: “daß bestimmte DDR-Medien in der Verbeitung behindert werden sollen. Ich teile diese Vermutung, da die 
Behinderung offenbar System hat. Ich werde mich an meinem Ort gegen alle Einschränkungen der Pressefreiheit mit 
neuen Mitteln und aus neuen Beweggründen wehren.” Letter to the editor, Redaktion Die Kirche, July 12, 1990, BArch 
DM3/21137.
1485Full quote, see above (fn 1483). Letter to the editor, Redaktion Die Kirche, July 12, 1990, BArch DM3/21137.
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communication with the MPF over its various distribution problems that, similar to readersʼ 
complaints, varied widely.1486 All added to growing pressures onto the still new government.
The Resolution on Press Distribution 
The Media Ministry finally acted. A Resolution on Press Distribution (Pressevertriebsordnung), 
drafted by West German advisors, was handed to the Council of Ministers and passed on May 2. A day 
later, Müller flew to Bonn to talk over distribution issues at the BMI. Just after landing, however, he 
was greeted at the airport by Wolfgang Fürstner (VDZ), by representatives of the BDZV, and by 
minister Hans “Johnny” Klein, government spokesperson and head of the Press and Information Office 
of the Federal Government.1487 Aiming to lobby for the publishersʼ distribution model (VDZ and 
BDZV) and to negotiate a clear policy timeline (Klein), they took Müller and his small delegation to 
the airportʼs VIP lounge. 
During Müller's conversation with Fürstner, the VDZ representative pushed two points: first, he 
emphasized that publishers were to retreat from distribution as soon as there was a viable system of 
independent Grossisten in place. Second, the real and most consistent problem was, in fact, “the old 
elites from the SED,” correspondingly not West German interests.1488 Their plans served the bigger goal
of supplying the population of the GDR with print media. Thus, only a few days later, Rolf Wickman 
(G+J) laid out the plans for the continuously growing distribution to the MfM. After all, Wickman 
underlined, it was clear to everyone that this was just a temporary solution and an independent Grosso-
system was in the making.1489 For now, however, with the territory of the GDR being divided into four 
parts, the publishers had “gathered several hundreds of their sales representatives from all over the 
Federal Republic and, in prior consultation, sent them into the different regions of the GDR.”1490 The 
system was to be expanded and so were the lists of distributed publications. When Müller pointed to 
boycotts by the publishers of independent Grossisten, Wickman responded that “the distribution 
business is a matter of trust and involves money” and needed serious partners only, not “big words.”1491
1486Communication, MPF and Die Kirche, September 3 until September 21, 1990, BArch DM3/21137.
1487Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 3, 1990, sent to author on January 12, 2017.
1488“die alten Kader von der SED.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 3, 1990, sent to author on 
January 12, 2017.
1489Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, p. 1, private archive Ralf Bachmann 
(file was handed to author).  
1490“einige Hundert ihrer Außenmitarbeiter aus der ganzen Bundesrepublik abgezogen und nach vorheriger Absprache in 
die verschiedenen Gebiete der DDR schickten.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 
1990, p. 1, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
1491Full quote: “Das Vertriebsgeschäft ist eine Vertrauenssache und habe mit Geld zu tun. Deshalb konne man dafür nur 
seriose Partner gebrauchen … großen Worten.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 
1990, p. 3, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
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The pretense of being organized in some sort of association, be it Grosso or publishers, according to 
Wickman, was not trustworthy enough.  
After the meeting with Fürstner, Müller remained in Bonn and on May 5, officially met with 
chancellor Kohl and the BDZV (see Chapter 3). And while Kohl spoke out against the domination of 
major publishers in distribution but left concrete solutions in the open, the BDZV, at a work brunch at 
the hotel Maritim, argued against the resolution. Müller later noted that the “association and the 
publishersʼ cartel appeared in unity,” and the BDZV, first and foremost, lobbied for the interests of the 
Big Four.1492 The atmosphere of the talks, though in a rather luxurious setting, was, therefore, 
“tense.”1493 Any intervention, the BDZV made clear, would make everything that had been built with 
considerable effort by the major publishers illegal. This would only create insecurities and chaos. 
Müller took a different approach. Elsewhere he underlined that his ministry wanted “the basic right of 
press freedom to also crystallize in distribution … Also publications with low circulation numbers or 
publications of less well-known publishers must get their chance on the media market.”1494 “It cannot 
be,” Müller added, “that a publisher does business in the GDR but that the respective tax money does 
not find its way into the coffers of the GDR.”1495 Thus, regardless of the attempts of direct influence, 
the MfM made the resolution public on May 8, two months after the major publishers had commenced 
operations.
The resolution stipulated that “companies whose business activities, in whole or in part, lie in 
the publishing of newspapers and magazines cannot directly or indirectly be involved in the distribution
of newspapers and magazines or invest in enterprises engaged in such distribution.”1496  It, thus, as had 
been feared by the BDZV, made press distribution by the major publishers illegal. It further introduced 
1492“Verband und Verlagskartell erschienen als Einheit.” Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on 
minister diary (April-May 1990), May 5, 1990, sent to author in January 30, 2017.
1493“Angespannt.” Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), May 5, 
1990, sent to author in January 30, 2017; als Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 5, 1990, sent to 
author on January 12, 2017.
1494Full quote: “Wir mochten, daß das Grundrecht der Pressefreiheit sich auch im Vertrieb konkretisiert. … Es müssen 
auch kleinere Publikationen oder Publikationen von weniger bekannten Verlagen ihre Chance auf dem Medienmarkt 
haben. Es kann jedoch nicht sein, daß ein Verlag im Bereich der DDR das Geschäft macht, aber die Abgaben dafür nicht
in die DDR-Kasse fliessen.” Cited in Für fairen Wettbewerb aller Medien, Regierungspressedienst, 14/90, 5/7/90, p. 5, 
BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
1495For quote, see above (fn 1493). Cited in Für fairen Wettbewerb aller Medien, Regierungspressedienst, 14/90, 5/7/90, p.
5, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
1496“Unternehmen, deren Geschäftstätigkeit ganz oder teilweise im Verlag von Zeitungen und Zeitschriften besteht, dürfen
sich weder unmittelbar oder mittelbar im Großhandel mit Zeitungen und Zeitschriften betätigen oder sich an 
Unternehmen, die einen solchen Großhandel betreiben, beteiligen.” Section 3(1) of the Resolution. Cited in Die Post und
private Grosso-Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am Lesermarkt bieten, Handelsblatt, p. 8, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07777.
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a distribution concept that consisted of independent Grossisten competing with Postal Distribution, and
West German companies could not hold private Grosso-shares exceeding a 50 percent margin. 
Grossisten had to register their business with the commencement of distribution activities at the MfM. 
For the itinerant sale, it needed an itinerant trade card (Reisegewerbekarte) that was available at the 
MfM only.1497 In this way, as was later reported by several newspapers, the resolution aimed to 
“establish transparency of the market”1498 and to “ensure equal opportunities insofar this was still 
possible”1499 by creating competitive conditions that were “somewhat even” for all publishers.1500 
When the representatives of the Big Four, namely Wickmann (G+J), Peter Heidenreich (Bauer),
Horst Keiser (Springer) and Hilbertz (Burda), and VDZ's Wolfgang Fürstner learned of the details of 
the resolution during a meeting at the MfM that same day, they expressed their anger openly. Müller 
noted, to them the resolution was a “slap in the face,” and they threatened to stop investments (see 
Introduction).1501 “All four publishers complained,” Bachmann noted, that “they were not even be 
mentioned in ... the resolution, which made their current activities appear illegal.”1502 This was the 
publishers' greatest concern, and they found individual arguments against any such document. 
According to Heidenreich, such a far reaching systemic decision “must not be made by means of a 
resolution, especially since it refers to the media resolution of February 5 of a not democratically 
legitimized People's Chamber.”1503 Instead, Heidenreich underlined, it required a law. Keiser spoke of a
“massive infringement of press freedom” and underlined that as one of Europe's leading publishing 
1497Die Post und private Grosso-Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am Lesermarkt bieten, Handelsblatt, p.8, 5/10/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07777. Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, DDR/Medienminister, 
Medienminister: Vertriebsverordung für Presseerzeugnisse soll Chancengleichheit sichern, press release, 5/11/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07742. Zeitungsvertrieb nur durch DDR-Unternehmen, BZ, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b.
1498“Tranzparenz in einen Markt zu bringen.” Die Post und private Grosso-Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am 
Lesermarkt bieten, Handelsblatt, p. 8, May 5, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07777. Also press release, 
DDR-Presse: Schlacht verloren, Rückzugsgefechte eingeleitet, Thomas Kunze, Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Nachrichtendienst, May 11, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07775.
1499“Chancengleichheit sichern, soweit dies gegenwärtig noch moglich sei.” Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, 
DDR/Medienminister, Medienminister: Vertriebsverordung für Presseerzeugnisse soll Chancengleichheit sichern, press 
release, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07742. Also Zeitungsvertrieb nur durch DDR-Unternehmen, 
BZ, 5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b.
1500“einigermaßen ausgeglichene.” Gewonnene Pressefreiheit darf nicht eingegrenzt werden, Neue Zeit, May 11, 1990, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07781. 
1501“die Folgen des Eindringens in die Grauzone DDR.” “Ohrfeige …  Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), 
May 8, 1990, sent to author on January 12, 2017.
1502“Alle vier Verlage beklagten sich darüber, im Par. 1 der Verordnung überhaupt nicht erwähnt zu werden, wodurch ihre 
gegenwärtige Tätigkeit den Anschein der Illegalität erhalte.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-
Verlagen, May 8, 1990, p. 3, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
1503“dürfe nicht als Verordnung getroffen werden, die sich noch dazu auf dem Medienbeschluss der nicht demokratisch 
legitimierte Volkskammer vom 5.2. beziehe, sondern nur durch ein Gesetz.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch
mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, p. 3, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
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houses, Springer “could not put up with being suspected of illegal activities.”1504 Yes, the publishers 
had divided the GDR into four parts, but this “division” only related to an allocation of routes that were
easiest to reach and be operated by one publisher. They had further urged their partners to pay taxes, 
and they were willing to make significant investments.1505 Burda alone calculated costs of around 4.5 
million DM annually and 10 million DM of direct investments for its region of Thuringia with a 
population of 1.8 million people.1506 If the resolution remained in place, however, they might not invest 
anymore into the GDR. Once the representatives realized that the resolution had already been passed, 
Bachmann noted, they changed their minds.1507 
Part of their mind-change likely related to the resolution itself. In spite of initially strong 
reactions, in reality, neither the resolution nor its consequences were quite as severe. The reason was an
exception clause: While Section 3(1) prohibited any direct or indirect involvement of publishers in 
distribution, Section 3(2) stated that publishers, for now, may act as distributors in regions “where a 
universal supply cannot be guaranteed otherwise.”1508 According to most critics (see below), this was a 
contradiction in itself, making the resolution useless, for it allowed publishers to continue with their 
business. The question was, how one defined “universal supply” and at what point it was “guaranteed.”
To Müller, however, the resolution resembled a “balancing act between allowing for a Grosso-
system independent of publishers … and the impossibility of counteracting the plans of the four major 
publishers with a strict ban.”1509 It was, thus, not as much a contradiction as the “difference between the
objective, we at least wanted to sketch, and the, by now, factually existing conditions that must not 
become normative.”1510 During the meeting, Müller explained to the publishers, it, in fact, made legal 
1504“massiven Eingriff in die Pressefreiheit … konne sich nicht gefallen lassen, in den Verdacht der ungesetzlichen 
Handlungen zu kommen.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, pp. 3-4, private
archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
1505Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, p. 3, private archive Ralf Bachmann 
(file was handed to author).  
1506Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, p. 3, private archive Ralf Bachmann 
(file was handed to author).  
1507Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, pp. 3-4, private archive Ralf Bachmann 
(file was handed to author).  
1508“wo auf anderen Wegen eine flächendeckende Versorgung nicht erreicht werden kann.” Die Post und private Grosso-
Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am Lesermarkt bieten, Handelsblatt, p.8, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07777.
1509Full quote: “Spagat zwischen der Ermoglichung eines verlagsunabhängigen Pressegrossos (in § 1 VO „die Kleinen“) 
und der Unmoglichkeit, den Absichten der vier Großverlage mit einem strikten Verbot (= § 3.1) entgegenzutreten (= § 
3.2 Ausnahmeregelung).” Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), 
April 19, 1990, sent to author in January 30, 2017.
1510 “Unterschied zwischen der Zielvorstellung, die wir wenigstens markieren wollten und dem inzwischen eingetretenen 
faktischen, das nicht normativ werden darf.” Kann die Verordnung über den Pressevertrieb noch greifen?, Berliner 
Allgemeine, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07781. 
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the current condition.1511 Still, to the publishers, 200 million DM of investment was not justifiable, if 
the resolution made clear that the in the future, distribution was to work without publishers only. “In 
practice this means, they first should pay, and once everything is set up, they are being chased 
away.”1512 Müller, in turn, responded that whether or not the publishers wanted to make further 
investments was up to them but that distribution in the GDR “was to remain a safe and good business 
for them.”1513 Along with an ambivalent resolution, Müller's inconsequential reasoning did not help to 
set clear guidelines. The next meeting was set for May 15.
In parting, Wickmann asked the minister to emphasize at the upcoming press conference that 
the resolution was not just directed against the major publishers and suggested a concrete phrasing of 
the matter. Fürstner explained to Müller that worries among the publishers of impressions of illegality 
were great.1514 Wanting to be on the safe side, the VDZ issued its own press release the next day. 
Emphasizing the close agreement between the MfM and the four major publishing houses, it focused 
on the exception clause and underlined “the minister has declared” that the publishers' distribution 
“was approved for the purpose of a transitional arrangement.”1515 
The next day, on May 10, Müller faced about seventy people at a press conference. It was the 
day the resolution was to become effective, and the “atmosphere was heated.”1516 Müller, inexperienced
in giving press conferences, underlined that the GDR was experiencing an “overheated transition 
period” in the sale of West German print media.1517 While there were many pressing issues, the 
Resolution on Press Distribution was to organize press distribution and counteract current dynamics 
that might endanger the just won press freedom.1518 Outlining the resolution, he emphasized, “[i]t is not 
1511Full quote: “dass der bisherige Zustand durch Ausnahmegenehmigungen legalisiert würde.” Internal note, Aktennotiz 
über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, p. 4, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
1512“Das hieße praktisch, sie sollten zuerst zahlen und dann, wenn alles fertig ist, würden sie fortgejagt.” Internal note, 
Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 8, 1990, pp. 3-4, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was 
handed to author).  
1513“für sie ein sicheres und gutes Geschäft bleibe.” Internal note, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit BRD-Verlagen, May 
8, 1990, p. 4, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
1514Quote: “die verlagsauslieferung durch die vier … verlage sei rechtswidrig.” Telex, wolfgang fuerstner to Müller, 
medienminister der ddr, May 9, 1990, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
1515“der minister hat erklaert … im sinne einer uebergangsregelung genehmigt sei.” Telex, wolfgang fuerstner to Müller, 
medienminister der ddr, May 9, 1990, private archive Ralf Bachmann (file was handed to author).  
1516“es brannte die Luft.” Endlich Ordnung bei dem Presse-Wildwuchs, Vera Krause, Bauern Echo, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07779; Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 10, 1990, sent to author 
on January 12, 2017.
1517“überhitzte Übergangsphase.” Gewonnene Pressefreiheit darf nicht eingegrenzt werden, Neue Zeit, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07781. 
1518Die Post und private Grosso-Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am Lesermarkt bieten, Handelsblatt, p.8, 5/10/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07777. Also Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, DDR-Presse: Schlacht 
verloren, Rückzugsgefechte eingeleitet, Thomas Kunze, press release, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07775; or Gewonnene Pressefreiheit darf nicht eingegrenzt werden, Neue Zeit, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
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our intention to decrease or regulate the sale of West German publications,” but the smaller and newly 
founded papers that had helped to establish a free press in the GDR needed some sort of protection.1519 
Because of Müller's aim to make it right for everyone, the conference generally remained below 
everyone's expectations . 
Later, Müller noted in his diary, he had interpreted the resolution in a “comparatively 
defensive” way to not aggravate the Big Four, disappointing the expectations of the East German media
representatives.1520 The latter would have preferred a limitation of imports by maintaining a 1:3 price 
ratio. “They are expecting too much of the state  – the little it can do is then being overlooked … 
Lesson learned: even weak accomplishment need to be sold strong!”1521 To Müller, already the 
existence of the resolution, regardless of its limitations, was a success, for it opened possibilities for 
independent Grossisten.1522 State Secretary Manfred Becker, therefore, called the resolution a “genuine 
attempt to cut down currently uncontrolled growth on the press market in our country.”1523 
East and West German interest groups took different views on the matter: While to the Bauern 
Echo the purpose of the regulation was to “not just preach an obtained press freedom but to practice it 
on a permanent basis,” to others, such as Berliner Allgemeine, it was doubtful that the resolution would 
make any difference at all.1524 The Berliner Zeitung emphasized that the exception clause “factually 
allowed the four big publishers to hold on to their current practices with only few alterations for an 
undetermined transitional period. Here, the government has little leeway to correct  conditions on the 
ground that have been created by market giants.”1525 Werner Hippe, president of the VDZ, on the other 
File 35a-b, DSC07781. 
1519“Wir haben nicht die Absicht, den Vertrieb westlicher Erzeugnisse zu drosseln oder zu reglementieren.” DDR schränkt
Freiheit der Presse wieder ein, Dieter Dose, Die Welt, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07778.
1520 “verhältnismäßig defensiv.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 10, 1990, sent to author on 
January 12, 2017.
1521“Sie erwarten zuviel vom Staat – das wenige, was er vermag, wird darüber übersehen. … Lehre: auch schwache 
Leistungen offensiver verkaufen!” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 10, 1990, sent to author on 
January 12, 2017.
1522Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), May 10, 1990, sent to 
author in January 30, 2017.
1523“ernstgemeinten Versuch, den gegenwärtigen Wildwuchs auf dem Zeitungsmarkt unseres Landes zurückzuschneiden.” 
Kann die Verordnung über den Pressevertrieb noch greifen?, Berliner Allgemeine, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 
35a-b, DSC07781. 
1524“die erstrittenen Pressefreiheit nicht nur zu predigen, sondern sie auch ständig zu praktizieren.” Endlich Ordnung bei 
dem Presse-Wildwuchs, Vera Krause, Bauern Echo, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07779. Kann die 
Verordnung über den Pressevertrieb noch greifen?, Berliner Allgemeine, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07781. 
1525“den vier großen Verlagen faktisch ermoglicht für eine nicht näher bestimmte Übergangszeit an ihren gegenwärtigen 
Praktiken mit nur wenigen Abstrichen festzuhalten. Auch hier also fehlt der Regierung die Moglichkeit, die von den 
Marktgiganten geschaffenen Tatsachen zu korrigieren.” Neue Vertriebsverordnung wirkt auch keine Wunder, K. 
Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07780. 
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hand, criticized the resolution as “downright alarming;” it gave the media minister the power to stop 
the sale of individual publications, which gave him “the de facto right for censorship.”1526 Also the FDP
media committee, working on principles for a media order in a future united Germany, was not in 
favor. It declared that the resolution stood in the way of the eventual takeover of federal framework 
legislation for the press in the East, for it was not compatible. This meant that “the prohibition of 
production or distribution of print media can only be issued by judicial ruling in case of a breach of 
general laws by a clearly defined crime.”1527 Arguing that press freedom stretched from production to 
distribution, the FDP emphasized merger control to counteract press concentration in production and 
distribution.1528 Springerʼs Die Welt agreed. Claiming that the “GDR limits again the freedom of the 
press,” it argued that the new resolution not only limited the sale of West German papers but that “in 
any other democratic country, this resolution [would] be inconceivable.”1529 
The particular bone of contention wwas the potential fines for an unregulated distribution. Die 
Welt predicted that the needed registration for itinerant or street sales (a sales channel particularly for 
Springerʼs Bild) will result in a break down of the system because receiving the necessary trade card 
might take weeks or months. In accordance with the arguments raised by the major publishers during 
the meeting on May 8, the paper stated that the resolution, based on the media resolution of February 5 
of a “not freely elected parliament” and the MKR, only prohibited the distribution of West German 
print media.1530 Suspecting its purpose to be the protection of former party papers that were now close 
to the PDS, it concluded that now was significantly harder for citizens of the GDR to access 
publications from the West.1531 Müller later commented that the article only showed “bad taste 
actually.”1532 
1526“ausgesprochen bedenklich … de facto das Recht zur Zensur.” Fachzeitschriften behaupten sich – neuer Markt in der 
DDR, dpa, press release, 5/15/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07916. 
1527“das Verbot der Herstellung oder des Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen nur bei Verletzung allgemeiner Gesetze mit 
klar definiertem Tatbestand auf der Grundlage einer richterlichen Entscheidung ausgesprochen werden kann.” Draft, 
“Eckwerte für die Medienordnung in einem vereinigten Deutschland, Kommissionsentwurf,” Bonn, May 17, 1990, p. 6, 
attached to letter Beate Damm, FDP Bundesmedienkommission, to Bernd Neumann, MdB, Bonn, May 17, 1990, Archiv
des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/25499.
1528Note: Also the FDP generally favored a distribution system based on medium-sized Grossisten independent of 
publishers. Draft, “Eckwerte für die Medienordnung in einem vereinigten Deutschland, Kommissionsentwurf,” Bonn, 
May 17, 1990, pp. 6-7, attached to letter Beate Damm, FDP Bundesmedienkommission, to Bernd Neumann, MdB, 
Bonn, May 17, 1990, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/25499.
1529“diese Verordnung in jedem anderen demokratischen Land undenkbar [wäre].” DDR schränkt Freiheit der Presse 
wieder ein, Dieter Dose, Die Welt, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07778.
1530“jenes nicht frei gewählten Parlaments.” DDR schränkt Freiheit der Presse wieder ein, Dieter Dose, Die Welt, 5/11/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07778.
1531 DDR schränkt Freiheit der Presse wieder ein, Dieter Dose, Die Welt, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, 
DSC07778.
1532“[e]igentlich geschmacklos.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 11, 1990, sent to author on 
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For the East German publishers, the resolution effectively changed nothing. The Big Four, as 
the paper Tagesspiegel pointed out, upheld their division of the GDR and continued operations based 
on “the principle of mass supply from federal territory, on the back of the East German press.”1533 Thus,
while officially having ended current practices and having introduced a temporary solution only, the 
business paper Handelsblatt reckoned, the resolution was interpreted by the VDZ as having given it 
“the respective permission from the Media Ministry” to continue distribution.1534 “The pie remained 
divided,” the division was still unchallenged and, now, had been given the official legitimization of the 
MfM.1535 “One representative of the cartel,” Müller noted, “was said to have stated: the exception to the
rule will just become the rule then.”1536 The VDZ, thus, offered future talks on building a more 
comprehensive distribution by adding the option to immediately include also East German 
publications.1537 And this set the baseline for all future negotiations.
Lobbying for Created Market Structures  
Müller later pointed out that though the resolution was “legally sound,” it did not match realities
on the ground, “which had been shaped by the concentrated power of the West German major 
publishers and could not simply by stopped by law.”1538 Also dpa estimated in retrospect, “it was clear 
to everyone involved that the capacities that had been built by the four major West German publishers 
could not be replaced in building a universal Grosso-distribution.”1539 G+J alone had bought 122 trucks 
for its distribution in Berlin, Cottbus, Potsdam and Frankfurt/O and by the end of July 1990, was 
shipping about 3.100 tons of newspapers and magazines per month.1540 In comparison, the about fifteen 
January 12, 2017.
1533Full quote: “nachdem sie das Gebiet der DDR unter sich verteilt haben und daran festhalten … Prinzip der vom 
Bundesgebiet aus erfolgenden Massenauslieferung zulasten der DDR-Presse.” DDR: Neuordnung des Pressevertriebs 
vom 16. Mai an, Der Tagesspiegel, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07776.
1534Full quote: “Eine entsprechende Genehmigung hätten der Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger (VDZ) und die 
Verlage Bauer, Burda, Gruner + Jahr sowie Springer vom DDR-Medienministerium erhalten, teilte der VDZ mit.” 
Übergangslosung für DDR-Pressevertrieb, Das Handelsblatt, 5/14/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07750.
1535“Der Kuchen bleibt verteilt.” DDR: Neuordnung des Pressevertriebs vom 16. Mai an, Der Tagesspiegel, 5/11/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07776.
1536“Ein Vertreter des Kartells soll denn auch gesagt haben: Aus der Ausnahme in der Anwendung der VO werde 
zukünftig eben die Regel.” Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), 
April 19, 1990, sent to author in January 30, 2017.
1537Übergangslosung für DDR-Pressevertrieb, Das Handelsblatt, 5/14/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07750.
1538“juristisch einwandfrei … die von der Übermacht der westdeutschen Großverlage geformt worden war und nicht per 
Gesetz einfach ausgeschaltet werden konnte.” Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary 
(April-May 1990), sent to author on January 30, 2017.
1539“Dabei war alle Beteiligten klar, daß beim Aufbau des flächendeckenden Grosso-Vertriebs die Kapazitäten, die die vier
bundesdeutschen Großverlage aufgebaut hatten, nicht zu ersetzen sein würden.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund.
Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 8, BArch DC9/1050.
1540Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 8, BArch DC9/1050.
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independent Grossisten at that point still had insufficient or no capacities and were trying hard to get 
their business in place. As one West German distribution manager stated, “currently, everyone in the 
GDR is pointing at the straw man … but no oneʼs got the money needed” for building an independent 
Grosso-system.1541 The money lay in the publishing industry.
Not surprisingly then, joint and individual lobbying activities of the Big Four, with the support 
of the VDZ, continued. On May 18, Springerʼs Tamm and Herfurth visited the MfM. While officially 
in search for public figures to speak at their Forum for Germany (Forum für Deutschland), at which 
also Kohl had given a talk, this visit was more likely an attempt to calm tensions between the 
publishers and the ministry.1542 A few days later, both paid a joint visit to the Berliner Verlag to meet 
with publishers and the (East) Berlin Association of Newspaper and Magazine Publishers. Their 
intention, according to Fürstner, was to “introduce the model of a universal Grosso-distribution system 
under the trusteeship of publishers of the GDR, with a managing partner from the GDR, as well as 
West German publishers.”1543 The argument put forward was that East German papers must have “a 
substantial and existential interest in immediately making use of the possibility of a universal 
distribution we have offered to them.”1544 The system was consistently being expanded and should be 
open also to them. And though the offer was clear, the meeting did not go as expected. 
A representative of the MfM, Marietta Grothe, who worked closely with Müller and was 
present at the meeting, strongly opposed.1545 Not only were the publishers misreading the resolution, 
she pointed out, but an amendment was soon to be implemented.1546 It would put an end to the 
publishersʼ model for good and push for an independent one that followed federal practices. Fürstner, 
in response, turned to the MfM to complain. Stating that any such points not only increased existing 
1541“Vorläufig horen alle DDR-Leute nur auf den Namen Strohmann … das notige Geld dafür [für den Aufbau eines 
unabhängigen Grossos] hat doch keiner.” Cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – 
Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 8, BArch DC9/1050.
1542Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 18, 1990, sent to author on January 12, 2017; Gottfried 
Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), May 18, 1990, sent to author in 
January 30, 2017.
1543“das Modell eines flächendeckenden Grosso-Vertriebssystems in der Trägerschaft von DDR-Verlagen, einem 
geschäftsführenden Gesellschafter aus der DDR sowie bundesdeutschen Verlagen vorzustellen.” Telegram, Wolfgang 
Fürstner, VDZ, to Gottfried Müller, Medien Ministerium, May 25, 1990, BArch DC9/1051.
1544“ein nachhaltiges und existentielles Interesse daran haben, unverzüglich die Moglichkeiten des flächendeckenden 
Vertriebs zu nutzen, die wir Ihnen angeboten haben.” Durchführungsbestimmungen zur Medienverordnung. Telegram, 
Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Gottfried Müller, Medien Ministerium, May 25, 1990, BArch DC9/1051.
1545Note: Marietta Grothe was responsible for distribution issues in the Media Ministry. Like Ralf Bachmann and Rudolf 
Müller, Grothe had previously worked in the Press and Informtaion Service of the Modrow government.  Gottfried 
Müller, personal communication, Email sent to author on January 10, 2017.
1546“Durchführungsbestimmungen zur Medienverordnung.” Telegram, Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Gottfried Müller, 
Medien Ministerium, May 25, 1990, BArch DC9/1051.
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legal uncertainties that had been created by the resolution, but they also contradicted the outcome of 
recent talks during which a green light had been given to the publishers' model.1547
Müller, however, informed by Grothe, contacted Tamm the day of the meeting to take a stand. 
He underlined that according to the resolution, the publishers' Grosso-model was “only acceptable for 
as long as a respective [independent] distribution does not exist to the extent necessary.”1548 Part of the 
MfM agreeing to the temporary continuation of current distribution practices was that it was an 
exception based on the expectation “that efforts will be taken on your part to work against the factual 
limitations of a free press, as they have developed by means of current overheated distribution 
practices,” mentioned during their talk on May 8.1549 “[F]ollowing the example of the FRG,” the share 
of Grossisten working with publishersʼ investments and making use of the exception clause should, 
therefore, “not be overly high.”1550 “It goes without saying that the existence of independent Grosso-
enterprises must not be hampered on part of the publishers by means of refusing to supply [them].”1551 
Rapid action on part of the publishers was now required, and Fürstner contacted Bachmann for further 
talks. 
Presse-Grosso and the BMI
Meanwhile, the lobbying work of Presse-Grosso continued. It had kept close correspondence 
with the MfM. On May 21, the same day Müller wrote his letter to Tamm, Gerd Kapp, general manager
of the association, invited Müller and Grothe on a tour through West Germany. He suggested visits to 
independent, medium-sized Grossisten in Mainz, Frankfurt and Cologne, and meeting with members of
the association.1552 Plans changed several times but Müller and Grothe eventually traveled to Bonn on 
May 30. This time they were greeted by Kapp, Christian G. Christiansen, Hübner and other 
representatives of the BMI. Müller carried with him a page of general and detailed questions regarding 
1547Telegram, Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Gottfried Müller, Medien Ministerium, May 25, 1990, BArch DC9/1051.
1548“nur noch solange zulässig ist, wie ein einschlägiger Großhandel nicht im notigen Umfang existiert.” Letter, Gottfried 
Müller, Medienminister, to Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag AG, May 21, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1549“daß Ihrerseits Anstrengungen unternommen werden, um den faktischen Einschränkungen der Pressefreiheit 
entgegenzuwirken, wie sie durch die bisherige überhitzte Vertriebspraxis eingetreten sind,” Letter, Gottfried Müller, 
Medienminister, to Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag AG, May 21, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1550Full quote: “sollte dem Beispiel der BRD-Verhältnisse folgend, nicht übermäßig groß sein.” Letter, Gottfried Müller, 
Medienminister, to Peter Tamm, Axel Springer Verlag AG, May 21, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1551“nur noch solange zulässig ist, wie ein einschlägiger Großhandel nicht im notigen Umfang existiert. Es ist 
selbstverständlich, daß das Bestehen unabhängiger Grosso-Firmen nicht durch verlagsseitige Maßnahmen wie 
Lieferverweigerung behindert werden darf.” Letter, Gottfried Müller, Medienminister, to Peter Tamm, Axel Springer 
Verlag AG, May 21, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1552Letter, Gerd Kapp, Presse-Grosso, to Marietta Grothe, Ministerium für Medienpolitik, Koln, May 21, 1990, BArch 
DC9/1050. See Presse-Grosso's communication with the GDR Media Ministry, its invitations, and concepts in BArch 
DC9/1050.
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the Grosso-system in the Federal Republic.1553 
What followed were extensive talks with the BMI, Presse Gosso, as well as individual 
Grossisten.1554 The issue was the new resolution. The board of Presse-Grosso, wholeheartedly in its 
favor, expressed grave concerns about the ways the four major publishers, in “violation of applicable 
law of the FRG,” were still aiming for an exclusive distribution in the GDR. Outlining the dangers of 
any such system, the real concern lay in the possible repercussions it might have for the FRG. There 
needed to be not only an even closer cooperation between the MfM and the association but immediate 
and effective measures.1555 One possibility lay in the addition of an amendment that made impossible 
any misinterpretation of the resolution, another in the allocation of resources to the building of a 
working independent Grosso-system. It needed to be proven that a “supply of printed media meeting 
existing demands” could be guaranteed to override Section 3(2) of the resolution.1556 This, according to 
Presse-Grosso, was the only way possible to stop the illegal actions of the publishers. The association 
and individual Grossisten offered to provide their concrete support by means of mentoring programs 
for Grossisten, management and material support, and trainings on the spot.1557 And to give more 
weight to their arguments, Müller and Grothe were given a tour through three different Grossisten 
facilities, which, according to Müller, gave them the opportunity “to familiarize [themselves] with this 
kind of medium-sized enterprise. We were confirmed in our belief that this is the only way to guarantee
a free press with equal opportunities and fair market chances.”1558 
And while Presse-Grosso was in favor of the resolution and lobbied for more stringent 
regulations, the BMI, specifically the head of the ministry Erich Schaible and his undersecretary 
Dietrich Hübner, made clear that any such resolution would never have been possible under federal 
law. “At the same time,” Müller noted later, “it has been acknowledged that only such a provision 
allows us to effectively confront the illegal entry of West German major publishing houses into the 
territory of the GDR.”1559 In this context, the representatives of the BMI expressed their lack of 
1553Questionnaire, Fragespiegel zum Problem Presse-Grossisten, n.d., BArch DC9/1050.
1554Note: Though the list of attendees also listed Christian G. Christiansen of Presse-Gosso GDR as a participant, no 
results of conversations with Mr. Christiansen were documented. List of Atendees, Der Bundesminister des Inneren (SM
10-344690-6/2a), Teilnehmerliste, Besprechung am 31.5.1990, Pressevertrieb in der DDR, BArch DC9/1050. 
1555“im Widerspruch zu geltendem Recht in der BRD.” Protocol, Dienstreise BRD, Müller und Grothe vom 30.5. - 1.6. 
1990, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050 .
1556“bedarfsdeckenden Belieferung mit Presseerzeugnissen.” Protocol, Dienstreise BRD, Müller und Grothe vom 30.5. - 
1.6. 1990, pp. 3-4, BArch DC9/1050 .
1557Protocol, Dienstreise BRD, Müller und Grothe vom 30.5. - 1.6. 1990, pp. 3-4, BArch DC9/1050 .
1558“mit dieser Art mittelständischen Unternehmen vertraut zu machen. Wir wurden in der Überzeugung bestärkt, daß nur 
so Pressefreiheit chancengleich und wettbewerbsneutral zu gewährleisten ist.” Protocol, Dienstreise BRD, Müller und 
Grothe vom 30.5. - 1.6. 1990, p. 4, BArch DC9/1050 .
1559“Gleichzeitig wurde anerkannt, daß nur mit den hier aufgeführten Regelungen die Moglichkeit gegeben ist, dem 
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understanding “that the expert commission [of the media talks on February 8] put into place under the 
Modrow government ... did such an insufficient job, especially in the print media sector.”1560 Now, the 
BMI agreed, the situation required urgent measures, such as an amendment, based on the “wide-
ranging legislative options of the FRG.”1561 A legal advisor of the BMI was to help draft the provision 
that needed to be finished within the next two weeks for it to have any effective consequence being 
before the monetary union on July 1. The BMI further made clear that with German unification 
according to Paragraph 23 of the Basic Law (see Chapter 3), press freedom in the Eastern Länder still 
needed specific protections by means of Länder-legislation. Close cooperation and continuous 
communication was agreed upon; for this, the BMI also considered providing communication 
technology (i.e. phones, fax machines etc.).1562 Müller concluded from these talks that both the BMI as 
well as Presse Grosse accepted and approved the May 2 resolution. It now required an amendment to 
make impossible any misinterpretation, as well as a working distribution model to be expanded 
gradually throughout the GDR.1563 He did as he was told.
Analysis (and Continuous Lobbying)
The Resolution on Press Distribution of May 2, 1990 created more confusion than it set clear 
guidelines. The taz reasoned that, initially, the Big Four had established a distribution network because 
the Post “was unable to do so.”1564 Now, the government in East Berlin aimed to “put to a stop to West 
German major publishers entering the distribution market.”1565 With the resolution, however, the MfM 
had not put an end to it but had given its approval and, thereby, left in place a system that was “heavily 
criticized.”1566 Other papers, such as the Berliner Zeitung and Handelsblatt, underlined that this solution
gesetzwidrigen Eindringen bundesdeutscher Großverlage in das Territorium der DDR wirksam zu begegnen.” Protocol, 
Dienstreise BRD, Müller und Grothe vom 30.5. - 1.6. 1990, pp. 1-2, BArch DC9/1050 .
1560Full quote: “daß die noch zu Modrow-Regierung eingesetzten Expertenkommission seitens der DDR – insbesondere 
auf dem Gebiet der Printmedien der DDR – so ungenügend wirksam geworden ist.” Protocol, Dienstreise BRD, Müller 
und Grothe vom 30.5. - 1.6. 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050 .
1561“weitreichenden Gesetzesmoglichkeiten der BRD.” Protocol, Dienstreise BRD, Müller und Grothe vom 30.5. - 1.6. 
1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050 .
1562Protocol, Dienstreise BRD, Müller und Grothe vom 30.5. - 1.6. 1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050 .
1563Protocol, Dienstreise BRD, Müller und Grothe vom 30.5. - 1.6. 1990, p. 5, BArch DC9/1050 .
1564 “hierzu nicht in der Lage sah.” DDR regelt Pressevertrieb, die tageszeitung, 5/9/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-
b, DSC07807. Also Neue Verordnung regelt Pressevertrieb, Der Tagesspiegel, 5/9/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-
b, DSC07800. 
1565 “dem Einstieg bundesdeutscher Großverlage in den Vertriebsmarkt einen Riegel vorschieben.” DDR regelt 
Pressevertrieb, die tageszeitung, 5/9/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07807. 
1566“das heftig kritisierte Vertriebssystem.” Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, Schnellinformation, 
Medienminister: Neue DDR-Pressevertriebsordnung gilt ab 16. Mai, press release, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File
35a-b, DSC07774.
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was only a transitional one.1567 In spite of heated arguments, in effect, not much changed for East 
German publishers or West German interest groups: The BMI renewed its cooperation offers, criticized
earlier media policy failings on part of the GDR, and kept its position as a friendly but disengaged 
federal institution. It left unmentioned its own ambivalent stand by offering lip-service support to East 
German interest groups while working closely with West German major publishers. The BMI's main 
interest lay in the eventual takeover of federal structures in the GDR, indicated by its focus on Länder-
legislation as protective means for the press (see Chapter 3). Presse-Grosso, fearing potential negative 
repercussions of publishersʼ distribution practices for its own members, kept up its lobbying efforts 
with success. Both, the BMI and Presse-Grosso, exclusively reasoned and acted out of their own 
interests while arguing on behalf of a free press in the GDR. The MfM, inconsequential in its resolution
and ambivalent in its arguments, aimed to include all interest groups. A task doomed to fail, given the 
political and economic interests at stake. 
In the meantime, little to no attention was paid to newspapers and publishers of the GDR, and 
their response to the resolution: To the Junge Welt, it meant a “gloomy future for the East German 
press,” and it already said its goodbye to press freedom, comparing the Media Ministry to Don 
Quixote's fight against windmills.1568 The FF dabei questioned if the resolution “can actually still 
accomplish anything,” while the Berliner Zeitung underlined that it “won't work wonders either,” only 
to point out that it, in fact, gave authority to continue current distribution practices for an indefinite 
time.1569 It was further doubtful if penalty payments, indeed, would have any effect, given that they 
were to be paid in Mark, would be hard to collect, there was no effective executive in place, and major 
West German publishers had enough capital.1570 
And while, as Müller had pointed out, some of this criticism might have related to high 
expectations as to what the ministry could do, it rooted also in the fact, Müller admitted at a press 
conference, that the resolution came too late. It had taken months, “in times when,” as the Berliner 
Allgemeine stated, “it's often the hour that counts.”1571 Grown market structures and a semi-legal 
1567Übergangslosung für den Pressevertrieb, BZ, 5/14/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07742. Die Post und 
private Grosso-Firmen sollen Chancengleichheit am Lesermarkt bieten, Handelsblatt, p.8, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07777; 
1568Düstere Zukunft für DDR-Presse, Junge Welt, 5/11/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (½); Pressefreiheit adé, Frank Schumann, 
Junge Welt, 5/12/90,  IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07754. 
1569“noch etwas bewirken kann.” Mit dem Fuß in der Tür, Alfred Wagner, FF dabei, 5/22/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File
35c, DSC08036; Neue Vertriebsverordnung wirkt auch keine Wunder, K. Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07780. 
1570Ordnung im Medienmarkt?, Klaus Bischoff, Berliner Zeitung, 5/10/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07795.
1571“Ein Monat. Wir leben in Zeiten, da zählt oft die Stunde.” Die gleiche Chance?, Berliner Allgemeine, Bodo Rehboldt, 
5/12/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07754. 
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distribution of West German print media could not be turned back completely. The resolution, 
according to Müller, was, therefore, more a “tool to limit the damage,” not due to “the indecisiveness 
of the Media Ministry,” but to “the reality of a press market on which the major publishers had a 
domineering position.”1572 “Even the West German Presse-Grosso had to admit that without the major 
publishers and their products, there could be no solution in matters of distribution in the East.”1573 Thus,
the existing conflict between what was doable and what was desirable found its manifestation in the 
resolution itself, and “this ambivalence defined the application and interpretation of the resolution until 
the end of the GDR.”1574 
The beneficiaries of this situation were the major publishing houses and their Grossisten. Not 
only were the publishers generally expanding their network, but they now aimed at incorporating also 
East German publications to increase the legitimacy of their system but also to gain a stronger foothold 
in the market. In the meantime, they had also continued negotiations with the MPF via the VDZ. In late
May, both came to an agreement “over the goals and scope of a future cooperation.”1575 “Also on the 
policy level, both sides agreed on a close cooperation based on trust.”1576 Fürstner, who had been the 
middleman in negotiating with Niehof (MPF), summarized that both organizations, “in allocating tasks 
to the Post, on the one hand, and to the [publishers'] Grosso-enterprise, on the other, agree on the goal, 
regardless of the question of how to solve transitional arrangements.”1577 
He made clear that neither the VDZ nor the Grossisten of Bauer, Springer, Burda and G+J 
supported plans of the MPF to establish postal Grossisten. It cannot “be part of the future tasks of the 
Post … to take over Grosso operations in competition with private Grosso-companies,” for only 
1572“Instrument der Schadensbegrenzung” Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, DDR-Presse: Schlacht verloren, 
Rückzugsgefechte eingeleitet, Thomas Kunze, press release, 5/11/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07775; 
“war nicht die Unentschlossenheit des MfM durchzugreifen, wie etwa auch Klammer vermerkt, sondern die Realität des 
Pressemarktes, auf dem die Großverlage eine dominierende Stellung hatten.” Gottfried Müller, personal communication,
comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), April 19, 1990, sent to author in January 30, 2017.
1573“Selbst der West-Grosso-Verband musste zugeben, dass es ohne die Großverlage und deren Produkte keine Losung der
Vertriebsfrage im Osten geben konne.” Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-
May 1990), sent to author in January 30, 2017.
1574Full first quote: “Zwiespalt ist der realen Situation entsprechend  in der VO selbst angelegt.” Gottfried Müller, personal
communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), May 10, 1990, sent to author in January 30, 2017; 
“Diese Ambivalenz hat die Anwendung und Interpretation der VO bis zum Ende der DDR bestimmt.” Gottfried Müller, 
personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), April 19, 1990, sent to author in January 30, 
2017.
1575“über Ziel und Umfang künftiger gemeinsamer Arbeit.” Letter, Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Jürgen Niehof, MPF, May
29, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
1576“Auch auf der politischen Ebene wurde enge und vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit von beiden Seiten zugesichert.” 
Letter, Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Jürgen Niehof, MPF, May 29, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
1577“in der Zuweisung der Aufgaben zwischen der Deutschen Post einerseits und dem [verlagseigenen] Grosso-Vertrieb 
andererseits im Ziel übereinstimmen, unabhängig von der Frage, wie Übergangsregelungen zu losen sind.” Letter, 
Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Jürgen Niehof, MPF, May 29, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
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granting exclusive rights to one Grossist within a defined territory guaranteed equal market 
opportunities for all publications.1578 “Breaking this principle,” Fürstner underlined, “must inevitably 
lead to charges of discrimination with regard to competition law.”1579 In making this argument, the 
publishers partly aimed to avoid postal competition in the distribution sector; they did not see any irony
in it with regard to their own distribution practices and boycotts of independent distributors. Instead, 
the publishers welcomed “the opportunity to expand the press sales network in the GDR by integrating 
postal retail locations [into their system].”1580 While, until now, Postal Distribution had distributed West
German publications on its own account, now, the publishers' Grossisten were to soon start supplying 
postal retail locations (i.e. kiosks) with their products. The four publishers further promised to come to 
final compensation arrangements with Germer for any of these postal services. 
The Post's plan to keep subscription services, including acquisition, and to manage them for 
West German publishers was rejected. Taking over acquisition tasks, the four publishers made clear, 
touched a “core area of competition” and could not be handed over regardless of East German 
practices.1581 And while, again, the MPF had approached distribution services based on assumptions of 
a non-commercial, centralized system based on different logics, the rules of the game were set by the 
market and its major players. To the latter, an essentially unregulated East German market offered 
undreamed of opportunities, and they now aimed to consolidate distribution capacities by integrating 
postal retail locations. All of this happened behind closed doors and with little public accountability.
Building an Independent GDR Grosso-System
Meanwhile, efforts for building an independent Grosso-system had continued. The situation, 
however, was chaotic and nontransparent. By June 1, the MfM knew of a total of forty-six officially 
registered Grossisten in the GDR.1582 While relatively evenly located, their financial and material 
resources differed greatly and so did their level of competence. Some companies had an extensive, 
1578“zu den Zukunftsaufgaben der Deutschen Post gehoren … Grossofunktionen im Wettbewerb mit privaten Grosso-
Firmen wahrzunehmen.” Letter, Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Jürgen Niehof, MPF, May 29, 1990, private archive Hans-
Jürgen Niehof. 
1579“Eine Verletzung dieser Pflicht müßte zwangsläufig zu einem Diskriminierungsvorwurf im wettbewerbsrechtlichen 
Sinne führen.” Letter, Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Jürgen Niehof, MPF, May 29, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen 
Niehof. 
1580“begrüßen die Moglichkeit, durch Integration der Postverkaufsstellen das Angebotsnetz für Presseerzeugnisse in der 
DDR zu vergroßern.” Letter, Wolfgang Fürstner, VDZ, to Jürgen Niehof, MPF, May 29, 1990, private archive Hans-
Jürgen Niehof. 
1581Full quote: “Kernbereich wettbewerbsbestimmenden Verhaltens der [bundesdeutschen] Verlage.” Letter, Wolfgang 
Fürstner, VDZ, to Jürgen Niehof, MPF, May 29, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
1582Table, Übersicht über private Pressegrossisten mit Firmensitz in der DDR, über die das Ministerium für Medienpolitik 
bisher informiert wurde, Referat Registrierung/Statistik, Berlin, June 1, 1990, BArch DC9/1052. 
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area-wide distribution range in one or several regions and employed between 150 and 200 people. 
Others had their name and registration without any infrastructures and/or means of transportation.1583 
Some initiatives were based on individual negotiations with West German publishers and/or their 
partner enterprises in the Federal Republic, like, for instance, a company in Dresden that registered for 
the distribution of mainly Burda and Neue Welt subscriptions.1584 Others worked exclusively “for 
publishers from the FRG,” in particular Springer but also Jahreszeiten, Gong and Hamburger 
Morgenpost.1585 Still, almost none of these Grossisten, as the MfM pointed out in an internal document,
mentioned any direct capital investments from the Federal Republic, and no registration application had
been received that indicated publishersʼ investments.1586 
However, of twenty-eight Grossisten that had contacted the ministry since the resolution on 
distribution came into place, seven had been in the business for some time and “were obviously 
supported by West German major publishers,” another two were supported by Grossisten from the 
Federal Republic through training programs, software and other means.1587 The majority of independent
distributors, however, were just starting business, and they were trying it “on their own.”1588 And it was 
them who struggled the most and who contacted the MfM in search for help: in several letters, they 
individually claimed that the major publishers were interfering with their work.1589 An overview, listing
registered Grossisten, even contained added notes to individual profiles, such as “major publishers 
interfered with distribution activities” or “West German publishers are impeding;” this was the case 
especially in the southern part of the GDR (Thuringia), where several Grossisten had to close business 
or were facing it soon.1590
1583Table, Übersicht über private Pressegrossisten mit Firmensitz in der DDR, über die das Ministerium für Medienpolitik 
bisher informiert wurde, Referat Registrierung/Statistik, Berlin, June 1, 1990, BArch DC9/1052.
1584Application for registration, Registrierung der Fa. Medienexpress Dresden für den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen, 
Dieter Franke, Medienexpress Dresden, to Minister für Medienpolitik, Dresden, May 9, 1990, BArch DC9/1069.
1585“Verlage der BRD.” Table, Übersicht über private Pressegrossisten mit Firmensitz in der DDR, über die das 
Ministerium für Medienpolitik bisher informiert wurde, Referat Registrierung/Statistik, Berlin, June 1, 1990, pp. 6-9, 
BArch DC9/1052.
1586Press conference material, R. Müller, Abteilung Inneres und Organisation, Zuarbeit für die heutige international 
Pressekonferenz, July 11, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
1587“werden offensichtlich von BRD-Großverlagen gefordert.” Letter, R. Müller, Abteilung Inneres und Organisation, to 
Gottfried Müller, Medienminister, June 7, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
1588“aus eigener Kraft.” Letter, R. Müller, Abteilung Inneres und Organisation, to Gottfried Müller, Medienminister, June 
7, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
1589Letter, R. Müller, Abteilung Inneres und Organisation, to Gottfried Müller, Medienminister, June 7, 1990, BArch 
DC9/1050. 
1590“BRD-Großverlage behinderten Vertriebstätigkeit … BRD-Verlage behindern.” Table, Übersicht über private 
Pressegrossisten mit Firmensitz in der DDR, über die das Ministerium für Medienpolitik bisher informiert wurde, 
Referat Registrierung/Statistik, Berlin, June 1, 1990, p. 5, BArch DC9/1052. 
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An Amendment and its Consequences
Aware of the shortcomings of the May 2 resolution, the MfM was working intensively on an 
addition, and only about two weeks later, amended it.1591 The amendment made clear that the direct sale
and distribution of print media by publishers was legal only if it concerned exclusively their own 
publications. General press distribution was permitted only to private Grossisten located in the GDR 
and that were independent of publishers. Retailers were to sell only what had been delivered to them 
either by private Grossisten or Postal Distribution. And though this excluded possible shares of 
publishers in Grosso-enterprises, section three of the amendment opened that door again by introducing
a special permit: “The request for a permission for publishers to participate in the distribution of 
newspapers and magazines is to be submitted in writing to the minister of media policy within a 10-
day-period after the release of this resolution.”1592 For this, the applicant (publisher) had to name the 
area of future (or current) distribution activities and the Grossist of such future (or current) direct or 
indirect shares. The permit, given out by the media minister alone, was temporary and under the right 
of revocation. “The freedom of the press demands” that such permission must be granted if the 
exception clause (Section 3(2)) of the resolution was applicable; Grossisten without publishers' 
holdings did not require any such permit.1593 The amendment, thereby, again allowed for direct and 
indirect involvement of publishers in distribution enterprises. 
This time, however, the focus was shifted to giving greater agency and authority to independent 
Grossisten by defining their rights and duties: Not only was it underlined that “[p]ublishers operating 
on the territory of the GDR are bound to treat press-Grossisten of the GDR as equal enterprises, on 
equal terms,” but publishers were by law bound to supply them. 1594 “The burden of proof lies with the 
publisher,” in the case of refusal.1595 Any supply claims (Belieferungsanspruch) of a Grossist towards a 
1591Second draft, Zweite Verordnung über den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR vom 2. Mai 1990, 2. Entwurf, 
n.d. [early May, 1990], § 1, BArch DC9/1050. Hinweise des Ministerium für Medienpolitik zur Anwendung der 
Verordnung über den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR vom 2. Mai (Veroffentlicht im 
'Regierungspressedienst' Nr. 14 vom 14. Mai 1990 und im Gesetzblatt der DDR Nr. 26 vom 15. Mai 1990), Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1592“Der Antrag auf Erteilung einer Erlaubnis zu einer Beteiligung von Verlagen am Großhandel mit Zeitungen und 
Zeitschriften ist schriftlich binnen einer Frist von 10 Tagen nach Veroffentlichung dieser VO beim Minister für 
Medienpolitik zu stellen.” Second draft, Zweite Verordnung über den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR vom 
2. Mai 1990, 2. Entwurf, n.d. [early May, 1990], § 3, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050. 
1593“Die Pressefreiheit gebietet.” Second draft, Zweite Verordnung über den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR 
vom 2. Mai 1990, 2. Entwurf, n.d. [early May, 1990], § 5, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050. 
1594“Die auf dem Gebiet der DDR tätigen Verlage sind verpflichtet die DDR-Pressegrossisten als gleichartige 
Unternehmen gleich zu behandeln.” Second draft, Zweite Verordnung über den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen in der 
DDR vom 2. Mai 1990, 2. Entwurf, n.d. [early May, 1990], § 5, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050. 
1595Full quote: “Rechtfertigungsgründe einer Lieferverweigerung trägt der Verlag die Beweislast.” Second draft, Zweite 
Verordnung über den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR vom 2. Mai 1990, 2. Entwurf, n.d. [early May, 1990],
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publisher existed when the distributor “can prove, after market entry and a short interim period,” that it 
could “guarantee the meeting of existing demand.”1596 Press distribution was regarded to be sufficient 
in quality and quantity (bedarfsdeckend) “when a Grossist is active in a territory and offers an area-
wide service, meeting existing needs.”1597 This would make obsolete the exception clause of the May 2 
resolution. The enforcement of these claims lay in the jurisdiction of the newly founded Office of 
Competition Protection and with the local civil courts. 
The same day this draft was signed off by the legal department of the Prime Ministerʼs Office, 
on June 7, Müller gave a joint press conference with the Minister of Economics Gerhard Pohl to 
introduce the Act against Restraints of Competition (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 6). It was relevant to 
distribution negotiations in that it officially introduced anti-trust legislation and put increasing 
pressures on the major publishers also with regard to ongoing joint venture negotiations (see Chapter 
6). Both the act and the amendment, regardless of their weaknesses, aimed to break old and new 
monopolistic structures by giving a legal grounding to medium-sized enterprises. Both, thus, also 
affected the Post, and Postal Distribution saw itself in an increasingly difficult situation. 
Just one day before the press conference, on June 6, Dietrich Germer was invited to report to the
Media Commission at the Peopleʼs Chamber on the current state of Postal Distribution. Germer urged 
that Postal Distribution “had to be developed into a market-oriented distribution enterprise, for 
otherwise, it was not competitive.”1598 The resolution, though it underlined the distribution authority of 
the Post, was not a sufficient means for regulating current distribution practices. The Media 
Commission, not aware of the amendment (or ongoing negotiations between the MPF and the major 
publishers), decided to suggest to the MfM an amendment to the resolution to ensure press freedom, a 
competitive market and fair sales.1599 Though meant well, any such suggestion did not help Postal 
Distribution with its persistent lack in infrastructures and financial resources, and its diminishing role 
in the distribution of print media in the GDR. The resolution had not reduced the growing pressures 
§ 5, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050. 
1596Full quote: “nachweislich nach Marktzutritt und kurzer Übergangszeit einen bedarfsdeckenden Pressevertrieb 
gewährleisten kann.” Second draft, Zweite Verordnung über den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR vom 2. 
Mai 1990, 2. Entwurf, n.d. [early May, 1990], § 5, p. 3, BArch DC9/1050. 
1597“wenn in einem Territorium ein Pressegrossist tätig ist und eine flächendeckende und bedarfsdeckended Tätigkeit 
anbietet.” Second draft, Zweite Verordnung über den Vertrieb von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR vom 2. Mai 1990, 2. 
Entwurf, n.d. [early May, 1990], § 3, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050. 
1598“müsse sich zur marktorientierten Vertriebsorganisation entwickeln, da er sonst nicht wettbewerbsfähig sei.” Minutes 
of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 6. Juni 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und Medien, 
Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, June 7, 1990, p. 1, BArch DA1/17579. 
1599Minutes of Decisions, Beschlußprotokoll über die Ausschußtagung vom 6. Juni 1990, Ausschuß für Presse und 
Medien, Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, June 7, 1990, BArch DA1/17579. 
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from the major publishers, but, instead, they now aimed at taking over the distribution of East German 
publications as well. Postal Distribution distributed only fifteen West German newspapers since the 
beginning of June, too little to remain in business.
By June 15, only two weeks after the initial talks, an agreement between the Post and the Big 
Four, again represented by the VDZ, was reached, when they agreed on a reallocation of tasks. Based 
on its improvement of services, the Post was to maintain the distribution of subscriptions and keep 
ownership of its newsstands. The publishers, on the other hand, were to maintain the Grosso-
distribution for the retail sector by supplying now also postal retail locations.1600 In consequence, this 
meant an expansion and reform of business, and it was again a medium-sized West German publisher 
that started a rigorous information campaign against it.
Tagesspiegelʼs Campaign 
 “Those who are in the press trade must not selectively 
choose in favor of individual publishers.”
Letter, Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Gottfried Müller, June 25,
19901601
On July 7, the newspaper Tagesspiegel took up the story of Grosso-enterprises in the GDR. In 
an article titled “West German Major Publishers Establish Distribution Companies,” the paper claimed 
that at the end of June, five Grossisten with publishersʼ majority shares had been founded for the 
regions of Leipzig, Gera, Mecklenburg, Dresden and Brandenburg (including Berlin).1602 The managing
directors of each enterprise had been chosen by one of the Big Four publishers who, together with the 
publishing house Spiegel, held a 50 percent share of each. Twenty-five percent was divided among 
fourteen West German newspaper and magazine publishers, while the other 25 percent was to be 
managed by a trustee for East German publishers still to be decided. Even though the Federal Cartel 
Office regarded these ownership structures to be “not unobjectionable,” it had given its consent, not the
least because, according the newly introduced amendment, “the five distribution companies initiated by
the major publishing houses” still needed to “ask for an exemption permit at the Ministry of Media 
1600Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, pp. 8-9, BArch DC9/1050.
1601Wer mit der Presse handelt, darf nicht zugunsten einzelner Verlagsanbieter selektierend auswählen.” Attachment, 
Punktation zur aktuellen Berliner Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 1990, Letter, Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to 
Gottfried Müller, June 25, 1990, Der Tagesspiegel, BArch DC9/1070.  
1602“Bundesdeutsche Großverlage gründen Vertriebsfirmen,” Der Tagesspiegel, July 7, 1990, p. 2.
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Policy before July 30.”1603 According to Tagesspiegel, several independent Grossisten had approached 
the Federal Cartel Office and the Council of Ministers, for they felt threatened by those enterprises and 
still struggled with boycotting tactics of the major publishers. Tagesspiegel had now approached both 
institutions to push for fair competition, quoting from a statement it had sent to Lothar de Maizière and 
Gottfried Müller (both had signed the May 2 resolution), only the day before.1604 
The paper's report documented the changed strategy of the Big Four in connection to its 
agreement with the Post and in response to the Act against Restraints of Competition. Implementing the
Big Four model from April 4 (see above), by June 28, the publishers had built five Grossisten, 
according to what Schulte-Hillen had called a “50-25-25” model. The East German shareholder, often 
directly taken over from a previously publisher-owned distributor, acted as the executive 25-percent-
partner. Christoph Keese from G+J put a positive spin on this by stating that the publishers had “kept 
the best [employees] for the [new] Grosso.”1605 To Tagesspiegel, however, this only resembled the 
continuation of old practices.
The publisher had initially responded to an advisor of de Maizière who had asked papers using 
Grossisten in the GDR to give their take on a neutral press distribution. On July 6, it did just that.1606 In 
its statement, Tagesspiegel claimed that the neutrality of press freedom required neutrality in 
distribution. It, thus, took a vigorous stand against the Grosso-model of the Big Four. Since the 
beginning of the year, citizens all across the GDR had built distribution enterprises and were willing to 
compete with those distributors that had been initiated by the four major publishers. These independent 
companies were now in danger of having to close business due to unfair business practices of the Big 
Four.1607 The current situation in the metropolitan area of Berlin was such that one of the major 
publishers 
under a breach of law and obstruction of an [operative and independent] press 
distribution enterprise (Erste Presse Vertriebs GmbH/EPV) pushed for the building of a 
quasi-monopoly distribution that widely denies individual retail locations/newsagents the
1603“nicht unbedenklich … die fünf von den Großverlagen initiierten Vertriebsfirmen … bis zum 30. Juli beim 
Ministerium für Medienpolitik um eine Ausnahme-Erlaubnis nachsuchen.” “Bundesdeutsche Großverlage gründen 
Vertriebsfirmen,” Der Tagesspiegel, July 7, 1990, p. 2.
1604“Bundesdeutsche Großverlage gründen Vertriebsfirmen,” Der Tagesspiegel, July 7, 1990, p. 2.
1605“Wir haben die besten ins Grosso übernommen.” Cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der 
DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 9, BArch DC9/1050.
1606Attachment, Punktation zur aktuellen Berliner Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 1990, Letter, Christian Hädler 
and Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Lothar de Maizière, Ministerpräsident der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 
July 6, 1990, BArch DE10/16; Attachment, Punktation zur aktuellen Berliner Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 
1990, Letter, Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Gottfried Müller, June 25, 1990, Der Tagesspiegel, BArch DC9/1070.  
1607Letter, Christian Hädler and Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Lothar de Maizière, Ministerpräsident der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, July 6, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
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possibility to work with several   Grossisten   and, thereby, takes away their contractual 
freedom.1608 
The mentioned “monopoly” Grossist was Brandenburg Pressevertrieb/BVP, closely affiliated with 
G+J. According to a Springer statement (likely of Leilich) from June 21, 1990, none of the major 
publishers were to supply Erste Presse Vertriebs GmbH/EPV.1609 The latter soon appealed to the MfM 
against this practice (see below). Tagesspiegel argued that such boycotts by publishers had to be 
stopped on pain of a fine. After all, the Big Four could only claim the exception clause because they 
arbitrarily influenced the market by boycotting independent Grossisten who, thus, could not guarantee 
an area-wide supply with all publications.1610 
And while Tagesspiegel pushed for rights of Grossisten in the GDR, it made it clear that its 
motives lay elsewhere. “West German major publishing houses are using the opening of the GDR as an
opportunity” to also gain more influence in distribution in the Federal Republic.1611 “The GDR is, thus, 
after an internal allocation of interests, the testing ground for a fundamental restructuring of press 
distribution in a future united Germany.”1612 With this statement also having been quoted in the article 
above, the publisher pushed its argument about a possible future systemic shift in distribution from 
mostly medium-sized, independent to “Grosso-enterprises owned by or dependent on publishers.”1613 
This needed to be stopped immediately by the GDR, not simply for matters of distribution but “through
it, for the freedom of the press per se.”1614 
Impatiently waiting for a response, the publisher went a step further and addressed the Federal 
1608“unter Rechtsbruch und unter Behinderung des DDR-Presse-Vertriebsunternehmens (Erste Presse Vertriebs 
GmbH/EPV) den Aufbau eines monopolähnlichen Vertriebssystems forciert, in welchem dem einzelnen Zeitungshändler
die Moglichkeit, mit mehreren Grossisten zusammenzuarbeiten und damit die Vertragsfreiheit weitgehend entzogen 
wird.”Attachment, Punktation zur aktuellen Berliner Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 1990, Letter, Lothar C. Poll,
Tagesspiegel, to Gottfried Müller, June 25, 1990, Der Tagesspiegel, BArch DC9/1070.  
1609Attachment, Punktation zur aktuellen Berliner Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 1990, Letter, Lothar C. Poll, 
Tagesspiegel, to Gottfried Müller, June 25, 1990, Der Tagesspiegel, BArch DC9/1070.  
1610Letter, Christian Hädler and Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Lothar de Maizière, Ministerpräsident der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, July 6, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
1611“bundesdeutschen Großverlage nehmen die Öffnung der DDR zum Anlaß.” Attachment, Punktation zur aktuellen 
Berliner Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 1990, Letter, Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Gottfried Müller, June 25, 
1990, Der Tagesspiegel, BArch DC9/1070.  
1612“Das Gebiet der DDR ist daher nach interner Interessenaufteilung das Versuchsfeld für eine grundlegende 
Umstrukturierung des Pressevertriebs im künftigen Gesamtdeutschland.” Attachment, Punktation zur aktuellen Berliner 
Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 1990, Letter, Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Gottfried Müller, June 25, 1990, 
Der Tagesspiegel, BArch DC9/1070.  
1613“verlagseigene bzw. verlagsabhängige Grosso-Firmen.” Attachment, Punktation zur aktuellen Berliner 
Vertriebssituation, Berlin, den 22. Juni 1990, Letter, Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Gottfried Müller, June 25, 1990, 
Der Tagesspiegel, BArch DC9/1070.  
1614“damit der Pressefreiheit schlechthin.” Letter, Christian Hädler and Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Lothar de 
Maizière, Ministerpräsident der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, July 6, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
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Ministry of Economics in Bonn two days later. With the subject line, “cartel and monopoly formation 
in the press sector in the GDR,” Tagesspiegel asked the minister to address the issue of “Western 
investments in newspaper publishing enterprises (formerly VOBs) as well as in distribution … as 
quickly as possible in the talks and negotiations with your East German colleagues.”1615 Pointing again 
to the five Grosso-enterprises that had recently been established, Tagesspiegel claimed 
the initiators [major publishers], however, are relying on the lethargy of those who apply 
the law, and they are counting on an exemption permit at the expense of already existing 
and newly created Grosso enterprises independent of publishers. It is the goal of the 'Big 
Four' by way of the GDR to also gain a foothold in distribution in the Federal 
Republic.1616 
The publishers claimed that if this “coup de main” was successful, it would eliminate the currently 
existing competition.1617 In spite of Tagespiegel's urge for action, seven more such distribution 
companies were built in June/July, and by July 11, the MfM knew of a total of fifty-eight Grossisten in 
the GDR.1618 
The Ministries of Economy and Ulterior Motives
 The BMI took initiative about a month later, an eternity considering the fast-paced negotiations
and the daily struggles of papers and Grossisten in the GDR.1619 After having inquired at the Cartel 
Office, the ministry wrote to the Economy Minister of the GDR, Gerhard Pohl, on August 3, 1990. 
Asking Pohl to support the building of a “press distribution system in the GDR, which guarantees the 
undistorted sales of newspapers and magazines and the market entry for every competitor,” it made 
also clear that “[o]n part of the federal government, Minister of the Interior Dr. Schäuble already 
submitted [its] respective principles to the government of the GDR in early March.1620 Repeating what 
1615“Kartell- und Monopolbildung im DDR-Pressebereich … der westlichen Beteiligung an Zeitungsverlagbetrieben 
früherer VOBs, als auch im Pressevertrieb … moglichst rasch in den Gesprächs- und Verhandlungsrunden mit Ihren 
Kollegen in der DDR.” Letter, Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Helmut Haussmann, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
July 9, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
1616“die Initiatoren bauen jedoch auf die Lethargie der Gesetzanwender und rechnen mit einer Ausnahmebewilligung zu 
Lasten bereits vorhandener und neugebildeter verlagsunabhängiger DDR-Grosso-Unternehmen.  Ziel der „Big Four“ ist,
über den Umweg der DDR auch den Vertrieb der heutigen Bundesrepublik in die Hand zu bekommen.” Letter, Lothar 
C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Helmut Haussmann, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, July 9, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
1617“Handstreich.” Letter, Lothar C. Poll, Tagesspiegel, to Helmut Haussmann, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, July 9, 
1990, BArch DE10/16. 
1618Press conference material, R. Müller, Abteilung Inneres und Organisation, Zuarbeit für die heutige international 
Pressekonferenz, July 11, 1990, BArch DC9/1050. 
1619Note: Economic Minister Dr. Hausmann put in charge state secretary Dr. Schlecht.
1620“Pressevertriebssystem in der DDR … das den wettbewerbsneutralen Abbsatz von Presseerzeugnissen und den 
Marktzugang für jeden Wettbewerber sicherstellt. Für die Bundesegierung hatte Bundesinnminister Dr. Schäuble der 
Regierung der DDR entsprechende Grundsätze bereits Anfang März übermittelt.” Letter, Staatssekretär Schlecht, 
Bundesministerrium für Wirtschaft, to Gerhard Pohl, Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Bonn, August 3, 1990, BArch 
DE10/16. 
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had been known before and referring to a document that had been submitted half a year earlier, the 
ministry had little to add. It had been informed that the Office of Competition Protection was 
investigating whether administrative procedures should be initiated against the major publishers for 
refusing to supply independent Grossisten. A clear stand of the government of the GDR, the ministry 
pointed out, would give it more political backup.1621 
The letter was received by the secretary of the East German Ministry of Economy on August 7. 
Three days later, its Unit for Principle Questions of Competition Policy (Referat Grundsatzfragen der 
Wettbewerbspolitik) had drafted an internal document on the matter. Not knowing the stand of the 
Cartel Office, to the unit, it was the first time it was confronted with the “practice of an indirect 
complaint about other competitors,” a practice quite common in the Federal Republic.1622 While the unit
agreed that the tendencies of the Big Four laid out by Tagesspiegel had to be addressed at the fifth 
German-German expert meeting on competition on August 14, it took its own approach on the matter. 
It underlined, “that in our view, the Ministry of Economy must under no circumstance be made the 
advocate of Tagesspiegelʼs competition issues.”1623 While the points made by Tagesspiegel were 
important, the situation had to be evaluated from several angles. The unit specifically referred to 
“extensive talks” that had been held between Tagesspiegel, Springer and the East German paper Der 
Morgen.1624 While in May, both publishers had been in joint venture negotiations with Der Morgen, by 
June 30, only Springer was left and Tagesspiegel had fallen out of the picture (see Chapter 4 and 6). 
Taking this into consideration, the department concluded, the allegations of Tagesspigel regarding the 
major publishersʼ restricting competition for Grossissten, in fact, had less to do with issues of 
distribution. Instead, they more likely “relate to this newspaper being driven out of the GDR-business 
by Springer. This complaint, thus, has little to do with an overall interest in free competition.”1625 And 
1621Letter, Staatssekretär Schlecht, Bundesministerrium für Wirtschaft, to Gerhard Pohl, Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Bonn,
August 3, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
1622“Praxis einer indirekten Beschwerde über andere Wettbewerber.” Internal document, Referat Grundsatzfragen der 
Wettbewerbspolitik, Informationen für den Leiter der Abteilung II, Herrn Koschelle, zum Schreiben des Staatssekretärs 
Herrn Schlecht an Hernn Dr. Pohl (vom 3.8.1990), August 10, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
1623“daß unserer Auffassung nach sich das das Ministerium für Wirtschaft auf keinen Fall durch den 'TAGESSPIEGEL' zu
dessen Anwalt in Wettbewerbsfragen machen lassen darf.” Internal document, Referat Grundsatzfragen der 
Wettbewerbspolitik, Informationen für den Leiter der Abteilung II, Herrn Koschelle, zum Schreiben des Staatssekretärs 
Herrn Schlecht an Hernn Dr. Pohl (vom 3.8.1990), August 10, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
1624“intensive Gespräche.” Internal document, Referat Grundsatzfragen der Wettbewerbspolitik, Informationen für den 
Leiter der Abteilung II, Herrn Koschelle, zum Schreiben des Staatssekretärs Herrn Schlecht an Hernn Dr. Pohl (vom 
3.8.1990), August 10, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
1625“eine Verdrängung dieser Zeitung aus dem DDR-Geschäft durch den Springer-Verlag herrühren. Diese Beschwerde 
hat also mit einem Gesamtinteresse an einen [sic] freien Wettbewerb wenig zu tun.” Internal document, Referat 
Grundsatzfragen der Wettbewerbspolitik, Informationen für den Leiter der Abteilung II, Herrn Koschelle, zum 
Schreiben des Staatssekretärs Herrn Schlecht an Hernn Dr. Pohl (vom 3.8.1990), August 10, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
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this was the end to the Tagesspiegel campaign.
The Burden of and with Postal Distribution and a Call for Action by the MKR
“It seems that staff members [of Postal Distribution] find
it tiresome, if a publisher is interested in properly
supplying its readership. Troubleshooting 
does not take place.”
Letter, Die Kirche to the MPF, September 3, 19901626
While the debate over an independent Grosso-system went on, for many papers in the GDR the 
distribution situation had still not changed. Being dependent on Postal Distribution, just getting papers 
to retail locations or to end consumers remained a daily challenge. Generally used in the arguments of 
different interests groups for a “free press” in the GDR but ignored with regard to practical support, 
publishers kept on using the means available to them to make transparent their struggles. Several 
papers, in their attempt to draw attention to their problems, continued to publish articles and letters to 
the editor sent by their readership (see Chapter 4). 
Publishers also continuously addressed the MfM, the Media Commission and the MKR to 
protest against reoccurring distribution problems. The MKR consequently approached Lothar de 
Maizière on June 15, the same day the MPF and the Big Four reached an agreement over their 
allocation of tasks (see above). The MKR, on its part, filed an appeal against the MPF. It claimed that 
“products of publishers of the GDR are being discriminated against” and gave several examples to 
prove its point: various reports from different cities and villages claimed that East German publications
arrived at retail location in the early afternoon while West German publications were available at 
opening times; subscriptions were being delivered later than had been agreed upon, and an “especially 
blatant case” was reported from Mecklenburg were “the newspaper Bauern Echo [was being] delivered
with ready-made filled out cancellation forms.”1627 Though these issues had been discussed with 
Dietrich Germer from Postal Distribution at the MKR meeting on May 16, and though he had reassured
the council “that these alleged practices would be stopped,” they were still being practiced a month 
1626“Es erscheint so, als ob die Mitarbeiter dort es als lästig empfinden, wenn man als Verlag interssiert ist, die Leser 
ordentlich beliefern zu lassen. Eine Fehleranalyse findet nicht statt.” Letter, Sabine Hoffmann, Die Kirche, to Liebling, 
MPF, September 3, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21137.
1627“Erzeugnisse aus den Verlagen der DDR werden benachteidigt … besonders krasser Fall … die Zeitung 'Bauern Echo' 
mit vorgefertigten ausgefüllten Abbestellforumlaren ausgeliefert [wurde].” Letter, Kramer, Medienkontrollrat, to Lothar 
de Maizière, Ministerpräsident, Berlin, June 18, 1990, BArch DC20/6569, also in private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
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later.1628 Acknowledging the fact that the underlying issue here was that it had yet not been possible to 
established a comprehensive distribution system, the MKR underlined its insistence on a “level playing
field” (Chancengleichheit) for all publications. “Though the Media Control Council cannot itself 
become active, it insists that the responsible authorities must take action here.”1629 How slowly the 
administrative process worked, however, is indicated by the fact that this letter was forwarded to the 
MPF on June 28, the same day the major publishers decided on the founding of their first five Grosso-
enterprises for the GDR. The response to the letter came about a month later
The appeal of the MKR on behalf of the Bauern Echo and other publications had, in fact, been 
investigated. On July 17, 1990, MPF minister Wolf presented his findings to the prime minister. The 
specific incident regarding the paper Bauern Echo had been inspected before the MKR meeting on 
May 16, initiated by a story published in the paper itself. Subscribers of the paper had been contacted, 
the responsible employees had been held accountable, and the paper was being delivered regularly 
since May 9.1630 With regard to retail locations offering East German publications later than 
publications from the Federal Republic, Wolf pointed out that in rural areas print media and postal 
items were transported simultaneously once a day, and in most regions this included East and West 
German publications likewise. It followed that time differences in delivery were not possible. In some 
regions such as Neubrandenburg or parts of Potsdam, however, “West German publishers [directly] 
supply all retail locations, thus, also those of the German Post … with their publications.”1631 This 
practice was based on “respective contractual agreements” and might explain different delivery times 
for East or West German publications.1632 Put differently, Postal Distribution might be late in its 
distribution, but it could not be held accountable for any discriminating behavior. There were, Wolf 
pointed out, also late deliveries on the part of the publishers, such as of Der Morgen or Berliner 
Allgemeine, that “put an addition burden on the complicated situation of Postal Distribution.”1633 
Wolf underlined that since May 16, several decisions and practical steps had been taken to 
1628“daß diese beanstandeten Praktiken abgestellt würden.” Letter, Kramer, Medienkontrollrat, to Lothar de Maizière, 
Ministerpräsident, Berlin, June 18, 1990, BArch DC20/6569.
1629“Der Medienkontrollrat kann selbst nicht aktiv werden, aber er muß darauf bestehen, daß die verantwortlichen 
Gremien hier wirklich tätig werden.” Letter, Kramer, Medienkontrollrat, to Lothar de Maizière, Ministerpräsident, 
Berlin, June 18, 1990, BArch DC20/6569.
1630Letter, Wolf, Staatssekretär, to Lothar de Maizière, Ministerpräsident, Berlin, July 17, 1990, DC20/6848.
1631“beliefern BRD-Verlage alle Vertriebsstellen, also auch die Vertriebsstellen der Deutschen Post, … mit ihren 
Erzeugnissen selbst.” Letter, Wolf, Staatssekretär, to Lothar de Maizière, Ministerpräsident, Berlin, July 17, 1990, p. 2, 
DC20/6848.
1632“entsprechender vertraglicher Vereinbarungen.” Letter, Wolf, Staatssekretär, to Lothar de Maizière, Ministerpräsident, 
Berlin, July 17, 1990, p. 2, DC20/6848.
1633“die komplizierte Situation im Postzeitungsvertrieb zusätzlich belasten.” Letter, Wolf, Staatssekretär, to Lothar de 
Maizière, Ministerpräsident, Berlin, July 17, 1990, p. 3, DC20/6848.
327
improve the situation. All concrete incidences had been investigated, and Wolf had decided on 
comprehensive reforms of Postal Distribution based on the current situation and in view of a union of 
the Post Offices of both German states (see above “Theses on the Development of Postal Distribution” 
form April 27, 1990). This reform package included improved transportation and logistics, a 
modernization of postal newsstands and retail locations (Kioske), a separation of postal and newspaper 
delivery, as well as the “creation of partial services (transport, delivery) for subscriptions ... 
corresponding to the organization [of these matters] in the FRG.”1634 According to Wolf, this concept 
had been introduced to the MRK at its meeting on May 16. However, “changing the distribution system
for retail sale by creating modern, efficient postal Grosso-enterprises is failing due to the opposition of 
West German major publishing houses.”1635 While the MPF had not given up on the attempt to build 
such postal Grossisten, the publishers, according to Wolf, principally opposed any activity of the Post 
in the Grosso-system. Simultaneously, they were building “an exclusively privately organized press 
distribution” in violation of Article 1 of the May 2 resolution that defined Postal Distributionʼs 
independent position in the press distribution sector.1636 In shifting the focus to the publishers and to 
reform attempts that had been in the making for three months, Wolf deflected from the responsibilities 
and potential failings of the MPF.
Also the aforementioned EPV (Erste Presse Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH), an independent 
Grossist whom Tagesspiegel had taken as an example of the boycotting practices of the major 
publishers, wrote an appeal to the MfM. This example too bore proof for the slowness of administrative
processes in the face of fast-changing market conditions: EPV contacted the ministry on July 19; the 
response came on September 5, 1990, about a month before German unification. EPV, active in Berlin, 
Potsdam, Frankfurt/O. and Cottbus, was listed to have had about thirty staff members who delivered 
print media to about five-hundred retail locations.1637 In its appeal, the Grossist complained about the 
situation of press distribution in general and pointed to its own struggles with boycotts in particular, 
referring to the May 2 resolution as a legal backing to its claims. The MfM, however, though 
1634Full quote: “Schaffung von Teilleistungen (Beforderung, Zustellung) von Abonnementsbelieferung durch die Verlage 
entsprechend der Organisation in der BRD.” Letter, Wolf, Staatssekretär, to Lothar de Maizière, Ministerpräsident, 
Berlin, July 17, 1990, p. 3, DC20/6848.
1635“zur Veränderung des Vertriebssystems für den Einzelverkauf durch die Schaffung moderner leistungsfähiger 
Postgrossobetriebe scheitert am Widerstand der BRD-Großverlage.” Letter, Wolf, Staatssekretär, to Lothar de Maizière, 
Ministerpräsident, Berlin, July 17, 1990, p. 3, DC20/6848.
1636“ein ausschließlich privatwirtschaftlich organisiertes Pressegrosso.” Letter, Wolf, Staatssekretär, to Lothar de Maizière,
Ministerpräsident, Berlin, July 17, 1990, p. 3, DC20/6848.
1637Table, Übersicht über private Pressegrossisten mit Firmensitz in der DDR, über die das Ministerium für Medienpolitik 
bisher informiert wurde, Referat Registrierung/Statistik, Berlin, June 1, 1990, BArch DC9/1052. 
328
recognizing the appeal and discussing possible measures, made it very clear that “due to the completely
changed situation since July 1, 1990 and with the upcoming [German unification on] October 3, the 
leeway for state intervention has been … reduced significantly.”1638 Put differently, with the 
approaching German unification, the MfM, as a regulatory body that never had much leeway to begin 
with, now hoped for unification to settle the issue. With the accession of the GDR according to Article 
23 of the Federal Basic Law, federal law became applicable also in the newly created Eastern Länder 
(see Chapter 3).
Independent Grossisten vs. the Big Four
The Association of Independent Newspaper and Magazine Grossisten (Verband der 
unabhängigen Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Großhändler) formed under the leadership of Christian F. 
Christiansen (Berlin-West) on July 21, 1990. The association had developed out of the Association for 
Supporting an Independent Press Distribution in the GDR, and its building had come with considerable
struggles and personal investments.1639 Its members now demanded their share in the Grosso-system 
and – after a possible withdrawal of the Post – a takeover of its newsstands. It further emphasized that 
except for the regions around Magdeburg and Chemnitz, the GDR could be supplied by altogether 
sixteen independent Grossisten who now aimed to claim more space in the political arena.1640 Arguing 
that an independent distribution was far better than a system in which publishers held their own interest
shares, the association aimed to take on the Big Four.1641 The association made these claims just days 
before the media minister was to decide on the exemption permits for the four publishers.
The focus of the Big Four, therefore, lay on the upcoming meeting. On July 30, their chief 
executives met in Berlin, aiming to get their permits for building the “25-25-50”-model Grossisten. 
Burda managing director Horst Hilbertz, convinced of success, stated: “I will be extremely happy once 
the the Grosso-distribution problem is finally off the table. It has taken a lot out of all of us.”1642 By 
July 27, the line-up of twelve such Grossisten had been completed – only three days earlier, the major 
1638“aufgrund der seit 1. Juli 1990 und angesichts des bevorstehenden 3. Oktober vollig veränderte Situation, der 
Spielraum für staatliches Eingreifen … deutlich begrenzt ist.” Letter, Brendel, Büro des Ministerpräsidenten, to Gütsche,
EPV – Erste Presse Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin, September 5, 1990, BArch DC20/6569.
1639For personal accounts and histories see: Albrecht, Kai-Christian, and Beate Wurst (eds.), 25 Jahre Presse-Grosso Ost: 
Freiheit, Einheit, Vielfalt. Blattmacher und Handelspioniere in den neuen Bundesländern, Presse Fachverlag, 2016.
1640Cited in “DDR-Grossisten formieren sich,” Textintern, No. 72, July 25, 1990, pp. 1-2, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / 
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1641Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 9, BArch DC9/1050.
1642 “Ich bin heilfroh, wenn das Problem Grosso-Vertrieb endlich vom Tisch ist. Es hat uns alle viel Kraft gekostet.” Cited 
in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp.
1-17, p. 9, BArch DC9/1050.
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publishers had founded seven, adding to the already existing five distributors.1643 While the media 
journal textintern claimed that press distribution was, in fact, in West German hands with or without 
exemption permits, VDZ's Fürstner, also attending the meeting, was optimistic “that there will not be 
any major changes” and that the distribution model would be approved.1644 Independent distributors, 
according to Fürstner, had “zero chance.”1645 
During the meeting, the shareholders (major publishers, their East German managing directors, 
and Fürstner) made their argument that “universal supply” in the GDR was currently “not guaranteed 
because independent press distributors do not meet existing needs.”1646 It, thus, needed an exemption 
permit. The independent Grossisten, on the other hand, had claimed earlier, that “a functioning 
organization and sufficient distribution experience” was available but this was “capriciously boycotted”
by the major publishers, which then made the system inefficient.1647 The media minister, thus, needed 
to disallow a distribution that was organized by Grossisten affiliated with publishers. Fürstner, in 
response to this allegation, claimed that, after all, “[w]e have a free market economy – no one can be 
forced to make supply agreements.”1648 The major publishers had shown good will and had made offers
to independent Grossisten to join their distribution network, working, for instance, as managing 
directors; these offers, however, had been rejected.1649 
In spite of their arguments and their already established infrastructures, to their surprise, Müller 
did not give his permission. Instead, he deferred the decision until September, keeping press 
distribution in legal limbo. Dpa, later, speculated that Müllerʼs hesitation might have been rooted in the
offer of the newly founded Association of Independent Grossisten or in the fear of renewed accusations
1643“Countdown für Grosso im Osten” Horizont, July 27, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; 
Box 27-30, File 30. 
1644Quote: “DDR-Pressevertrieb in bundesdeutscher Hand,” Textintern, No. 73, July 27, 1990, p. 2, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. “dass es zu keinen grossen Änderungen kommen wird.” 
Cited in “Countdown für Grosso im Osten” Horizont, July 27, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1645“keine Chance.” Cited in “Countdown für Grosso im Osten” Horizont, July 27, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / 
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1646Full quote: “nicht bedarfsdeckend gewährleistet, weil unabhängige Pressegroßhändler nicht bedarfsdeckend und 
flächendeckend tätig sind.” In “DDR-Pressevertrieb in bundesdeutscher Hand,” Textintern, No. 73, July 27, 1990, p. 2, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1647“eine funktionierende Organisation und genügend Vertriebserfahrung … willkürlich boykottiert.” Cited in 
“Countdown für Grosso im Osten” Horizont, July 27, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; 
Box 27-30, File 30. 
1648“Wir haben eine freiheitliche Wirtschaftsordnung – niemand kann gezwungen werden, Lieferverträge abzuschließen.” 
Cited in “Countdown für Grosso im Osten” Horizont, July 27, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1649Cited in “Countdown für Grosso im Osten” Horizont, July 27, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
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of holding secret negotiations with the major publishing houses.1650 A different explanation, following 
the one given earlier: with a soon approaching German unification, press distribution fell under federal 
law and all regulatory steps of the Media Ministry would have been annulled; unification itself turned 
into a convenient regulatory act.
To the involved parties, however, it was not a matter of future regulations but of urgent 
currency. The next day, on July 31, the Association of Independent Grossisten spoke at the MKR, 
which had long favored a distribution system independent of publishers. Bachmann of the MfM 
attended the meeting as a guest. The association reported that the “impeding strategies of the Big Four”
continued and were “distorting competition” in that the publishers regularly boycotted independent 
Grossisten, which “threatened [their] existence” 1651 Bachmann, it was noted by the MKR, had little to 
set against such reports, and “exhausted himself in his answers undiluted by his expert knowledge in 
helpless rhetoric and repeated well-known declarations of intent.”1652 The MKR, in turn, urged Müller 
to take three different measures: first, no exemptions should be given to Grossisten owned by and or 
affiliated to publishers. Second, the full range of possibilities of the Office of Competition Protection to
sanction any practices that distorted competition needed be made use of. Third, the MfM needed to 
work closer with the Grossisten association.1653 
1650Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, BArch DC9/1050.
1651Full quote: “Verhinderungsstrategie der Großen Vier … mittels eines Lieferungsboykotts die freien Grossisten nicht 
zur flächendeckendes Entfaltung kommen lasse, damit wettbewerbsverzerrend und unmittelbar existenzgefährdend 
wirken.” Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 25.7.1990, Berlin, July 25, 1990, p. 1, Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1652“erschopfte sich in seinen von Sachkenntnis ungetrübten Antworten in hilfloser Rhetorik und repetierte bekannte 
Absichtserklärungen.” Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 25.7.1990, Berlin, July 25, 1990, 
p. 1, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1653Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 25.7.1990, Berlin, July 25, 1990, p. 2, Archiv Grünes 
Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
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The Cartel Office Takes Over
“The purpose of the planned Grosso, dependent on publishers, is
to organize press distribution according to the interests of the
shareholding publishers.”
Letter, Federal Cartel Office to Axel Springer Publishers, August
16, 19901654
By August 1990, however, nothing had changed with regard to the legal uncertainties and/or 
practiced realities in press distribution. In spite of the legal grey zone, spokespersons of the major 
publishers reported planned expansions of the publishersʼ Grosso-system and an increase from 
currently 7.000 to 13.000 sales points.1655 On August 8, representatives of the MfM, the Federal Cartel 
Office and the Grosso Association East (Ost-Grosso-Verband) met to discuss the future of the 
Resolution on Press Distribution. To Müller, this day, two months before German unification, became a
key date for heightened cooperation between the Cartel Office and the MfM.1656 Dpa speculated that 
with unification approaching, the office, which had already given its general approval to the Grosso-
model, would solve the distribution problem in favor of the major publishers.1657 And while the office 
was to take over authority, it took a different stand on the outcome. During the meeting with the MfM, 
it decided to maintain the initial policy line but to not apply the exception clause Section 3(2) to the 
Western cartel and its affiliates.1658 
About a week later, on August 16, the office contacted Springer regarding their meeting on 
April 4, during which it had given its general approval to the “25-25-50”-model (see above). With the 
office soon taking jurisdiction over the territory of the GDR, it wrote to the publisher, “as a reminder of
a, by now, significant point.”1659 In April, the office had tolerated the publishersʼ model under the 
1654“Zweck des geplanten verlagsabhängigen Grosso ist es, den Pressevertrieb nach den Interessen der beteiligten Verlage 
auszugestalten.” Letter, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Hamburg und Berlin, und andere; Zusammenwirken beim 
Pressegrossovertrieb; Prüfung nach § 37 a Abs. 1 I.V.m. § 1 GWB, Bundeskartellamt to Axel Springer, August 16, 
1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.  
1655Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 10, BArch DC9/1050.
1656Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), May 5, 1990, sent to author
in January 30, 2017.
1657Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 2, BArch DC9/1050.
1658Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 1990), May 5, 1990, sent to author
in January 30, 2017.
1659“an einen mittlerweile bedeutsam gewordenen Punkt zu erinnern.” Letter, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Hamburg und 
Berlin, und andere; Zusammenwirken beim Pressegrossovertrieb; Pruefung nach § 37 a Abs. 1 I.V.m. § 1 GWB, 
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preconditions that, first, there were no independent Grossisten and, second, that no consolidated system
of Grossisten owned by publishers would be established. The office now declared that both 
requirements were “not fulfilled,” and it would initiate prohibition proceedings against “collaborations 
especially of the major publishers” in distribution as soon as it held jurisdiction over the matter.1660 The 
office made clear, not only did the joint concept of the major publishers apply different standards to the
distribution of publications and, thus, negatively disadvantage other publishers, but it “limits also the 
competition of publishers in offering publications on the distribution market.”1661 This was because in 
the company agreements of Grossisten affiliated with publishers “the shareholding publishers limit the 
freedom of [other] publishers to also supply their publications to other Grosso-enterprises.”1662 This 
practice clearly limited the competitive chances of other publishers. Due to their large shares in the 
overall Grosso-system and likely large profits made in distribution, the major publishers took a 
dominant role within this set-up and could, thus, shape it according to their interests. This “limits 
competitive opportunities of smaller publishers in publishing and in establishing their less popular 
publications on the market,” for instance, by economizing distribution in the interest of bigger 
publishers.1663 The office, further, considered administrative procedures regarding the boycotting of 
independent Grossisten, which had no legal foothold in the Federal Republic. Instead, such a practice 
purely served the goal “of asserting a Grosso-system dependent on publishers [that was] questionable 
in matters of neutrality.”1664 And while the Cartel Office now took on the matter with regard to future 
jurisdictions, the dominant market position of the “25-25-50” Grossisten persisted and informed the 
scope of action of other institutions.
Bundeskartellamt to Axel Springer, August 16, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.  
1660“nicht erfüllt … Zusammenwirken insbesondere der Großverlage.” Letter, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Hamburg und 
Berlin, und andere; Zusammenwirken beim Pressegrossovertrieb; Pruefung nach § 37 a Abs. 1 I.V.m. § 1 GWB, 
Bundeskartellamt to Axel Springer, August 16, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.  
1661“beschränkt auch den Wettbewerb der Verlage als Anbieter von Presseerzeugnissen auf dem Vertriebsmarkt.” Letter, 
Axel Springer Verlag AG, Hamburg und Berlin, und andere; Zusammenwirken beim Pressegrossovertrieb; Pruefung 
nach § 37 a Abs. 1 I.V.m. § 1 GWB, Bundeskartellamt to Axel Springer, August 16, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen 
Niehof.  
1662“beschränken die beteiligten Verlage ihre Freiheit, ihre Presseerzeugnisse auch an andere Grossounternehmen 
auszuliefern.” Letter, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Hamburg und Berlin, und andere; Zusammenwirken beim 
Pressegrossovertrieb; Pruefung nach § 37 a Abs. 1 I.V.m. § 1 GWB, Bundeskartellamt to Axel Springer, August 16, 
1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.  
1663“schränkt die Wettbewerbsmoglichkeiten kleinerer Verlage bei der Herausbringung und Marktdurchsetzung ihrer 
weniger gängigen Verlagsobjekte ein.” Letter, Axel Springer Verlag AG, Hamburg und Berlin, und andere; 
Zusammenwirken beim Pressegrossovertrieb; Pruefung nach § 37 a Abs. 1 I.V.m. § 1 GWB, Bundeskartellamt to Axel 
Springer, August 16, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof.  
1664“ein unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Neutralität bedenkliches verlangsabhängiges Pressegrosso durchzusetzen.” Letter, 
Axel Springer Verlag AG, Hamburg und Berlin, und andere; Zusammenwirken beim Pressegrossovertrieb; Pruefung 
nach § 37 a Abs. 1 I.V.m. § 1 GWB, Bundeskartellamt to Axel Springer, August 16, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen 
Niehof.  
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By the end of August, the Post's head office reported to its respective institutions that twelve 
Grossisten affiliated with publishers were operating in the GDR, and they were capable of “supplying 
the entire press retail sector, including the retail locations of the Post, with the entire product range of 
East and West German publishers,” which made necessary a “changed allocation of tasks” on the side 
of the MPF.1665 Thus, plans for the MPF to build a postal Grosso-system were officially given up. The 
goal was to gradually decrease and eventually discontinue the distribution activity of the Post by March
31, 1990; at that point all distribution was to be taken over by private Grossisten.1666  
Conclusion – The Backdoor of Distribution
In August 1990, dpa gave its own overview of the recent developments in distribution in the 
GDR: The Post, in the lead-up to the media resolution of February 5 that lifted the postal monopoly 
over distribution, had aimed to adjust to an expanding market while keeping its monopoly by reaching 
out to possible cooperation partners in the Federal Republic.1667 In mid-January, the MPF approached 
the West German major publishers, namely Springer, Burda, Bauer and Gruner + Jahr to improve its 
distribution infrastructures. Negotiations between the MPF and the Big Four publishers were kept 
secret “[d]ue to the strong wish of the Post,” a narrative that was later widely publicized.1668 When 
negotiations became known shortly before the Council of Ministers was to decide on a joint venture 
between the MPF and the Big Four, small and medium-sized West German publishers protested 
fiercely. In particular the publisher Jahreszeiten started an information campaign against these “secret 
negotiations.” Core argument: the list of publications for distribution in the GDR, containing between 
seventy to 100 West German newspapers and magazines, gave one-sided advantage to those of the Big 
Four and left out publications of small and medium-sized publishers. Jahreszeiten succeeded in its 
campaign in that the deal between the Post and the Big Four fell through.1669 Eventually the objections 
of the Council of Ministers ended the plans for a distribution joint-venture between the Big Four and 
1665“die in der Lage sind, den gesamten Zeitungseinzelhandel, einschließlich der Verkaufsstellen der Deutschen Post, mit 
dem gesamten Pressesortiment der BRD- und DDR-Verlage zu beliefern … veränderte Aufgabenabgrenzung” Letter, 
Deutsche Post, Generaldirektion Postdienst, to Alle BDP und ZVA, August 20, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen 
Niehof. 
1666“veränderte Aufgabenabgrenzung” Letter, Deutsche Post, Generaldirektion Postdienst, to Alle BDP und ZVA, August 
20, 1990, private archive Hans-Jürgen Niehof. 
1667Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, BArch DC9/1050.
1668“Auf dringenden Wunsch der DDR-Post hielten die vier Verlagshäuser die Gespräche geheim.” Deutsche Presse 
Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 4, BArch 
DC9/1050.
1669Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 4, BArch DC9/1050.
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the East German Post on February 1. Four days before the media resolution was passed and the Postʼs 
monopoly became obsolete, the decision of the council began of a long struggle over press distribution 
in the GDR. It culminated in the eventual “press coup of the 'Big Four'.”1670 In March 1990, Burda, 
Springer, Gruner+Jahr and Bauer started their own distribution system focusing mainly on the direct 
supply of their own products. In doing so, they stood in direct competition with Postal Distribution. 
This set a strong basis for the availability of West German print media in the GDR.
While this narrative of dpa laid open – and was critical of –  the strategies employed by the 
major West German publishers to explore the East German market, it still followed a narrative widely 
circulated by the publishers themselves. As this chapter has shown, archival findings suggest that this 
construction of events needs adjustments in several points: First, negotiations between institutions of 
the GDR and the major publishing houses on questions of import, distribution and sale started already 
in late November. The initial approach was made by the major publishing houses, not in a joint effort 
but in individual attempts to attain a quasi-monopoly market position as the exclusive West German 
partner in joint-venture activities with institutions of the GDR. Here, in particular G+J and Springer 
took a lead position. Both (in addition to Bauer) had business concepts ready for reforming East 
German media in general and the press in particular only weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 
particular G+J offered the first holistic approach in offering a financing scheme that allowed for 
comprehensive reform efforts based on advertising revenue affecting all media in the GDR. The 
substantial influence of the G+J concept lay, first, in the quick and seamless adoption of an 
advertising-based free press model and market logic to a planned media economy. Second, all policy 
proposals on the import and distribution of West German print media on side of the GDR were based 
on this concept, first by the MfK, later by the MPF. A reformative East German media (distribution) 
policy, thus, never developed in its own right but, from its offset, was a blue-print takeover of Western 
business proposals put into the service of political reform. The MPF, in its aim to maintain its control 
over distribution, rejected the proposal based solely on G+J and took over negotiations. Aiming at 
exploiting the competitive situation between publishers to its own advantage, it held individual 
negotiations with the publishers G+J, Bauer, Burda and Springer, now presenting concepts and ideas 
that had initially been introduced by G+J as their own. Core concern: the building of a joint venture 
distribution company with the Post.  
Here, in particular Springer had an all-inclusive and comprehensive approach to reforming the 
1670“Presse-Coup der 'Vier Großen'.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis 
Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 4, BArch DC9/1050.
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media in the GDR far beyond the initial concern of the MPF, and proposed its financing by means of 
advertising revenue. It framed its own efforts (such as taking over printing orders from East German 
publishers, marketing advertising time or marketing East German print media in the FRG) as political 
imperatives not as economically beneficial. In this way, the potential exploitation of new market 
opportunities were presented as standing in the service of reform. 
And while these individual deals were still in the making, the publishers had simultaneously 
consolidated their interests. On January 16, the “Big Four” presented a joint concept that envisioned a 
national distribution joint venture between the Post and the four major publishers. The concept, a 
continuation of a monopoly already in place with an added private interest component, also served the 
purpose of the MPF and its aim to maintain the strong position of Postal Distribution. It pushed further 
the introduction of West German market criteria and legal standards into the media economy of the 
GDR. While the publishersʼ concept officially gave control to an appointed East German committee to 
select West German publications for import, it made the marketability of publications the key 
prerequisite. This pre-set narrowing of choice made the Big Four the main beneficiaries and came 
along with a ready-made list of West German publications ready for import. The publishers justified 
this pre-selection and the maintaining of centralist structures with the urgent political situation and the 
high demand for (mainly West German) publications in the GDR. 
The dpa narrative left out this fundamental part of the story, mainly because these were deals 
made behind closed doors. It goes without saying that the concept provided by the publishers, in 
particular with regard to selecting publications based on market-criteria, would have been deemed 
illegal if held to West German legal standards. In effect, such a pre-selected list meant a head-start in 
winning over a potential future readership. Thus, while introducing market criteria and Western 
concepts of a privately owned press, the legal norms keeping them in check remained aside. Instead, 
they adapted  a market rationale to the centralized structures of a planned economy. 
The eventual policy proposal of the MPF from January 26, based on the publishers' concept 
grounded its purpose in “expanding the press range in the GDR” based on selected publications by 
means of a joint venture distribution company between the Post and the publishers. And though further 
publications were to be included gradually, small and medium-sized publishers went into opposition 
under the leadership of Jahreszeiten. Fearing the loss of a potential future readership to the Big Four 
and the Eastern expansion of their market domination, Jahreszeiten started a fierce information battle. 
Appealing also to the RT, the publisher primarily argued for a free press while pushing for the interests 
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of smaller West German publishers on the East German market and, thereby, followed familiar 
patterns.
Left out in the dpa account, it was the RT veto that ended the deal, and it was the debates at the  
RT that focused on the interests of the East German publishers. Arguing against the domination of any 
West German interest groups in the GDR, the RT pushed a point conveniently ignored by Jahreszeiten. 
The publisher was successful, however, in steering the controversy and making transparent the internal 
power interests in the VDZ that heavily favored the market-domineering publishers in the Federal 
Republic. Jahreszeiten did so, not because it fundamentally questioned well-known structures, but 
because it served its best current purposes and future interests. The information campaign and its 
appeal to the RT had not been the publisher's first choice of negotiation but only its climax. Evidence 
shows that all relevant opposing Western parties, including Presse-Grosso, had initially aimed to work 
with the major publishing houses, not against them. In particular Jahreszeiten would later continue to 
do so while Presse-Grosso went into opposition fearing potential repercussions for established 
infrastructures in the Federal Republic. 
It follows that while all sides – the major publishing houses, the medium-sized ones, Presse-
Grosso as well as the MPF – argued for the citizensʼ rights for a free press, and freedom of opinion and 
expression in the GDR, their primary concerns lay in maintaining control over established structures or 
gaining control over new markets. None argued or acted on behalf of the interests of East German 
papers or publishers, not to speak of media workers. And while this general Western-centric approach 
comes out also in the dpa narrative, it leaves out the many East German institutions, including 
publishers, that had raised their grave concerns and made public their daily dilemmas with distribution. 
With the Big Four distributing exclusively West German print media, East German newspapers still 
relied on Postal Distribution. In spite of high fees, they consistently struggled with delayed or canceled 
deliveries to newsstands and subscribers. Generally used in the arguments of different interests groups 
for a “free press” in the GDR but ignored with regard to practical support, publishers kept on using the 
means available to them to make transparent these problems, and several papers published articles and 
letters to the editor (see also Chapter 4). These consistent and fierce protests were overlooked partly 
because they did not touch Western interests. It does not follow, however, that they were irrelevant. 
Especially the heated debates of the Round Table and the MKR bore proof of the dilemma of East 
German (media) institutions and publishers. Generally, however, none of the parties concerned with 
media policy argued completely on their own grounds. Their arguments and debates were generally 
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informed by information sent by opposing parties in the Federal Republic. 
A similar picture presented itself at the German-German media policy talks. While the rhetoric 
of the federal government generally underlined the need for a free press and a plurality of opinion in 
the GDR, the argumentation of the BMI gave clear indication for its close ties with the top-
management circles of the Big Four and the publishers associations BDZV and VDZ. This close 
relationship shifted slightly with increasing tensions but did not change fundamentally in its quality. 
And in spite of a rhetoric of support, open gaps in the press sector in the GDR were filled, if not in 
open cooperation with, then with the tacit acceptance of the federal government. Specifically the BMI 
did little to nothing to counteract the marketization of the East German press landscape by West 
German publishers. On the contrary, it explicitly supported the interests of the major West German 
institutions and gave a helping hand in securing their interests.
The MPF had an ambivalent role. Its overall goal to maintain the strong position of Post 
Distribution let to different strategies. Maintaining continuous communication with Big Four was one 
of them, shifting all responsibility for newly developed problems to the RT and MKR was another. The
latter, overloaded with tasks, was to decide on distribution issues already at its constitutive meeting on 
February 13. The MKR, like the BMI, soon held hearings, the BMI with the major lobbying groups of 
competing West German interests, the MKR with the East German Post. What was being explicitly 
supported by the BMI, namely the individual “grey zone” initiatives of West German publishers to sell 
their publications in the GDR, was being refuted by the MKR. Any such uncontrolled import and 
distribution schemes designed by Western publishers, according to the MKR, served them more than it 
served the GDR. The MKR, thus, took a clear and critical stance towards Western pressures exercised 
and their consequences for the democratic process in the GDR. This position and central role of the 
BMI are fundamental to understanding the policy level that underlay the distribution initiatives of the 
major publishers.
The BMI took a pragmatic approach: It rejected appeals from the GDR and claimed to have no 
jurisdiction in any press matters and/or individual actions of publishers. Because publishers were not 
breaking federal law, the ministry was in no position to make any adjustments or encourage the 
publishers to act differently. Arguing for its own neutrality in press matters, it still held a coordinating 
function, however, first, in bringing together and giving space to the major West (rather than East) 
German lobbying and interest groups, second, in fostering legal grey zone initiatives, and, third, in 
setting clear regulatory premises. The BMI pushed the point that nothing that was being built in the 
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GDR must endanger well-built infrastructures in the Federal Republic. This set clear guidelines, less so
for a free press in the GDR but for long-established interests in the FRG. With these three points 
combined, the BMI supported and pushed the idea that a “free press” was to come to the GDR via press
imports, and gave little to no consideration to reform processes from within. Though East German 
publishers were given some thought, the immediate measures focused on imports, not the least because 
of the upcoming elections heavily influenced by West German political interests (see Chapter 3). The 
BMI, thus, stood side by side with West German publishers; their interests met in the aim to sell West 
German print media and information to an East German readership, and to do so fast. This duality of 
reasoning, pointing to the lack of jurisdiction while being deeply engaged in dealing with (and 
encouraging) a factual one-German market, defined the BMI's role during the transition. This is an 
essential part of the story. It helps us understand that the push of West German major publishers onto 
the East German market did not happen purely on their own account, but it required political will. The 
line of argument of all was that of a free press and freedom of opinion in the GDR.
The MKR emancipated itself from this rhetoric in that it shifted the focus to long-term goals of 
the GDR and the building of a domestic free press. With the Big Four, having single-handedly divided 
East German distribution among themselves, the MKR eventually took the side of the Post. While the 
initial goal had been to break its strong position, now, Postal Distribution presented the only viable 
alternative to Western interests that aimed to fill a vacuum left by a lifted postal monopoly. Eventually 
authority was shifted back to the Post giving it the right the distribute Western print media in the GDR. 
The sheer speed of this policy initiative was mind-blowing. The Post, determined to not let go of Postal
Distribution, as soon as it was in the position of negotiating with West German publishers again, 
reinitiated contact. The MKR, on its part, aimed at finding its own stance in a debate that had, from its 
offset, been heavily influenced by Western interests. Without holding any regulatory or executive 
power on its own, it urged various institutions to act in a fast-changing situation that would soon 
outpace any regulatory means.
With the establishment of the MfM after the election, Media Minister Gottfried Müller referred 
to the Federal Cartel Office as the “spearhead” in the search for any legal means to set regulatory limits
to the dealings of the major publishers. This indicates the impotence of domestic institutions in the face
of the sheer market power of the major publishers. It also proves a succumbing to capital interests in 
search for a free press; after all, the Cartel Office was not per se concerned with matters of a free press 
but with its economic underpinnings. This left out various aspects of a transitioning press in a country 
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over which it had no jurisdiction. The Cartel Office hesitantly gave its consent to what G+J's Gerd 
Schulte-Hillen called the “25-25-50” Grossisten-model on April 4, declaring it to be “tolerable,” not 
preferable. In spite of not holding jurisdiction, the office was still considered the prime institution to be 
consulted with regard to business activities in the East; a fact that was by no means self-evident but 
spoke to the approach of Western interests to the GDR more generally.
 In response, the Resolution on Press Distribution of May 2 was a late attempt of the MfM to 
regulate distribution. While deeming the involvement of publishers in distribution illegal, its exception 
clause approved current practices. According to Müller, it was a “tool to limit the damage” owing to 
“the reality of a press market on which the major publishers had a domineering position.” Thus, the 
existing conflict between what was doable and what was desirable found its manifestation in the 
resolution itself. Its eventual amendment, similarly ambivalent, aimed to give greater agency and 
authority to independent Grossisten, only to again open the door for publishers' interests. The MfM, 
inconsequential in its resolution and ambivalent in its arguments, failed to bring about regulative 
measures. Instead it was caught in-between lines and generally driven by third-party interests.
The beneficiaries of this situation were the major publishing houses and their Grossisten who 
were soon to incorporate also East German publications to increase the legitimacy of their system but 
also to gain a stronger foothold in the market. During their continued negotiations with the MPF via the
VDZ they further agreed to soon start supplying postal retail locations (i.e. kiosks) and eventually 
started implementing the Big Four model from April 4, and by June 28, had built five Grossisten, by 
July 30, it was a total of twelve. Largely unchallenged the media minister refrained from making clear 
decisions, keeping press distribution in legal limbo. With a soon approaching German unification, the 
takeover of federal law itself was to turn into a convenient regulatory act, and two months before 
German unification, the Federal Cartel Office took a more prominent role in distribution negotiations. 
It prepared publishers for what was to come by declaring that it was to initiate prohibition proceedings 
against “collaborations especially of the major publishers” in distribution as soon as it held jurisdiction.
Here, again, the office took steps only once possible repercussions for established federal structures 
loomed on the horizon. 
At its last meeting, on September 19, 1990, the MKR took its time to discuss “the 'long' way” to
an independent Grosso-system, which, “though 'not yet over,' seems to lead to a compromise between 
independent and publishers' Grossisten, similar to the proportional representation in the Federal 
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Republic.”1671 And, indeed, after unification, under the leadership of the Federal Cartel Office, a 
compromise was reached on November 1, 1990. Of a total of nineteen Grossisten supplying the 
territory of the five new Eastern Länder, ten were independent, and nine worked according to the 
model introduced by the major publishers on April 4. The ten independent Grossisten distributed to 
about 40 percent of the East German population.1672 By January 1991, the publishers gave up their 
shares of three of those companies. The office further offered some former border regions to 
Grossisten from neighboring West German regions. This compromise remained a temporary agreement
(vorläufige Duldungserklärung) bound to several preconditions, such as neutrality, equal market 
chances, and price fixing to name a few.1673 Klammer sketches, however, how distribution remained an 
embattled sector until mid-July 1992, when Presso-Grosso and the major publishers eventually settled 
on a concrete compromise.1674 Until today, ownership structures in press distribution are, therefore, 
significantly different from those working in the Western part of Germany. And though Tagesspiegel's 
concerns that practices in the GDR would eventually bring down well-established structures in the 
Federal Republic did not become manifest, they did bring down sovereign and larger visions of a free 
press. The reason for both lay in the unquestioned establishment and continuation of economic and 
political interests manifest in press (distribution) structures in the Federal Republic.
The Post, trying to limit damages, outsourced retail sale to a wholly-owned subsidiary in 
September 1990 that was taken over and continued by the Federal Post Office until the end of 1997. 
Postal Distribution (PZV) was eventually dissolved. As of March 1990, a working group “liquidation 
Postal Distribution VGO” was in charge of the process that was finished by June 1992, and Postal 
Distribution ended its services on June 30, 1992. In its final report, the group underlined that its work 
1671“den 'langen' Weg des verlagsunabhängigen Presse-Grosso, der, obgleich 'noch nicht ausgestanden', auf einen 
Kompromiss zwischen freien und verlagsabhängigen Grossi [sic] analog dem Proporz in der Bundesrepublik 
hinzuführen scheint.” Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der letzten Medienkontrollratssitzung am 19.9.1990, Berlin, 
September 30, 1990, p. 1, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1672Albrecht, Kai-Christian, and Beate Wurst (eds.), 25 Jahre Presse-Grosso Ost: Freiheit, Einheit, Vielfalt. Blattmacher 
und Handelspioniere in den neuen Bundesländern, Presse Fachverlag, 2016, p. 63.
1673Cartel Office Report 1989/90, Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes über seine Tätigkeit in den Jahren 1989/90, 
Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, Bundeskartellamt, Drucksache 12/847, June 26, 1991, p. 106. Cartel Office 
Report 1991/92, Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes über seine Tätigkeit in den Jahren 1991/92 sowie über die Lage und 
Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet, Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, Bundeskartellamt, Drucksache 
12/5200, June 24, 1993. Both available online:  
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/DE/UeberUns/Publikationen/Taetigkeitsberichte/taetigkeitsberichte_node.html 
[Accessed February 10, 2018]. Klammer, Bernd, Pressevertrieb in Ostdeutschland. Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen
Interessen beim Aufbau eines Pressegroßhandelssystems nach der Oktoberwende 1989, Dortmunder Beiträge zur 
Zeitungsforschung, Band 56, München: Saur, 1998, p. 145. 
1674Klammer, Bernd, Pressevertrieb in Ostdeutschland. Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Interessen beim Aufbau eines
Pressegroßhandelssystems nach der Oktoberwende 1989, Dortmunder Beiträge zur Zeitungsforschung, Band 56, 
München: Saur, 1998, pp. 145-161.
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of liquidating a once so important enterprise in the former GDR had been “difficult and unpopular …. 
Especially tragic, that so many employees who had often, for many years, proved their hard work and 
competence needed to leave the Post.”1675 
1675“schwierig und unpopulär … Besonders tragisch war, daß so viele Mitarbeiter, die oftmals langjährig dem PZV ihren 
Fleiß und Ihr [sic] Konnen bewiesen hatten, aus dem Postdienst ausscheiden mußten.” Final report, “Abschlußbericht 
der Arbeitsgruppe 'Abwicklung Postvertrieb VGO,'” März 1991 bis Juni 1992, June 1992, p. 37, private archive Hans-
Jürgen Niehof.  
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CHAPTER 6: JOINT VENTURES
“They are playing a perfect game of Monopoly around us, and we
are nodding our heads as if we got the game.”
Wolfgang Tiedke, journalist, July 19901676
In February 1990, the left-leaning West German paper taz made clear that “distribution and 
sales is one story, an entering of West German major publishers into your press landscape by means of 
joint ventures is another.”1677 In April 1990, it added that even though the “flow” of West German 
publications into the GDR was talked about quite frequently, at this point, there was no radio station or 
newspaper “that is not already in negotiations over sales agreements – generally going over the heads 
of the employees.”1678 Thus, parallel to efforts of publishers to sell their products in the GDR and of the
major publishing houses to establish a new Grosso-system, all publishers “tried to get a good head-start
on market competition by getting shares in East German publishers.”1679 And the conditions were 
extremely favorable.
 On the economic level, as Konrad Weiß put is, all East German papers “are deep in the red.”1680
Without subsidies, they needed marketing expertise, communication infrastructures, and sales and 
advertising logistics to be economically feasible. On the material level, they suffered from outdated 
editorial and printing technology, and a general lack of resources (i.e. paper, office supplies etc.). The 
newspaper Norddeutsche Neuste Nachrichten, for instance, depended on printing plants of its 
competitor Bauer, and since May 1990, had to distribute Bauer's free TV guide supplement Telestar 
1676“Rundherum spielen sie perfekt Monopoly, und wir nicken freundlich, als hätten wir das Spiel kapiert.” Cited in, 
Druck aus dem Westen, journalist Special - DDR, 7/90, p. 23. 
1677“Der Vertrieb ist die eine Geschichte, ein Einsteigen bundesdeutscher Großverlage über Joint-ventures in eure 
Presselandschaft die andere.” Interview, “'Der Postminister übte Zensur aus' - Konrad Weiß von 'Demokratie Jetzt' und 
Mitglied der DDR Regierungskommission für ein neues Mediengesetz begründet den Beschluß gegen die 'big four',” 
Interview Ute Scheub (taz vom 10.2.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von
der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 124-125, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
1678“Eindringen … bei denen nicht bereits Kaufverhandlungen laufen – meist über die Kopfe der Belegschaft hinweg.” 
Cited in Aschenputtel auf dem Ball. Journalistinnen aus Ost und West diskutieren über Umbruch der Medienlandschaft 
und ihre eigene Zukunft, die tageszeitung, Ulrike Helwerth, April 24, 1990, DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
1679“versuchten, sich mit Beteiligungen an DDR-Verlagen eine günstige Ausgangsposition für den Wettbewerb zu 
verschaffen.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 
10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 10, BArch DC9/1050.
1680“stecken alle in den roten Zahlen.” Interview, “'Der Postminister übte Zensur aus' - Konrad Weiß von 'Demokratie 
Jetzt' und Mitglied der DDR Regierungskommission für ein neues Mediengesetz begründet den Beschluß gegen die 'big 
four',” Interview Ute Scheub (taz vom 10.2.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 
1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 124-125, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / 
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
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(16 pages, with a weekly circulation of 1.5 million copies) in return for printing services.1681 On the 
journalistic level, most papers were in the midst of internal reform processes that tookup time and 
resources. And though newspapers had claimed their independence, publishers that had not formerly 
been owned by the SED still struggled with monopolistic structures geared towards their dominant 
position (see Chapter 3). This referred in particular to former SED regional papers. All newspapers, 
however, faced problems with distribution and financing that only increased in the face of cut-throat 
competition from West German publishers over future market shares at newsstands (see Chapter 4). 
The West German magazine Spiegel claimed the losers were East German papers: The fear spread 
quickly “to fall victim to the price war at home,” and this fear made it seem that the only chance for 
survival was in cooperating with Western publishers.1682 The secretary of the Media Control Council 
(Medienkontrollrat, MKR), Andreas Graf, agreed but pointed out that joint ventures and cooperation 
agreements offered not simply a seeming stronghold or security but, in many cases, became an 
economic necessity or, as he put it, “inevitable.”1683 
Graf agreed with Media Minister Gottfried Müller who, over and over again, underlined the 
importance of transferring West German expertise and capital, “because we can see that many 
publishers will not survive without them,” only to conclude that “[b]y now, this is certainly not about 
the broadening of press freedom anymore.”1684 Müller particularly hoped for investments in newspapers
of former bloc parties or in new, smaller regional papers “that had carried the democratic movement,” 
and that were now struggling or had already folded due to the lack of capital.1685 “They need support to 
survive,” Müller claimed, whereas former SED regional papers still had high subscription numbers (see
Chapter 4) and were stable enough, though also in need of capital.1686 Given this context, Müller 
1681Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 11, BArch DC9/1050.
1682“schneller als befürchtet Opfer des Pressekrieges im eigenen Land zu werden.” Wie die Fliege im Netz, Der Spiegel, 
14/90, p. 136. Note: Deutschlandfunk agreed by pointing out that within a few months, “an acute existential fear 
amongst colleagues” of lay-offs and unemployment circulated within generally overstaffed editorial rooms, and became 
a dominant theme amongst media staff. “eine akute Existenzangst unter den Kollegen.” Situation auf dem 
Zeitungsmarkt, Deutschlandfunk, 7.15pm/3, 5/3/90, ISSH, 35a-b, DSC07814.
1683“unumgänglich.” ADN, Medienkontrollrat hält Kooperation BRD-Verlagen für unumgänglich, press release, 6/1/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08135. 
1684“denn wir sehen, daß viele Verlage ohne diese nicht auskommen werden … Inzwischen ist das wahrlich keine 
Erweiterung der Pressefreiheit mehr.” Cited in Minister Müller zur Pressekonzentration: Kein Vernichtungsfeldzug, eher
süßer Brei aus Verlegertopfen, Susanne Anger, Kontrapunkt, 13/90, 6/25/90, pp.6-8, p.7, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2). Also 
ADN, Medienkontrollrat hält Kooperation BRD-Verlagen für unumgänglich, press release, 6/1/90, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35d, DSC08135. 
1685“die die Demokratiebewegung mitgetragen haben.” Cited in Ostberliner Kartellwächter folgen westlichem Beispiel, 
Die Welt, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. Harte Zeiten, Frankfurter Rundschau, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08074. 
1686“Die brauchen Hilfe um zu überleben.” Cited in DDR-Pressemarkt ist aufgeteilt, Frankfurter Rundschau, 6/7/90, 
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viewed investments or joint-ventures (also higher then 50 percent) as “altogether desirable.”1687
Already in mid-January, at the German-German economic congress in East Berlin, Economic 
Minister Christa Luft had announced a radical shift in economic policies. Joint ventures with majority 
holdings of foreign investors were soon to be possible, if the overall aim of the company lay “in the 
economic interest of the GDR.”1688 Though these plans did not crystalize, by February 1990, there were
a “great number of registered joint venture initiatives” in different sectors of the economy.1689 By April 
1990, joint venture negotiations in the press sector were being held in “humongous dimensions.”1690 
Cooperations took different shapes and forms: generally, West German partners took a 49 percent share
and contributed capital investments and/or the technology for editorial systems or printing facilities. 51 
percent of the holdings came from the East German publisher that provided the readership, addresses 
and facilities.
Different interest groups in the Federal Republic watched closely what was happening in the 
GDR. Kurt Hübner (see Chapter 3) claimed West German corporate media and newspaper publishers 
“are acting like in colonial times,” and its consequences were soon to be felt in the Federal Republic.1691
It was not exclusively corporate media and newspaper publishers but, as Verena Metze-Mangold, press 
spokesperson of the West German public broadcasting institution ARD, pointed out, also public 
broadcasters had their plans for a takeover of the GDR. Metze-Mangold, however, criticized the 
“accusing mindset” of East Germans; in the end, it was their own people who were in search for capital
in the West.1692 In the current “'legal vacuum' continuous concessions were being made to big money: 
past anti-trust legislation, a competitive fight to the death, conditions like in the early days of 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. 
1687“durchaus wünschenswert.” dpa, DDR-Medienminister: Vorrang für offentlich-rechtliches System,  dpa-
informationen, 20/90, 5/17/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
1688“im volkswirtschaftlichen Interesse der DDR.” Cited in Information box, Infokasten 13./14.1.90, taz - DDR Journal 
Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der 
Wahlurnen, p. 22, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
1689“gemeldete große Zahl von Joint-Venture-Vorhaben.” “Wenn die D-Mark den Osten überrollt. Ein Szenario,” Kurt 
Hübner (taz vom 07.2.90), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des
Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 83-85, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; 
Box 31-38, File 33. 
1690“usurpatorische Dimensionen.” Sabine Zumühl, freelance journalist, cited in “Aschenputtel auf dem Ball. 
Journalistinnen aus Ost und West diskutieren über Umbruch der Medienlandschaft und ihre eigene Zukunft,” die 
tageszeitung, Ulrike Helwerth, April 24, 1990, DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
1691“verhielten sich wie im Zeitalter des Kolonialismus.” Cited in Protocol, Protokoll der Sitzung der 
Bundesmedienkommission vom 31.05. 1990, May 31, 1990, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/25499.
1692“Vorwurfsmentalität.” Cited in Aschenputtel auf dem Ball. Journalistinnen aus Ost und West diskutieren über 
Umbruch der Medienlandschaft und ihre eigene Zukunft, die tageszeitung, Ulrike Helwerth, April 24, 1990, DC 9/1033 
(1/2). 
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capitalism.”1693 Editor-in-chief of the former SED regional paper Leipziger Volkszeitung (LVZ) 
Wolfgang Tiedke gave the other side to the story. He argued that without West German capital, sooner 
or later, most newspapers would disappear. Such cooperation need not to be love matches but 
marriages of convenience, though the result might simply be badly made copies of West German 
blueprints.1694 The Round Table (RT) was critical of investments as the one and only remedy to current 
struggles. “We need much more phantasy here, instead of constantly crying out for money from the 
West and for a monetary union that has been offered by Mister Kohl in deceiving ways,” Konrad Weiß 
claimed in February.1695 He underlined “that not everything should be sold now on unconditional 
terms,” but there needed to be a search for “alternative models,” as in the case of Neue Berliner 
Illustrierte, which had founded a cooperative for readers to join.1696 
In late May, Andreas Ruppert, representative of Gruner + Jahr, gave the major publishers' 
perspective. They, according to Ruppert, had already divided newspapers and magazines amongst each 
other. Particularly interesting to G+J were cooperation in the magazine sector and with former SED 
regional dailies.1697 Lists, containing the information of West German buyers and East German 
incumbent owners, circulated amongst publishers, and Ruppert underlined that the latter would only be 
able to face growing competitive pressures by means of alliances with West German partners. Their 
task was to quickly introduce Western standards with regard to paper, print and editorial capacities by 
means of capital investments.1698 Attempts to keep West German holdings as minority shares, however, 
1693““rechtsfreien Raum” würden immer wieder unglaubliche Konzessionen ans große Geld gemacht: vorbei an 
Kartellbestimmungen, Konkurrenz bis aufs Messer, Zustände wie im Frühkapitalismus.” Cited in Aschenputtel auf dem 
Ball. Journalistinnen aus Ost und West diskutieren über Umbruch der Medienlandschaft und ihre eigene Zukunft, die 
tageszeitung, Ulrike Helwerth, April 24, 1990, DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
1694APA, Westdeutsche Verlage investieren in der DDR – Diskussion zur Medienentwicklung der DDR im Salzburger 
ORF-Landesstudio, press release, 5/26/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08003.
1695“Hier muß noch viel mehr Phantasie her statt immer nach Westgeld zu schreien und nach der Währungsunion, die in 
Roßtäuschmanier von Herrn Kohl angeboten worden ist.” Interview, “'Der Postminister übte Zensur aus' - Konrad Weiß 
von 'Demokratie Jetzt' und Mitglied der DDR Regierungskommission für ein neues Mediengesetz begründet den 
Beschluß gegen die 'big four',” Interview Ute Scheub (taz vom 10.2.1990), taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der 
Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, pp. 124-125, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
1696“daß jetzt [nicht] alles bedingungslos verkauft werden sollte … Alternativmodelle.” Interview, “'Der Postminister übte 
Zensur aus' - Konrad Weiß von 'Demokratie Jetzt' und Mitglied der DDR Regierungskommission für ein neues 
Mediengesetz begründet den Beschluß gegen die 'big four',” Interview Ute Scheub (taz vom 10.2.1990), taz - DDR 
Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung 
der Wahlurnen, pp. 124-125, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
1697APA, Westdeutsche Verlage investieren in der DDR – Diskussion zur Medienentwicklung der DDR im Salzburger 
ORF-Landesstudio, press release, 5/26/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08003. Also Nur mit BRD-Partner 
überlebensfähig, Berliner Allgemeine, 5/28/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08004. ADN, Medienexperte: 
DDR-Medienmarkt ist aufgeteilt – Interesse an regionalen Zeitungen, press release, 5/29/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
File 35d, DSC08159.
1698ADN, Medienexperte: DDR-Medienmarkt ist aufgeteilt – Interesse an regionalen Zeitungen, press release, 5/29/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08159.
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would be very difficult to maintain.1699 
This chapter gives insights into the “game of poker over GDR-cooperations” and shows how 
joint-ventures became the third cornerstone in a larger political-economic shift in the press sector of the
GDR.1700 While the aforementioned study of Beate Schneider for the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
(Bundesministerium des Inneren, BMI) has documented in detail press ownership transfers in the 
Eastern part of Germany in the early 1990s, this chapter puts these shifts into their historical 
perspective. It gives insights into the political current behind this massive transit of ownership, first, by 
showing how East German institutions aimed to get a hold of them, and, second, by documenting the 
reluctance of the federal government to counteract structural shifts towards press concentration in the 
new Länder. 
Contrary to sales, which had connected political imperatives of a free press to those of a free 
market, and distribution, which had brought about infrastructures in joint efforts of the major 
publishers, joint-ventures in close relation to the privatization of East German publishers required a 
legal and institutional framework. This eventually fell under the jurisdiction of the trust agency 
Treuhand AG or Treuhandgesellschaft (THA), which took over in August 1990. Until the ownership of
papers and publishers was transferred under the authority and with the permission of the THA, as dpa 
made clear in August, any joint venture agreements remained statements of intent.1701 But while this 
was the official narrative, nothing in the estimate, reporting or language used on actual cooperation and
joint ventures agreements, either in newspaper coverage or by the publishers themselves, gave any 
indication that these agreements were intents only. And, similar to the last two chapters, also the basis 
for eventual joint ventures was preemptive cross-border cooperation and practices that, once put in 
place, were hard to change, and a general policy agenda of the federal government that did little to 
counteract market realities. 
1699APA, Westdeutsche Verlage investieren in der DDR – Diskussion zur Medienentwicklung der DDR im Salzburger 
ORF-Landesstudio, press release, 5/26/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08003. Also Nur mit BRD-Partner 
überlebensfähig, Berliner Allgemeine, 5/28/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08004. 
1700“Poker um DDR-Kooperation.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis 
Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 13, BArch DC9/1050.
1701Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 10, BArch DC9/1050.
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Early Cooperations and a Joint Venture Boom
“Western interests in newspaper publishers
of former VOBs as well as in press
distribution run the risk to preclude, at the
outset, what we in this country call
competition.”1702
Letter of Tagesspiegel to the Federal Ministry of Economics, July 9, 1990
 During the RT meeting on February 12, discussions over press distribution moved to joint 
ventures. One RT member reported negotiations in Dresden between the director of the major printing 
plant Volkerfreundschaft (formerly under SED ownership), “now nominally transferred into people's 
property,” and possibly Springer and/or Gruner + Jahr.1703 “We think that what is being tried here is to 
close deals in an uncertain legal situation, or in this point almost a legal vacuum, which, according to 
our understanding, is completely unlawful and definitely needs to be examined or blocked by the 
Media Control Council as soon as possible.”1704 The printing plant only stood exemplary for early 
cooperation negotiations that were being held in increasing numbers between East and West German 
press-related enterprises and that went under the radar of any legislative framework. Checking on their 
legality fell to the MKR, which was to have its constitutive meeting the following day. 
With pressing issues in distribution (see Chapter 5), throughout March, the MKR discussed 
cooperation and joint venture issues with the overall aim of finding ground-rules to keep them in check.
According to the February 5 resolution, it was on the MKR to authorize or approve foreign capital 
investments in publishers in the GDR (see Chapter 3). The council underlined that this right of 
approval aimed “not at blocking media joint-ventures but [it aimed] for transparency … we should not 
find ourselves in the situation of a new monopoly influencing public opinion.”1705 According to MKR 
member Wolfgang Kleinwächter, the council's guidelines were, first, “that the respective shareholder 
1702“sowohl bei der westlichen Beteiligung an Zeitungsverlagsbetrieben früherer VOBs, als auch im Pressevertrieb drohen 
Zustände, die das, was wir hierzulande Wettbewerb nennen, von vornherein ausschließen.” Letter, Lothar C. Poll, 
Tagesspiegel, to Helmut Haussmann, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, July 8, 1990, BArch DE10/16. 
1703“jetzt nominell in Volkseigentum überführt.” Protocol, Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 10, BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
1704“Wir denken, daß auch hier wiederum versucht wird, in einer noch rechtsunsicheren oder in diesem Punkt fast 
rechtsfreien Zeit, Verabredungen unter Dach und Fach zu bringen, die nach unserem Verständnis vollig rechtswidrig 
sind und die auf jeden Fall schnellstens vom Medienkontrollrat geprüft bzw. blockiert werden sollten.” Protocol, 
Protokoll Runder Tisch, February 12, 1990, p. 10, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1705“nicht auf Blockade von medialen Joint ventures, sondern auf Tranzparenz … Es darf nicht dazu kommen, daß sich ein
neues meinungbildenes Monopol herausbildet.” Cited in ADN, Medienkontrollrat hält Kooperation BRD-Verlagen für 
unumgänglich, press release, 6/1/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08135. 
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agreement makes references to the media resolution of the People's Chamber.”1706 This was to ensure 
employees' participative rights in media companies. Second, the MKR was to only allow foreign 
investment shares below 50 percent. No domestic and/or foreign publisher was to attain any sort of 
monopoly position, and majority shares of West German publishers in publishing and/or printing 
facilities were illegal. “The same applies to press start-ups in the GDR or any intended purchase of 
existing papers.”1707 All publishers, further, had to lay open to the MKR all relevant deals, negotiations 
and contracts.1708 
After the election on March 18 that had brought about a conservative government, joint venture 
negotiations skyrocketed, and by March 23, the MKR had received “a flood of new mail” on issues of 
cooperation, investments, joint ventures, and start-ups.1709 Due to the tremendous increase of inquiries, 
the MKR even created a temporary working group of four whose only task was to respond to incoming 
mail.1710 The MKR asked for the partnership agreements, in particular of start-ups, upon which to base 
its decision of approval. Cooperations with already existing publishers (Beteilungsanträge) needed 
statements of their respective works councils (Betriebsrat).
Inquiries were not just made to the MKR, however, but initially to individual newspapers and 
publishers. According to media researcher Jürgen Grubitzsch (part of the BMI study group around 
Beate Schneider), some newspapers received up to fifteen investment offers from West German 
publishers within several weeks; the former SED regional paper LVZ  received a total of seventeen.1711 
Already between late November and December 5, 1989 alone, the small LDPD regional paper 
Norddeutsche Zeitung (NdZ) had received at least five such inquiries. Offers came mainly from 
newspapers that were, similar to the NdZ, located in the northern part of Germany, such as Hamburger 
Abendblatt, Landeszeitung Lüneburg, or Lübecker Nachrichten. All proposed some sort of “close 
cooperations” or “exchange of our newspapers” or, as the publisher Morgenpost put it on November 
1706“daß im entsprechenden Gesellschaftsvertrag Bezug aus den Medien-Beschluß der Volkskammer genommen wird.” 
Mit beschränkten Vollmachten. Gespräch mit dem Mitglied des Medienkontrollrates Prof. Kleinwächter, Berliner 
Zeitung, 4/19/90, ISSH, 35a-b, DSC07836. See also notes, Gerhard Bächer, March 7, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / 
B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1707“Gleiches trifft zu auf Neugründungen von Presseerzeugnissen inder [sic] DDR bzw. den beabsichtigen Aufkauf 
bestehender Presseerzeugnisse.” Press release, Presseerklärung, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, March 21, 1990, p. 2, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1708ADN, Medienkontrollrat hält Kooperation BRD-Verlagen für unumgänglich, press release, 6/1/90, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35d, DSC08135. 
1709“eine Fülle von neuer Post.” Protocol, Ergebebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 21.3.1990, Berlin March,
23, 1990, p. 2,  IISH/ID-Archive MKR,  Box 1-4, File 1.
1710Protocol, Ergebebnisprotokoll der Medienkontrollratssitzung am 21.3.1990, Berlin March, 23, 1990, p. 2,  IISH/ID-
Archive MKR,  Box 1-4, File 1.
1711Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 11, BArch DC9/1050.
349
30, 1989, “cooperation initiatives, whether the exchange of editorial staff – which we have done 
already with the Sächsischen Zeitung – or cooperation in production, advertising or distribution.”1712 
Only three months later, the Lübecker Nachrichten, which had initially looked for “concrete talks [as] 
the basis for possible cooperation,” started distributing a free special edition once a week in the 
distribution area of the NdZ advertising job openings for East German journalists.1713 To keep his staff, 
editor-in-chief Günter Grasmeyer, like those of other LDPD papers (such as Der Morgen), had to raise 
wages while simultaneously decreasing all other expenses to keep the paper afloat.1714 
In May, the NdZ eventually started a cooperation with the Springer-owned Hamburger 
Abendblatt. For Springer, this was part of a larger market entry, announced by the publishers on May 
18, 1990: joint ventures had been arranged also between Hamburger Abendblatt and Sächsische 
Zeitung (Leipzig), and the Liberal-Demokratische Zeitung (Halle). The Springer-owned Berliner 
Morgenpost was to hold shares of the former LDPD paper Der Morgen.1715 Cooperation agreements 
entailed, for instance, the exchange of editorial staff and the furnishing of offices with modern 
electronic equipment.1716 The overall goal, according to Springer, was “to secure market positions and 
the competitiveness of the East German papers.”1717 Just a day earlier, Burda had announced it was 
planning a long-term collaboration with the Australian media magnate Rupert Murdoch, and Springer's 
Die Welt dedicated an entire page to the “spectacular deal” of “Burda making common cause with 
Murdoch in East Berlin.”1718 Both were to be equal partners in a printing plant, the expected location 
1712“engere Zusammenarbeit … Austausch unserer Zeitungen … Kooperationsansätze vom Austausch von Redakteuren – 
dies haben wir bereits mit der Sächsischen Zeitung praktiziert – bis hin zur Zusammenarbeit im Produktions-, Anzeigen-
oder Vertriebsbereich.” See Letter, Klaus J. Groth, Chefredakteur Lübecker Nachrichten, an Günter Grasmeyer, 
Chefredaktion NdZ, Lüneburg, November 27, 1989; Letter, F.J. Rausch, Chefredakteur Landeszeitung Lüneburg, an 
Grasmeyer, Chefredaktion NdZ, Lüneburg, December 1, 1989; Letter, Christian Nienhaus, Geschäftsführung 
Morgenpost Verlag, an Chefredaktion NdZ, Hamburg, November 30, 1989; Letter, Bernd U. Kirchner, Vertriebsdirektor
Handelsblatt, an Chefredaktion NdZ, Düsseldorf, December 5, 1989; Letter, Peter Kruse, Chefredakteur Hamburger 
Abendblatt, an Chefredakteur NdZ, Hamburg, December 5, 1989, all in Archiv des Liberalismus, NDZ / 31898. 
1713“konkrete Gespräche [als] die Basis für eine mogliche Zusammenarbeit.” Letter, Klaus J. Groth, Chefredakteur 
Lübecker Nachrichten, an Günter Grasmeyer, Chefredaktion NdZ, Lüneburg, November 27, 1989, Archiv des 
Liberalismus, NDZ / 31898. 
1714Letter, Günter Grasmeyer, Chefredakteur NdZ, to Pressestelle der LDP, February 20, 1990, Archiv des Liberalismus, 
NDZ / 31898. Note: Already in November 1989, Grasmeyer had pointed to an upcoming competitive media market in a 
detailed reform concept for the paper; his ideas had related to a radical change of content and profile, not of finances. 
See draft, Entwurf, Grobkonzeption zur Weiterentwicklung des Profils der NdZ, [gr], Schwerin, November 27, 1989, 
Archiv des Liberalismus, NDZ / 31898. 
1715Dpa, Springer steigt bei DDR-Zeitungen ein, press release, 5/18/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08044. 
1716Dpa, Springer steigt bei DDR-Zeitungen ein, press release, 5/18/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08044. 
1717“die Marktpositionen und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der DDR-Zeitungen abzusichern.” Cited in dpa, Springer steigt bei 
DDR-Zeitungen ein, press release, 5/18/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08044. 
1718“spektakuläre Deal.” In Ost-Berlin macht Burda gemeinsame Sache mit Murdoch, Die Welt, 5/17/90, ISSH, 35a-b, 
DSC07911. Note: According to Burda, starting in Fall the publisher's rotogravure printing plant in Darmstadt was to 
print the british Sunday magazine Sunday with a run of 6 Million copies. Another Sunday magazine of Murdoch with a 
run of 1.5 Million copies was to follow. Total value of the contract: 60 Million DM. In 1989, Burda printing plants 
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was East Berlin. Both publishers agreed that the “printing market in a unified Germany was particularly
interesting and a great entrepreneurial challenge.”1719 The project was to contain a three-digit-million 
investment volume. 
The Ministry of Media Policy (Ministerium für Medienpolitik, MfM) tried to keep track of 
these deals, which was hard enough to do, due to the pace and number of negotiations. Between May 
15 and May 22, the MfM issued three different surveys.1720 According to an earlier one, having 
contacted the twenty-three most important regional newspapers in the GDR, the MfM found that all 
had cooperation agreements of some sort with a West German publisher. Eight were cooperating with 
Bauer, and seven with Springer; both had the strongest foothold in the GDR, followed by Gruner+Jahr, 
and the WAZ Group, each with three such agreements. “Negotiations are at different stages, in several 
cases, [they are] ready to be confirmed. Our publishers and newspapers generally aim to keep West 
German shares below 50 percent.”1721 In many cases, as had been predicted by G+J's Andreas Ruppert, 
this goal fell through eventually.
A more comprehensive overview on “cooperations in the press sector,” based on several 
sources (questionnaires, publications, unofficial sources in Berlin, Bonn, Hamburg, Munich etc.), listed
the various states of cooperation agreements in more detail. According to this study, Springer (or its 
affiliates) was in cooperation talks, had joint-ventures with or was interested in buying a total of eleven 
papers. This included Märkische Volksstimme (circulation 391.000 copies), Ostsee-Zeitung (272.200 
copies) and Fussballwoche (285.000 copies). Bauer had five joint venture agreements closed, and five 
additional ones were in the making. G+J was planning a joint venture with Sächsische Zeitung 
(544.700 copies), and aimed at buying two more magazines. The WAZ Group planned on joint 
ventures with four newspapers, including Leipziger Volkszeitung with a circulation of almost 500.000 
generated a revenue of 407 (410) Million DM. While Murdoch was to hold shares of the Burda printing plants in 
Darmstadt, Burda was going to hold shares in the yet to be founded Murdoch company in the GDR. See Burda plant mit 
Murdoch, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5/17/90, ISSH, 35a-b, DSC07913. 
1719“Druckmarkt in einem vereinten Deutschland besonders interessant sei und eine große unternehmerische 
Herausforderung.” In Ost-Berlin macht Burda gemeinsame Sache mit Murdoch, Die Welt, 5/17/90, ISSH, 35a-b, 
DSC07911. 
1720Note: Earlier rather random surveys on the “Cooperation with FRG-newspapers or publishers,” or “Cooperations in the
press sector,” were soon followed by several others, giving a more detailed “Overview over cooperations of important 
regional papers” and an “Overview over cooperations of central publishers and media.” See table, 
Kooperationsbeziehungen im Pressebereich, May 15, 1990, pp. 1-4, BArch DC9/1050; Survey, Kooperation mit BRD-
Zeitungen bzw. Verlagen, May 16, 1990, BArch DC9/1050; Survey, Kooperation mit BRD-Zeitungen bzw. Verlagen, 
May 16, 1990, BArch DC9/1050; Survey, Übersicht über Kooperationen wichtiger Regionalzeitungem, und Übersicht 
über Kooperationen zentraler Verlage und Medien, May 22, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1721“Die Verhandlungen sind unterschiedlich weit gediehen, in mehreren Fällen bereits bestätigungsreif. Bei der 
Beteiligung wird im allgemeinen von unseren Verlagen und Zeitungen angestrebt, die BRD-Beteiligung unter 50 % zu 
halten.” Survey, Kooperation mit BRD-Zeitungen bzw. Verlagen, May 16, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
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copies. The publisher of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was in negotiation with VOB Union (see 
Chapter 3) on building a subsidiary – part of VOB Union were five newspapers with a total circulation 
of 280.000 copies.1722 Other, smaller West German publishers, such as Gong Verlag, Militaria Verlag, 
Seebald Verlag- und Druckerei GmbH, or Suttgarter Verlag Motor-Presse were in negotiations and/or 
had already built joined ventures with twelve different newspapers and magazines. Even the Bavarian 
Farmer's Association (Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsverband) was to enter the press market by building a
publishing company with the Deutschen Bauernverlag (i.e. Bauern Echo with a circulation of 100.000 
copies). Twenty-three other such cooperation agreements, negotiations or already existing subsidiaries 
of mainly small and medium-sized West German publishers were listed. This included, however, also 
leading papers such as Mitteldeutsche Zeitung (formerly Freiheit with a circulation of 580.000 copies) 
in negotiations with Du Mont Schauberg, and Thüringer Allgemeine (formerly Das Volk with a 
circulation of 410.000 copies) with the WAZ Group.1723 Added to this list were fifteen weeklies and 
other periodicals, such as Deutsche Wirtschaftszeitung (125.000 copies), all of which were also in 
cooperation with Western, mainly medium-sized publishers.1724 
The union magazine journalist summarized, in a comprehensive overview of the “newspaper 
market in the GDR,” that a total of thirty-eight “start-ups of West German publishers or of German-
German cooperations” and thirty-four “newspapers with West German partners” existed on the 
market.1725 While most of the start-up papers involved mainly small and medium-sized West German 
publishers, the majority of partnership and cooperation agreements involved the bigger and major 
publishing houses.1726 Essentially no East German publishers or newspapers (with a few exceptions, 
such as Neues Deutschland) were without an affiliated West German partner by mid-May. These 
“alliances between East and West German publishers are very diverse,” they ranged from the 
acquisition of advertisements to technical production aid.1727 “Predominantly,” however, they included 
“equity investments or preliminary agreements on such.”1728 Generally, the magazine concluded, “[t]he 
1722Table, Kooperationsbeziehungen im Pressebereich, May 15, 1990, pp. 1-4, BArch DC9/1050.
1723Table, Kooperationsbeziehungen im Pressebereich, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-8, BArch DC9/1050.
1724Table, Kooperationsbeziehungen im Pressebereich, May 15, 1990, pp. 9-10, BArch DC9/1050.
1725“Zeitungsmarkt in der DDR … Neugründungen von westdeutschen Verlagen oder mit deutsch-deutschen 
Kooperationen … DDR-Zeitungen mit westdeutschen Partnern.” Treffer sind Glücksache, Horst Roper, der journalist, 
6/90, pp. 32-35, p. 34, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08080.
1726Treffer sind Glücksache, Horst Roper, der journalist, 6/90, pp. 32-35, p. 34, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, 
DSC08080.
1727“Die Partnerschaft zwischen Ost-Verlagen und West-Verlagen sind sehr vielgestaltig.” Treffer sind Glücksache, Horst 
Roper, der journalist, 6/90, pp. 32-35, p. 34, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08080.
1728Full quote: “Überwiegend wurden allerdings auch Kapitalbeteiligungen vollzogen oder in Vorverträgen geregelt.” 
Treffer sind Glücksache, Horst Roper, der journalist, 6/90, pp. 32-35, p. 34, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, 
DSC08080
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development of German-German alliances is in flux.”1729 Not surprisingly, the MfM found about a 
week later that of ten major East German publishers, such as the Berliner Verlag with a total of seven 
publications and a circulation of 2.5 million copies, all were in negotiations with Western partners, the 
Berliner Verlag with several.1730 
The journalist reported, “[f]or weeks now, there has been a never ending stream of major 
publishing houses” aiming to get the deal.1731  “First, Springer was considered the hot favorite, now 
industry insiders think it might be the WAZ Group from Essen or Gruner+Jahr.”1732 In the end, it was to
become Robert Maxwell (Mirror Group), a deal initiated by Lothar Bisky and made by Gregor Gysi, 
the new head of the SED-PDS. To Gysi, “only one thing mattered, not Springer!”1733 The Berliner 
Verlag was to become the only East German publishers with foreign (non-German) share holders.
The MfM commonly learned of these cooperation agreements from newspapers and/or press 
releases. Also the MKR and the Media Commission of the People's Chamber relied on the press as the 
number one source of information over the joint ventures they were to keep in check. How non-
transparent negotiations were (only allowing for a reactive position of the MKR) became clear when 
MKR secretary Graf stated that though the state of negotiations was not clear, apparently Springer had 
bought also Sport-Verlag Berlin. Springer now dominated the sports magazine market with its other 
two publications Sport-Echo and Fußball-Woche, and there was, in fact, little that could be done.1734 
Due to the general reliance on press information, it was also not surprising that Müller, when being 
asked how many of such cooperation and joint venture agreements existed, announced at a press 
conference in June 1990 that the MfM knew of about one hundred such agreements out of the press. 
None of them (with the exception of three) had yet been registered or requested at the MKR or the 
Ministry of the Economy. They, therefore, were without any legal basis.1735 And while by June 20, 
industry insiders spoke of well over fifty West German publishers being active on the market in the 
1729Full quote: “Die Entwicklung der deutsch-deutschen Kooperation ist im Fluß.” Treffer sind Glücksache, Horst Roper, 
der journalist, 6/90, pp. 32-35, p. 34, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08080
1730Survey, Übersicht über Kooperationen wichtiger Regionalzeitungem, und Übersicht über Kooperationen zentraler 
Verlage und Medien, May 22, 1990, BArch DC9/1050.
1731 “Seit Wochen geben sich die Großverlage die Klinke in die Hand.” Schlechte Karten, journalist, 5/90, p.41, ISSH, 
35a-b, DSC07768.
1732 “Zuerst galt Springer als heißer Favorit, jetzt tippen Branchenkenner auf die Essener WAZ-Gruppe oder auf 
Gruner+Jahr.” Schlechte Karten, journalist, 5/90, p. 41, ISSH, 35a-b, DSC07768.
1733Personal communication, Gregor Gysi, interview, March 9, 2017.
1734“nicht auf Blockade von medialen Joint ventures, sondern auf Tranzparenz … Es darf nicht dazu kommen, daß sich ein
neues meinungbildenes Monopol herausbildet.” Cited in ADN, Medienkontrollrat hält Kooperation BRD-Verlagen für 
unumgänglich, press release, 6/1/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08135. 
1735Gegen Monopole – für freien Wettbewerb, Dieter Resch, Berliner Zeitung, 6/8/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, 
DSC08069. Also Medien in BRD und DDR: Alles unter Kontrolle?, Ute Thon, die tageszeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08071. 
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GDR, they emphasized that “due to a lacking legal basis,” they had only “closed preliminary 
contracts.”1736 
While some claimed that this “[r]estructuring of East German publishers brings many jobs;”1737 
the Association of Newspaper and Magazine Publishers of the GDR (Verband der Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR, VZZD) appealed to the MKR and claimed “we are being colonized.”1738 
The union magazine Publizistik und Kunst brought to point what various East German papers claimed 
and experienced:
[West] German publisher are overrunning the GDR not only by selling their newspapers 
and magazines – they are also exercising a massive buy out. The wave of mergers is so 
massive, as yet unparalleled in international media history.”1739
By the end of June 1990, West German publishers had founded about forty new newspapers (two 
nationals), and, in particular six publishers (Bauer, Springer, G+J, WAZ, FAZ, and Madsack), had “by 
July, secured their shares in virtually all East German publishing houses.”1740 By August 1990, any aim 
to enter the press market, particularly in the Berlin metropolitan area, was “like suicide,” considering 
“the major players” in the industry.1741 Particularly Bauer and Springer had established themselves 
strongest on the market with regard to cooperation and joint venture agreements but also in sales (see 
Chapter 4).1742 The earlier mentioned success of Springer's Bild with a circulation of about one million 
copies by June 1990 was possible only because of newly established East German regional editions of 
Bild by means of joint ventures.1743 
1736“aufgrund fehlender rechtlicher Grundlagen … Vorverträge abgeschlossen.” Dpa, Neuorganisation der DDR-Verlage 
bringt viele Arbeitsplätze, Dietmer von Ladiges, press release, 6/20/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08190. 
1737Dpa, Neuorganisation der DDR-Verlage bringt viele Arbeitsplätze, Dietmer von Ladiges, press release, 6/20/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08190. 
1738“Wir werden kolonialisiert.” Open letter, Verband der Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR, April 22, 1990, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR,  Box 1-4, File 1.
1739“Bundesdeutsche Verlage überrennen die DDR nicht nur durch den Vertrieb ihrer Zeitungen und Zeitschriften – sie 
kaufen sich in der DDR auch ganz massiv ein. Die Konzentrationswelle rollt in so gewaltiger Form, wie dies in der 
internationalen Mediengeschichte bisher einmalig ist.” Wolfgang Mayer, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, p.53, ISSH, 35a-b,
DSC07921. 
1740“sicherten sich bis Juli Beteiligungen an so gut wie allen DDR-Verlagshäusern.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 
“Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 2, BArch 
DC9/1050.
1741“ist es wohl selbstmorderisch hier auf den Markt zu wollen … mit den Großen.” Cited in Nicht nach dem Staat rufen, 
Mathias Heller and Michael Buschner, BZ am Abend, 8/1/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
1742dpa, Neuorganisation der DDR-Verlage bringt viele Arbeitsplätze, Dietmer von Ladiges, press release, 6/20/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08190. 
1743Note: Following the success of Bild, several tabloids were introduced to the GDR market, either sent from West 
Germany or newly established in the GDR. On June 11, four days after ADN had announced that one out of two GDR 
citizens reads Bild (see Chapter 4), G+J introduced the first edition of Dresdner Morgenpost with an overall circulation 
of 170.000 copies (sixteen pages for 60 Pfennig). Prior to its market introduction, G+J had run a test distribution of the 
Hamburger Morgenpost containing local pages (Wechselseiten) in Dresden. In August 1990, G+J included six local 
pages in its circulation of Hamburger Morgenpost in the region of Mecklenburg. As of June 18, the regions of Leipzig 
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The Office of Competition Protection and the Act against Restraints of 
Competition
“The existence of newspapers/magazines depends on the financial
strength of the publishers. The acute lack of financial resources
compels a most rapid, profitable cooperation with financially
strong partners.”
Internal note, Office of Competition Protection, early August
19901744
On March 21, the MKR had made clear that when investigating inquiries of West German 
publishers or already closed contracts involving capital investments, joint ventures or start-ups, it was 
to consult the Office of Competition Protection (Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz) as well as the Ministry of
Finance.1745 Also Lothar de Maizière, in his government policy statement on April 20, 1990, underlined
that “[i]n the light of competitive pressures of West German print media, it seems necessary to pass 
anti-trust legislation as quickly as possible.”1746 But in spite of the political urgency and though the 
Council of Minister had decided to create an Office of Competition Protection already on March 22, it 
took until late May/early June for the office to commence operations, and even then, it was hardly 
functional (see Chapter 3).1747 Even after May 1990, close cooperation between the MKR and the office
and Halle were covered as well. With a starting circulation of 200.000 copies, the publishers DuMont Schauberg (West 
German publications: Kölner Stadtanzeiger, Express) and Madsack (Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung) had joined 
forces by introducing the tabloid NP-Express. Their slogan: “NP-Express wants to become your friend” (“NP-Express 
will Ihr Freund werden”). Cited in Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis 
Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 1-17, p. 15, BArch DC9/1050.
1744 “Die Existenz von Zeitungen/Zeitschriften ist abhängig von der Finanzkraft der Verlage, da sie eng an diese gebunden 
sind. Der akute Finanzmangel der Verlage erzwingt jedoch eine moglichst schnelle, gewinnbringende Kooperation mit 
zahlungskräftigen Partnern.” Internal Note, Ergänzungen zu den Aussagen vom 1./2. 8. 1990, Amt für 
Wettbewerbschutz der DDR, n.d., [early August, 1990] BArch DE10/16.
1745Press release, Presseerklärung, Medienkontrollrat der DDR, March 21, 1990, p. 2, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 –
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 30. 
1746“Angesichts des Konkurrenzdrucks bundesdeutscher Printmedien scheint es geboten, schnellstmoglich kartellrechtliche
Bestimmungen zu erlassen.” Cited from Regierungserklärung des Ministerpräsidenten der DDR, Neues Deutschland, p. 
6, April 20, 1990, BArch DC9/1033 (1/2), folder 3. 
1747Note: A first meeting with the Federal Cartel Office on March 13, was soon followed by further administrative and 
legislative steps to bring about the official formation of the office. It took until May for the office to work at full 
capacity. Internal communication, Freier Wettbewerb – Grundsatz der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Bildung des Amtes für 
Wettbewerbsschutz beschlossen – Gesetze und erste Entscheidungen gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen sind 
vorbereitet, n.d., BArch DE10/67. See also, policy document, Information über die im Ergebnis vom 22. März 1990 
durchgeführeten Maßnahmen zur Bildung des Amtes für Wettbewerbsschutz, Berlin, May 21, 1990, BArch DE10/67. 
“Die Fusionskontrolle soll in der DDR nur in einer abgemilderten Form gelten,” Das Handelsblatt, June 7, 1990, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08071. Also “Medien in BRD und DDR: Alles unter Kontrolle?,” Ute Thon, die 
tageszeitung, June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08071. Also “DDR-Kartellbehorde nimmt Medien an 
die Kandare,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08072. Also “Ostberliner 
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happened only sporadically, if at all. This was partly due to the office's different stand on matters of 
cross-border joint ventures.
Already in early May, it announced it had started an inspection of the press sector, closely 
related to distribution practices and sales issues of West German publishers in the GDR.1748 According 
to vice president Reinhold Wutzke, accusations of “unfair competition” referred to unrestrained price 
dumping strategies of West German publishers, and their “restrictive practices towards developing 
medium-sized press Grossisten in the GDR.”1749 With regard to joint ventures, however, the Federal 
Cartel Office (note: not the Office of Competition Protection) had made it clear that it did not deem 
illegal minority shares of West German major publishers.1750 This indicates again how much the office 
relied on the weight of its federal partner in providing anti-trust ground rules. According to the 
president of the Federal Cartel Office, Wolfgang Kartte, even in the GDR, assessments about press 
consolidations needed to be made according the economic criteria only, thus, a potential “economically
dominant position” of a publisher, not according to its political orientation.1751 To prohibit joint 
ventures in the press sector for reasons of plurality of opinion was, thus, illegitimate given the federal 
legislative blueprint of the Office of Competition Protection. 
The latter followed this line of reasoning. For the press market, it noted that while the general, 
positive joint venture trend went towards regional papers, 
[t]he regionalization of these processes, however, comes along with an increasing 
complexity allowing only for a limited amount of reliable information with regard to 
start-ups, start-up partners, revenue, locality, conversions or mergers, closures etc., 
which, of course, would be the precondition for a targeted intervention on matters of 
competition.1752 
Kartellwächter folgen westlichem Beispiel,” Die Welt, June 7, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. 
1748DDR-Presseerzeugnisse kartellrechtlich schützen! Stellungnahme des Vizepräsidenten Dr. Reinhold Wutzke vom 
4.5.1990, das blatt, 13/90, p. 22, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08044. 
1749“unlauteren Wettbewerb … wettbewerbsbeschränkendem Verhalten gegenüber dem sich entwickelnden 
mittelständischen Pressegroßhandel der DDR.” DDR-Presseerzeugnisse kartellrechtlich schützen! Stellungnahme des 
Vizepräsidenten Dr. Reinhold Wutzke vom 4.5.1990, das blatt, 13/90, p.22, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, 
DSC08044. Note: Wutzke, while underlining that Postal Distribution did not meet current needs and that it required 
reform according to the West German Grosso-system, he was concerned that “West German major publishing houses 
have filled the gap” (“Bundesdeutsche Großverlage sind in die entstandene Lücke gestoßen”) by now controlling parts 
or all of press distribution in the GDR. This represented a “restrain of competition” (“wettbewerbsbeschränkend”), for it 
allowed publishing corporations to disadvantage smaller publishers in the distribution of their products under equal 
conditions. The current model served merely as a “guise for antitrust concerns” (“Deckmantel gegenüber 
kartellrechtlichen Bedenken”) while in practice it took a very different form.
1750DDR-Presseerzeugnisse kartellrechtlich schützen! Stellungnahme des Vizepräsidenten Dr. Reinhold Wutzke vom 
4.5.1990, das blatt, 13/90, p.22, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35c, DSC08044. 
1751“wirtschaftliche Vormachtstellung.” Cited in Gegen Monopole – für freien Wettbewerb, Dieter Resch, Berliner 
Zeitung, 6/8/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08069. 
1752“Die starke Regionalisierung der Prozesse ist jedoch mit ebenso starker Unübersichtlichkeit derselben verbunden, so 
daß gesicherte Erkenntnisse über Gründung, Gründungspartner, Umsatz, Gründungsgebiet, Wandlung oder 
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Still, due to increasing involvement of West German investors in all sectors of the economy, on June 7,
the Minister of Economics Gerhard Pohl introduced the Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) at a joint press conference with MfM minister Müller. The act 
(see Chapter 3) was to become effective on July 1, and according to Pohl, it set a fundamental 
framework “for introducing the market economy”1753 The act, based on the premise that the economy 
needed to be stimulated, which made necessary foreign capital and investments, gave great leeway to 
foreign investments: as pointed out by Handelsblatt, “some barriers must be set at a lower margin.”1754 
This, the paper noted, did not take care of the problem of “market dominance,” but, according to 
Wutzke, the high margin of discretion enshrined in the act allowed for faster decision-making-
processes and, thus, for shorter waiting periods (see Chapter 3); and for more foreign investments in 
the press sector.1755  
It was not without reason that the act was introduced at a press conference with Müller; the 
press-market served as a prime example of old and new monopolies merging.1756 Thus, after having 
introduced the details of the act, the focus lay on the new monopoly position of West German major 
publishers in distribution (see Chapter 5) and on investments of West German publishing houses in 
East newspapers. Both Pohl and Müller made it clear that they opposed mergers of East German 
publishers with dominant positions with likewise market-domineering publishers of the FRG.1757 
Müller pointed out, the “real problem” of press concentration in the GDR related to the fifteen former 
SED regional dailies; with circulation numbers between 200.000 and 600.000 copies daily, and an 
“incredible concentration of subscriptions,” they dominated the market in their respective regions.1758 
Fusionierung, Einstellung des Erscheinens etc. nur in geringem Umfang vorliegen, was natürlich Voraussetzung für ein 
gezieltes wettbewerbspolitisches Eingreifen wäre.” Internal Note, Ergänzungen zu den Aussagen vom 1./2. 8. 1990, Amt
für Wettbewerbschutz der DDR, n.d., [early August, 1990] BArch DE10/16.
1753Full quote: “Mit diesem Gesetz ist eine wichtige Grundlage für die Einführung der Marktwirtschaft geschaffen 
worden.” Cited in Ostberliner Kartellwächter folgen westlichem Beispiel, Die Welt, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File
35d, DSC08073. 
1754“müssen in der Übergangsphase einige Hürden etwas niedriger gesetzt werden.” Die Fusionskontrolle soll in der DDR 
nur in einer abgemilderten Form gelten, Das Handelsblatt, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08071. 
1755“Marktbeherrschung.” Die Fusionskontrolle soll in der DDR nur in einer abgemilderten Form gelten, Das 
Handelsblatt, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08071. Medien in BRD und DDR: Alles unter Kontrolle?, 
Ute Thon, die tageszeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08071. Also Medienminister: Etwa 100 
Fusionen im DDR-Pressewesen geplant, Der Tagesspiegel, 6/8/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08070. 
1756Medien in BRD und DDR: Alles unter Kontrolle?, Ute Thon, die tageszeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 
35d, DSC08071. 
1757Medienminister: Etwa 100 Fusionen im DDR-Pressewesen geplant, Der Tagesspiegel, 6/8/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
File 35d, DSC08070. 
1758“sagenhafte Abonnentendichte.” DDR-Pressemarkt ist aufgeteilt, Frankfurter Rundschau, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive 
MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. Also Medienminister: Etwa 100 Fusionen im DDR-Pressewesen geplant, Der Tagesspiegel,
6/8/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08070. Also DDR-Kartellbehorde nimmt Medien an die Kandare, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08072. Also DDR-Pressemarkt ist aufgeteilt, 
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They, therefore, became popular investment opportunities for West German publishing houses such as 
Springer. Repeating what he had noted in his diary earlier (see below), Müller argued that the new 
danger was that “the old SED monopolies are ... colliding with new monopolies.”1759 According to 
Pohl, in particular the activities of Springer were geared to achieving a dominant market position in the
GDR.1760 
Müller underlined that any current joint venture agreements were not legal because no 
corresponding inquiries had been made to the Office of Competition Protection. Also the questions of 
ownership of former SED papers remained unsolved, and no East German newspaper had registered 
for a transition into a limited liability company with the office, which was the precondition for any 
such joint venture.1761 Pohl added that any such transitions from publicly owned enterprises 
(volkseigene Betriebe) to companies would have to be executed by July 1 and be finished by October 
3, 1990, otherwise their ownerships fell to the THA.1762 The office had contacted all relevant East 
German publishers to obtain information regarding their plans.1763 From now on, so Wutzke, “they 
[East German publishers] are obliged to send us the required documentation” for joint ventures, which 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung interpreted as the office “keeping media on a tight rein.”1764 With the act 
coming into effect retroactively, all agreements that had been made after January 26, 1990, could be 
put to a halt.1765 This, however, never took take place. 
Even though Wutzke also considered Springer investments in East German publishers to be 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. 
1759“die alten SED-Monopole mit neuen Monopolen zusammenstoßen” Cited in DDR-Pressemarkt ist aufgeteilt, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. Full quote: “Dann kommt zum alten 
SED-Monopol ein neues.” Cited in Ostberliner Kartellwächter folgen westlichem Beispiel, Die Welt, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. 
1760Gegen Monopole – für freien Wettbewerb, Dieter Resch, Berliner Zeitung, 6/8/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, 
DSC08069. Medienminister: Etwa 100 Fusionen im DDR-Pressewesen geplant, Der Tagesspiegel, 6/8/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08070. Also ADN, Wettbewerbs-Gesetz soll Monopolstellungen verhindern, press release, 
6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08075. 
1761Die Fusionskontrolle soll in der DDR nur in einer abgemilderten Form gelten, Das Handelsblatt, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08071. Also ADN, Wettbewerbs-Gesetz soll Monopolstellungen verhindern, press release, 
6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08075. Also DDR-Pressemarkt ist aufgeteilt, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. 
1762ADN, Wettbewerbs-Gesetz soll Monopolstellungen verhindern, press release, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d,
DSC08075. Also DFF, AK am Abend, radio transcript, 6/7/90, 7:30 pm, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08074.
1763DDR-Kartellbehorde nimmt Medien an die Kandare, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, 
DSC08072. 
1764“haben sie die Pflicht, und die Unterlagen zu schicken.” Cited in Ostberliner Kartellwächter folgen westlichem 
Beispiel, Die Welt, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. DDR-Kartellbehorde nimmt Medien an die 
Kandare, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08072. 
1765Also Ostberliner Kartellwächter folgen westlichem Beispiel, Die Welt, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, 
DSC08073. Also Medien in BRD und DDR: Alles unter Kontrolle?, Ute Thon, die tageszeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08071.
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“worrisome” and aimed to examine closed deals retroactively, a restrictive joint venture regulation did 
not crystallize.1766 This was partly due to the great leeway given to West German capital investments 
enshrined in the act itself. It was also due to a lack of joint efforts on part of East German institutions. 
According to MKR's secretary Graf, it required a “sort of concerted effort” to enforce the media 
resolution and the act, which required the participation of the MfM, the Office of Competition Control, 
and the Media Commission.1767 The problem was only to be solved jointly by institutions that took 
different approaches to the meaning of a free press. While the MKR viewed itself as a guardian of 
media freedom and diversity of opinions, and expected media companies to acknowledge the resolution
of February 5 “also in its duties,” the Office of Competition Protection followed the market-based 
approach established in the Federal Republic. Following the Federal Cartel Office, a plurality of 
opinion was not to be implemented by means of ownership but the office was concerned with market 
concentration only.1768 This did not hold true for East Germany.
According to an internal note of the Office of Competition Protection, looming bankruptcies 
and the overall aim to maintain jobs, “often only leave no alternative but to link” East German 
publishers to West German investors.1769 This made “any interference in the cooperations of publishers 
in the GDR currently neither possible, nor (considering labor market aspects) desirable.”1770 The MfM, 
on its part, weary of accusations of controlling the media, deferred to the Office of Competition 
Protection for executive action. Müller repeated over and over that the MfM did not hold any means to 
directly influence cross-border joint ventures and/or investments, partly because the use of bans and 
prohibitions was precarious, partly because the civil justice system had broken down. He could not 
even stipulate tax breaks, which otherwise would be a means to help smaller and new papers.1771 
The constant push of the MKR to enact anti-trust legislation remained unnoticed. Even Müller 
acknowledged that the office “is relatively reluctant to assess market concentrations [that would be] 
1766“bedenklich.” Cited in Medienminister: Etwa 100 Fusionen im DDR-Pressewesen geplant, Der Tagesspiegel, 6/8/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08070. Also Ostberliner Kartellwächter folgen westlichem Beispiel, Die Welt, 
6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08073. Also Medien in BRD und DDR: Alles unter Kontrolle?, Ute Thon,
die tageszeitung, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08071.
1767“Art konzentrierter Aktion.” ADN, Medienkontrollrat hält Kooperation BRD-Verlagen für unumgänglich, press 
release, 6/1/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08135. 
1768“auch in den Pflichten.”ADN, Medienkontrollrat hält Kooperation BRD-Verlagen für unumgänglich, press 
release, 6/1/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08135. 
1769“bleibt meist nur das alternativlose Binden.” Internal Note, Ergänzungen zu den Aussagen vom 1./2. 8. 1990, Amt für 
Wettbewerbschutz der DDR, n.d., [early August, 1990] BArch DE10/16.
1770“das Eingreifen in die Kooperationsbeziehungen der DDR-Verlag [sic] derzeit weder moglich noch (unter 
arbeitsmarktpolitischen Gesichtspunkten) wünschenswert.” Internal Note, Ergänzungen zu den Aussagen vom 1./2. 8. 
1990, Amt für Wettbewerbschutz der DDR, n.d., [early August, 1990] BArch DE10/16.
1771Nicht nach dem Staat rufen, Mathias Heller and Michael Buschner, BZA, 8/1/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
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inadmissible everywhere else.”1772 With the MfM in negotiations with the Treuhandanstalt over issues 
of ownership, the question of which papers were to remain on the market was going to be decided in 
the Fall.1773 Eventually, Müller turned the dilemma into a virtue. “Since it is always preferable to let 
self-regulating mechanisms come into effect than to just intervene randomly,” he stated, he looked at 
the positive side – with the struggling and/or folding of newspapers across the country, at least former 
SED regional papers were stable enough, which was “encouraging.”1774 Müller knew, however, that the
reality looked somehow different.
The Big Four and SED Regional Papers, and the Struggles of Smaller Papers  
“Especially worrisome, the old SED monopoly of the 
regional papers is going together with new 
monopolies in the West.”
Diary entry of Gottfried Müller, May 18, 1990.1775
 
Former SED regional papers were “humongous units” with circulation numbers West German 
publishers could only dream of.1776 Bauer had managed to secure the biggest piece of this sector: With 
49 percent shares in the Brandenburger Neuste Nachrichten, Märkische Oderzeitung, Norddeutsche 
Neuste Nachrichten, Nordkurier, Schweriner Volkszeitung and Volksstimme, by June 1990, Bauer held 
a share in the circulation of about 1.2 million daily newspapers. It provided technological support 
(supply of editorial technology, copy machines etc.) and aimed at modernizing the outdated printing 
plants of its partners.1777 
Bauer was satisfied with its business in the GDR. Its six regional papers had lost little of their 
1772Full quote: “ist relativ zurückhaltend, überall schon unzulässige [Markt-] Konzentrationen festzustellen. Da hielt man 
sich bisher bedeckt, konstatierte aber, daß es sich um nachgerade europäische Maßstäbe handelt.” Cited in Nicht nach 
dem Staat rufen, Mathias Heller and Michael Buschner, BZ am Abend, 8/1/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
1773“wenn einerseits die Umstellung von Lesern wie Machern auf die Marktwirtschaft stattfand. Und wenn andererseits 
klar wird, wie die westdeutschen Partner in den Verlagen nach Klärung der Eigentumsfrage handeln, wie sich diese 
Partnerschaft stabilisiert und auswirkt.” Nicht nach dem Staat rufen, Mathias Heller and Michael Buschner, BZ am 
Abend, 8/1/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
1774Full quote: “Da es ja immer gut ist, wenn man nicht irgendwo eingreift, sondern wenn selbstregulierende 
Mechanismen wirken, finde ich die Regionalzeitungsentwicklung ermutigend.” Cited in Nicht nach dem Staat rufen, 
Mathias Heller and Michael Buschner, BZ am Abend, 8/1/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
1775“Besonders bedenklich: das alte SED-Monopol bei Bezirkszeitungen geht zs. mit neuem Monopol aus dem Westen.” 
Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-May 1990), May 18, 1990, sent to author on January 12, 2017.
1776“riesige Einheiten.” Günter Rager, director of the Journalism Institute at the University of Dortmund, cited in 
“'Lokalzeitung ist Herzstück des Pressewesens',” General-Anzeiger, November 13, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1777Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 11, BArch DC9/1050.
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overall readership; between five percent (Nordkurier, Neubrandenburg) and 20 percent (Norddeutsche 
Neuste Nachrichten). According to Bauer spokesperson Roman Koster, the low drop of circulation and 
readership was the result of Bauer having promoted reader loyalty towards specific papers (Leser-Blatt-
Bindung) and having provided journalistic expertise. The complimentary supplement Telestar had 
received very positive feedback and was being printed by Bauer in a weekly circulation of 1.5 million 
copies (see above).1778 
With its general focus on magazine publishing, daily newspapers were a new business segment 
for Bauer, and 3.000 of its employees were involved in its business in the GDR. “I believe in the future 
of local newspapers,” owner Heinz Bauer made clear. “It [a newspaper] must be made by people who 
are living in the region and who are speaking its language, the language of the newspaper.”1779 By June 
20, Bauer expected the closed “declarations of intent to convert into final contracts,” intending to now 
buy shares, again, 49 percent of each paper.1780 
The main competitor of Bauer was Springer. With investments in the Märkische Volksstimme 
(Potsdam) (in cooperation with the Nordwest-Zeitung), Norddeutsche Zeitung (Schwerin) and Ostsee-
Zeitung (Rostock), Springer was present at three Bauer locations. In addition, it had affiliations with the
Liberal-Demokratische Zeitung (Halle), the Sächsische Tageblatt (Leipzig), the national Deutsches 
Sportecho (with a daily circulation of about 130.000 copies), and the former LDPD paper Der Morgen 
(circulation of 51.500 daily).1781 The Office of Competition Protection noted in mid-May, based on the 
total circulation of 7.213.000 daily copies in the GDR, the cooperation agreements of Springer and its 
affiliates gave the publisher a thirty percent market share with a circulation of 2.177.000 copies.1782 
Next to the usual technology support, the agreements between Springer and the papers 
Tageblatt, Liberal-Demokratischen Zeitung, Der Morgen and Norddeutschen Zeitung also entailed 
provisions that handed their advertising logistics to the Springer-owned publications Hamburger 
Abendblatt and Berliner Morgenpost.1783 This would later prove disastrous for Der Morgen. Not 
1778dpa, Bauer mit DDR-Engagement zufrieden, press release, 6/19/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08206. 
1779“Ich glaube an die Zukunft der Lokalzeitung. Sie muß von Menschen gemacht werden, die vor Ort leben und die 
Sprache der Region sprechen, in der die Zeitung erscheint.” Cited in dpa, Bauer mit DDR-Engagement zufrieden, press 
release, 6/19/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08206. 
1780“Umwandlung von Absichtserkärungen in endgültige Verträge.” dpa, Neuorganisation der DDR-Verlage bringt viele 
Arbeitsplätze, Dietmer von Ladiges, press release, 6/20/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08190. 
1781Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 11-12, BArch DC9/1050.
1782Treffer sind Glücksache, Horst Roper, der journalist, 6/90, pp. 32-35, p. 34, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, 
DSC08080.
1783Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 12, BArch DC9/1050.
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receiving a sufficient amount of advertising to cover its expenses, it could do little about it. Springer 
refrained from allocating additional resources, and the paper folded in June 1991. Wulf Oehme, last 
press spokesperson of the LDPD and former editor at Der Morgen, commented in retrospect that “such 
a fast ending was not foreseeable.”1784 In the end, there was just “resigned exhaustion” amongst the 
staff, “like in soccer, you gave everything and still lost.”1785 To Springer it was one less paper and a 
further consolidation of its interests.
The same day Springer had announced its full-blown market entry and Müller pointed at the 
danger of new monopolies (see above), Springer CEO Peter Tamm and a colleague visited the MfM 
(see Chapter 5). When Müller addressed the issue of “monopolies limiting competition” and pointed to 
the large amount of newspapers now affiliated with Springer, both representatives acted “slow-
witted.”1786 As Tamm put it elsewhere: “You must think big here, no matter how the numbers look.”1787 
Springer, Tamm made clear, was going to focus all its resources into “securing its position as the 
leading press publisher and media corporation in all of Germany by means of a strong involvement in 
the GDR.”1788 This was a long-term task, and all options to cooperate in the newspaper or magazine 
market, in radio and television were to be taken.1789 According to Süddeutsche Zeitung, it was a 
“massive investment program” for years to come.1790 Already by July 1990, Springer employed several 
hundred workers in its commission plants and various holdings (Kommissionsbetriebe).1791 
G+J was successful also. By the end of April 1990, it had secured a 49 percent share in one of 
the economically most interesting former SED regional papers Sächsische Zeitung (Dresden) with an 
overall circulation of 536.000 copies. As discussed by the RT above, part of the joint venture was also 
the printing plant Graphischer Großbetrieb Volkerfreundschaft (GGV).1792 
1784“Ein so schnelles Ende war nicht absehbar.” Personal communication, Wulf Oehme, interview, January 25, 2017. 
1785“am Ende: „resignierte Erschopfung“ - wie beim Fussball: man hat alles gegeben und doch verloren.” Personal 
communication, Wulf Oehme, interview, January 25, 2017. 
1786“die den Wettbewerb eingrenzenden Wirtschaftsmonopole … begriffsstutzig.” Gottfried Müller, minister diary (April-
May 1990), May 18, 1990, sent to author on January 12, 2017.
1787“Hier kann man nur klotzen, ganz egal, wie die Zahlen aussehen.” Cited in Im Medienmarkt werden die Karten neu 
gemischt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6/15/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08244. 
1788“die Stellung als führendes Pressehaus und bedeutendes Medienunternehmen in ganz Deutschland durch das starke 
Engagement in der DDR zu sichern.” Cited in Axel Springer Verlag mir Rekordinvestitionen, Die Welt, 6/14/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08259. 
1789Axel Springer Verlag mir Rekordinvestitionen, Die Welt, 6/14/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08259. 
1790“gewaltiges Investitionsprogramm.” Im Medienmarkt werden die Karten neu gemischt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6/15/90, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35e, DSC08244. 
1791Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 8, BArch DC9/1050.
1792Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Hintergrund. Pressemarkt der DDR – Dezember 1989 bis Juli 1990,” August 10, 1990, pp. 
1-17, p. 12, BArch DC9/1050.
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This takeover of former SED papers by the major publishing houses created problematic 
dynamics on various levels. On the local level, it helped continue former party privilege and fostered 
quasi local press monopolies by means of additional financial and material support. This was felt by 
former bloc party papers, but more so by newly founded, small local newspapers. For instance, the 
executive director of Neues Torgauer Kreisblatt, a small local newspaper, founded in April 1990 with 
an overall circulation of 5.000 copies, approached the government on December 12, 1990 with an 
appeal for help, listing some of the “many obstacles” that came with the “aggressive strategies of 
former SED papers and West German major publishers.”1793 In spite of great interest in a local paper for
the district of Torgau (Kreis Torgau), its proximity to the provincial capital of Leipzig brought the 
former SED paper Leipziger Volkszeitung (LVZ) at close reach. The LVZ, now in cooperation with 
Madsack (Hanover), became increasingly hostile towards local competitors. An indication of this was 
the increase of editors, reporting solely on the district of Torgau, from two to four. “The aim to wipe us
off the market becomes very clear, because the claim for monopoly still exists.”1794 In consequence, the 
manager asked to regulate such cooperations and joint-ventures by establishing requirements to allow 
also for new local papers in the distribution area of the LVZ.1795
It was by no means only the major publishing houses that entered the new market. Smaller and 
medium-sized West German publishers in border regions had expanded their circulation numbers by 
founding new newspapers and by distributing localized versions of their own publications. The latter 
were mostly cover-products (Mantelprodukte): newly founded editorial offices in the GDR supplied the
pages for the local section, the cover came from the West German editorial headquarters. The list of 
examples for such cooperations was long, the cases differed, but the majority were soon driven out with
further increases of market concentration.1796  
1793“viele Hindernisse … aggressiven Handlungen der ehemaligen SED-Zeitungen und der bundesdeutschen Großverlage.”
Letter, Geschäftsführer, Neues Torgauer Kreisblatt an Minister für Medienpolitik, Dresden, December 12, 1990, BArch 
DC9/1069.
1794Full quote: “Das Bestreben, uns schon in der Gründungsphase wieder vom Markt zu fegen, wird sehr deutlich, denn 
der Monopolanspruch ist nach wie vor da. Dies wird nun durch ein Kooperationsabkommen zwischen der LVZ  und der 
Madsack-Gruppe aus Hannover sogar noch verstärkt. Die Gruppe ist nach unseren Informationen dafür bekannt, alle 
kleineren Zeitungen rund um Hannover gekauft oder vernichtet zu haben und beabsichtigt wohl dies auch gemeinsam 
mit der LVZ mit viel Geld und Technik auch um Leipzig.” Letter, Geschäftsführer, Neues Torgauer Kreisblatt an 
Minister für Medienpolitik, Dresden, December 12, 1990, BArch DC9/1069.
1795Letter, Geschäftsführer, Neues Torgauer Kreisblatt an Minister für Medienpolitik, Dresden, December 12, 1990, 
BArch DC9/1069.
1796Note: According to the survey on cooperations in the press sector from mid-May, twenty-three cooperation 
agreements, negotiations or already existing subsidiaries of mainly small and medium-sized West German publishers 
were listed in the GDR. Often times these were done deals. Examples were the Westfalen-Blatt in Bielefeld (FRG) that 
was now publishing the Eisenacher Tagespost (50.000 copies) in Thuringia, or the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung 
that was being distributed with a respective local section as Magdeburger Allgemeine, or also listed the Lübecker 
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Analysis
The paradox in Müller's reasoning for a liberalization of the East German press market for joint-
ventures with West German publishers lay in his disregard for the market dynamics behind such 
investments. He presupposed or hoped for democratic or political goodwill on the part of the publishers
to invest in papers that needed help; those that had been been founded in a democratic act but did not 
promise future revenue. What eventually ruled investment decisions, however, were the 
“uncompromising, hard-core conditions of the market.”1797 This referred more to the market logic out 
of which West German publishers acted, than to the struggles of a press transitioning to a higher ideal 
of democracy. The Frankfurter Rundschau, in reaction to the Act against Restraints of Competition, 
faulted Müller for his naivety. “In the GDR – if Müller and others get it their way – everything will be 
better than in the Federal Republic” by introducing anti-trust laws and urging for investments to 
guarantee local press diversity.1798 Anti-trust legislation, however, was not an adequate means to avoid 
market concentration, “as can be seen, not least, in the example of the Federal Republic,” where, “after 
years of newspapers dying” relatively stable structures have developed with mostly one big daily on a 
local level (Einzeitungsregionen).1799 Likewise, the market-domineering positions of former SED 
regional papers will not change by means of investments of West German publishers, and the outcome 
“will not be very different in the GDR.”1800 What was going to remain, the paper predicted, were 
former SED papers in partnership with West German publishers. “A greater diversity of the press can 
only be achieved,” the paper claimed, “if publishers courageously take on local monopolies.”1801 
As was shown in the previous chapters, though the wave of joint venture negotiations was at its 
height in June 1990, the initial move was already on the table by December 1989. When chief 
executive of Gruner+Jahr, Gerd Schulte-Hillen wrote to Modrow on November 29, 1989 he underlined 
that “our preference are projects we can execute in cooperation with partners from the GDR.”1802 
Nachrichten that distributed 32.000 copies daily with its Mecklenburg edition Table, Kooperationsbeziehungen im 
Pressebereich, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-8, pp. 7-8, BArch DC9/1050.
1797Full quote: “Zeitungsmachen in der DDR wird schon in wenigen Wochen unter den knallharten Bedingungen des 
Marktes erfolgen” Vom Regen in die Traufe, Manfred Präcklein, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, pp.50-54, p.51, ISSH, 35a-
b, DSC07920. 
1798“In der DDR soll – so will es nicht nur Müller – alles besser werden, als es in der Bundesrepublik ist.” Harte Zeiten, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08074. 
1799“wie nicht zuletzt das bundesdeutsche Beispiel zeigt … nach Jahren des Zeitungssterbens.” Harte Zeiten, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08074. 
1800“In der DDR wird das nicht viel anders sein.” Harte Zeiten, Frankfurter Rundschau, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, 
File 35d, DSC08074. 
1801“Großere Pressevielfalt konnen nur Anbieter schaffen, die mutig gegen die regionalen Marktbeherrscher antreten.” 
Harte Zeiten, Frankfurter Rundschau, 6/7/90, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08074. 
1802“Präferenz hätten für uns Unternehmungen, die wir in Kooperation mit Partnern aus der DDR durchführen konnen.” 
Letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, November 29, 1989, p. 2, 
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Respectively, all early proposals of major publishers on press distribution entailed such joint venture 
plans that specifically related to the founding or further developments of existing papers (see Chapters 
3 and 5). Likewise, the first draft on the import of Western print media to the GDR (see Chapter 3) 
entailed such stipulations.1803 It stated that for creating a greater variety of  print media, “joint-ventures 
with different Western partners for [establishing] independent newspapers and magazines are to be 
made possible”1804 The overall purpose was the creation of a press that operated “independently and 
non-partisan.”1805 The consequences of market logics a socialist press in transition were not given 
adequate thought.  And though all cooperation agreements were talked about as if they were done 
deals, they were preliminary contracts and it was on the THA to decide on their legitimacy.
The Privatization of the Press and the Treuhandanstalt
“The Treuhand decided against any experiments. Ideas to
restructure the press in East Germany and to not give additional
impetus to the much lamented press concentration in West
Germany, had no prospects of success.”1806
Konrad Dussel, Deutsche Tagespresse, 2004
Joint venture and ownership negotiations were not administered by the MfM but fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Treuhand in August 1990. As laid out earlier, the Round Table, having faced 
increasing unification scenarios, on February 12, 1990, on the initiative of Wolfgang Ullmann (see 
Chapter 3), demanded the appointment of a trust agency to safeguard the rights of the population in the 
transitioning of the country's property.1807 The privatization of property (Volkseigentum) was to happen
BArch DC9/1052. 
1803Policy draft, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der 
DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., 
BArch DC9/1052.
1804“sind als Gemeinschaftsunternehmen unabhängige Zeitungen und Zeitschriften mit unterschiedlichen westlichen 
Partnern moglich zu machen.” Policy draft, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  Einführung 
westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von Helsinki 
und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 6, BArch DC9/1052.
1805“müssen unabhängig und überparteilich wirken.” Policy draft, Vorlage für den Ministerrat der DDR, Konzeption zur  
Einführung westlicher Presseerzeugnisse in der DDR zur Realisierung der Verpflichtung aus Kob. 3, der Schlußakte von
Helsinki und der Wiener Folgekonferenz, n.d., p. 6, BArch DC9/1052.
1806“Die Treuhand ihrerseits entschied sich gegen jedes Experiment. Überlegungen, das ostdeutsche Pressewesen neu zu 
strukturieren und der in Westdeutschland viel beklagten Pressekonzentration nicht noch zusätzlichen Auftrieb zu 
verleihen, hatten keine Realisierungschance.” See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 
Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 245.
1807Information box, Infokasten 12.2.90, taz - DDR Journal Nr. 2, Die Wende der Wende, Januar bis März 1990, Von der 
Öffnung des Brandenburger Tores zur Öffnung der Wahlurnen, p. 72, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
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“for the benefit of the citizens of the GDR” to let them take their share “in the various kinds of equity 
ownerships in a private market economy.”1808 The resolution for building an Institution for the Trust 
Management of the People's Property (Anstalt zur treuhänderischen Verwaltung des Volkseigentums) 
followed on March 1, 1990, added by a resolution to transfer state-owned enterprises (volkseigenen 
Betriebe) into limited liability companies. The basic idea of both, according to Modrow, was to 
preserve existing economic assets in their substance, to prevent from capricious takeover and to allow 
enterprises to adjust to the new conditions of a private market economy while entering partnership 
agreements.1809 At the first meeting of the German-German working group on competition on March 
27, the West German delegation was informed of both resolutions.1810 For the process of privatization, 
it recommended the drafting and implementation of competitive guidelines by means of an act. 
By July 1, 1990, all people's property fell under the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Act 
(Treuhandgesetz) of June 17. By August 1, all enterprises were to be transformed into limited liability 
companies under ownership of the THA. This initially included 8.500 enterprises with about four 
million employees in about 45.000 different facilities.1811 THA director and head of the steel group 
Hoesch, Detlev Rohwedder, estimated that “all this junk is worth 600 billion DM.”1812 Eventually, the 
THA was enshrined in Article 25 of the unification treaty, though it was barely functional in October 
1990, lacking personnel and facilities. Within a year, the THA employed 3.000 staff members, by 
1993, 4.600. 1813 It became the biggest administrative body in Germany, responsible also for around 2.4 
million hectares of agricultural land and forests, the property of the former state police, large parts of 
DDR; Box 31-38, File 33. 
1808“zugunsten der Bürgerinnen und Bürger der DDR … den vielfältigen Formen der Kapitalbeteiligung im Sinne der 
Marktwirtschaft zu verbinden.” Report, Ergebnisse der 16. Sitzung des Rundentischgespräches am 12. März 1990, 
Privatisierung von Volkseigentum, March 12, 1990, p. 4, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; File 7.
1809Full quote: “Die in der Wirtschaft vorhandenen Werte sollten in ihrer Substanz bewahrt, vor willkürlichen Zugriffen 
geschützt und mit neuen Rechtsformen in die Lage versetzt werden, sich auf marktwirtschaftliche Bedingungen 
einzustellen, als auch entsprechende Partnerschaften einzugehen.” Hans Modrow, “Die Treuhand – Idee und 
Wirklichkeit,” iPW, 7/8-91, pp. 39-42, p. 39, Archiv Demokratischer Sozialismus, Modrow 016 (1990-1994, Band I). 
1810Protocol, Ergebnisprotokoll der 1. Beratung der deutsch-deutschen Arbeitsgruppe Wettbewerb am 27.3.1990, 
Ministerium der Finanzen und Preise, Abt. Grundsätze des Preis- und Wettbewerbsrechts, Berlin April 4, 1990, p. 2, 
BArch DE10/67. 
1811“Treuhand – Ein Ding der Unmoglichkeit,” Dieter Fockenbrock, Handelsblatt. August 11, 2006. [Accessed January 
12, 2018] http://www.handelsblatt.com/archiv/60-jahre-deutsche-wirtschaftsgeschichte-treuhand-ein-ding-der-
unmoeglichkeit/2691746.html. Grosser, Dieter, Treuhandanstalt, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 
http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202195/treuhandanstalt?p=all  [Accessed 
May 1, 2017].
1812“der ganze Ramsch 600 Milliarden D-Mark wert ist.” Cited in “Treuhand – Ein Ding der Unmoglichkeit,” Dieter 
Fockenbrock, Handelsblatt. August 11, 2006. [Accessed January 12, 2018] http://www.handelsblatt.com/archiv/60-
jahre-deutsche-wirtschaftsgeschichte-treuhand-ein-ding-der-unmoeglichkeit/2691746.html.
1813Grosser, Dieter, Treuhandanstalt, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 
http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202195/treuhandanstalt?p=all  [Accessed 
May 1, 2017].
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the property of the former army, large-scale public housing property, as well as the property of the state
pharmacy network.1814 The institutionalization of the THA became a manifest for how “governments 
privatize.”1815 
Hans Modrow, under whose government the THA had been brought to life, soon pointed out, 
however, that its initial task had gone amiss. Priority was now given solely to “privatization rather than
renovation and preservation.”1816 This redefinition of tasks had let to the breakdown of the entire 
industrial and agricultural production, and a sale of economic assets at dumping prices. In an interview 
on August 14, 1990 Günter Nooke (representative of the opposition and member of the THA 
administrative board), pointed to one of the challenges of the THA: while it needed constant data to 
assess the potential for restructuring (Sanierungsfähigkeit) of more than 8.000 enterprises, on the one 
hand, it needed a simultaneous analysis of their market ability, on the other. The THA was further 
lacking the legal basis that allowed for an assessment of assets and liabilities.1817 And though the THA 
was the official “owner,” its main purpose was regulate ownership by means of selling. Thus, “[a]s 
long as ownership questions are not settled, investors hold the upper hand, until they can get an 
enterprise for cheap money.”1818 And while the THA could invite different offers, its scope was limited.
This was true particularly for the press.
Before the THA took over on August 1, 1990, and started operations in October 1990, it 
consulted with the Office of Competition Protection and the MfM for “official and legally secure 
statements” with regard to Western capital interests in, and cooperation agreements with publishers in 
the GDR.1819 According to their conservative estimates, with the exception of one, “there are no 
requests for [future] foreign investments in any of the [now] transformed companies.”1820 Two 
1814Cassell, Mark, How Governments Privatize: the Politics of Divestment in the United States and Germany, Georgetown 
University Press, 2002.
1815Cassell, Mark, How Governments Privatize: the Politics of Divestment in the United States and Germany, Georgetown 
University Press, 2002.
1816“Privatisierung statt Sanierung und Erhalt.” Hans Modrow, “Die Treuhand – Idee und Wirklichkeit,” iPW, 7/8-91, pp. 
39-42, p. 39, Archiv Demokratischer Sozialismus, Modrow 016 (1990-1994, Band I). 
1817“'Daten reichen nicht aus',” Interview – Günter Nooke, taz, August 14, 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – 
Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 21. 
1818“Solange die Eigentumsverhältnisse nicht geklärt sind, sitzt der potentielle Investor am längeren Hebel und wartet, bis 
der den Betrieb billig bekommen kann.” “'Daten reichen nicht aus',” Interview – Günter Nooke, taz, August 14, 1990, 
Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 21. 
1819“offizielle und rechtlich gesicherte Aussagen.” Report, Zum Presse-Grosso, Amt für Wettbewerbschutz der DDR, n.d., 
[late July, 1990] BArch DE10/16.
1820Full quote: “liegt der Treuhandanstalt kein Antrag auf ausländische Beteiligung an den gewandelten Unternehmen 
vor.” Note: The exception was T&M Verlagsgesellschaft mbH Overview, a joint enterprise of transpress Verlag and 
Vereinigter Motorverlag GmbH & Co KG. Report, Zum Presse-Grosso, Amt für Wettbewerbschutz der DDR, n.d., [late 
July, 1990] BArch DE10/16.
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publishers had claimed foreign shares (ausländische Beteiligung) at the Office of Competition 
Protection, namely Der Morgen (a 49 percent share of Springer), and Märkische Volksstimme in 
Potsdam (owned by Springer, Nordwest Zeitung Oldenburg, and the Springer affiliate Ullstein-Verlag).
“Officially, there are no further requests affecting anti-trust legislation and investigation,” the office 
claimed.1821 There were, however, indications that Springer also aimed for a cooperation with the 
Ostsee-Zeitung (not in the competency of the THA) as well as a fifty percent share in Sportecho. Based
mainly on newspaper articles and press releases, and partly on statements of the MfM, an additional 
eleven cooperation and/or joint venture plans of publishers, printing plants and newspapers/magazines 
added to a survey that had been published in the magazine journalist on May 15, 1990 (see above).1822 
This was the information the THA based its initial work on. Eventually, it received about eighty 
purchasing requests for forty publishing houses; the most important ones were those for the former 
SED regional papers. In May 1992, the Association of the Local Press claimed that the fifteen “big, 
financially strong [former SED] regional papers” had kept their former monopoly position; they now 
published about 220 local editions and could do so only because they “had been given a market built on
unaltered structures of state centralist monopolies,” which they since “had consolidated and centralized
further.”1823 Former MfM minister Müller agreed. In retrospect, he noted that because former SED 
regional papers had not been split by the THA in their privatization process, their local monopolies 
remained and do so until this day. “Smaller papers, and especially the local press fell victim to it, one 
would have wished them a better fate. The question remains to this day: What motivated the Treuhand 
to keep SED-built-structures of the regional papers?”1824 This sub-chapter takes a first step to answering
this question by looking at the battles thought over their privatization. 
1821“Offiziell liegen keine weiteren Anmeldungen vor, die den Kreis kartellrechtlicher Untersuchungen tangieren.” Report,
Zum Presse-Grosso, Amt für Wettbewerbschutz der DDR, n.d., [late July, 1990] BArch DE10/16.
1822Report, Zum Presse-Grosso, Amt für Wettbewerbschutz der DDR, n.d., [late July, 1990] BArch DE10/16.
1823Full quote: “Die 15 großen kapitalstarken Bezirkszeitungen, die heute rund 220 Unterausgaben herausgeben, haben 
nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus als Monopol aufgebauten Markt in unveränderter Struktur übergeben 
bekommen, sich danach zunehmend konsolidiert und den Markt weiter zementiert.” Memorandum, “Notwendige 
Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des 
staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen 
Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 2, 
BArch B/106/156193.
1824“Leidtragende waren kleinere Blätter und vor allem auch die Lokalpresse, der man ein besseres Schicksal gewünscht 
hätte. Frage bis heute: Was hat die Treuhand bewogen, bei den Bezirkszeitungen die von der SED geschaffene 
Zeitungsstruktur beizubehalten?” Gottfried Müller, personal communication, comments on minister diary (April-May 
1990), May 18, 1990, sent to author on January 30, 2017.
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Privatizing the Press and the Federal Government
The Treuhandanstalt officially transferred the ownership of the majority of former SED-
regional papers to “chosen buyers” on April 13, 1991.1825 On April 11, 1991, two days earlier, Peter 
Hoss, managing director of the Association of the Local Press (Verband der Lokalpresse), the umbrella 
organization for local newspaper publishers, wrote “with the greatest concern” to the Minister of the 
Interior Wolfgang Schäuble and the Ministry of Economics.1826 Before, Hoss had contacted the 
administrative council and the executive board of the THA, protesting the transfer of ownership of 
these newspapers likely “to a few major West German publishers.”1827 Since November 7, 1990, he had
repeatedly asked both “to defer [the decision] until all possibilities still open for investment shares of 
smaller and medium-sized publishers have been presented and examined,” and he had urged the 
administrative council “to not consent to the expected proposal of the board” before any such 
assessments have been made; without response.1828 Hoss, thus, expressed little hope that his initiative 
would result in a positive outcome or in the possibility of acquiring interest shares in these newspapers.
Still, he turned to the BMI because it had repeatedly emphasized the necessity to “keep a diverse 
press,” and Hoss urged Schäuble to assume his “political responsibility” and “to do everything 
possible” to postpone the decision.1829 After all, smaller publishers made possible a diverse press, and 
they should be given the opportunity to participate in the East German press market by acquiring shares
of these newspapers. “In my opinion, it would be irresponsible in structural and media policy aspects, if
this is being neglected.”1830 The next day, on April 12, Hoss met with an executive board member of the
THA to lobby for his cause, without success.1831 
1825“ausgewählten Erwerbsinteressenten.” Letter, Wolf Klintz, THA, to Ministerialrat Homann, Bundesminister für 
Wirtschaft, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 17, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1826“mit großter Sorge.” Letter, Treuhandvergabe der ehemaligen DDR-Parteipresse, Hoss, Standortpresse GmbH, 
Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., to BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, April 11, 1991, p. 1, BArch 
B/106/156193.
1827“an wenige westdeutsche Großverlage.” Letter, Treuhandvergabe der ehemaligen DDR-Parteipresse, Hoss, 
Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., to BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, April 11, 
1991, p. 1, BArch B/106/156193.
1828“[die Entscheidung] so lange zurückzustellen, bis alle noch offenen Moglichkeiten einer Beteiligung mittlerer und 
kleiner Verlage vorgetragen und geprüft worden sind … der zu erwartenden Beschlußvorlage des Vorstandes der 
Treuhandanstalt nicht zuzustimmen.” Cited in Letter, Treuhandvergabe der ehemaligen DDR-Parteipresse, Hoss, 
Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., to BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, April 11, 
1991, p. 1, BArch B/106/156193.
1829“Politischer Verantwortung … die Vielfalt im Pressewesen zu erhalten … alles nur Mogliche zu unternehmen.” Cited 
in Letter, Treuhandvergabe der ehemaligen DDR-Parteipresse, Hoss, Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse 
pro lokalzeitung e.V., to BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, April 11, 1991, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193.
1830“Es wäre struktur- und medienpolitisch meiner Meinung nach unverantwortlich, wenn dieses versäumt würde.” Cited 
in Letter, Treuhandvergabe der ehemaligen DDR-Parteipresse, Hoss, Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse 
pro lokalzeitung e.V., to BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, April 11, 1991, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193.
1831Mentioned in letter, Mollemann, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, to Hoss, Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung 
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In spite of his urging, the response of the BMI came late, on May 6, after the THA 
administrative board had agreed to the “preliminary sale of 10 former SED regional papers to 12 
different publishing enterprises” on April 13.1832 Though these transactions were not considered 
finalized until after the private restitution claims (Restitutionsansprüche) had been assessed, the deal 
was done. The BMI made clear, however, that the responsibility lay entirely with the THA:
[W]ith the autonomous decision of the Treuhandanstalt, onto which the federal 
government, due to the principle of separation of state and media, could not accede any 
influence, an important step has been taken for the development of the free press in the 
new Länder.1833  
The future, according to Schäuble, very much depended on the question “whether or not the press 
succeeds in creating similar structures as exist in the old Länder” that would allow also for the 
existence of small and medium-sized newspaper publishers.1834 Whether Schäuble's estimate took into 
consideration that the majority of rural areas in the Federal Republic had one big daily only, he did not 
say. How the publishers were to do this, Schäuble did not explain either. Instead, underlining the 
economically and politically important role of the local press in the Federal Republic, further 
developments were going to be watched closely by the BMI.
A week later, the Association of the Local Press received a letter from Minister of Finances 
Jürgen Mollemann. He declared, the THA administrative council had unanimously agreed to sell “to 
particular publishers from the old Länder,” and also representatives of the new Länder had approved 
and given their consent in consideration of “all relevant criteria.”1835 And while this seemed to settle 
any issue the federal government might have had with the sale of former SED regional papers, it was 
just another defeat in the struggle of small and medium-sized West German publishers. It had been in 
e.V., May 14, 1991, attachment to Merk, BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Ministerialrat Homann, Bundesminister 
für Wirtschaft, and Ministerialdirigent Knauss, Bundesminister der Finanzen, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 5, 1991, 
BArch B/106/156193.
1832“dem vorläufigen Verkauf von 10 ehemaligen SED-Bezirkszeitungen an 12 verschiedene deutsche 
Presseunternehmen.” Letter, Neusel, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Hoss, Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der 
Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., May 6, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1833“mit der autonomen Entscheidung der Treuhandanstalt, auf die die Bundesregierung mit Rücksicht auf den Grundsatz 
der Staatsferne der Medien keinen Einfluß nehmen konnte, ist eine bedeutsame Weichenstellung für die Entwicklung der
freien Presse in den neuen Bundesländern erfolgt.” Letter, Neusel, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Hoss, Standortpresse 
GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., May 6, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1834“ob es der Presse gelingt, eine ähnliche Struktur wie in den alten Bundesländern zu schaffen.” Letter, Neusel, 
Bundesminister des Inneren, to Hoss, Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., May 6, 
1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1835“an bestimmte Verlage aus den alten Bundesländern … all relevante Kriterien.” Letter, Mollemann, Bundesminister für 
Wirtschaft, to Hoss, Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., May 14, 1991, attachment to Merk, BMI, 
Bundesminister des Inneren, to Ministerialrat Homann, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, and Ministerialdirigent Knauss, 
Bundesminister der Finanzen, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 5, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
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particular they who had created the early fundaments for cross-border activities, for regional imports of
West German publications and early cooperation agreements with publishers in the GDR (see Chapter 
4), which Hoss called an initially “hopeful development.”1836 With the sale of these regional papers, 
however, this had come “practically to a halt or a regression,” and smaller publishers and their 
publications were being driven out of an increasingly centralized market.1837 
The BMI and the Question of Press Ownership
There was no coherent line and/or approach of different federal governmental bodies on how to 
deal with the privatization of the press in the former GDR. This related to the press in general and to 
the privatizing of former SED regional papers in particular. With the Minister of the Interior being the 
“minister responsible for press law in the federal government,” the BMI, on February 4, 1991, held a 
meeting on the “the soon to be expected privatization of eleven former SED regional papers by the 
Treuhandanstalt” at its next meeting.1838 Invitations went out to all departments of the federal 
government broadly concerned with media policy issues (i.e. the Federal Cartel Office, the Press- and 
Information Office of the Federal Government, the Federal Ministry of Economics, the Federal 
Ministry of Finances, and of Justice, as well as the head of the Chancellor's Office). Present for the 
BMI were, among others, Hans-Günther Merk and Dietrich Hübner. Both had also been part of the 
German-German expert group meetings on media in February and March 1990, and Hübner had been 
deeply involved in negotiations over a distribution system in the GDR (see Chapter 3 and 5). 
During the meeting “the departments agreed to approach the Treuhandanstalt in an appropriate 
manner” by sending the Minister of Economy von Würzen, a member of the THA administrative 
1836“hoffungsvolle Entwicklung.” Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt 
lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur
unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” 
Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193.
1837“zu einem praktischen Stillstand bzw. zu einer Rückentwicklung.” Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen
gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus 
geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur 
Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193.
1838“innerhalb der Bundesregierung für das Presserecht zuständige Minister.” Letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im 
Betrittsgebiet - Entwurf eines Schreibens von Herrn BM Seiters an Herrn Geschaeftsfueher Peter Hoss), Merk, 
Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, Dezember 20, 1991, p. 7, 
BArch B/106/156193. “in Kürze zu erwartenden Privatisierung von elf ehemaligen SED-Bezirkszeitungen durch die 
Treuhandanstalt.” Letter, Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, Besprechung am 4. Februar 
1991 im BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren to Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes et al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 4, 
1991, p. 1, BArch B/106/156193. For an overview see letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im Betrittsgebiet, Merk, 
Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, Dezember 20, 1991, pp. 2-3, 
BArch B/106/156193.
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board, to THA president Detlef Rohwedder with a concerted written statement.1839 The letter, drafted 
and ready to be sent, underlined that in privatizing SED regional papers, “media policy, as well as 
economic aspects, should be taken into consideration.”1840 
The maintenance and support the press as an economically significant and, for political
communication, important information channel is a central media policy goal. It falls 
to the state to effectively account for the Basic Right of the freedom of information and
opinion.1841
This referred in particular to newspapers whose transfer of ownership was still in question. Any such 
transfer to just one interested party would “considerably distort” future ownership and press structures 
in the new Länder compared to those of the old.1842 “Especially smaller and medium-sized newspaper 
publishers have almost no chance to hold their ground as a second paper against former SED regional 
papers with high circulations.”1843 It was desirable, however, that in the process of privatization all 
newspapers remain “economically efficient enterprises.”1844 The minister of economy, thus, 
recommended “to break up the former regional papers into smaller units and to give also some smaller 
1839“Die Ressorts kamen überein, in geeigneter Form an die Treuhandanstalt heranzutreten.” Letter, Privatisierung von 
Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, Besprechung am 4. Februar 1991 im BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren to
Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes et al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 4, 1991, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193. 
1840“neben den wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten sollten auch die medienpolitischen Aspekte Berücksichtigung finden.” 
Letter draft, “Entwurf eines Schreibens von Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. von Würzen als Verwaltungsratsmitglied der 
Treuhandanstalt an den Präsidenten der Treuhandanstalt Dr. Detlef Rohwedder,” n.d. [February 4, 1991], p. 1, 
attachment 2 to report, Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, Besprechung am 4. Februar 
1991 im BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren to Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes et al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 4, 
1991, BArch B/106/156193. 
1841“Die Erhaltung und Stärkung der Presse als wirtschaftlich bedeutender und für die politische Kommunikation 
wichtiger Informationsträger ist ein zentrales medienpolitisches Anliegen. Der Staat ist hierbei gehalten, dem 
Grundrecht auf Informations- und Meinungsfreiheit effektiv Rechnung zu tragen.” Letter draft, “Entwurf eines 
Schreibens von Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. von Würzen als Verwaltungsratsmitglied der Treuhandanstalt an den 
Präsidenten der Treuhandanstalt Dr. Detlef Rohwedder,” n.d. [February 4, 1991], p. 1, attachment 2 to letter, 
Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, Besprechung am 4. Februar 1991 im BMI, 
Bundesminister des Inneren to Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes et al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 4, 1991, BArch 
B/106/156193.
1842“erheblich verzerren.” Letter draft, “Entwurf eines Schreibens von Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. von Würzen als 
Verwaltungsratsmitglied der Treuhandanstalt an den Präsidenten der Treuhandanstalt Dr. Detlef Rohwedder,” n.d. 
[February 4, 1991], p. 1, attachment 2 to letter, Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, 
Besprechung am 4. Februar 1991 im BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren to Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes et al., SM 10-
344 242-2/1, February 4, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1843“Insbesondere kleinere und mittlere Zeitungsverlage hätten gegenüber den auflagenstarken ehemaligen SED-
Bezirkszeitungen kaum eine Chance, sich als Zweitzeitung zu behaupten.” Letter draft, “Entwurf eines Schreibens von 
Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. von Würzen als Verwaltungsratsmitglied der Treuhandanstalt an den Präsidenten der 
Treuhandanstalt Dr. Detlef Rohwedder,” n.d. [February 4, 1991], pp. 1-2, attachment 2 to letter, Privatisierung von 
Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, Besprechung am 4. Februar 1991 im BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren to
Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes et al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 4, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1844“wirtschaftlich leistungsfähige Einheiten.” Letter draft, “Entwurf eines Schreibens von Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. von 
Würzen als Verwaltungsratsmitglied der Treuhandanstalt an den Präsidenten der Treuhandanstalt Dr. Detlef 
Rohwedder,” n.d. [February 4, 1991], p. 2, attachment 2 to letter, Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die 
Treuhandanstalt, Besprechung am 4. Februar 1991 im BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren to Chef des 
Bundeskanzleramtes et al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 4, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
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and medium-sized publishers the opportunity to purchase subunits as far as possible, but not by means 
of a consortium.”1845 In the protocol of the meeting it was noted that if the THA considered these 
aspects, small and medium-sized companies should be able to request such purchases by means of an 
extended request list. 
In consideration of future concentration processes, the market position of purchasing 
companies in the old Länder and possible consequences of additional purchases of 
individual newspapers in the new Länder should definitely be taken into account.1846 
In pushing for media policy concerns, this letter was to be made available to other members of the 
administrative board, in particular the representatives of each Land. Merk asked all departments to 
request changes and propose amends to the letter by February 6, and von Würzen was to approach the 
THA as soon as possible. 
While several departments followed this request, communication between the different 
departments did not go without problems. On February 6, the Minister of Finances Greite declared he 
had not been aware of any plans for privatizing the SED papers, nor had he been aware of or 
participated in the meeting on February 4. Greite demanded “in the future, to respect the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the Treuhandanstalt that was established in Art. 25 of the unification treaty.”1847 Before 
any formal steps (such as a letter of a state secretary) were to be taken, the THA should be given the 
opportunity to comment on these issues. Greite, thus, proposed another meeting of the departments, a 
suggestion welcomed by Hübner. 
In the meantime, however, von Würzen changed his mind. He now refrained from making any 
interference, and on February 8, made clear that no such letter should be written. The minister had 
1845“soweit als moglich, die bisherigen Bezirkszeitungen in kleinere Einheiten zu entflechten und die Moglichkeit des 
Erwerbs von Teileinheiten auch für kleinere und mittlere Verlage zu offnen, jedoch keine Konsortiallosung vorzusehen.”
Letter draft, “Entwurf eines Schreibens von Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. von Würzen als Verwaltungsratsmitglied der 
Treuhandanstalt an den Präsidenten der Treuhandanstalt Dr. Detlef Rohwedder,” n.d. [February 4, 1991], p. 2, 
attachment 2 to letter, Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, Besprechung am 4. Februar 
1991 im BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren to Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes et al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 4, 
1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1846“Im Hinblick auf spätere Konzentrationswirkungen sollten auf jeden Fall zudem die Marktstellung der erwerbenden 
Unternehmen im alten Bundesgebiet und die moglichen Folgen bei einem zusätzlichen Erwerb einzelner Zeitungen in 
den neuen Bundesländern ins Kalkül gezogen werden.” Letter draft, “Entwurf eines Schreibens von Herrn Staatssekretär
Dr. von Würzen als Verwaltungsratsmitglied der Treuhandanstalt an den Präsidenten der Treuhandanstalt Dr. Detlef 
Rohwedder,” n.d. [February 4, 1991], p. 2, attachment 2 to letter, Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die 
Treuhandanstalt, Besprechung am 4. Februar 1991 im BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren to Chef des 
Bundeskanzleramtes et al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 4, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1847“künftig die in Artikel 25 Einigungsvertrag festgelegten fachaufsichtlichen Zuständigkeiten für die Treuhandanstalt zu 
beachten.” Letter, Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, Greite, Bundesminister der 
Finanzen BMI, to Bundesminister des Inneren et. al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 6, 1991, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193.
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decided “to not set guidelines for the Treuhand in privatizing daily newspapers.”1848 Any such 
interference would lead to “further delays in privatization that only lead to a further consolidation of 
the existing, undesirable cooperative structures.”1849 In having come to this decision, the minister 
referred to a statement sent by the Cartel Office on February 6, and he had discussed this position by 
phone with Deputy Government Spokesman Norbert Schäfer. What had influenced him most, he did 
not say.
Six days later, Hübner, in response to von Würzen's refusal to approach the THA, urged the 
different ministries again on the significance of the matter for broader media policy issues and “the 
possible structural changes for the press in the Federal Republic of Germany.”1850 Hübner pointed to the
suggestion of the Cartel Office Vice President Stefan Held “to sell regional papers of the former GDR 
to smaller and medium-sized companies or to respective consortiums, if the sale price was not too 
high.”1851 But while Greite asked for a new meeting, he simultaneously insisted on his exclusive 
jurisdiction in the matter. From that point on, Merk and Hübner were informed only informally of ideas
circulating in the THA.1852 
This was the only initiative of the BMI to directly influence the privatization of SED regional 
papers by lobbying for a breakup of its monopoly structures. This initiative had largely been based on 
the work of Merk and Hübner, while the minister had refrained from making any clear statements or 
taking action. Hübner's overall concern, as had been in issues of sales and distribution, was the 
potential repercussions of an increased press concentration in the East for the West.
The Sale by the Treuhand and a 'Good Will Clause'
On April 13, 1991, the administrative council of the THA agreed to the sale of ten former SED 
1848“der Treuhand bei der Privatisierung der Tageszeitungen keine Vorgaben zu machen.” Letter, Privatisierung von 
Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, Plessing, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, to Bundesminister des 
Inneren et. al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 8, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1849“weitere Verzogerung der Privatisierung, die nur zu einer Verfestigung der bestehenden unerwünschten 
Kooperationsstrukturen führt.” Letter, Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, Plessing, 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, to Bundesminister des Inneren et. al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 8, 1991, BArch 
B/106/156193.
1850“die moglichen strukturellen Veränderungen für die Presse in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” Letter, Privatisierung 
von Presseunternehmen durch die Treuhandanstalt, BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Bundesminister der Finanzen 
et. al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, February 12, 1991, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193.
1851“Regionalzeitungen der Ex-DDR an kleine und mittlere Unternehmen oder entsprechende Konsortien zu veräußern, 
sofern der Kaufpreis nicht zu hoch ist.” Cited in Letter, Privatisierung von Presseunternehmen durch die 
Treuhandanstalt, BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Bundesminister der Finanzen et. al., SM 10-344 242-2/1, 
February 12, 1991, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193.
1852Letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im Betrittsgebiet, Merk, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des 
Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, Dezember 20, 1991, p. 3, BArch B/106/156193.
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regional papers (with 8.000 employees) and a total circulation of 2.7 million copies to thirteen West 
German press companies for a price of 850 million DM and an investment volume of 1.3 billion 
DM.1853 According to Mollemann, the THA ,“in choosing the buyers,” had not only considered the 
sales price but “the entire concept, including planned investments and the saving of jobs.”1854 In close 
cooperation with the Federal Cartel Office, the consequences for the overall media infrastructure had 
also been taken into consideration.
The THA, however, had largely followed previously made cooperation agreements and had, 
thereby, contrary to von Würzen's point, given final and legal status to already existing but 
“undesirable cooperative structures.” About two months later, the federal government, having asked the
Monopolies Commission1855 to include press ownership in its annual report, declared the THA had 
made sure
that the takeover of individual major publishers does not lead to increased imbalances 
between different regions or between companies of different scales. Considering media 
policy and competitive aspects, the federal government would have preferred … a 
further decentralization of the press, if there had been a feasible way.1856
This would have required the independence of regional papers and their local editions. But because  
publications without a clearly distinguishable and well-established format ran a high crowding-out risk,
they could hardly be privatized. A break-up of publishers into subunits was, therefore, not possible. 
According to Birgit Breuel, president of the THA after the death of Rohwedder, board member 
Karl Schirner had developed and announced in April 1991 an “overall solution” (Großlosung). This 
was to become the core element in a restructuring process in which profitable publishers of the former 
1853Letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im Betrittsgebiet, Merk, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des 
Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, Dezember 20, 1991, pp. 2-3, BArch B/106/156193.
1854“bei der Auswahl der Bewerber … das Gesamtkonzept einschließlich der vorgesehenen Inventionen und der 
gesicherten Arbeitsplätze.” Letter, Mollemann, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, to Hoss, Verband der Lokalpresse pro 
lokalzeitung e.V., May 14, 1991, attachment to Merk, BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Ministerialrat Homann, 
Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, and Ministerialdirigent Knauss, Bundesminister der Finanzen, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, 
December 5, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1855Note: The Monopolies Commission is an independent expert committee that advises the German government and 
legislature in competition policy-making, competition law, and regulations. See: Monopolies Commission, Mission,  
http://www.monopolkommission.de/index.php/en/monopolies-commission/mission [Accessed January 18, 2017].
1856Full quote: “daß die Übernahme durch einzelne große westdeutsche Verlage nicht dazu führt, Ungleichgewichte 
zwischen einzelnen Regionen oder zwischen Unternehmen verschiedener Großenordnungen in vertretbarer Weise zu 
verstärken. Angesichts der medien- und wettbewerbspolitischen Problematik hätte die Bundesregierung eine 
verlegerische Verselbständigung großer Lokalausgaben mit leistungsfähiger Redaktion und damit eine weitere 
Dezentralisierung der Zeitungslandschaft bevorzugt, wenn es einen praktischen Weg dahin gegeben hätte. Schon wegen 
des hohen Verdrängungsrisikos lassen sich jedoch Lokalausgaben ohne eingeführten, klar unterscheidbaren eigenen 
Titel und Zeitungsmantel kaum privatisieren.” Cited in letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im Betrittsgebiet, Merk, 
Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, Dezember 20, 1991, p. 5, 
BArch B/106/156193.
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GDR were divided systematically amongst West German interests groups that had set their claims all 
along.1857 To ensure fair competition, the THA administrative council had included a “good will 
clause.” To not endanger other press enterprises in the respective regions, the council had asked the 
purchasing publishers to not impede smaller local papers but to be supportive of them. “Respective 
wording was included in all privatization contracts.”1858 This meant, purchasing publishers had agreed 
“in an economically feasible way – by means of cooperation or by other suitable means – to look for 
possibilities to not hamper the development of publishing activities of small local papers but, if 
possible to, facilitate them.”1859 Competition in the press sector was, thus, to be limited for the sake of 
press diversity. 
Protest of Small and Medium-Sized Publishers
Cooperation between the BMI and the Association of the Local Press remained rather sporadic. 
The minister admitted there had been major shifts in the press structures in the new Länder but focused 
on the breakup of former monopolies of national SED papers and the remaining dominance of former 
regional papers while leaving unmentioned any share of the major publishing houses in the matter.1860 
As a guest speaker at the annular meeting of the association in Bonn-Bad Godesberg in mid-November 
1991, Schäuble gave a copy-paste version of the official government statement given above: the federal
government would have preferred independent local papers, unfortunately there had been no feasible 
way.1861 Since the federal government expected the Monopolies Commission to include the results of 
the privatization process in its next report so did Schäuble, and he was content with it.1862 He underlined
the importance of press diversity and that it was the task of the local press to counteract any 
concentration processes.1863
1857Breuel, Birgit (ed.), Verleger kennen ihre Macht, in Treuhand intern. Tagebuch, pp. 232-239, Berlin, 1992.
1858Full quote: “Eine entsprechende Formulierung wurde in alle Privatisierungsverträge mit den ausgewählten 
Erwerbsinteressenten aufgenommen.” Letter, Wolf Klintz, THA, to Ministerialrat Homann, Bundesminister für 
Wirtschaft, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 17, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1859“in wirtschaftlich vertretbarem Umfang – im Wege der Kooperation oder auf andere geeignete Weise – nach 
Moglichkeiten zu suchen, die Entfaltung eigener verlegerischer Aktivitäten von kleinen Lokalzeitungen nicht zu 
behindern, sondern nach Moglichkeit zu erleichtern.” Cited in manuscript, “Rede von Bundesminister Wolfgang 
Schäuble vor dem Kongress der deutschen Lokalpresse in Bonn-Bad Godesberg,” Der Bundesminister des Inneren, 
Bonn, November 12, 1991, p. 18, BArch B/106/156193. See also “'Lokalzeitung ist Herzstück des Pressewesens',” 
General-Anzeiger, November 13, 1991, BArch B/106/156193. 
1860Manuscript, “Rede von Bundesminister Wolfgang Schäuble vor dem Kongress der deutschen Lokalpresse in Bonn-Bad
Godesberg,” Der Bundesminister des Inneren, Bonn, November 12, 1991, p. 16, BArch B/106/156193.
1861Manuscript, “Rede von Bundesminister Wolfgang Schäuble vor dem Kongress der deutschen Lokalpresse in Bonn-Bad
Godesberg,” Der Bundesminister des Inneren, Bonn, November 12, 1991, p. 18, BArch B/106/156193.
1862Cited in letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im Betrittsgebiet, Merk, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister 
des Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, Dezember 20, 1991, p. 5, BArch B/106/156193.
1863Cited in press release, “Lokalzeitungen sehen Pressevielfalt in den neuen Ländern bedroht,” dpa, November 12, 1991, 
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The president of the association, Klaus Wagner, expressed his anger at this inconsequential take
on press ownership in the former GDR. In the presence also of the president of the Federal Association 
of German Newspaper Publishers (Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, BDZV), Rolf 
Terheyden, Wagner stated it was not enough to only express concerns. A nascent “competition of 
opinions [as] the basis for a viable democracy” had largely been ruined.1864 The matter of fact was, the 
THA had divided the “(newspaper) cake” among the major publishers, and now “[a]bout 87 percent of 
the overall sold circulation in the Eastern part … is in the hands of only a few major publishers.”1865 
Predatory competition on the part of the major publishers who, with gigantic advertising budgets, were 
pushing aggressive strategies by keeping their prices low threatened to drive local papers out of 
business. This had set in motion “the great demise of newspapers.”1866 
Günter Rager, director of the Journalism Institute at the University of Dortmund, provided the 
numbers for this estimate. Seventy out of around 100 newly established dailies and weeklies, he 
claimed, had already disappeared. The new Länder had no “wealth of papers but only a few, strong 
publications.”1867 The market was “highly concentrated and dominated by power interests” due to the 
THA's support of major regional papers.1868 The problem, according to Rager, was that the THA had 
approached the matter exclusively based on economic considerations. What the “free market” in the 
Federal Republic had not accomplished in more than twenty years, the THA had, thereby, managed to 
do in one in the new Länder.1869  
To Schäuble, on the other hand, the real problem lay in the lack of a local democratic culture in 
the East and the consequent lack of newspapers' coverage about it. Here, Schäuble referred to the study 
of Beate Schneider commissioned by the BMI. It would take time but a local press tradition needed to 
be developed and take a central role in fostering an “inner German unity.”1870 Schäuble's reasoning 
BArch B/106/156193.
1864“Wettbewerb der Meinungen [als] Grundlage fuer eine ausgewogene Demokratie.” Cited in “'Lokalzeitung ist 
Herzstück des Pressewesens',” General-Anzeiger, November 13, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1865“Zeitungskuchen … Rund 87 Prozent der verkauften Auflagen im Ostteil befinden sich … in den Händen einiger 
weniger Großverlage.” Cited in press release, “Lokalzeitungen sehen Pressevielfalt in den neuen Ländern bedroht,” dpa,
November 12, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1866“das grosse Zeitungssterben.” Cited in “'Lokalzeitung ist Herzstück des Pressewesens',” General-Anzeiger, November 
13, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1867“Blätterwald, sondern nur wenige mächtige Bäume.” Cited in “'Lokalzeitung ist Herzstück des Pressewesens',” 
General-Anzeiger, November 13, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1868“hochgradig konzentriert und vermachtet.” Cited in press release, “Lokalzeitungen sehen Pressevielfalt in den neuen 
Ländern bedroht,” dpa, November 12, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1869Cited in “'Lokalzeitung ist Herzstück des Pressewesens',” General-Anzeiger, November 13, 1991, BArch 
B/106/156193.
1870Press release, “Lokalpresse hat wichtige Funktion bei Herstellung der inneren Einheit Deutschlands,” dpa, November 
12, 1991, BArch B/106/156193. See also 
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focused entirely on the political dimensions of a free press introduced to a country that for forty years 
had suffered from censorship and information monopoly. While agreeing that the SED regional papers 
were the primary newspapers in their respective regions and belonged to the biggest thirty German 
dailies, he gave no word to the economic consequences of such dominance but pointed to the “good 
will clause,” a piece of information that was new to the association.1871 What this meant in detail and 
practice in a free market that made for a free press, Schäuble did not specify. BDZV president 
Terheyden, on the other hand, held little hope for fair competition. Press companies stood not only in a 
journalistic (publizistisch) but also in an economic competition, and price dumping strategies were part 
of it. The BDZV, however, would advocate for fair competition.1872 
Shortly after this meeting, Rudolf Seiter (see Chapter 3) became the minister of the interior, and
Hoss lost no time in contacting him to push for the interests of local newspapers, and he inquired after 
the “good will” clause.1873 If any such clause really existed, it was worth nothing as the major 
publishers were doing everything in their power to undercut smaller publishers. 
There are concrete examples that clearly prove that cooperation is flatly denied and the 
work of the new medium-sized publishers is actively impeded or even fought against 
with the goal to soon again (just like in SED times)  rule the market as the exclusive 
press company!1874 
Citing examples of former SED regional papers that knew nothing of any such clause, he wondered if 
the clause indeed existed. If so, it not only prohibited impediments but explicitly demanded support for 
local papers.1875 The association later asked for a disclosure of the exact wording of the sales 
agreements for legal revision.1876 Urging the importance of the matter, offering cooperation and joint 
1871Manuscript, “Rede von Bundesminister Wolfgang Schäuble vor dem Kongress der deutschen Lokalpresse in Bonn-Bad
Godesberg,” Der Bundesminister des Inneren, Bonn, November 12, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1872Cited in press release, “Lokalzeitungen sehen Pressevielfalt in den neuen Ländern bedroht,” dpa, November 12, 1991, 
BArch B/106/156193. See also manuscript, “Rede von Bundesminister Wolfgang Schäuble vor dem Kongress der 
deutschen Lokalpresse in Bonn-Bad Godesberg,” Der Bundesminister des Inneren, Bonn, November 12, 1991, p. 3, 
BArch B/106/156193. 
1873Letter, Hoss, Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., to BMI, Bundesminister des 
Inneren, November 28, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1874“Es gibt hierzu konkrete Beispiele, die klar belegen, dass Kooperation rundweg abgelehnt und die Arbeit der neuen 
mittelständischen Lokalzeitungen aktiv behindert bzw. sogar bekämpft wird mit dem Ziel, moglichst schnell wieder (wie
zu SED-Zeiten) als alleiniges Presseunternehmen den Markt zu beherrschen!” Letter, Hoss, Standortpresse GmbH, 
Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., to BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, November 28, 1991, BArch 
B/106/156193.
1875Full quote: “nicht nur eine Behinderung kleiner Lokalzeitungsverlage untersagt, sondern eine Unterstützung der im 
Wettbewerb stehenden kleinen Lokalzeitungen im Verbreitungsgebiet ausdrücklich verlangt.” Memorandum, 
“Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den 
Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in 
den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 
1992, p. 9, BArch B/106/156193.
1876Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 
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solutions, Hoss asked Seiters to take action in the matter. In his Christmas card to Seiters, Hoss pushed 
for “fast and decisive political actions” to create the “political framework” that would allow for the 
survival of the local press.1877
The matter was not taken lightly. Only a few days after the initial letter, the BMI contacted the 
Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Finance to inquire whether or not these allegations had any 
substance, in particular whether the THA was aware that the “good will clause” was being ignored by 
some publishers.1878 This started a chain of inquiries. Eventually, the THA responded to the Ministry of 
Economy, clarifying that it was not aware of any breach of this clause. It was willing to contact the 
respective publishers, if there was concrete evidence for any such breach, “to urge the compliance with 
the clause.”1879 The THA underlined, however, that it lay neither in its possibilities nor was it its legal 
task to safeguard the “good will of the purchasing publishers towards the local press”1880 Whether or 
not there was indeed any such breach in reference to some small publishers should be determined 
according to the criteria of antitrust and competition law.1881 
What followed was a rather comprehensive documentation for Seiters on the situation of the 
local press in the new Länder. Added by a handwritten note, Merk underlined the situation of the local 
press “poses a serious media policy problem.”1882 “By now, almost all local papers that have been 
established after German unification have folded again, if they did not find strong Western cooperation 
partners.”1883 But even with such partners, papers were struggling and the still existing small and 
medium-sized publishers only remained competitive by means of “considerable financial 
1992, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
1877“schnelles und entschiedenes politisches Handeln … die politischen Rahmenbedingungen.” Letter, Hoss, 
Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., to BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, December 
17, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1878Letter, Merk, BMI, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Ministerialrat Homann, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, and 
Ministerialdirigent Knauss, Bundesminister der Finanzen, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, Dezember 5, 1991, BArch 
B/106/156193.
1879“um auf die Einhaltung der Wohlverhaltensklausel hinzuweisen.” Letter, Wolf Klintz, THA, to Ministerialrat Homann,
Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 17, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1880“das Wohlverhalten der ausgewählten Erwerbsinteressen gegenüber der Standortpresse.” Letter, Wolf Klintz, THA, to 
Ministerialrat Homann, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 17, 1991, BArch 
B/106/156193.
1881Letter, Wolf Klintz, THA, to Ministerialrat Homann, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 
17, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
1882“stellt ein ernsthaftes medienpolitisches Problem dar.” Letter and attachments, Lage der Lokalpresse im Beitrittsgebiet,
Merk, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 20, 1991, 
BArch B/106/156193.
1883“Fast alle nach der Einheit Deutschlands neu gegründeten Lokalzeitungen sind inzwischen wieder eingestellt worden, 
soweit sie nicht starke westdeutsche Kooperationspartner gefunden haben.” Letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im 
Beitrittsgebiet, Merk, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, 
December 20, 1991, p. 4, BArch B/106/156193.
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investments.”1884 This situation demanded some sort of legal arrangement; any such regulations, 
however, would cause “considerable legal (difficult discrimination criteria) and budget (new subsidies) 
problems,” in particular since the press loan program for smaller publishers had just been shut down.1885 
Thus, the recommendation for further action was to remain with the answer of the THA: it neither lay 
in the possibilities nor was it the legal task of the THA to ensure good will or the competitive conduct 
of publishers or their shareholders.1886 This response was sent on December 30, 1991. It put all 
responsibility onto a THA that itself took no responsibility in enforcing a “free press” clause that had 
no practical relevance. Two months later, Seiters, when responding to renewed protests of the 
association, added that “according to the Treuhandanstalt, a legal enforcement of the 'good will clause' 
is out of the question,” also sanctions were not part of the clause “and can apparently also not be 
deduced from it.”1887 The BMI could do nothing about it. This left the Association of the Local Press 
with lip-service from the BMI and no legislation.
Different Takes on a Free Press and the Let Down of the Local Press
By May 1992, only forty (of initially ninety-eight) newly founded local dailies were left. Only 
two local publishers held a 50 percent circulation share in their respective regions, the rest was held by 
former SED regional papers.1888 This, according to the Association of the Local Press was a “direct 
consequence of uneven competitive conditions and by no means a matter of long-term competitive 
ability.”1889 On May 26, 1992, the CDU Federal Committee on Media Policy (Bundesfachausschuss 
1884“erheblichem finanziellen Einsatz.” Letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im Beitrittsgebiet, Merk, Bundesminister des Inneren,
to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 20, 1991, p. 4, BArch B/106/156193.
1885“erhebliche rechtliche (schwierige Ausgrenzungskriterien) und haushaltspolitische (neue Subventionen) Probleme.” 
Letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im Beitrittsgebiet, Merk, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des 
Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 20, 1991, p. 4, BArch B/106/156193.
1886Letter, Lage der Lokalpresse im Beitrittsgebiet, Merk, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des 
Inneren, SM 10 – 344 242-2/1, December 20, 1991, p. 6, BArch B/106/156193. See also Memorandum, “Notwendige 
Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des 
staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen 
Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 9, 
BArch B/106/156193.
1887Full quote: “Eine gerichtliche Durchsetzung der 'Wohlverhaltensklausel' kommt nach Ansicht der Treuhandanstalt 
nicht in Betracht. Sanktionen sind mit der Einhaltung der Klausel nicht verbunden und lassen sich daraus wohl auch 
nicht herleiten.” Cited in Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler 
Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur 
unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” 
Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 9, BArch B/106/156193.
1888Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher 
nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten 
Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, 
Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 2, BArch B/106/156193.
1889“unmittelbare Folge ungleicher Wettbewerbsbedingungen und keinesfalls eine Frage langfristiger 
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Medienpolitik der CDU) met to discuss the issue; on November 20./21., 1992, also the FDP media 
advisory board put press concentration in the new Länder on its agenda; invited to both for testimony 
was Peter Hoss.1890 The basis for his testimony was the association's memorandum “Necessary 
Measures for Equal Market Chances of Local Newspapers ….”1891 Its content was largely based on 
Schneider's study that had been commissioned by the BMI a year earlier.1892 The association insisted 
that current market structures had “not developed by means of the market,” but they were the mere 
continuation of centralized newspaper monopolies once established under a political dictate now run 
for market reasons.1893 Since it had apparently not been the task of the THA to take into consideration 
media policy concerns, the results were catastrophic. Currently, about 95 percent of the total circulation
of local dailies was being produced by twenty publishers, in about 80 percent of the distribution areas 
the share of regional papers lay at about 100 percent, “journalistic competition is the exception!”1894 
The advantages of the regional papers were plenty: For decades, these papers had established 
themselves (or had been established) in almost every household. They held not only large and steady 
subscription bases but also had the necessary means of production. This included printing facilities and 
other properties in the best locations with clear ownership statuses, which provided them with the 
necessary guarantees to creditor banks. Local papers were disadvantaged in matters of personnel, 
distribution, finances, real estate and loans and were being impeded or “fought” by regional papers. 
The latter acted “still not according to market economic criteria” in that, for instance, “retail and 
subscription prices were not covering general costs.”1895 Instead, sales prices were partly 68 percent less
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in einem realen Markt.” Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten 
Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in
der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer 
Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 10, BArch B/106/156193.
1890Letter, Hoss, Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse pro lokalzeitung e.V., to Werth, Büro des 
Staatssekretärs, May 21, 1992, BArch B/106/156193.
1891Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher 
nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten 
Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, 
Bonn, May 21, 1992, BArch B/106/156193.
1892In letter, Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to 
Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344 242-2/0, June 29, 1992, BArch B/106/156193.
1893“nicht durch Markt und Wettbewerb entstanden.” Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen 
gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus 
geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur 
Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 3, BArch B/106/156193.
1894“publizistischer Wettbewerb ist die Ausnahme!” Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen 
gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus 
geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur 
Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 3, BArch B/106/156193.
1895“nach wie vor nicht nach marktwirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten … keine kostendeckenden Verkaufs- und Abo-Preise 
verlangt werden.” Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen
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than those of Western newspapers of the same publishers, possible only because of financially strong 
West German owners who could play on time until all competition was driven out of the market.
The “ruinous subscription rates” especially took a central place in these strategies, with 
subscription costs ranging from 9.50 DM to 13 DM while “the Western partners of these newspapers” 
charged between 25.30 and 37.10 DM.1896 Beate Schneider who attended both meetings agreed that 
aggressive price strategies were the primary means of competition.1897 The association added that low 
subscription rates were generally joined by dumping price strategies in advertising, a further 
“localization” of regional papers or legal harassment whenever there was a competing local paper. In 
the face of such dominance, the association argued, newly established local papers, from the beginning,
had had no real chance of longterm market success. But despite all this, the association underlined, 
local papers had to become economically feasible in the shortest time possible. 
The BMI acknowledged that East German readers in general bought one paper only, they had 
an “extraordinary ... loyalty toward regional papers” and that “start-ups have currently no chance.”1898 
Stefan Lehnebach, editor-in-chief of the former SED regional paper Freiheit that in March 1990 had 
turned into Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, gave his side of the story. Describing the transition process of the 
paper, the beginning cooperation with and eventual sale to Neven-DuMont, the Mitteldeutsche Zeitung 
had twenty-three local editions, each containing four pages of local news. “The communication 
between local offices and the editorial head offices was very difficult and did not happen by 
command.”1899 Local editions were more independent than might seem, and press plurality was in 
place, given that these editions sometimes even placed a local story on their front page. Also Dirk M. 
Barton, managing director of BDZV, pushed the point that “[a]n exclusively numerical approach to 
in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert 
fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der 
Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 4, BArch B/106/156193.
1896“ruinose Abonnementspreise … die West-Partner dieser Zeitungen.” Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für 
einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus 
geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur 
Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 5, BArch B/106/156193. 
Note: Hoss gave two examples: one regional paper, having increased subscription costs from 11 to 13 DM in ten out of 
its eleven distribution areas, kept its initial price only in the one area with a newly founded, medium-sized local 
competing daily. The latter had to work with the subscription price of 12 DM, ruinous to remain competitive.
1897Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 
1992, p. 4, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
1898Full quote: “außergewohnliche Leserbindung zugunsten der Regionalzeitungen … Neugründungen sind derzeit 
chancenlos.” Letter, Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des 
Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344 242-2/0, June 29, 1992, p. 4, BArch B/106/156193.
1899“Die Kommunikation zwischen den Lokalredaktionen und der Zentrale sei sehr schwierig und erfolge nicht über 
Leitung.” Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 
20/21, 1992, p. 5, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
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publications and their distribution areas was insufficient, and a plurality of opinion did exist.”1900 
Barton agreed with Hoss that press concentration was particularly high in the new Länder, but to him 
the “phrasing that the newspaper landscape had adapted unaltered SED structures [was] very 
dangerous.”1901 Press diversity in the GDR had just been a pretense, and the press had been controlled 
by the state on various levels. This was not the case now. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, “regional 
papers had aimed for cooperation with West German publishers. The Treuhandanstalt, in making its 
decisions, had not taken into consideration already made investments and existing cooperation 
agreements”1902 Central criteria for giving away regional papers (Vergabekriterium) to purchasing 
publishers had been sales prices and the financial strength of buyers; a core concern had been the 
keeping of jobs.1903 And while it was true and regrettable that the THA had not segmented former 
regional papers, “[t]oday, it was clear that there were no more possibilities for structural change on the 
part of the state. Existing structures of the press landscape in the East needed to be accepted.”1904 This 
also meant, no state subsidies as they could be interpreted as a means of state censorship. 
The association disagreed. Arguing for the political responsibility of the state (based of Article 
5 of the Basic Law) to secure diverse press as the basis for press freedom, it now needed action. 
Though the “good will clause” had been added with this intention, it was irrelevant if not enforceable. 
After all, it had been the lack of political guidelines and media policy concerns of the THA that had 
allowed for the transfer of exiting monopolies into the free market. It had thereby given advantage to 
certain publishers over others. In doing so, the THA had created realities that now disallowed long-
term market success for smaller local papers on the ground of their own means or those of the market. 
1900“Eine ausschließlich numerische Betrachtung der Zeitungstitel und ihres Verbreitungsgebietes sei unzureichend, 
Meinungspluralität sei durchaus gegeben.” Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. 
November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 3, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
1901“die Formulierung, daß die Zeitungslandschaft die SED-Strukturen unverändert übernommen habe, für hoch 
gefährlich. Eine ausschließlich numerische Betrachtung der Zeitungstitel und ihres Verbreitungsgebietes sei 
unzureichend, Meinungspluralität sei durchaus gegeben.” Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats 
am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 3, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP 
Medienkommission/24548. 
1902“hätten die Bezirkszeitungen Kooperationen mit westdeutschen Zeitungen angestrebt. Die Treuhandanstalt habe bei 
ihren Entscheidungen schon getätigte Investitionen und bestehende Kooperationen nicht berücksichtigt.” Protocol, 
Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 3, 
Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
1903Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 
1992, p. 3, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
1904“Heute müsse man konstatieren, daß von staatlicher Seite keine Moglichkeit zur Strukturänderung mehr bestehe. Die 
bestehenden Strukturen der Presselandschaft Ost müßten hingenommen werden.” Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des 
F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 3, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP 
Medienkommission/24548. 
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It needed state measures to outweigh the damage that had been done.1905 The association made six 
suggestions on how to improve the situation: it needed, first, a press loan program for East Germany 
with individual support measures for smaller publishers; second, the implementation and enforcement 
of the “good will clause” and the THA taking responsibility for it; third, equal opportunities in the 
allocation of federal advertising budgets; fourth, specific loans for small and medium-sized publishers, 
fifth, tax cuts, and sixth, a working group in charge of the above.1906  
The day the memorandum was finished, Hoss sent it to different governmental bodies in 
preparation for the hearing in May 1992.1907 The association further published its memorandum on June
1 and on June 12, and, in search for help, sent it to several federal institutions (i.e. Federal Press Office,
the Federal Ministry of Economy, several state secretaries Etc.) and all members of the German 
Bundestag. The latter resulted in several inquires made to the BMI: Rainer Eppelmann, former civic 
group member and now member of the German Bundestag, on June 15, urged the BMI to consider the 
proposals, and, two days later, Hans Joachim Otto, FDP representative at the German Bundestag and 
head of the FDP media advisory board (who was soon to meet with the association) took the 
opportunity to ask for a statement of the minister.1908 
All federal institution and ministries that had been contacted by the association agreed that the 
BMI was to respond in their name.1909 The BMI's coordinated answer can, thus, be taken as the more 
general stand of the federal government on the matter of press concentration in the former GDR. 
Though in general agreement on the seriousness of the situation, the BMI was hesitant in its stand and 
not in support of the association's proposal. Internally, it made clear that regardless of potential legal 
issues,
maintaining the competitiveness of the remaining small and medium-sized press 
1905Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher 
nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten 
Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, 
Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 9, BArch B/106/156193.
1906Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher 
nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten 
Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, 
Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 10, BArch B/106/156193.
1907Notes: Hoss had received little information about the meeting and had a list of questions regarding the hearing, 
including whether or not he could also take deputy director Krause (publishers of the Goslarche Zeitung and 
Wernigeröder Zeitung) and colleague Majorosi. Letter, Hoss, Standortpresse GmbH, Verband der Lokalpresse pro 
lokalzeitung e.V., to Werth, Büro des Staatssekretärs, May 21, 1992, BArch B/106/156193.
1908In letter, Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to 
Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344 242-2/0, June 29, 1992, BArch B/106/156193.
1909See letter, Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to 
Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344 242-2/0, June 29, 1992, p. 8, p. 14, BArch B/106/156193.
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companies would, considering the extraordinary market domineering position of the 
regional papers, lead to considerable financial investments; if any such support is 
successful in the long-term is further doubtful.1910
The financial demands of the association (i.e. funds, loans and tax cuts) needed to be seen in this 
light.1911 With regard to the “good will clause,” the ministry referred to its previous communication, and
underlined it had made its position clear to the association; it, thus, continued to follow the THA's 
stance on the matter.1912 With regard to the formation of an inter-ministerial working group, the BMI 
pointed out that creating such a group “raised very high expectations” that, “considering the current 
budget and the legal situation, could likely not be fulfilled.”1913 Internally it was made clear that the 
current budget, the lack of interest amongst readers in new publications and their loyalty to regional 
papers, made unnecessary such a group.1914 And while the ministry was watching the situation very 
closely, it underlined to Otto and Eppelmann that “the scope of action of the federal government [is] 
very limited” and it referred to the state's duty of neutrality in press matters and potential means of 
support (i.e. subsidies).1915 And, again, the BMI let down the local press in its failure to provide more 
than lip service support.
Analysis
Beate Schneider had her own take on the situation. While underlining “that diversity and equal 
market opportunities in the press sector had never existed on the territory of the former GDR,” she 
1910“würde die Erhaltung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit für die noch verbliebenen kleineren und mittleren Presseunternehmen 
in Anbetracht der außergewohnlich marktbeherrschenden Stellung der Regionalzeitungen einen erheblichen finanziellen 
Einsatz erfordern; ob eine solche Forderung langfristig erfolgversprechend ist, erscheint zudem fraglich.” Letter, 
Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, 
Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344 242-2/0, June 29, 1992, p. 4, BArch B/106/156193.
1911Note: The BMI made clear the ERP press loan program (established in 1976) for small and medium-sized publishers 
had been stoped without replacement due to subsidiary reduction in late 1991. Whether or not additional funds could be 
made available lay in the competence of other ministries, and so did tax cuts and other sorts of deduction. Letter, 
Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, 
Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344 242-2/0, June 29, 1992, pp. 6-7, BArch B/106/156193.
1912Note: It specifically refered to its letter from May 6, 1991, Schaeuble's talk in November 1991, as well as the answer of
minister Seiters on December 30, 1991 (all given above). Letter, Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen Ländern, 
Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344 242-2/0, 
June 29, 1992, p. 5, BArch B/106/156193.
1913Full quote: “Mit der Einsetzung einer Arbeitsgruppe entsteht ein sehr hoher Erwartungsdruck. Aufgrund der 
derzeitigen Haushaltslage und der verfassungsrechtlichen Situation kann dieser jedoch voraussichtlich nicht befriedigt 
werden.” Letter, Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to
Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344 242-2/0, June 29, 1992, p. 8, BArch B/106/156193.
1914Part of letter, Situation der Lokalpresse in den neuen Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to 
Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10 – 344 242-2/0, June 29, 1992, p. 11, BArch B/106/156193.
1915“der Handlungsspielraum fuer die Bundesregierung sehr begrenzt [ist].” Part of letter, Situation der Lokalpresse in den 
neuen Ländern, Schmitt-Vockenhauen, Bundesminister des Inneren, to Seiters, Bundesminister des Inneren et al., SM 10
– 344 242-2/0, June 29, 1992, p. 10, also p. 12, BArch B/106/156193.
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made clear that the press structure that had developed in the new Länder was “the [economically] 
superior form … and was, therefore, to assert itself also in the West.”1916 Schneider, thus, “predicts a 
process of approximation” based on the observation that magazine publishers such as Burda, Bauer, 
and Gruner + Jahr for the first time were active also in newspaper publishing. This not only advanced 
their publishing but also their economic profile.1917 Following Schneider's argument, it was monopoly 
capitalism established in the East that increased concentration processes also in the West
Schneider's overall thesis put to the fore what different media institutions, including the FDP 
advisory board, feared the most, namely the spillover effect of an (administered) laissez-fair press 
market to the old Länder. What could be witnessed in the East, according to Schneider's estimate, were 
simply the consequences of market logic. Media policy makers, on their part, acted largely indifferent 
towards print media, partly because there was a perceived greater need for, and possibility to exert 
influence over broadcasting.1918 In the print media sector the reliance on disciplinary effects of 
publishers' associations, however, had increasingly lost traction. Many East German dailies were not 
organized in the BDZV, which according to DuMont Schauberg was for wage-policy reasons.1919 Put 
differently, by not being organized in associations, unions could not push for collective bargaining.
Schneider's approach, however, missed two important points: first, that it was not simply market
dynamics that had led to consolidated market interests. Instead, these markets came into reality only 
because of political neglect, if not political will. The Association of the Local Press pointed at this by 
claiming that “[o]ne could not help but to lay charges also against the federal government,” for it had 
been “a recklessly wrong setting of a media policy agenda” that had allowed for the transfer of the 
former SED monopoly, now strengthened by the market.1920 Second, the BMI had had a choice, and it 
chose to not make the local press a matter of priority. While it consistently reasoned with its own due 
1916“daß auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen DDR zu keinem Zeitpunkt Vielfalt und gleiche Marktchancen im Pressewesen 
existiert hätten … überlegene Form ... und werde sich demzufolge auch im Westen durchsetzen.” Protocol, Protokoll der
4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 4, Archiv des 
Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. See also Schneider, Beate, Die ostdeutsche Tagespresse- eine (traurige) 
Bilanz, in Media Perspektiven, 7/92, 1992, pp. 428-441.
1917“prognostiziert einen Angleichungsprozeß.” Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. 
November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 4, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
1918Full quote: “Gegenüber den Printmedien verhielten sich die Medienpolitiker weitestgehend gleichgültig, da der 
Regelungsbedarf und Einflußmoglichkeiten bei den Funkmedien hoher eingestuft würden.” Protocol, Protokoll der 4. 
Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 4, Archiv des 
Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
1919Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, November 20/21, 
1992, p. 4, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
1920“Man konne der Bundesregierung Vorwürfe nicht ersparen … eine fahrlässig falsch verursachte Weichenstellung in 
der Medienpolitik.” Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in Halle, 
November 20/21, 1992, p. 2, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
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neutrality, it still held a coordinating function. It took a stand by refraining from political action in 
favor deferring all responsibility to the THA, which itself took no media policy responsibilities. 
In the view of future competitive structures, the BMI had started an early attempt to influence 
the THA decision in favor of breaking up monopoly structures. It fell through for various reasons: one 
was the general reluctance of the federal government to complicate and delay the privatization of the 
press. Also the Chancellors Office was involved in the decision to not interfere with already set market 
claims; how far it pushed in favor of them, remains an open question. Still, the BMI's attempt bore 
proof that an opportunity for intervention had not been an impossibility. In how far this would have 
succeeded in the face of already existing market pressures  is a different matter. 
It seem like irony but is not surprising that BDZV managing director Barton claimed that prior 
cooperation agreements had not influenced the THA decision in finding potential buyers. Here, the 
BDZV's close alliance to the major publishing houses played out in a different way (see also Chapter 3 
and 5). Following Barton's line of argument, press concentration was a mere consequence of financially
strong publishers aiming to keep jobs; a viewpoint that not only put into a positive light the major 
publishers but also downplayed press concentration. Barton's argument that press diversity (and 
through that diversity of opinion) did not show in ownership structures and/or circulation numbers (that
there was a plurality of opinions even though the press was highly concentrated) contradicted common 
approaches to press diversity applied in the Federal Republic. These were first and foremost market-
based, and as shown above, the THA, the FDP media board and other conservative media policy 
institutions continuously referred to anti-trust legislation and merger control as principal tools to ensure
diversity of opinion. Following Barton's argument, these were not applicable to the same degree in the 
case of the regional papers in East Germany. Pointing to state ownership and manipulation of the press 
in the GDR, the diversity of opinion was much better off now than it was back then. 
Conclusion -  'You must think big'
“85 percent of the overall circulation [in East Germany] is in the
hands of ten publishers.”
Günter Rager, professor of journalism, November 12, 19911921
The federal government continuously argued for the state's neutrality in press matters. The 
1921“85 Prozent der Gesamtauflage [im Osten] sind in Händen von zehn Verlagen.” Cited in press release, “Lokalzeitungen
sehen Pressevielfalt in den neuen Ländern bedroht,” dpa, November 12, 1991, BArch B/106/156193.
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privatization process and ownership shifts of the East German press, administered by a federal agency, 
however, did not make the state a neutral agent. Instead, it was deeply involved in the privatization of 
the press and the shift of ownership to private media enterprises. This required an agenda and pointed 
only to the political current underlying a Western free press model based on private ownership. Though
the BDZV managing director Barton rejected claims that the THA had followed formerly made 
cooperation agreements between major publishers and former regional SED papers, the numbers 
proved him wrong. Almost all prior joint venture agreements had been adopted by the THA as part of a
larger package deal. Here, the press sector differed decidedly from other sectors and the THA's 
approach to their privatization. 
Konrad Dussel, referring to the example of former SED regional papers, asks what alternative 
was there? He answers that the most important one had come up just before German unification with 
the Medienunion (Ludwigshafen) buying Freie Presse, and DuMont-Schauburg (Cologne) buying 
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung.1922 How far this “alternative” of being bought by one publisher rather than 
another was an alternative, he does not say. Dussel's approach is based on the assumption, implicitly or 
explicitly found in the general discourse of the day, that the emergence of East-West joint ventures was
a necessity because East German publishers lagged behind on all levels. The assumption of this 
chapter, in building on the preceding ones, is that joint-ventures only became a necessity because of 
early market dynamics and aggressive market strategies executed by those publishers who then became
future buyers. None of this, however, was self-evident but the outcome of political and economic 
decision-making on various levels:
The BMI chose to not make the local press a matter of priority, and it refrained from political 
action in favor of deferring all responsibility onto the THA. The THA claimed, however, it was solely 
concerned with market criteria, and it lay not in its jurisdiction to ensure that the “good will clause,” 
enshrined in the purchasing agreements, was complied with. The Association of the Local Press 
claimed that because of the lack of any political provisions, the THA had transferred existing 
monopolies into the free market economy. In doing so, it had created realities that disallowed long-term
market access for smaller local papers by their own means or those of the market.1923 To Schneider it 
had been “trust in the laws of the free market” that had led to the folding of almost all local papers in 
1922See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 245, Corporate 
Archives of Axel Springer SE.
1923Memorandum, “Notwendige Massnahmen für einen gleichberechtigten Marktzutritt lokaler Zeitungen in einen früher 
nach den Gesetzen des staatlichen Zentralismus geschaffenen und heute in der Struktur unverändert fortgeführten 
Pressemarkt in den neuen Bundesländern bis zur Feststellung realer Chancengleichheit,” Verband der Lokalpresse, 
Bonn, May 21, 1992, p. 9, BArch B/106/156193.
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East Germany; the opportunity for press diversity had been missed, and part of the reason lay with the 
“incomprehensible” sales policy of the THA.1924 
But while the general focus, also of Schneider's analysis, lay on the inconsequential take of the 
THA, only a few, such as the Association of the Local Press, pointed to the responsibility of the federal
government. Hans Modrow made a similar argument in 1991: opposing the justified criticism of the 
THA's dealings in the privatization process, he underlined that any focus on the THA alone only 
missed the point that it acted under the authority and guidelines (Richtlinienkompetenz) of the federal 
minister of finances and the chancellor. It followed that the doings of the THA “lie in the responsibility
of the Kohl government and are characteristic of its general policy.”1925 And the federal government 
aimed for fast privatization and no further delays. A break up of regional monopolies with regard to 
more complicated structural media policies would have defeated this goal. 
Other reasons why the THA passed former SED press monopolies into the hands of the major 
publishers lay, similar to the previous chapters, in the dominant economic position: 
The big West German publishers, in their expansion strategy, [had] already created 
matters on the ground. It was made clear to the Treuhandanstalt that their desired goals,
if needed, could be reached also without its cooperation, and [they] threatened that any 
delay in closing the contract endangered the entire deal.1926  
Franz Wauschkuhn, THA press spokesperson, made this point. He claimed that the idea the THA could
have changed everything and saved the publishers was nothing but “pure theory.”1927 By the time the 
THA started its work in October 1990, the market had been divided. Breuel further claimed that 
“publishers are aware of their power;” by representing issues according to their liking, they put 
additional pressures onto the THA.1928 Any criticism on a failed decentralization in the press sector, as 
had been done in other sectors, according Wauschkuhn, only missed the point that a “newspaper with a 
strong market position” was not the same as a run-down mechanical engineering company.1929 In the 
1924“Vertrauen auf die Gesetze des freien Marktes … unverständlichen.” Mahle, Walter A. (ed.), Pressemarkt Ost, 
Nationale und internationale Perspektiven, Munich: Ölschläger 1992, p. 15.
1925“ist von der Regierung Kohl zu verantworten und kennzeichnend für deren Gesamtpolitik.” Hans Modrow, “Die 
Treuhand – Idee und Wirklichkeit,” iPW, 7/8-91, pp. 39-42, p. 39, Archiv Demokratischer Sozialismus, Modrow 016 
(1990-1994, Band I). 
1926“die großen westdeutschen Verlage [hatten] mit ihrer Expansionsstrategie schon vollendete Tatsachen geschaffen, 
nämlich die Redaktionen und Apparate praktisch übernommen. Man habe der Treuhandanstalt zu verstehen gegeben, 
daß man das angestrebte Ziel notfalls auch ohne ihre Mitwirkung erreichen konne, und damit gedroht, daß jede 
Verzogerung des Vertragsabschlusses das ganze Geschäft gefährde.” In Mahle, Walter A. (ed.), Pressemarkt Ost, 
Nationale und internationale Perspektiven, Munich: Ölschläger 1992, p. 15,  Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
1927“reine Theorie.” In Mahle, Walter A. (ed.), Pressemarkt Ost, Nationale und internationale Perspektiven, Munich: 
Ölschläger 1992, p. 15,  Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
1928Breuel, Birgit (ed.), Verleger kennen ihre Macht, in Treuhand intern. Tagebuch, pp. 232-239, Berlin, 1992, p. 234.
1929“Zeitung mit gefestigter Marktstellung.” In Mahle, Walter A. (ed.), Pressemarkt Ost, Nationale und internationale 
Perspektiven, Munich: Ölschläger 1992, p. 15,  Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
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end, the THA received about 1.2 billion DM in revenue and about 1.4 billion DM in investment 
promises for publishers of the GDR; 8.500 jobs were saved temporarily at least.1930
At an expert meeting in the early 1990s, Dussel stated that reforming the press of the former 
GDR had never had a real chance and, in accordance with other media experts, claimed that the reason 
lay in market developments. Because the federal government saw itself confronted with “new regional 
monopolies” it “could not even react with its own goals ('diversity', 'competition') because of the 
market structures on the ground.”1931 This chapter has shown that this was not the whole story. The 
federal government had the opportunity and decided not to interfere. It lacked the political interest 
and/or will to make press issues in the new Länder a priority. This was a continuation of a general 
neglect regarding policy initiatives on matters of import or distribution.
Dussel concludes that at least West German major publishers had not been allowed to buy 
several publishing major enterprises; “[t]he rule was, one each.”1932 It was primarily a question of who 
got to pick, not what needed to be kept alive. In the end, all major West German newspaper and 
magazines publishers got their respective shares.1933 Hübener from the BMI, however, also pointed out 
that between fifty and sixty (mainly smaller) publishers had been passed over in those deals.1934  
1930See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, pp. 245-246, 
Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
1931Full quote: “Die Politik sah sich – wie so oft seit dem Sommer 1989 – vollendeten Tatsachen gegenüber, auf die sie im 
Fall der neuen Regionalmonopole “nicht einmal mit eigener Zielsetzung (“Vielfalt”, “Wettbewerb”) reagieren konnte, 
eil es sich um “Markt”-Gegebenheiten handelte.” In Mahle, Walter A. (ed.), Pressemarkt Ost, Nationale und 
internationale Perspektiven, Munich: Ölschläger 1992, p. 13.  
1932“Die Regel war: immer nur eine.” See Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Münster: Lit
Verlag, 2004, p. 246, Corporate Archives of Axel Springer SE.
1933Note: For instance, the Märkische Allgemeine went to FAZ, Märkische Oderzeitung to Südwestpresse, Schweriner 
Volkszeitung (Burda) and Volksstimme (Bauer). Dussel, Konrad, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 
Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 247.
1934Mahle, Walter A. (ed.), Pressemarkt Ost, Nationale und internationale Perspektiven, Munich: Ölschläger 1992, p. 16.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
“The GDR, however, is by no means the endpoint of the Eastward
expansion of West German publishing houses.”
Publizistik und Kunst, May 19901935
“Since the press was and is subject to market principles, its role in
the service of the public depends on the coincidences of the
private sector. … This is one of the paradoxes of our democratic
society.”
European Parliament, April 19921936
Underlining the intrinsic connection between a free press and a viable democracy, in 1992, the 
European Parliament made clear that in spite of their “public task,” newspapers were still “subject to 
the laws of the market.”1937 Its assumption was that a free market allowed for all competing voices to 
take their equal share in a media landscape. Then free media would represent the plurality of opinions 
that constitute a viable democracy. Acknowledging that market interests did not always go hand-in-
hand with those of a democratic society, to the parliament this was a given paradox of the press, and 
self-regulation and other regulatory means could be applied if needed. This paradox defined the 
transition of the press in East Germany; lacking sufficient regulatory means, it went one-sidedly in 
favor of market interests and impeded exactly those voices that had brought about democratic change 
in the GDR. 
What some called “the decade for gold-diggers”1938 that reminded others of “the early days of 
capitalism”1939 related to a (media) transition defined almost exclusively by market logic. Little, 
1935“Die DDR ist allerdings nicht der Endpunkt für die Expansion bundesdeutscher Verlage Richtung Osten.” Wolfgang 
Mayer, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, p. 53, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07921. 
1936“Da die Presse jedoch den Gesetzen der Marktwirtschaft gehorchte und gehorcht, hängt ihre Rolle vom Dienste der 
Öffentlichkeit von den Zufällen der Privatwirtschaft ab. … Dies gehort zu den Paradoxien unserer demokratischen 
Gesellschaft.” Session document, Sitzungsdokumente, “Bericht des Ausschusses für Kultur, Jugend, Bildung und 
Medien über Medienkonzentration und Meinungsvielfalt,” A3-0153/91, PE 152.265/endg., Europäisches Parlament, 
April 27, 1992, p. 13, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548.
1937“Aufgabe einer offentlichen Einrichtung … den Gesetzen des Marktes unterworfen.” Session document, 
Sitzungsdokumente, “Bericht des Ausschusses für Kultur, Jugend, Bildung und Medien über Medienkonzentration und 
Meinungsvielfalt,” A3-0153/91, PE 152.265/endg., Europäisches Parlament, April 27, 1992, p. 13, Archiv des 
Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548.
1938“Das Jahrzehnt der Goldgräber” Ulrich Briefs, Revier, April 1990, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei 
DDR; Box 27-30, File 21. “Medien in der DDR: Vom totalitären Zwang zum manipulativen Kommerz” Ulrich Briefs, 
Publizisitk & Kunst, Zeitschrift der IG - Medien, No. 7/90, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 
27-30, File 21. 
1939“Zustände wie im Frühkapitalismus.” Cited in Aschenputtel auf dem Ball. Journalistinnen aus Ost und West 
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however, happened by “coincidence,” and the continuation of former press monopolies in the service of
market oligopolies was no accident. Instead, it was the outcome of aggressive market strategies on 
various levels employed by West German publishing houses, and the tacit acceptance, if not 
encouragement, of these strategies by the federal government. The latter did little to nothing to 
counteract the marketization of the East German press landscape. On the contrary, it explicitly 
supported the interests of major West German press institutions and gave a helping hand in securing 
their interests. This is an essential part of the story. It helps to understand that the push of West German
publishers onto the East German market did not happen purely on their own account, but it required 
political will. Thus, while various and competing governmental bodies, publishers and reform groups in
the GDR were concerned with reforming a centralized state press into a public institution fostering a 
transitioning state, early market pressures in close connection to a political federal agenda of a fast 
unification defined these domestic reform endeavors early on. Both set the principles according to 
which this media transition was to happen. And while all sides argued for the citizensʼ rights of a free 
press and the freedom of opinion and expression in the GDR, their primary concerns lay with 
maintaining control over established structures or gaining a head-start in the new markets. A diverse 
local press and those initiatives that had been founded by various reform movements after the Fall 
revolution were the first to fall prey to consolidated market forces.
In this way, this thesis underlines the corporate aspect of Hallin and Mancini's categorizing  
Germany's media as a democratic corporate system. It challenges their state-bound categorization in 
emphasizing the crucial importance of cross-border media policy influence and media production.1940 
Was there a different vision for free media in the GDR and a subsequently unified Germany? Yes there 
was. How could such a system have looked like? Born out of the dictatorship experience, reformers in 
the GDR emphasized on workers' autonomy, on inner press freedom, on diversity, on gender equality 
and on the freedom of the press from political and economic pressures. Did their visions have an actual
chance of success? Given the early market penetration, they did not. Joachim Nolte pointed to April 1, 
1990, the day subsidies ended for East German papers, as the day when market penetration of West 
German companies set in. By May 1990, the West German public broadcast station Hessischer 
Rundfunk 2 made clear that regardless of differences in opinion, “one thing cannot be ignored any 
longer: signs are mounting that our media system is being exported to the East. This already applies to a
diskutieren über Umbruch der Medienlandschaft und ihre eigene Zukunft, die tageszeitung, Ulrike Helwerth, April 24, 
1990, DC 9/1033 (1/2). 
1940 Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini, Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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large extent to the press. And in spite of … defense strategies …. in the long run, there will likely be no
way around but also the tv sector in the GDR, in one way or the other, will fall in line with West 
German chains.”1941 This thesis has shown that the penetration of market logic had, in fact, already set 
in in early December 1989 by means of lobbying, imports and cross-border production. Following 
Hessischer Rundfunk 2, it further showed that what happened with the media in the GDR can only be 
understood as an institution transfer as part of a broader expansion of the West German political 
economic order. The FDP media committee agreed “that the West German media order was imposed 
upon the East” and showed an understanding for resentments on part of the GDR for the subsequent 
filling of management positions with West German personnel, “because also in the old Länder it would
cause indignation if, for instance, all management positions at the North German Broadcasting 
Corporation were filled with journalists from Bavaria.”1942 Whether or not individual transfers in the 
press sector, such as the acquisition of market positions of West German publications, were successful 
in the long-run is not as important as the immediate strategies put into their service. The latter, if not 
disallowed, from the offset fundamentally limited the scope of sovereign reform attempts, not the least 
because they soon made necessary a response to new market pressures rather than a break of old 
monopoly structures.
This thesis has shown that the East German press became a market in three interconnected 
ways: shifts in sales, in distribution, and in ownership. While current studies focus on one to explain 
general transition dynamics and their outcomes (or to look at their consequences for specific 
publishers), this thesis has looked at all three. It has shown how deeply intertwined issues of massive 
imports of West German publications and aggressive sales strategies were with those of distribution, 
creating new dynamics and pressures that fostered ownership transfers. Not without reason did 
Alexander Jahr (Gruner+ Jahr) in early 1990, when asked about the chances of East German publishers 
to survive, predict their “death sentence” given their low competitiveness. They were going to “go 
1941“Eins ist bei allen Abweichungen [zwischen beiden Mediensystemen]… nicht mehr zu übersehen: die Zeichen mehren 
sich, daß unser Mediensystem nach Osten exportiert wird. Das gilt in hohem Maße schon heute für die Presse. Und 
trotz ... Abwehrstrategien ...wird auf längere Sicht wohl kaum ein Weg daran vorbeiführen, daß die DDR im TV-Bereich
sich in dieser oder jeder Form den bundesdeutschen Fernsehketten anschließt. Identität und Eigenständigkeit, die wird 
die DDR, nach allem, was zur Zeit an Informationen über den Mediensektor vorliegt, wohl nur auf einem Gebiet auf 
Dauer behalten – im Horfunk.” Transcript, Hessischer Rundfunk 2, 6.15pm/1, 5/5/90, Hermann Mein, Uwe Schulz, 
IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07799. Also BArch DC9/1033 (1/2).
1942“daß die westliche Medienlandschaft dem Osten übergestülpt wurde … [d]enn auch in den alten Bundesländern würde 
es Emporung hervorrufen, wenn beispielweise beim Norddeutschen Rundfunk alle Führungspositionen mit bayerischen 
Journalisten besetzt würden.” Protocol, Protokoll der Sitzung der Bundesmedienkommission am Freitag, den 6.9.1991, 
in Bonn, p. 3, Archiv des Liberalismus, ÜP 45/2014 - Lothar Mahling/22.
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down,” and it required Western investments to keep them alive.1943 In mid-July 1990, FDP media 
committee member and lawyer at the legal department of Springer, Renate Damm, agreed. 
“Problematic were … the sales difficulties faced by East German publications;” Damm sees, the 
committee noted, “in joint ventures the only possibility for maintaining the press of the GDR.”1944 
Following Damm, it was the drop in sales (conditioned by the lagging interest of East German readers) 
that made for the struggles of the East German press. And while sales generally did drop, this thesis has
shown that the realities behind the numbers were more complicated than that. Likewise, while joint 
ventures turned out to be the only alternative, this was not inevitably so.
In early 1990, the East German press (still under the limitations of a planned economy) faced 
increasingly fierce competition and aggressive market strategies employed by (the major) West 
German publishing houses. In particular the price war, exclusively fought between West German 
publishers who aimed at securing a future readership, set a deflated 1:1 DM-M price baseline that was 
impossible to meet, if production and transportation costs needed to be covered. Selling publications 
for one-third of the original price to win a competitive advantage and to set future claims required a 
strong, established market position and the respective financial resources, which pushed to the sidelines
East German, as well as small and medium-sized West German publishers. East German publishers 
further lagged in printing and editorial technology, faced high paper prices, if not lacking paper 
supplies, and simultaneously underwent internal reform processes. By April 1, subsidies ceased to exist
and publishers needed to finance themselves by means of higher prices and advertising. This required 
ad-hoc solutions for building individual marketing infrastructures, often possible only by means of 
West German investments and expertise; this was the market penetration Nolte pointed to. And while 
West German publications were superior in the quality of paper, color, print and layout, and exceeded 
East German standards by far, their initial success cannot be explained by these assets alone. High sales
required deflated prices that would have been deemed highly problematic, if not illegal, if held to West 
German standards. 
Publishers admitted to these strategies and to the negative consequences for the East German 
press, only to continue them out of market necessity. Self-regulation by means of pleas against 
1943“Todesurteil.” Cited by Gottfried Müller, Dpa, DDR-Medienminister: Vorrang für offentlich-rechtliches System,  dpa-
informationen, 20/90, 5/17/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2). Original quote: “95 Prozent der DDR-Verlage werden 
eingehen.” Cited in Schlechte Karten, journalist, 5/90, p. 40, IISH/ID-Archive MKR 35a-b, DSC07767.
1944“Problematisch seien ... die Absatzschwierigkeiten, vor denen DDR-Presseerzeugnisse stünden. Damm sieht in joint 
ventures die einzige Moglichkeit für den Erhalt der DDR-Presse.” Protocol, Protokoll der Sitzung der 
Bundesmedienkommission vom 31.05. 1990, May 31, 1990, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/25499.
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unrestrained competition, thus, remained ineffective to the promise of new markets.1945 And while 
Media Minister Müller insisted that “mass media [of the GDR] must not be susceptible to blackmail, 
economic blackmail” to give into joint venture offers, this is exactly what happened.1946 Ironically, it 
became the perpetrators of these marketing strategies who then claimed to save the East German press 
by means of joint ventures, not because of any considerations for a democratic press, but because the 
initial success of West German publications could not be maintained. Readers showed considerable 
loyalty especially to former SED regional papers. Those had remained high in circulation and sales. 
Competition, therefore, soon shifted to the acquisition of these “prime objects” amongst East German 
publishers even “by means of artifice,” which became the core competitive target.1947 And while the 
Treuhandgesellschaft was officially in charge of their privatization, it largely only gave into prior 
cooperation agreements and already practiced cross-border productions between still dominant SED 
regional papers and their market-domineering West German investors. It, thereby, as Schneider's study 
pointed out, transferred old press monopolies into new private oligopolies.1948 Smaller publishers aimed
for their shares and focused on establishing offspring of their publications in the East. Facing strong 
concentration processes, however, they were largely driven out of this new market. Again, this process 
required the political will of various institutions and was not a market “coincidence.”
And while sales and ownership were the two more obvious transitional shifts, underlying both 
was the “completely insufficient distribution situation in the GDR.”1949 The lack of efficient press 
distribution infrastructures initially put serious obstacles to the sale of West German print media; it 
became the backdoor through which major publishing houses entered the East German market, and the 
key to its structural transition. The individual business proposals from November/December 1989, in 
particular of G+J and Springer, offered holistic approaches to reforming the import and distribution of 
West German publications by means of a financing scheme based on advertising revenue. The goal on 
the side of each publisher was to attain a quasi-monopoly market position as the exclusive West 
1945“'Die Worte veralten im Mund.' Eine Dokumentation zum Pressevertrieb in der DDR.” Textintern, DDR extra, No. 13, 
March 21, 1990, pp. 11-14, p. 14, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis / B.V.3 – Grüne Partei DDR; Box 27-30, File 29, (see 
Chapter 4).
1946“Die Massenmedien dürfen nicht erpressbar sein, okonomisch erpressbar.” Cited in DFF, Interview Gottfried Müller, 
Dr. Peter Gugisch, transcript, 9.40 pm, 6/11/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (1/2).
1947“Filetstücke … auch mit Tricks.” Treffer sind Glücksache, journalist, Horst Roper, 6/90, pp. 32-35, p. 35, IISH/ID-
Archive MKR, File 35d, DSC08087.
1948Schneider, Beate, Pressemarkt Ost II. Nur die  Konzentration macht Fortschritte, in Walter A., Mahle (ed.), 
Pressemarkt Ost, Nationale und internationale Perspektiven, Munich: Ölschläger, pp. 35-46, 1992. Schneider, Beate, 
Die ostdeutsche Tagespresse-eine (traurige) Bilanz, in Media Perspektiven, 7/92, 1992, pp. 428-441.
1949“vollig unzureichenden Vertriebssituation in der DDR.” Alles ohne Gewähr, kress report, no. 3, February 1, 1990, p. 3,
attachment III to letter, Thomas Ganske, Jahreszeitenverlag et. al. an Runden Tisch, Hamburg, February 3, 1990, BArch 
DA3/34 (see Chapter 5).
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German partner in joint-venture activities with institutions of the GDR. This related to matters of 
import, production, distribution, marketing, and the training of journalists. The particular strength of 
these proposals lay in their adaptation to centralized media structures developed for maintaining a 
political information monopoly and putting them into the service of monopolistic corporate strategies. 
Their substantial influence lay, first, in the quick and seamless adoption of an advertising-based free 
press model and market logic to a planned media economy. They, secondly, offered an easy fix for 
reform efforts of state institutions whose scope of action was severely limited by the lack of hard 
currency. All policy proposals on the import and distribution of West German print media on side of 
the GDR were, therefore, based on these concepts. A reformative East German media (distribution) 
policy, thus, never developed in its own right but, from its offset, was a blue-print takeover of Western 
business proposals put into the service of political reform. And while these concepts introduced market 
criteria and Western concepts of a privately owned press, the legal norms keeping them in check were 
absent. 
With their subsequent building of an exclusive distribution system largely for their own 
publications – not in cooperation with institutions of the GDR but in opposition to them – the “Big 
Four” major publishers Springer, G+J, Bauer and Burda disregarded East and West German legal 
standards and demands for equal market opportunities. Unilaterally established within a weak state, the 
publishers ignored the protests of various institutions of the GDR and claimed to act on behalf of a free 
press, pushing the idea of a free flow of information. Small and medium-sized publishers under the 
leadership of Jahreszeiten, fearing the loss of a potential future readership, went into opposition and 
appealed to the Round Table not because they fundamentally questioned well-known structures, but 
because it served best their current purposes and future interests. And while the Round Table argued 
for a sovereign East German media, against a domination of any West German interest groups, for a 
plurality of opinion and information, these demands were heard only if they served the respective 
interests of publishers. With the distribution practices of the major publishers having been illegal also 
according to federal norms, these protests could have been matched by those of the federal government. 
The BMI, however, remained largely inactive with regard to GDR interests. It rejected appeals of the 
government and emphasized that it had no jurisdiction in any press matters and/or individual actions of 
publishers; because publishers were not breaking federal law in the FRG, the ministry was in no 
position to make any adjustments or encourage the publishers to act differently. 
Arguing for its own neutrality in press matters, the BMI still held a coordinating function, 
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however, first, in bringing together and giving space to the major West (rather than East) German 
interest and lobbying groups, second, in fostering legal grey zone initiatives, and, third, in setting clear 
regulatory premises. The BMI pushed the point that nothing that was being built in the GDR must 
endanger well-established infrastructures in the Federal Republic. This set clear guidelines, less so for a
free press in the GDR but for long-established interests in the FRG. With these three points combined, 
the BMI supported and pushed the idea that a “free press” was to come to the GDR by means of press 
imports and gave little to no consideration to reform processes from within. Though East German 
publishers were given some thought, the immediate measures focused on imports, not the least because 
of the upcoming elections heavily influenced by West German party politics. The BMI, thus, stood side
by side with West German publishers; their interests met in the aim to sell West German print media 
and information to an East German readership, and to do so fast. This duality of reasoning, pointing to 
the lack of jurisdiction while being deeply engaged in dealing with (and encouraging) a factual one-
German market, defined the BMI's role during the transition. The Federal Cartel Office would step in 
only shortly before German unification. It took on the methods and practices of the major publishers to 
ensure that no harm could be done for an all-German distribution system. It is, therefore, fair to say that
the German unification itself became a regulatory act that put back in check the actions of West 
German publishers to comply with federal practices. Unfair distribution and sales methods, however, 
had taken their toll on a blossoming East German press. What remained were distribution 
infrastructures still different from those of the old Länder, and a press largely in the hands of Western 
publishers. 
East German institutions, manifold and engaged in their interest in reforming media, were 
generally ignored in the arguments of West German interest groups, and so were the struggles of 
publishers. The MfM, the MKR and the Media Commission of the People's Chamber, as well as the 
Round Table and the government itself, were only left to react to situations on the ground while 
remaining unsuccessful in setting clear regulations. Especially the MfM and the MKR remained 
inconsequential in their actions, the MKR because of its lack of legislative and/or executive powers, the
MfM because of its ambivalent take on media policies owing to market structures on the ground. 
Though Müller expressed himself in a vigorous tone against the Big Four distribution system, neither 
he nor his ministry were (able) to stand up to them. On the contrary, the MfM under Müller was a 
weak, partly ill-informed and generally ineffective institution that focused on problem management 
rather than on a pro-active confrontation of issues. It lacked the rigorous stand the many issues in the 
397
media sector would have required. It was the result of structural circumstances, the lack of resources, 
information and unclear legislative competences of the ministry. It was also due, however, to the lack 
in leadership and political experience of Müller, and a consistent change of personnel within the 
ministry.
This only stood representative for East German institutions at large. All faced reform processes 
from within aiming to find new stands on practical and societal issues. Competing institutional interests
and centralized structures contributed to lengthly administrative processes that gave greater leeway to 
ad-hoc strategies of publishers. And therein lay the most prominent influence of early market pressures:
in the necessity of responding to a new playing field defined by major economic players rather than 
exhausting the full variety of reforms options. This, again, stood in the service of the federal 
government, as any such reforms (e.g. a comprehensive media law, the introduction of 
Redaktionsstatute or the abolishment of Tendenzschutz) might have questioned what was well-
established in the FRG.
The reasons why it was almost exclusively West German publishers to explore the East German
market lay, first, in language ties that made possible immediate sales of West German products. Also, 
the East German economy had never been able to disentangle itself from West German capital and 
dependencies had been well-established. Third, and most importantly, it lay in a federal political 
agenda that fostered these efforts by means of German-German agreements. In the spirit of CSCE 
resolutions, underlining the importance of a free press for democratic change, East and West German 
politicians agreed on mutual press exchanges. But while the political will for such trade was expressed 
clearly, the economic realities behind them were left aside. Press imports into the GDR needed to be 
bought by a broke state, while exports required additional scarce paper. With East German publications
lagging behind Western standards and with general newspaper demand being higher than their supplies,
the East faced an already saturated market of superior products in the West. A mutual exchange, 
therefore, never happened, and the federal government left it to the publishers to take charge of the 
economic side of this unilateral press trade. This happened according to market rationale, not out of 
considerations for a democratic press. Still, the bilateral agreements gave the publishers the political 
justification for their actions. 
This stood in a longer tradition of international media policy efforts throughout the 1980s, 
influenced exceedingly by the US and larger media corporations, to push forward liberal regulatory 
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communication frameworks regardless political and/or economic boundaries.1950 
The case of the GDR shows that this move benefitted not a diverse press but the economic interests of 
major publishers in close alliance with those of the federal government.
It is not by coincidence that the European Parliament made its assessment of the paradox of a 
“free press” in the midst of the post-socialist transition in Eastern Europe. In the GDR, everything had 
happened immediately following November 9, 1989, but it only set a precedent and became the point 
of entry into the Eastern European market at large. In April 1990, the newly founded Association of 
Newspaper and Magazine Publishers of the GDR pushed this point in its plea to publishers across 
Europe. They needed to take seriously concerns of market domination of the Big Four in the GDR “in 
their own interest, because in the next months to come, significant decisions are being made in the 
GDR for a future common Europe.”1951  Also in April 1990, Springer announced that it had taken over 
four out of twenty local newspaper publishers in Hungary.1952 Other Western European media 
corporations (e.g. Hersant) followed.
Ágnes Gulyás shows how, in a process frequently described as “self-privatization,” most 
newspapers in Hungary were sold to multinational investors such as Bertelsmann, Hersant, and 
Springer. By the end of 1991, foreign ownership had reached 70 percent, and especially tabloid 
newspapers skyrocketed.1953 Similar to Nolte, Gulyás distinguishes between three processes or phases 
in this transition: first, “the changing political functions of the media with a general aim toward 
pluralism and democratization,” followed by the “introduction of a market-driven press system,” which
culminated in the “commercialization and commodification of the media.”1954 And similar to the 
narratives of East German journalists, many Hungarian journalists look back on the initial transition 
1950Harcourt, Alison, Transnational Media Regulation in Central and Eastern Europe, in Downey, John, and Sabina Mihelj 
(eds.), Central and Eastern European Media in Comparative Perspective: Politics, Economy and Culture, pp. 137–155, 
London: Ashgate, 2012. 
1951“in ihrem eigenen Interesse, denn auf dem Boden der DDR werden in den nächsten Monaten wesentliche 
Entscheidungen für ein künftiges gemeinsames Europa getroffen.” Open letter, Verband der Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR, April 22, 1990, IISH/ID-Archive MKR,  Box 1-4, File 1.
1952Wolfgang Mayer, Publizistik und Kunst, 5/90, p. 53, IISH/ID-Archive MKR, File 35a-b, DSC07921. 
1953Gulyás, Ágnes, The development of the Tabloid Press in Hungary, in Colin Sparks and John Tulloch (eds.), Tabloid 
Tales. Global Debates over Media Standards, pp. 111-127, Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2000. Also Sükosd, Miklós, Democratic Transition and the Mass Media in Hungary: From 
Stalinism to Democratic Consolidation, in Gunther, Richard, and Anthony Mugham (eds.), Democracy and the Media. 
A Comparative Perspective,  pp. 122–164, Cambridge University Press, 2000. Bajomi-Lázár, Péter, Auksė Balčytienė, 
Alina Dobreva, and Beata Klimkiewicz, History of the Media in Central and Eastern Europe, Handbook of European 
Communication History, Wiley, forthcoming [2018].
1954Gulyás, Ágnes, The development of the Tabloid Press in Hungary, in Tabloid Tales. Global Debates over Media 
Standards, edited by Colin Sparks and John Tulloch, pp. 111–127, Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 2000, p. 113.
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period as the “golden age” of media freedom, when the old political elites “were no longer powerful 
enough to control media, while the new ones did not yet have the will or the power to do so.”1955 
Similar narratives are given by journalists in Bulgaria, where “[t]he media market underwent a rapid 
process of ownership concentration and many of the small outlets fell victim to economic pressure.”1956 
In particular the West German WAZ Group managed to become so influential that, as Dobreva, 
Voltmer, and Pfetsch claim, “it forced local authorities to tum a blind eye to its obviously illegal 
monopoly on the market (owning a share of over 70%, whereas regulation puts a cap at 35%).”1957 Also
in Lithuanian and Estonia, it was “economic logics” that became the driving motives in press 
production and in matters of representation. A liberal market soon replaced concerns of liberation from 
censorship and political control with “rapid financial gains and 'new criteria'” of news production.”1958 
This gave little chance to the development of an effective system of self-regulation. In Poland where, in
February 1989, round table negotiations had started an unprecedented political transformation, 
privatization was administered by state institutions. Policies, however, lacked anti-trust legislation and 
set no limitations on foreign ownership. The foreign acquisitions of papers and their mergers followed 
quickly, and in particular Springer found a strong foothold on the Polish market. Generally, foreign 
owners “tended to 'clone' and bring to Poland products that had met commercial success in their 
respective countries.”1959 This was true also for other Eastern European markets, and the results could 
1955Bajomi-Lázár, Péter, Auksė Balčytienė, Alina Dobreva, and Beata Klimkiewicz, History of the Media in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Handbook of European Communication History, Wiley, forthcoming [2018].
1956Dobreva, Alina, Katrin Voltmer, and Barbara Pfetsch, “Trust and Mistrust on Yellow Brick Road. Political 
Communication Culture in Post-Communist Bulgaria.” In Making democracy in 20 years. Media and politics in Central
and Eastern Europe, edited Boguslawa Dobek-Ostrowska and Michał Głowacki, pp. 171–191. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2001, p. 179. Available online:  
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Barbara_Pfetsch/publication/261640532_Trust_and_mistrust_on_Yellow_Brick_R
oad_Political_communication_culture_in_post-communist_Bulgaria/links/5661892c08ae15e7462c5473/Trust-and-
mistrust-on-Yellow-Brick-Road-Political-communication-culture-in-post-communist-Bulgaria.pdf [December 14, 2017].
1957Dobreva, Alina, Katrin Voltmer, and Barbara Pfetsch, Trust and Mistrust on Yellow Brick Road. Political 
Communication Culture in Post-Communist Bulgaria, in Dobek-Ostrowska, Boguslawa and Michał Głowacki (eds.), 
Making democracy in 20 years. Media and politics in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 171-191, Wrocław: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2001, p. 179. 
1958Balčytienė, Auksė, and Lauk, Epp, Media Transformations: The Post-Transition Lesson in Lithuania and Estonia, 
Informacijos mokslai, 33, pp. 96-110, 2005. Available online: http://etalpykla.lituanistikadb.lt/fedora/get/LT-LDB-
0001:J.04~2005~1367153234451/DS.002.1.01.ARTIC [December 14, 2017]. Balčytienė, Auksė, Mass Media in 
Lithuania: Changes, Development, and Journalism Culture, Berlin: Vistas, 2006. Also Balčytienė, Auksė, Lithuania: 
Mixed Professional Values in a Small and Highly Blurred 
Media Environment, in Trappel, Josef, Hannu Nieminen, and Lars Nord (eds.), Media for Democracy Monitor: Leading 
News Media Compared, pp. 175-203, Gothenburg: Nordicom, 2011. Available online:  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320322666_Lithuania_Mixed_Professional_Values_in_a_Small_and_Highly_
Blurred_Media_Environment [December 14, 2017].
1959Bajomi-Lázár, Péter, Auksė Balčytienė, Alina Dobreva, and Beata Klimkiewicz, History of the Media in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Handbook of European Communication History, Wiley, forthcoming [2018]. Also Jakubowicz, Karol, 
Rude Awakening: Social and Media Change in Central and Eastern Europe, in the public, 8/4, 2001, pp. 59-80. 
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be seen already in 1992, when Beate Schneider stated that “[a]lso with respect to a common European 
market, there is a tendency towards standardization. In the West, the dominant competitor liked to keep
a smaller competitor, but this was more for cosmetic reasons.”1960 In the East, no such cosmetic reasons 
were needed. And though the specifics and outcomes differed in each country (with regard to 
privatization, the sustainability of press markets, and levels of media corruption), common to all were 
the institutional and regulatory implementation of Western free-press models, the overall penetration of
Western market interests and their products, and a considerable foreign ownership and high market 
concentration.1961 This contributed to demise of several media organizations that had been created 
during the first few years of democratic transition.1962 And this is where the paradox of a free media in a
free media market, pointed to by the European Parliament, worked against the interests of competing 
voices that make for a viable democracy. In the case of post-socialist countries, it did not break 
monopolies but only changed their political justification.
Additional Notes of Future Research 
Follow-up research, expanding on the issues presented in this thesis, is in the making. While 
initially also “unions” were to be part of the scope of analysis as an interest group in its own rights, it 
fell out of the picture for reasons of space. In a follow-up project, I analyze the influence of media 
unions (i.e. IG Medien, IG Druck, or DJV) and their own “expansion motives” in close relations to 
Available online: https://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-R7PMGORA/d3ba274f-d52d-488c-8baa-
3e490cb9257e/PDF [January 2, 2018].
1960“Auch im Hinblick auf den gemeinsamen europäischen Markt sei eine Tendenz zur Vereinheitlichung zu verzeichnen. 
Im Westen hielte sich zwar der überlegene Wettbewerber gern einen kleineren Konkurrenten, aber dies mehr aus 
kosmetischen Gründen.“ Protocol, Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des F.D.P. Medienbeirats am 20./21. November 1992 in 
Halle, November 20/21, 1992, p. 4, Archiv des Liberalismus, FDP Medienkommission/24548. 
1961Jakubowicz, Karol, Rude Awakening: Social and Media Change in Central and Eastern Europe, in the public, 8/4, 
2001, pp. 59-80. Available online: https://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-R7PMGORA/d3ba274f-d52d-488c-
8baa-3e490cb9257e/PDF [January 2, 2018]. Note: Current comparative studies, therefore, document concentration 
processes and strong commercialization tendencies on different East European media markets and their difference with 
regard to political cultures. See Peace Institute, Media Ownership and Its Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism,
edited by Sandra B. Hrvatin and Brankica Petković, Ljubljana: Peace Institute, 2004. Available online: 
http://www3.mirovni-institut.si/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/media-ownership-and-its-impact-on-media-independence-
and-pluralism.pdf [December 10, 2017]. Also Jakubowicz, Karol, and Miklós Sükosd, Finding the Right Place on the 
Map. Central and Eastern European Media in a Global Perspective, Bristol, UK and Chicago: Intellect Books, 2008. 
Balčytienė, Auksė, and Aušra Vinciūnienė, Older and Newer Media in Transitional Democracies: Similarities and 
Differences in Media Functions and Patterns of Use, in Reifova, Irena, and Tereza Pavlickova (eds.), Working Title: 
CEECOM 2012 conference papers, pp. 14–20, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014. Available online: 
http://www.cambridgescholars.com/download/sample/61936 [December 13, 2017]. Dobek-Ostrowska, Boguslawa, and 
Michał Głowacki, Making democracy in 20 years. Media and politics in Central and Eastern Europe, Wrocław: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2001. Klimkiewicz, Beata, Structural Media Pluralism and Ownership 
Revisited. The Case of Central and Eastern Europe, in Journal of Media Business Studies, 6/3, pp. 43-62,  2009.
1962Klimkiewicz, Beata, Structural Media Pluralism and Ownership Revisited. The Case of Central and Eastern Europe, in 
Journal of Media Business Studies, 6/3, pp. 43-62, 2009.
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those of publishers. While March 1990 was defined by the first free elections, in May 1990 collective 
bargaining in the Federal Republic kept unions and publishers busy, and their agendas were likewise 
pushed onto the GDR. East German unions, representing the interests of journalists and other media 
sector workers, were soon to become the target of information campaigns and inter-union competition 
over membership. The situation by mid-1990 was such that  West German unions faced West German 
investors in the struggle for workers' rights in the GDR.
A similar study as has been presented in this thesis should be done on the broadcasting sector.
While individual studies (i.e. on Länder legislation) do exist, a broader approach on the dealings of 
public and private broadcasters, their lobbying strategies and policy measures in the allocation of 
frequencies, the “defense strategies” (as Hessicher Runderfunk 2 called them) of East German 
reformers and officials, such as Lothar Bisky, for a sovereign media and a third public channel in the 
FRG, and the eventual transition to federal structures would be a highly informative study. Similar 
debates on how to reform media happened later with regard to broadcasting, but they were even more 
forceful. Similar patterns of a “run” for frequencies started as soon as German unification stood at the 
horizon. Public and private institutions battled over policy influence at a time when private 
broadcasting as part of a “dual broadcasting system” was fairly new also to federal structures, and the 
Eastern market promised new territories to put into practice and manifest new broadcasting norms. 
Next to commercial pressures, party politics became a defining feature in the transition of broadcasting 
by means of Länder jurisdiction, the building Länder broadcasting stations and the clear and more 
aggressive stand of the federal government on broadcasting issues.1963 
1963Examples: Zukunft der Rundfunkanstalten nach Bundesrecht: Medienpolitische Korrekturen, Das Parlament, no.22, 
5/25/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2); Report, CDU Bundestagsfraktion, Eckwerte für die Medienordnung in einem 
vereinigten Deutschland, Bericht, Bernd Neumann, pp.1-8, 5/14/1990, Bonn, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2); Wirtschaftliche 
Planspiele allein genügen nicht, Frankfurter Rundschau, 6/28/90, BArch DC 9/1033 (2/2). Recommended files BArch 
DC9/1058; Archiv des Liberalismus; IISH/ID-Archive MKR. 
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Spickermann, Wolfgang (chief editor Neues Deutschland)
Interviews/Communication (in alphabetic order)
Bächer, Gerhard (MKR/Green Party)
Bachmann, Ralf  (Press and Information Office, and MfM)
Bartsch, Dietmar (treasurer Junge Welt, politician)
Bartsch, Uda (MfK Minister April 1990)
Gysi, Lothar (head of the SED-PDS) 
Heinke, Lothar (journalist Der Morgen)
Kleinwächter, Wolfgang (MKR)
Links, Christoph (publisher)
Lorenz, Vera (journalist Der Morgen)
Mahling, Lothar (FDP/Der Morgen)
Mangelsdorf, Frank (journalist Der Morgen)
Morchutt, Bernd (managing director Sportverlag/Springer)
Müller, Gottfried (MfM Minister April 1990)
Niehof, Hans-Jürgen (MPF)
Nolte, Joachim (MfM)
Oehme, Wulf (LDPD / Der Morgen)
Spickermann, Wolfgang (new chief editor Neues Deutschland)
Boick, Marcus (reseacher on the THA)
Gohsmann, Christine (head archivist ADS)
Konig, Jens (researcher on the GDR)
Koppe, Olaf (Neues Deutschland)
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APPENDIX A: THE GRUNER + JAHR CONCEPT, NOVEMBER 29, 1989
While G+J's “Concept of Universal Import of Western Publications into the GDR in the Recognition of
the Commitment of Korb 3, the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna Follow-Up Conference” carried the 
same name as the first East German policy document (see Chapter 4), its content differed in the 
absence of political imperatives but brought out the central role of G+J for the building of a press 
distributor (NPV). According to G+J, “the NPV will be founded as a joint venture of one or several 
partners in the German Democratic Republic and the Gruner + Jahr publishing house ...  each [holding]
50 percent of the shares,” financed by a reasonable profit margin.1964 G+J's concept aimed for the 
provision of a country-wide supply with domestic and international print media via the joint venture 
NPV, which was to be done with the exception of subscription services that were to remain with the 
Post. For its services, the joint venture was to make use of distribution and retail facilities of the 
Post.1965 The joint venture was also to handle to the export of East German publications for hard 
currency.
Just as in the initial policy document, G+J stated that the import and distribution of international
publications were to be handled by an Außenhandelsbetrieb (an GDR enterprise specialized on 
international trade) but now with a fifty percent share of G+J.1966 Absent in the policy document, G+J 
put particular emphasis on the joint-venture coordinating the import and distribution of 
Remissionsexemplare, that is remaindered copies of foreign publications, for an interim period of time. 
With great similarity in phrasing to the policy draft, the concept of G+J pointed out that the joint-
1964Full quote: “Das NPV wird gegründet als Gemeinschaftsunternehmen eines oder mehrerer Partner in der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und dem Verlag Gruner+Jahr. Die Partnerunternehmen der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik und der Verlag Gruner + Jahr halten je 50 Prozent der Anteile an diesem Gemeinschaftsunternehmen.” 
Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Pressepordukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), p. 1, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052. 
1965The direct quote of G+J: “Zur Sicherstellung der flächendeckenden Versorgung mit Presseprodukten nutzt das 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmen die bestehenden Vertriebseinrichtungen der Deutschen Post und die Verkaufsstellen der 
Handelsorganisationen sowie weitere Einrichtungen gegen eine angemessene Handelsspanne.” Concept, Konzept zur 
umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und ausländischen 
Pressepordukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 1989?), p. 1, 
attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, 
November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
1966Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Pressepordukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), pp. 1-2, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
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venture must “give all domestic and foreign publications equal access to its distribution system.”1967 It 
differed in its explicit demand for the exclusive position of the NPV in being the sole organization in 
charge of the tasks above. According to G+J, only “such a universal distribution system with country-
wide price fixing by the publishers as well as reasonable profit margins in the supply chain guarantee 
an optimal way of universal supply with press products regardless their political orientation.”1968 This 
centralist approach made G+J the sole Western institution on each and every level of press import, 
export and distribution in the GDR
G+J also added possibilities of media production by proposing specific projects for possible 
future cooperations, such as the founding of an independent daily newspapers with one or more East 
German partners and/or the founding of a magazine on the same conditions. In both instances, 
journalists and editors from the GDR were to be employed, and more such initiatives were desirable. 
Further, for developing the necessary printing capacities, G+J envisioned a joint venture in the printing 
sector and the building of printing plants. For this, the East German partner was to contribute the 
facilities and property while G+J was to provide the machinery, expertise and capital.1969 While this 
part was missing in the policy draft, the financial estimates, listed under the heading “Provision of 
needed hard currency for the financing of the comprehensive package and risk protection,” though less 
detailed, were the same in numbers, language and reasoning: It was suggested that the needed hard 
currency could be earned with a limited amount of advertising for Western companies on the public 
television of the GDR.1970 This meant, thirty minutes of advertising per day in the first year, forty-five 
minutes per day in the second year, and sixty minutes per day in 1992. G+J was to take over the 
1967“allen in- und ausländischen Presseerzeugnissen den gleichen Zugang zu seiner Vertriebsorganisation zu gewähren.” 
Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), pp. 2-3, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
1968“Ein solches einheitliches Vertriebssystem mit landeseinheitlicher Preisfestlegung und -bindung durch die Verleger 
sowie angemessener Handelsspannen für die Handelsstufen sichert in optimaler Weise eine umfassende Versorgung mit 
Presseproduktion unabhängig von ihrer politischen Ausrichtung.” Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der 
Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung 
von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 1989?), p. 3, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-
Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
1969Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), pp. 3-4, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
1970“Bereitstellung der erforderlichen Valuta zur Finanzierung des Gesamtpaketes und zur Risikoabsicherung.” Concept, 
Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), p. 4, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
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marketing of advertising airtime for a provision of 15 percent, and it would do so with the exclusive 
marketing rights.1971 G+J added that though the concept was explicit in detail and had been submitted to
Modrow on the initiative of G+J, its participation was still conditioned on the approval of its board of 
directors.1972
1971Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), p. 5, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
1972Concept, Konzept zur umfassenden Versorgung der Bevolkerung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik mit in- und 
ausländischen Presseprodukten zur Verwirklichung von Korb 3 der KSZE-Schlußakte von Wien, n.d. (November 29, 
1989?), p. 5, attachment (?) to letter, Gerd Schulte-Hillen, Gruner + Jahr, to Hans Modrow, Ministerrat der DDR, 
Hamburg, November 29, 1989, BArch DC9/1052.
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APPENDIX B: THE SPRINGER PROPOSAL, JANUARY 12, 1990.
Divided into a number of parts, the concept “Cooperation Between Institutions of the German 
Democratic Republic and Companies in the Federal Republic in the Media Sector,” sent by Peter 
Tamm to the Ministry of Postal and Telecommunication on January 12, 1990, gave detailed 
propositions not simply on the establishment of a press distribution company (part 2), but it outlined 
concepts for a joint marketing company (part 3), cooperations in television and broadcasting (part 4), 
the establishment and expansion of newspapers and magazines (part 5), printing plants (part 6), 
educational programs and staff training (part 7) and other specialized sectors (part 8). 
Springer as a Partner
Very similar to Springer's first proposal though different in order and emphasis, Springer based 
its ambitions in the GDR on the CSCE agreements and on the rights of all political groups to access 
media.1973 Introducing its business activities and expertise, and their relevance for the GDR on the first 
three pages, Springer stressed again that it was “qualified for any partnerships like no other West 
German publisher because it is active in all media segments and markets.”1974 The later part of this 
statement, similar to several other segments in the document, were underlined by hand by East German 
officials.1975 Following these markings, the most outstanding points in Springerʼs general proposal 
were: First, Springerʼs willingness “to bring its own financial funds into the joint venture … It is 
principally also willing to include other nationally distributing West German publishers in the 
cooperation.”1976 Second, Springer had “significantly helped shape the most efficient press distribution 
1973“Ziel ist, allen politischen Gruppierungen Zugang zu den Medien Fernsehen, Horfunk, Zeitungen und Zeitschriften zu 
ermoglichen.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1974“eignet sich zu derartigen Partnerschaften wie kein anderer westdeutscher Verlag, weil er in allen Sparten und Märkten
der Medienbranche tätig.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, 
Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 1, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1975Note: The marks can be found on the copy available in BArch DC9/1052, not BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1976“eigene finanzielle Mittel im Gemeinschaftsunternehmen einzubringen … Er ist grundsätzlich bereit, auch andere 
überregional tätige westdeutsche Verlagsunternehmen in die Zusammenarbeit einzubeziehen.” Concept, 
Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel 
Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, 
January 12, 1990, p. 1, BArch DC9/1052.
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system in Europe.”1977 Thirdly, referencing back to Tammʼs visions on foreign currency intake (see 
Chapter 5), the proposal made clear, “currently, the biggest problem lies with the provision of sufficient
financial resources (foreign currency). This is why for the time being, mainly those projects must be 
promoted that directly lead to a foreign currency intake for the German Democratic Republic.”1978 What
Springer, therefore, presented was a cost-efficient, all-inclusive media business plan that gave the 
greatest possible benefits for the GDR.
Building a High-Performance National Distributor
Decidedly different from the initial proposal, this concept focused on press distribution as one 
factor that required a general improvement in media infrastructure. Making “the populationʼs demand 
for a comprehensive and widespread supply with press matter ... the objective,” distribution needed to 
be improved to meet new demands.1979 According to Springer, the Postʼs current emphasis on 
subscriptions left limited resources for the supply in retail sale, which made it “less efficient … than 
necessary in the future.”1980 A joint-venture distribution company with shares of the Post and Springer 
could meet this task. Springer would contribute its expertise in distribution (holding shares in several 
Grosso-enterprises) and its “market significance” (Marktbedeutung) in retail sale. 
Springer pointed out, however, that the universal distribution of print media required the 
realization of additional goals. It required, first, the “acquisition of significant amounts of foreign 
currency through services offered to West German and foreign publishers,” second, the best possible 
1977“das leistungsfähigste Pressevertriebssystem in Europa wesentlich mitgestaltet.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im 
Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer 
Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 
1990, p. 2, BArch DC9/1052.
1978“In der augenblicklichen Konstellation besteht das grosste Problem in der Bereitstellung ausreichender Finanzmittel 
(Devisen). Deshalb müssen zunächst vorrangig jene Projekte gefordert werden, die unmittelbar zu Deviseneinnahmen 
für die Deutsche Demokratische Republik führen.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, 
attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, 
Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 3, BArch DC9/1052.
1979“Im Rahmen der Entwicklungen in der DDR muss dem Wunsch nach umfassender, flächendeckender Versorgung der 
Bevolkerung mit Presseprodukten Rechnung getragen werden.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen 
Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. 
Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3).
1980“nicht so leitungsfähig ist, wie es in der Zukunft notwendig ist.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich 
zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 4, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3).
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use of existing resources with “increasing performances, especially of selected publications with high 
circulation numbers,” and, third, improved distribution services for East German publications.1981 All of
these measures needed a fast start and gradual development. Only a distributor that “meets these goals 
is profitable in the long-run and unchallenged in the market.”1982 And though this in itself was a goal, 
long-term considerations went into a direction with bigger visions and “further activities with 
interesting foreign currency revenue [intake].”1983 
Regarding distribution, the structure of the joint venture was to be that of a “national 
distributor” (Nationalvertrieb) consisting of about sixteen local “press distribution centers” 
(Presseverteilzentren). The central task of the national distributor was, first, to manage the distribution 
for East German publishers that had no own sales department and, second, to manage the import and 
sale of West German and foreign publications. And while sales revenues and all connected transactions
were to handled in Mark, special methods of billing applied to West German and foreign publishers 
who were to pay for these services in hard currency.1984 
The national distributor was to deliver national and international publications to the local 
distribution centers who were then to distribute all publications to individual sales points. Local 
distribution centers already existed as part of the Postal Distribution but, according to Springer, “should
be part of the common distribution enterprise.”1985 What it needed was an increase in the quality and 
1981“Beschaffung eines erheblichen Devisenvolumens aus dem Dienstleistungsangebot für westdeutsche und ausländische 
Verlage … Steigerung der Leistungsfähigkeit insbesondere für ausgewählte grossauflagige Objekte.” Concept, 
Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel 
Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, 
January 12, 1990, p. 5, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1982“das diese Ziele erfüllt, ist langfristig ertragsstark und im Markt unangefochten.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im 
Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer 
Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 
1990, p. 5, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1983“weitere Aktivitäten mit interessanten Devisenerlosen.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen 
Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. 
Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 6, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3).
1984Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, pp. 6-7, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1985“sollten Bestandteil des gemeinsamen Vertriebs-Unternehmens sein.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich 
zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 7, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3).
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quantity of their services; this was the precondition for handling additional publications, larger 
quantities and for expanding the sales network. For the common distribution enterprise, it required 
additional transportation capacities, the gradual improvement of internal organizational resources such 
as packaging lines, and office equipment, computer systems and possibly construction work.1986 And 
while distribution centers could also receive publications directly from the publishers (i.e. local dailies),
the key task of distribution was on them: they handled the logistics and maintenance of transportation, 
established and managed further sales points, organized the daily delivery of publications and the 
weekly pick-up of unsold returns, billed publishers, and they regulated procurements according to 
current demands.1987 Doing this, “the press distribution centers work according to uniform guidelines 
and programming systems,” on the one hand, to ensure the central access to all data, relating in 
particular to sales figures, on the other.1988 
Sales and the expansion of local sales points took a central part in Springer's concept. Postal 
newsstands were only partially attractive sales points due to their limited “capacities for display” 
(“Präsentationskapazität”). Instead, for the medium-term Springer envisioned the building of “media 
centers” (“Mediencentern”) that were to offer a “selected attractive range of publications.”1989 These 
were to add to an increasing number of sales points of daily need, such as gas stations, bakeries or 
grocery stores that were attractive because they were frequented by a high number of customers, and 
should, therefore, offer “high circulating publications on the sideline.”1990 For these sales services of the
1986Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 7, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1987Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 8, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1988“Die Presseverteilzentren arbeiten nach einheitlichen Richtlinien und Programmsystemen.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit 
im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer 
Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 
1990, p. 8, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1989“ausgewählte attraktive Titel-Palette.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, 
attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, 
Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 9, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1990“hochauflagige Presseerzeugnisse als Randsortiment.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen 
Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. 
Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 9, BArch DM3/21121 
(1/3).
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national distributor, East German publishers were to pay a “reasonable trade margin.”1991 According to 
Springer, “it is to be expected that this revenue in Mark of the GDR, linked to developing prices of 
newspapers and magazine, will cover the costs of the entire distribution and sales organization 
including the retail profit margin.”1992 The financial resources necessary for immediate investments into
capital goods were to be provided in hard currency by Springer. Springer determined that what was 
needed most were investments into transportation (about one hundred vehicles were needed for the 
distribution centers, as well as about five truck-trailers), computer systems (sixteen for the distribution 
centers and one central system for the national distributor) and office equipment (fax machines, 
telephones etc.).1993 
And while this was to finance the national distribution system, the services provided to West 
German and international publishers, such as transport, distribution and sales for all of non-GDR print 
media, were to generate hard currency revenue. “Assuming a service fee that falls into the magnitude 
range of the Federal Republic, a constructed comparable sales revenue of about 300 mio DM p.a. 
results in a foreign currency revenue of about 100 mio. DM p.a..”1994 Half of this revenue was to be at 
the disposal of the Post for expanding its distribution system. The other half was going to the West 
German partners, and was to be used for the “amortization of investments.”1995
The estimate of a hard currency revenue of about 100 mio. DM p.a. had, again, been underlined 
by an East German representative, indicating the importance of foreign currency intake 
1991“eine angemessene Handelsspanne.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, 
attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, 
Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 10, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1992“Es ist davon auszugehen, dass dieses Finanzvolumen in Mark der DDR, das an die Preisentwicklung der Zeitungen 
und Zeitschriften gekoppelt ist, die Kosten der gesamten Vertriebs-Organisation einschliesslich der Handelspanne für 
die Einzelverkaufsstellen sichert.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, 
Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 10, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1993Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 11, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1994“Unter der Annahme, dass sich die Dienstleistungsgebühr an der Grossenordnung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
orientiert, ergibt sich bei einem rechnerisch vergleichbaren Umsatz von ca. 300 Mio DM p.a. eine Deviseneinnahme von
ca. 100 Mio DM p.a.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, 
Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 12, BArch DC9/1052.
1995“Amortisation der Investitionen.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, 
Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 12, BArch DC9/1052.
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(Devisenerlose). Springer also suggested in different passages the possibility of “further activities with 
interesting foreign currency revenue,” such as “the export of the East German publications.”1996 The 
“sale of newspapers and magazines of the GDR in the Federal Republic and other Western counties” 
could be handled via the national distributor or the respective service facilities of Springer.1997 
A Marketing Company of the GDR for the Intake of Foreign Currency
Springer's proposal introduced the idea of a centrally-run marketing company whose main 
purpose was to acquire foreign revenue through the sale of advertising space in all East German print 
and broadcast media. The company's field of activity also included sports sponsoring, the marketing of 
television rights, as well as video production. To provide these services, it was furthermore to conduct 
audience and market research, and it was to provide acquisition and price estimates for international 
customers. Like the national press distributor, the marketing company was to be a joint venture 
between the GDR and Springer.1998  
 According to Springer, the task of the company was, first, to sell advertising time on East 
German television and broadcast radio, “as far as these channels are allowed to broadcast 
advertising.”1999 Second, to build a professional sales field service (Verkaufsaußendienst) in 
cooperation with Western advertising agencies. This was the “essential prerequisite for the acquisition 
of commercials for the branded goods, and service industry.”2000 The third task was the marketing of 
1996“weitere Aktivitäten mit interessanten Devisenerlosen … der Export von Presseprodukten aus der DDR.” Concept, 
Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel 
Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, 
January 12, 1990, p. 6, BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1997“Verkauf von Zeitungen und Zeitschriften der DDR in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und im westlichen Ausland.” 
Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 12, BArch DC9/1052.
1998Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, pp. 13-19,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
1999“soweit diese Kanäle Werbung verbreiten dürfen.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen 
Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. 
Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 13,  BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
2000“wesentliche Voraussetzung für die Akquisition von Werbespots der Markenartikelindustrie und 
Dienstleitungsgewerbes.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, 
Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 13,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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television shows “that find interest among advertisers as well as the development of ad specials, in 
particular in the sports sector.”2001 This included sponsoring, the sale of TV shows to interested 
companies, and the acquisition and marketing of perimeter advertising and other sorts of advertising 
space for events broadcasted on television.2002 
For print media, the company could, fourth, be responsible “also for the marketing of 
advertising space in newspapers and magazines of the GDR.”2003 According to Springer, such centrally 
controlled marketing of advertising space in print media had the advantage of allowing for 
comprehensive offers for the entire East German market. For this, Springer offered its expertise with its
“close acquisition network in the Federal Republic as well as marketing offices in the most important 
foreign markets.”2004 Via the joint-venture marketing company, Springer was furthermore willing to 
provide assistance to East German publishers on competitive pricing and advertising. 
Another advantage of the centrally controlled marketing of advertising, according to Springer, 
was its cost efficiency, for such business “causes the least costs, which can be covered with a 
percentage share of the sales revenue.”2005 Springer did not make concrete estimates regarding the 
expected overall revenue. It only stated that “following a start-up phase, they [earnings] can reach the 
two-figure million range.”2006 This depended on the volume and distribution of newspapers, the 
2001“die bei der werbungstreibenden Wirtschaft Interesse finden sowie die Entwicklung von Sonderwerbeformen, 
insbesondere im Sportbereich.“ Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, 
Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 13,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
2002Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 14,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
2003“auch für den Verkauf von Anzeigenraum in DDR-Zeitungen und -Zeitschriften.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im 
Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer 
Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 
1990, p. 14,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
2004“engmaschige Akquisitionsapparat in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland sowie Verkaufsbüros in den wichtigsten 
ausländischen Märkten.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, 
Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für 
Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 14,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
2005 “verursacht auch die geringsten Eigenkosten, die mit einem Prozentanteil an den Verkaufserlosen gedeckt werden 
konnen.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 15,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
2006“sie konnen aber nach einer gewissen Anlaufzeit zweistellige Millionengroßen annehmen.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit 
im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer 
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purchasing power of the population as well as then range of consumer products for sale. 
Establishing and Developing East German Newspapers and Magazines
In its proposal, Springer laid out that it was furthermore “interested and ready to contribute to 
the establishment and further development of newspapers and magazines in the GDR.”2007 This related 
to already existing newspapers and magazines as well as to new publications. As part of joint ventures 
with East German partners, this could entail anything from regional dailies in metropolitan areas, to a 
national daily, a Sunday paper, a weekly TV guide, a weekly sports paper, as well as a domestic weekly
magazine. “In addition, it is likely that market segments for so-called do-it-yourself magazines will 
develop in the GDR.”2008 Also, popular novels were a possible market segment. 
Priority should be given to developing regional and national dailies as they appear most 
“promising” (aussichtsreich), while a sports paper could attract readers in the entire German speaking 
region. For the magazine sector, Springer envisioned a possible joint-venture between the East German 
Neue Berliner Illustrierte (NIB) and the Springer magazine Berliner Illustrierte. For a weekly TV guide
it was necessary that it contained an overview of “all television programs that can be received in the 
GDR.”2009 Depending on available personnel and material resources, any such publishing projects in 
cooperation with Springer were to be developed gradually.2010 This also required improved printing 
facilities, a sector for which Springer also its offered cooperation and investments through joint 
ventures.2011 Open positions in editorial offices, as well as technical positions in the different joint 
Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 
1990, p. 15,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 19,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
2008“Darüber hinaus dürften in der DDR Marktsegmente für sogenannte Do-it-yourself Zeitschriften … entstehen.” 
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Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 19,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
2009 “aller in der DDR zu empfangenden Fernseh-Programme.” Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen 
Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. 
Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 20,  BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
2010Concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 21, BArch DC9/1052.
2011See concept, Zusammenarbeit im Medienbereich zwischen Institutionen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
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ventures should be filled mainly with suitable East German candidates. Springer could provide for the 
training of staff in its respective departments, but it was generally willing to provide for the training of 
all media workers in the GDR via another joint-venture company.2012 For specific joint-venture 
publishing projects, Springer would furthermore provide experienced project teams “that could 
facilitate the journalistic, commercial and technical planning in cooperation with the East German 
partner and could supervise the start of projects.”2013 East German partners, on the other hand, were to 
bring in tangible assets such as “existing but unpublished publications, properties and buildings.”2014 
The leading goal in all these initiatives was to offer “an expanded selection of newspapers and 
magazines for the population of the GDR.”2015  
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
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Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, 
Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und 
Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 24,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
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12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen 
Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, January 12, 1990, p. 20,  BArch 
DM3/21121 (1/3).
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in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12. Januar, 1990, attachment to letter, Peter Tamm, Vorstandvorsitzender Axel 
Springer Verlags AG, to Hans-Jürgen Hammer, Stellvertreter des Ministers für Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, 
January 12, 1990, p. 21,  BArch DM3/21121 (1/3).
425
APPENDIX C: INDEX OF INSTITUTIONS
Abteilung Literaturverbreitung- und propaganda (GDR) (Department of Literature Distribution and 
Propaganda) 
Amt für Wettbewerbsschutz (GDR) (Office of Competition Protection)
Berliner Verband der Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger (Berlin Association of Newspaper and Magazine
Publishers) (GDR)
Bundesministerium des Inneren (BMI) (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen (Federal Ministry of Intra-German Relations)
Bundespresseamt (Federal Press Office)
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) (Federation of German Industries)
Bundesverband des werbenden Buch- und Zeitschriftenhandels e.V. (Federal Association of the 
Advertising Book and Newspaper Trade)
Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (BDZV) (Federal Association of German Newspaper 
Publishers)
Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) (German Federation of Trade Unions)
Deutsche Journalistinnenbund (German Association of Female Journalists)
Deutsche Werbe- und Anzeigengesellschaft (Dewag) (German Association for Advertising)
Deutscher Journalisten-Verband (DJV) (German Journalists Association)
Forderverein unabhängiger Pressevertrieb in der DDR (Association Supporting an Independent Press 
Distribution in the GDR)
Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB) (GDR) (Free German Trade Union Federation) 
Gesamtdeutsches Institut – Bundesanstalt für gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben (All-German Institute – Federal 
Office for All-German Tasks)
Gesamtverband Werbeagenturen (GWA) (Association of Advertising Agencies)
IG Druck und Medien (Industrial Union Print and Media)
Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e. V. (IVW) (German 
Information Association for Ascertaining the Distribution of Advertising Media)
Ministerium für Betrieb und Verkehr (GDR) (Ministry of Operation and Traffic)
Ministerium für Medienpolitik (MfM) (GDR) (Ministry of Media Policy)
Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen der DDR (MPF) (Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication of
the GDR)
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Ministerium für Finanzen und Preise (GDR) (Ministry of Finances and Prices)
Postzeitungsvertrieb (PZV) (GDR) (Postal Newspaper Distribution)
Presse- und Informationsdienst der Regierung der DDR (Press and Information Service of the Government
of the GDR)
Saarländischer Journalistenverband (SJV) (Saarland Journalists Association) 
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (German Council of 
Economic Experts)
Treuhandgesellschaft / Treuhandanstalt (Trust agency) was in charge of privatizing East German 
enterprises (namely Volkseigene Betriebe (VEBs)) in public or people's property (Volkseigentum)
Verband der Film- und Fernsehschaffenden (VFF) (GDR) (Association of Film and Television 
Professionals)
Verband der Journalisten der DDR (VJD) (GDR) (Association of Journalists of the GDR) 
Verband der Lokalpresse (Association of the Local Press)
Verband der Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverleger der DDR (VZZD) (Association of Newspaper and 
Magazine Publishers of the GDR )
Verband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten e.V. (Presse-Grosso) (Registered 
Association of German Book, Newspaper and Magazine Grossisten) (Press Grosso)
Verband deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger (VDZ) (Association of German Magazine Publishers): West 
German trade association of magazine publishers
Verband der unabhängigen Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Großhändler (Association of Independent  
Newspaper and Magazine Grossisten)
Verein Berliner Zeitungsverleger (GDR) (Association of the Berlin Newspaper Publishers)
Vereinigung organisationseigener Betriebe (VOB) (GDR) (conglomerate of plants and enterprises owned 
generally by an political organization)
Verein zur Forderung eines unabhängigen Vertriebs von Presseerzeugnissen in der DDR (Association for 
Supporting an Independent Press Distribution in the GDR)
Vertriebs-Vereinigung der Berliner Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten (GDR) (Association of the 
Berlin Newspaper and Magazine Distributors)
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APPENDIX D: TIMELINE
Key Dates Media Policy Initiatives Business Activities
11/09/89 Fall of the Berlin Wall
11/13/89 Hans Modrow (SED) becomes 
Prime Minister of the GDR
Meeting between Bauer and 
the MfK
11/29/89 G+J submits its proposal 
“Concept of Universal Import”
12/89 .. The policy proposal “Concept 
of Universal Import” is drafted 
under the leadership of the 
MfK, and the MPF
Continuous work between G+J
and the MfK, and the MPF on 
import and distribution issues
12/07/89 Constitutive meeting of the RT Expert meeting on press 
imports and exports at the 
Office for Press and 
Information Services
Bauer representatives continue 
talks after the expert meeting 
12/19/89 Meeting between Modrow and 
chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU)
in Dresden
Modrow and Kohl agree on the 
press exchange between both 
states
12/20/89 Springer submits its proposal 
“Cooperations in the Media”
12/21/89 The Council of Ministers 
ratifies the “Resolution on 
Start-up Newspapers and 
Magazines” guaranteeing 
media access to RT groups
01/09/90 The policy proposal on 




Individual talks between the 
“big four” major publishers 
(Springer, G+J, Bauer, and 
Burda) and the MPF on 
reforming distribution 
01/15/90 Modrow attends his first RT 
meeting
The RT ratifies the proposal
01/16/90 The “Big Four” submit the 
“Concept of Universal Supply”
to the MPF
01/23/90 A tentative partnership 
agreement for a distribution 
joint venture is signed between
the Big Four and the MPF
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Key Dates Media Policy Initiatives Business Activities
01/26/90 The MPF submits a policy 
proposal on the “Distribution of
Press Matters” for the building 
of a press distribution joint 
venture 
01/29/90 Jahreszeiten Publisher starts a 
media campaign against the 
joint venture plans
02/01/90 The Council of Ministers 
rejects the MPF proposal
02/03/18 Jahreszeiten appeals to the RT
02/04/90 The first meeting between 
Modrow and RT members, and 
Kohl in Bonn
02/05/90 The People's Chamber passes 
the resolution on “Guaranteeing
the Freedom of Opinion, 
Information and Media,”  
issuing a non-partisan advisory 
board on media policy; work 
continues on a comprehensive 
media law
02/08/90 German-German meeting of 
experts on Press and Media 
02/12/90 The RT suggests the creation of
a trust agency 
(Treuhandgesellschaft) for 
People's Property
The RT vetoes the MPF 
proposal on a press distribution 
joint venture and passes it on to
the MKR
02/13/90 The second meeting between 
Modrow and RT members, and 
Kohl in Bonn
The advisory MKR holds its 
constitutive meeting 
02/19/90 The BMI holds hearings on 
press distribution and drafts its 
“Principles on Preserving Press
Diversity”
02/21/90 The MKR hold hearings with 
the MPF on press distribution
03/90 ... The legislative committee on 
media law hold several 
meetings
A high increase of West 
German publications in the 
GDR
03/01/90 The resolution for an Institution
for the Trust Management of 
the People's Property 
(Treuhand) is passed
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Key Dates Media Policy Initiatives Business Activities
03/05/90 The “Big Four” start their own 
direct distribution in the GDR, 
70 percent of the publications 
are their own
03/09/90 The Council of Ministers 
allows for the sale of print 
media from West Germany via 
Postal Distribution; the MKR 
introduces registration for 
Western print media
03/12/90 Final Meeting of the RT
03/15/90 The MKR issues its statement 
on “Equal Opportunities and 
Variety of Print Media” 
A price war led among West 
German publishers leads to 
price deflation 
03/18/90
First Free Elections in the 
GDR, Lothar de Maizière 
(CDU) becomes Prime Minister
Joint venture negotiations 
increase
03/22/90 The creation of an Office of 
Competition Protection is 
announced
04/90 ... Joint venture negotiations are 
increasing 
04/01/90 Press subsidies end 
04/04/90 The “Big Four” presents a “50-
25-25” Grossisten model, the 
Federal Cartel Office gives its 
consent
04/17/90 The Ministry of Media Policy 
(MfM) starts its work
04/24/90 People's Chamber creates a 
Press and Media Commission
05/02/90 The Resolution on Press 
Distribution is passed
05/05/90 Media Minister Gottfried  
Müller meets Kohl in Bonn
05/09/90 First meeting of the Press and 
Media Commission
05/10/90 The Resolution on Press 
Distribution is introduced, the 
MfM starts to work on a 
broadcasting act; plans on a 
media law are given up
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Key Dates Media Policy Initiatives Business Activities
05/15/90 An amendment is added to the 
Resolution on Press 
Distribution
05/18/90 First State Treaty regulating the
monetary, economic and social 
union 
Springer announces a large 
investment program in the 
GDR
06/90 ... About 100 newly established 
newspapers in the GDR
06/07/90 The Office of Competition 
Protection starts its work and 
introduces the Act against 
Restraints of Competition
06/15/90 The Big Four and the MPF 
come to an agreement for 
future cooperation
06/17/90 The Trusteeship Act is passed
07/90 ... The Big Four build their 
Grossisten system in the GDR
07/01/90 A monetary, economic and 
social union between both 
German states is executed; the 
Act against Restraints of 
Competition becomes effective;
all people's property falls under
the jurisdiction of the 
Trusteeship Act
07/26/90 The Press and Media 
Commission gives up plans on 
a comprehensive media law
07/30/90 MfM minister Müller defers the
decision on the legality of the 
Big Four Grossisten 
08/90 ... All enterprises owned by the 
Treuhandgesellschaft are 
transformed into limited 
liability companies 
The MfM works on media 
legislation for future Länder
09/31/90 The unification treaty is signed
09/20/90 The People's Chamber and the 
German Bundestag each adopt 
the unification treaty
10/03/90 The GDR joins the FRG 
according to Article 23 of the 
federal basic Law
The Treuhandgesellschaft is in 
charge of privatizing the press
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